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ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  provides  an  empirical  analysis  of  international  joint  venture  activities  in 
Taiwan.  The  primary  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  examine  control  and  its  antecedents  in 
terms  of  ownership,  bargaining  power,  resources  contribution,  and  motivation  for 
forming  international  joint  ventures. 
Primary  data  collected  by  means  of  a  mail  questionnaire  is  analysed  along  five  core 
dimensions  of  international  joint  venture  activities.  First,  the  mechanism,  focus,  and 
extent  of  parent  control  is  identified  and  tested  in  a  number  of  sample  characteristics.  This 
empirical  results  also  reveal  that  most  joint  ventures  in  Taiwan  have  higher  autonomy  and 
have  more  autonomy  on  the  appointment  of  key  function  managers.  Supporting  results 
reveal  that  parent  firms  seek  to  focus  their  control  over  specific  activities  of  the  joint 
ventures  rather  than  attempting  to  control  the  entire  range  of  joint  venture  activities. 
Second,  the  results  of  equity  shares  held  by  the  host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents 
show  that  both  parents  have  minority  shareholding  in  the  joint  ventures.  The  results  also 
reveal  that  a  higher  ownership  by  the  parents  in  joint  ventures  indicates  that  they  have  a 
higher  percentage  of  board  members.  Supporting  evidence  is  found  that  ownership  is 
significantly  correlated  with  control.  Parents  can  gain  more  control  of  their  joint  venture 
through  obtaining  higher  equity  shares  in  such  ventures. 
Third,  the  relative  importance  of  a  set  of  bargaining  power  is  identified  and  hypothesis 
tested  the  relationship  between  control  and  bargaining  power.  There  is  little  evidence 
found  that  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  control  is  not  closely 
associated. 
Fourth,  the  relative  importance  of  resource  contribution  by  parents  is  identified  and 
hypotheses  are  tested  on  the  relationship  between  control  and  resource  contribution factors.  The  results  are  strongly  supported  that  the  relationships  between  resource 
contributions  in  terms  of  physical,  invisible,  financial,  human,  and  organizational  ability  of 
parents  and  their  control  has  significant  and  positive  associations.  The  greater  the  resource 
contribution  of  parents  to  joint  ventures,  the  greater  their  control  in  joint  ventures. 
Fifth,  the  relative  importance  of  a  set  of  motives  for  international  joint  venture  formation 
is  identified  and  hypotheses  are  tested  on  the  relationship  between  control  and  motivation 
factors  in  terms  of  technological  acquisition,  knowledge  learning,  risk  sharing,  competitive 
strategy  consideration,  resource  complementarity,  market  expansion.  The  findings  reveal 
a  limited  number  of  significant  correlations  between  motivation  factors  and  control. 
These  findings  reveal  that  there  are  many  possible  explanations  for  forming  an 
international  joint  venture  with  respect  to  different  theoretical  perspectives.  The  motives 
for  forming  an  IJV  might  be  to  acquire  critical  resources  in  order  to  overcome  a 
transaction  difficulty  (transaction  cost  perspective  and  resource  dependency  perspective), 
or  to  achieve  a  specific  strategic  objective  (strategic  behaviour  perspective),  or  to  benefit 
from  knowledge  learning  (organizational  learning  perspective),  or  include  all  these 
motives  at  the  same  time.  Different  motives  will  result  in  a  different  influence  on  the 
extent  of  control.  Therefore,  we  suggest  that  the  parent  companies  can  employ  various 
degrees  of  control  over  their  joint  ventures  according  to  their  main  motives. 
The  findings  indicate  that  among  the  four  antecedent  dimensions,  ownership  and  resource 
contributions  demonstrate  significant  strong  and  positive  linkages  with  the  extent  of 
control.  Parent  companies  can  increase  their  control  in  their  joint  venture  through  the 
acquisition  of  a  higher  proportion  of  the  N's  equity  shares  or  by  contributing  large  and/or 
significant  resources  to  their  joint  venture.  However,  the  two  other  antecedents, 
bargaining  power  and  the  motives  for  forming  an  IN  have  only  tenuous  relationships  with 
the  extent  of  control.  Parent  companies  can  increase  directly  or  indirectly  their  influence 
and  power  over  the  joint  venture. 
According  to  this  finding,  the  international  joint  venture  is  an  effective  mode  to  achieve  a 
parent  company's  objectives.  We  suggest  that  Taiwanese  enterprises  can  create  IJVs  to 
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Chapter  1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  The  Research  Background 
With  the  world  economic  scene  growing  rapidly  and  markets  becoming  globalized  and 
more  competitive,  most  enterprises  face  intensified  competition  and  severe  challenges. 
Because  of  changes  in  global  economic  circumstances,  international  cooperation  has  had 
a  tendency  to  increase  (Buckley,  1994;  Teece,  1992;  Contractor  &  Lorange,  1988; 
Hergert  and  Morris,  1988).  International  cooperation  may  involve  several  modes  such  as 
franchising,  strategic  alliance,  joint  venture,  and  licensing,  etc.  Comparing  all  of  them, 
International  Joint  Venture  (IJV)  are  commonly  used  by  firms  as  a  means  of  competing 
within  global  competitive  markets  (Harrigan,  1988).  International  Joint  Venture  has 
been  perceived  as  an  effective  competitive  strategy  (Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Harrigan, 
1987)  and  a  key  entry  mode  into  foreign  markets  (Child  and  Faulkner,  1998;  Beamish, 
1985).  IN  has  become  one  of  the  most  important  topics  in  international  business. 
The  attraction  of  IN  lies  in  the  advantages  which  it  can  offer  to  both  multinational  firms 
and  local  firms.  For  multinational  firms,  several  advantages  can  be  obtained,  such  as: 
sharing  business  risk  and  costs,  attaining  economies  of  scale,  overcoming  market  barriers, 
acquiring  raw  materials  at  a  lower  cost,  and  so  on.  For  local  firms,  the  benefits  include 
new  competencies  to  improve  management  by  transferring  tacit  knowledge,  increasing 
local  managerial  flexibility,  obtaining  complementary  contributions  of  technology  or 
know-how,  etc.  Therefore,  the  IN  has  been  perceived  as  an  increasingly  important 
strategic  weapon  for  competing  within  a  firm's  core  technologies,  management  and 
markets  (Buckley  and  Casson,  1996;  Dunning,  1988a;  Beamish  and  Banks,  1987; 
Harrigan,  1986;  Beamish,  1985). 
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Due  to  globalization,  more  countries  are  opening  up  their  markets.  As  a  newly  developed 
country,  Taiwan  faces  pressures  from  opening  its  market  that  stem  from 
internationalization.  Thus,  the  government  of  Taiwan  abolished  the  restrictive  policies 
on  foreign  investment  and  implemented  a  set  of  economic  plans  to  stimulate  national  and 
inward  investments  in  1949.  The  government  has  strongly  encouraged  foreign 
investments  and  that  brings  many  foreign  companies  or  multinational  enterprises  into 
Taiwan  and  encourages  cooperation  with  Taiwanese  companies.  One  mode  for  foreign 
enterprises  entering  Taiwan  is  the  international  joint  venture  which  plays  a  vital  role  in 
the  development  of  the  Taiwan  economy. 
Taiwanese  companies  have  been  encouraged  by  the  government  to  obtain  rapid  access  to 
capital,  technology,  management  knowledge  and  export  markets  by  adopting  an  IN. 
Sometimes  the  government  would  invite  foreign  and  domestic  enterprises  to  form  an  IN 
for  particular  products.  For  example,  in  December  1986,  the  Ministry  of  Economic 
Affairs  encouraged  the  formation  of  IN  for  26  industrial  products,  including  seven  types 
of  electrical  machinery,  three  types  of  industrial  materials,  nine  types  of  information  and 
electronics  products,  three  types  of  chemical  engineering  products,  and  four  types  of 
textile  products.  ' 
One  particular  example  is  the  motor  industry.  Since  1953,  the  government  has  helped 
the  motor  industry  to  be  independent,  not  to  rely  on  government  protection.  The 
government  achieves  this  by  (a)  imposing  high  tariffs,  and  (b)  encouraging  cooperation 
between  major  foreign  companies  and  domestic  motor  companies.  This  allows  domestic 
companies  to  obtain  the  final  production  design  technology  from  the  co-operators  and 
also  helps  produce  a  higher  self-manufactured  rate.  Therefore,  nine  of  eleven  motor 
manufacturing  companies  have  used  an  IN  in  the  cooperative  mode;  the  detail  is  shown 
in  Table  I.  I.  Moreover,  from  the  statistics  of  the  Investment  Commissions  of  the 
Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  IN  is  used  not  only  in  manufacturing  industries,  but  also 
in  the  service  sector  and  other  industries.  Further  details  will  be  demonstrated  in  Chapter 
2. 
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Table  1.1  The  Cooperation  between  Taiwanese  Companies  and  Foreign  Companies  in  the  Motor 
Tnrinetrv  in  Taiwan 
Taiwanese  companies  Nationality  of  foreign  company  Equity  shareholding  of  fore 
Yulon  Motor  Co.  Japan  25% 
China  Motor  Co.  Japan  21.4% 
Ford  Motors  Canada  70% 
Sanfu  Motors  Co.  France  44.4% 
San  an  Industxy  Co.  American  13.5% 
Kuozui  Motors  Co.  Japan  47.2% 
Da-Cing  Motor  Co.  Japan  25% 
Taiwan  Isuzu  Co.  Japan  51% 
Chinchun  German  33.3 
Prince  Motor  Co.  Ja  an,  American  Technical  cooperation 
Goldsur  Japan  Technical  cooperation 
source:  Taiwan  Motor  Industries  Association,  1998. 
By  utilising  the  IN,  Taiwanese  companies  have  cooperated  well  with  foreign  partners 
and  have  acquired  management  knowledge  and  technological  skills  from  partners  which 
in  turn  has  increased  their  competitive  abilities.  As  a  result,  Taiwan  has  fast  economic 
development  and  attracts  many  foreign  companies  to  seek  partnership  with  Taiwan 
companies.  Taiwan  has  become  a  leading  nation  in  global  trade  and  provides  a  perfect 
model  of  transparent  economic  development  for  the  rest  of  Asia. 
Most  researches  focus  on  the  developed  countries  and  developing  countries;  however, 
Taiwan,  as  a  Newly  Industrialized  Country  (NIC),  plays  an  intermediate  and  vital  role 
between  developed  and  developing  countries  because  of  her  successful  development 
experience.  Based  on  the  study  of  the  strategic  alliance  between  Canada  and  the  Newly 
Industrialized  Countries  of  Pacific  Asia,  Hung  (1992)  stressed  that  the  NICs  are 
particularly  important  because  they  provide  the  gateway  to  other  countries'  markets  in 
the  region  such  as  China,  Japan  and  Indonesia.  Especially,  since  the  "reopening"  policy 
of  China  for  business  in  1978,  China  has  implemented  plans  for  rapid  economic  growth 
by  freeing  up  agriculture,  loosening  central  control  on  regional  government  enterprises, 
opening  foreign  investment,  and  encouraging  private  domestic  business  (Barro,  2002). 
This  results  in  a  lot  of  foreign  investments  flowing  into  China.  Unfortunately,  it  seems 
that  major  difficulties  have  been  encountered  by  many  IN's  in  the  People's  Republic 
4 Chapter  1 
China  (PRC)  (Shenkar,  1990)  and  have  often  led  to  foreign  parent's  dissatisfaction  and 
high  failure  rates  (Dacin,  Hitt,  and  Levitas,  1997;  Parkhe,  1993;  Kogut,  1989;  Beamish, 
1988). 
However,  with  the  great  potential  of  the  market  place,  China  has  still  attracted  many 
foreign  investors.  Therefore,  how  to  successfully  enter  China  is  an  important  issue  for 
multinational  enterprises.  On  this  issue,  Taiwan  can  play  an  intermediate  and  vital  role 
between  Western  countries  and  China,  because  of  its  successful  cooperation  experience 
with  foreign  partners  and  its  location  to  and  similar  culture  with  Mainland  China. 
Most  multinational  enterprises  deem  Taiwan's  experience  as  a  touchstone  of  entering 
Asian  markets,  especially  Mainland  China.  For  example,  the  Cetelem  Bank  which  is  a 
subsidiary  of  the  Franch  BNP-Paribas  group,  built  its  first  Asian  branch  in  Taiwan  in 
1998.2  Cetelem  Bank  occupies  a  leading  position  in  the  European  market  and  has  close 
cooperation  with  global  enterprises  such  as  Dell  and  Carrefour.  Cetelem  Bank  expanded 
its  overseas  subsidiaries  more  actively  since  the  middle  period  of  1990s  in  order  to 
achieve  its  strategy  objective  which  was  to  become  the  largest  financial  products 
company  in  the  world.  Taiwan  is  its  first  branch  in  Asian.  The  manager  of  BNP-Paribas 
believes  that  without  studying  Taiwan's  experience,  success  in  doing  business  with  China 
will  be  very  difficult  to  achieve. 
In  addition,  according  to  the  data  provided  by  the  Japan  Interchange  Association, 
between  2000  and  2002,63  IJVs  cooperated  with  Taiwan  to  successfully  enter  China's 
markets.  3  This  phenomenon  that  foreign  companies  cooperate  with  Taiwanese 
enterprises  to  enter  the  mainland  China  and  to  seek  "double  win"  have  increased 
continuously.  For  example,  the  biggest  optical  lens  company  worldwide,  the  Asia- 
Optical  Company  is  the  most  popular  company  that  has  Taiwanese  and  Japanese  joint 
ventures  in  China.  Sixteen  Japanese  companies  including  Ricoh,  Nikon  and  Pioneer  are 
all  cooperating  with  it  to  establish  factories  in  China.  The  mean  reasons  for  forming  an 
IJV  with  Taiwanese  companies  to  access  China  are  the  advantages  gained  from  their 
long-term  cooperative  relationships  and  Taiwan's  background  with  China.  As  Taiwan 
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plays  an  intermediate  and  vital  role  between  Western  countries  and  China,  it  is 
worthwhile  to  understand  how  the  international  joint  venture  is  operated  in  Taiwan. 
IN  has  its  strategic  value  and  benefits;  however,  it  is  not  without  its  difficulties. 
Forming  an  IN  often  involves  partners  from  different  countries.  The  presence  of  two  or 
more  parents  can  make  the  situation  difficult  to  manage.  Different  partner's  nationalities, 
strategic  objectives,  management  style,  and  organizational  cultures  can  create  conflicts 
between  partners  that  result  in  the  instability,  low  performance  and  high  failure  rate 
(Brannen  and  Salk,  2000;  Yan  and  Zeng,  1999;  Dacin,  Hitt  and  Levitas,  1997;  Parkhe, 
1993;  Kogut,  1989;  Beamish,  1988;  Anderson  and  Gatignon,  1986;  Reynolds,  1984; 
Killing,  1983).  This  phenomenon  is  not  only  peculiar  to  western  countries  but  can  also 
occur  in  Taiwan.  When  firms  consider  developing  their  markets  through  IJVs,  they  must 
evaluate  the  conditions  and  consequences  to  their  ownership  resources  before  making 
any  investment  decisions.  Each  partner  must  negotiate  with  other  partners  in  order  to 
decide  what  contributions  will  be  made  by  each  and  what  proportion  of  ownership  will 
be  allocated  to  each  one.  Thus,  it  is  important  to  learn  more  about  the  fundamental 
issues  with  respect  to  international  joint  ventures.  What  factors  will  affect  the  host 
country  parents  to  exercise  control  over  the  joint  venture.  What  factors  will  affect  the 
equity  shares  of  the  joint  venture  held  by  the  parents?  What  kinds  of  resources  will  be 
contributed  by  the  host  country  parents  and  what  influence  will  these  contributions  have 
on  the  management  of  the  joint  venture?  What  motives  do  the  host  country  parents  have 
for  forming  international  joint  ventures;  and  are  there  any  influences  regarding  different 
motivations?  What  factors  will  affect  the  bargaining  power  when  the  host  country 
parents  negotiate  with  foreign  partners?  All  these  issues  are  worth  examining  and  can 
help  understanding  of  how  international  joint  ventures  have  been  undertaken  in  Taiwan. 
Numerous  studies  of  joint  ventures  have  addressed  the  main  points  of  motivation,  control 
and  performance.  However,  Parkhe  (1993)  argues  that  the  dimensions  of  joint  ventures 
(motives  for  joint  venture  formation,  partner  selection  or characteristics,  control/conflict, 
and  stability/performance)  have  previously  been  investigated,  and  cannot  be  viewed  as 
separate  phenomenon,  and  need  to  be  re-conceptualized  into  an  integrative  framework. 
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Therefore,  this  study  attempts  to  draw  the  following  dimensions  together  which  are 
motivation,  contribution,  ownership,  bargaining  power  and  control  in  order  to  have  a 
clearer  picture  of  all  the  relative  activities  of  the  international  joint  venture. 
1.2  Objectives  of  the  Study 
Taiwan  must  upgrade  its  industry  structure  from  the  demands  of  labour  structure  to  the 
demands  of  technology  and  capital,  at  this  time  it  faces  intensified  global  competition.  It 
needs  various  resources  contributed  by  foreign  firms.  These  resources  include  capital, 
raw  materials,  management  knowledge,  marketing  ability,  productive  skills,  and  new 
product  development,  etc.  The  international  joint  venture  is  an  effective  model  to 
achieve  the  Taiwanese  company's  objectives  and  has  been  adopted  by  many  local 
enterprises.  While  the  international  joint  venture  is  becoming  a  popular  and  effective 
investment  strategy,  making  significant  contributions  to  Taiwan's  economy,  a  closer 
examination  of  its  nature  is  justified. 
Thus,  the  objectives  of  this  study  are  presented  as  follows. 
I.  To  clarify  the  type  of  control  and  the  extent  of  control 
Although  the  international  joint  venture  has  been  used  universally;  there  are  still 
problems  associated  with  the  relationship  between  the  partners.  Major  problems  arise  in 
the  negotiation,  planning  and  management  when  the  IN  is  formed  by  more  than  two 
firms  which  have  different  cultures,  strategic  objectives,  contributions  and  management 
methods.  This  often  results  in  a  high  failure  rate  (Dacin,  Hitt  and  Levitas,  1997;  Parkhe, 
1993;  Kogut,  1989;  Beamish,  1988).  Therefore,  control  is  a  particularly  important 
research  topic  in  relation  to  the  internal  dynamics  of  the  IN.  Theoretically  speaking, 
control  offers  a  company  an  excellent  opportunity  to  determine  the  most  effective  use  of 
resources.  This  may  improve  the  efficiency  and  profitability  of  the  parent  companies. 
Thus,  it  is  important  to  learn  more  about  the  precursors  of  control.  What  factors  affect 
the  issue  of  control?  What  type  and  what  extent  of  control  does  the  parent  company 
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have  over  the  joint  venture?  What  is  the  relationship  between  the  extent  of  control  and 
its  antecedent  factors?  To  answer  these  questions  is  the  main  objective  of  this  study. 
H.  To  identify  the  relationship  between  ownership  and  control 
There  is  substantial  literary  research  to  describe  the  relationship  between  ownership  and 
control;  however,  some  research  results  are  conflicting.  Blodgett,  1991;  Fagre  and  Wells, 
1982;  Stopford  and  Wells,  1972  all  use  the  ownership  as  a  proxy  for  management 
control  in  joint  ventures.  From  the  result  of  their  investigation  in  China,  Child  and  Yan 
(1999)  indicate  that  equity  share  is  the  major  factor  for  the  exercise  of  strategic  control 
and  also  influences  operational  control.  They  suggest  that  the  parent  company  should 
acquire  a  larger  equity  share,  because  this  could  increase  the  parent  company's  ability  to 
influence  the  strategic  direction  of  the  international  joint  venture. 
However,  in  his  research  sample,  Lecraw  (1984)  finds  that  the  link  between  the  level  of 
ownership  and  control  may  not  be  straightforward.  It  depends  on  the  type  of  technology 
transferred,  the  capabilities  of  the  local  partners,  and  the  host  government  policies. 
Multinational  enterprises  may  be  able  to  control  the  operations  of  its  subsidiary  without 
majority  ownership,  or,  conversely,  may  have  little  control  over  these  operations  despite 
majority  ownership.  In  addition,  in  their  case  study,  Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  also  argue 
that  equity  structure  is  not  equivalent  to  management  control.  From  the  controversial 
results  of  empirical  studies,  can  we  indicate  a  significantly  positive  correlation  between 
the  ownership  and  control  in  the  Newly  Industrialized  Countries  context,  particularly  in 
the  case  of  Taiwan?  If  so,  does  a  larger  equity  share  provide  more  control? 
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III.  To  investigate  the  factor  of  bargaining  power 
There  is  little  research  on  bargaining  power  in  terms  of  the  IN.  The  literature  on  IJVs 
has  not  addressed  the  issue  of  bargaining  power  in  detail,  with  a  few  exceptions  (Combe 
and  Mucchielli,  1998;  Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Yan  and  Gray,  1994;  Kobrin,  1987; 
Lecraw,  1984;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982).  However,  previous  researchers  discussed  the 
topic  of  bargaining  power  using  different  variables  and  methods,  and  focused  more  on 
the  precursors  of  bargaining  power.  Therefore,  one  of  the  aims  of  this  study  is  the 
attempt  to  highlight  previously  unidentified  factors  in  relation  to  bargaining  power  in  the 
international  joint  venture  context. 
IV.  To  explore  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power,  ownership  and 
control 
If  a  parent  company  has  more  bargaining  power  will  it  have  a  larger  equity  share  and 
greater  control  over  the  joint  venture?  Previous  research  suggests  that  the  bargaining 
power  of  the  partners  is  a  critical  variable  in  determining  the  patterns  of  control  in  joint 
ventures  (Blodgett,  1991;  Harrigan  and  Newman,  1990;  Lecraw,  1984).  For  example, 
Lecraw  (1984)  finds  a  significant  association  between  bargaining  power  and  control. 
Using  the  perspective  of  bargaining  power,  Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  also  indicate  that  the 
bargaining  power  between  parents  will  affect  the  control  of  IN.  Although  previous 
researchers  investigated  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  control,  the 
results  are  difficult  to  compare  because  they  have  measured  both  variables  differently. 
Therefore,  one  of  the  aims  of  this  study  is  the  attempt  to  elucidate  the  relationship 
between  bargaining  power  and  control. 
In  his  empirical  study,  Lecraw  (1984)  finds  that  the  bargaining  power  of  multinational 
firms  and  host  LDCs  has  a  strong  influence  on  the  percentage  of  equity  ownership.  He 
suggests  that  the  greater  the  bargaining  power  possessed  by  the  host  country,  the  greater 
the  level  of  local  ownership  gained  by  domestic  stakeholders.  Fagre  and  Wells  (1982) 
use  a  bargaining  power  framework  to  explore  the  relationship  between  the  multinational 
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firms'  characteristics  and  the  proportion  of  equity  ownership.  They  regard  equity 
ownership  as  an  outcome  of  negotiation.  However,  prior  studies  investigated  the 
relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  ownership  by  using  different  perspectives  and 
objectives.  This  study  discusses  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and 
ownership  based  on  the  bargaining  power  theory. 
V.  To  explore  the  relationship  between  the  partner's  motivations  and  their 
contribution  to  the  IJV 
Why  should  one  company  wish  to  cooperate  with  other  foreign  companies?  A  number 
of  theories  and  hypotheses  have  been  proposed  to  explain  the  reasons  for  the  formation 
of  the  international  joint  venture.  The  main  theories  relate  to  resource  dependence 
theory,  transaction  cost  theory,  strategic  contingency  theory  and  organizational  learning 
theory.  Prior  studies  proposed  that  there  are  many  motives  or  factors  which  may 
influence  the  formation  of  international  joint  ventures.  However,  there  are  some 
different  results  which  stem  from  partner  variables,  different  approach  aspects  and 
different  research  samples.  There  are  many  possible  explanations  of  the  motives  for  the 
formation  of  IJVs.  Do  all  of  these  theories  fit  the  Taiwanese  context?  In  Taiwan,  can 
we  explain  the  motives  for  forming  an  international  joint  venture  in  relation  to  other 
variables  by  identifying  similar  or  opposing  fundamental  concepts? 
Firms  will  cooperate  with  other  partners  by  forming  joint  ventures  when  they  can  benefit 
from  other  partner's  knowledge  or  advantages  (Hamel,  1991;  Badaracco,  1991;  Ciborra, 
1991;  '  Kogut,  1988;  Harrigan,  1984;  Nelson  and  Winter,  1982).  And  many  previous 
studies  point  out  that  one  of  the  motivations  for  forming  a  joint  venture  is  resource 
complementarity  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Beamish,  1985;  Harrigan,  1985;  Killing, 
1983;  Pfeffer  and  Salabcik,  1978;  Zald,  1970;  Aiken  and  Hage,  1968;  Thompson,  1967; 
Blau,  1964;  Emerson,  1962;  Selznick,  1948).  But  what  kind  of  motives  for  forming  the 
IN  will  affect  the  parent  company's  resource  contribution  to  the  joint  venture  has  not 
been  discussed  precisely. 
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Therefore,  one  of  the  objectives  of  this  study  is  to  explore  the  relationship  between  the 
partner's  motivations  and  their  contribution  to  the  IN. 
VI.  To  examine  the  relationship  among  motivations,  resource  contributions, 
bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control 
As  Parkhe  (1993)  argues  that  most  dimensions  of  joint  ventures  have  previously  been 
investigated,  and  cannot  be  viewed  as  separate  phenomenon,  and  need  to  be  re- 
conceptualized  into  an  integrative  framework.  Therefore,  this  study  attempts  to  draw 
the  following  dimensions  together  viz,  motivation,  contribution,  ownership,  bargaining 
power  and  control.  The  relationships  between  the  above  dimensions  will  be  discussed  in 
order  to  have  a  clearer  picture  of  all  the  relative  activities  of  international  joint  ventures. 
Once  the  research  objectives  have  been  demonstrated,  we  need  to  clarify  the  term  of 
international  joint  venture  which  is  described  in  the  following  section. 
1.3  Definition  of  International  Joint  Venture 
The  term  of  international  joint  venture  has  become  generally  used  to  describe  a  wide 
variety  of  collaborative  agreements  between  firms.  There  have  been  some  difficulties  in 
defining  international  joint  ventures  precisely  because  the  concept  has  been  viewed  as 
covering  numerous  situations.  Many  empirical  studies  have  given  many  definitions  but 
there  has  been  no  systematic  adoption  of  a  universally  accepted  definition  (Young  et  al., 
1989).  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  understand  and  define  the  nature  of  international 
joint  ventures  clearly  before  moving  further  into  this  study. 
In  order  to  understand  the  meaning  of  the  international  joint  venture,  we  first  have  to 
describe  the  meaning  of  joint  venture.  Friedman  and  Kalmanoff  (1961)  in  their 
pioneering  study  adopt  a  very  broad  definition  of  joint  ventures  as:  "any  type  of 
association  which  implies  collaboration  for  more  than  a  transitory  period".  However  that 
definition  is  too  broad,  it  cannot  describe  the  characteristics  of  joint  venture. 
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Recognising  the  lack  of  a  clearer  definition,  Sukijasovic  (1970)  stresses  four  distinctive 
features  of  a  joint  venture,  namely  "a  community  of  interests  involving  doing  business  in 
common,  the  sharing  of  profits,  the  sharing  of  business  risks  and  losses,  and  longevity  of 
cooperation".  Tomlinson  (1970)  defines  that  a  joint  venture  is:  "the  commitment  for 
more  than  a  very  short  duration  of  funds,  facilities  and  services  by  two  or  more  legally 
separate  interests  to  an  enterprise  for  their  mutual  benefit".  Young  and  Bradford  (1977) 
also  define  a  corporate  joint  venture  as:  "An  enterprise,  corporation  or  partnership, 
formed  by  two  or  more  companies,  individuals,  or  organizations,  at  least  one  of  which  is 
an  operating  entity  that  wished  to  broaden  its  activities,  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  a 
new,  profit-motivated  business  of  permanent  duration". 
Harrigan  (1985)  defines  a  joint  venture  as:  "separate  entities  with  two  or  more  active 
businesses  as  partners".  Christelow  (1987)  broadly  defines  joint  ventures  to:  "include 
both  jointly  owned  business  enterprises  and  long  term  contracts  covering  supplies, 
technology  exchange,  production  methods,  licensing  agreements  and  the  like".  Kogut 
(1988)  suggests  that:  "a  joint  venture  occurs  when  two  or  more  firms  pool  a  portion  of 
their  resources  within  a  common  legal  organization".  Beamish  (1988)  defines  joint 
ventures  as:  "shared-equity  undertakings  between  two  or  more  parties,  each  of  which 
holds  at  least  five  percent  of  the  equity".  Borys  and  Jemison  (1989)  define  a  joint 
venture  as:  "joint  ventures  result  in  the  creation  of  a  new  organization  that  is  formally 
independent  of  the  parents;  control  over  and  responsibility  for  the  venture  vary  greatly 
among  specific  cases".  Lyons  (1991)  defines  a  joint  venture  as:  "joint  venture  is 
cooperative  forms  of  organization  between  independent  parties  who  could  otherwise 
engage  in  competition  or  have  a  competitive  potential".  Driscoll  and  Paliwoda  (1997),  in 
studying  the  mode  of  entry  decision,  identify  the  joint  venture  as  one  of  the  main  choices 
of  mode  of  entry  to  new  markets.  In  their  study,  they  define  the  joint  venture  as  "the 
pooling  of  assets  in  common  ownership  and  separate  organizations  by  two  or  more  firms 
who  share  joint  ownership  and  control  over  the  use  and  output  of  these  assets  (Kogut 
and  Singh,  1988).  " 
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Joint  ventures  can  be  divided  into  two  classes:  equity  joint  ventures  and  non-equity  joint 
ventures.  For  the  definition  of  equity  joint  venture,  the  OECD  (1984)  stresses  it  as  "an 
equity  joint  venture  implies  the  sharing  of  assets,  risks  and  profits,  and  participation  in 
the  ownership  (i.  e.  equity)  of  a  particular  enterprise  or  investment  project  by  more  than 
one  firm  or  economic  `group'  ".  Killing  (1988)  views  it  as  "traditional  joint  ventures", 
which  is  created  when  two  or more  partners  join  forces  to  establish  a  newly  incorporated 
company  in  which  each  has  an  equity  position,  thereby  each  expects  a  proportional  share 
of  dividend  as  compensation  and  representation  on  the  board  of  directors. 
Beamish  and  Banks  (1987)  define  equity  joint  ventures  as:  "shared  equity  undertakings 
between  two  or  more  parties".  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  address  that  joint  ventures 
involve  two  or  more  legally  distinct  organizations,  each  of  which  actively  participates  in 
the  decision  making  activities  of  the  jointly  owned  entity.  If  at  least  one  parent 
organization  has  headquarters  outside  the  joint  venture's  country  of  operation,  or  if  the 
venture  has  a  significant  level  of  operations  in  more  than  one  country,  then  it  is 
considered  to  be  an  international  joint  venture.  Inkpen  and  Beamish  (1997)  defines 
equity-based  joint  venture  as  "an  alliance  that  combines  resources  from  more  than  one 
organization  to  create  a  new  organizational  entity,  which  is distinct  from  its  parents". 
In  contrast,  non-equity  joint  ventures  are  agreements  between  partners  to  cooperate  in 
some  ways,  but  they  do  not  involve  the  creation  of  new  firms.  Wright  (1981)  defines  a 
contractual  joint  venture  as: 
"a  risk-sharing  venture  in  which  no  joint  enterprise  with  separate  personality  is 
formed.  It  is  a  partnership  in  which  two  or  more  companies  (or  a  company  and  a 
government  agency)  share  the  cost  of  an  investment,  the  risks  and  the  long  term 
profits.  The  contractual  joint  venture  may  be  formed  for  a  particular  project  of 
limited  duration,  or  for  a  longer  term  cooperative  effort,  and  the  contractual 
relationship  may  terminate  once  the  project  is  complete".  (Wright,  1981) 
Some  international  joint  ventures  are  formed  on  an  equity  basis  and  may  have  more  than 
two  parents.  Habib  and  Burnett  (1989)  define  an  international  joint  venture  as  "the 
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national  firm  from  the  country  where  the  joint  venture  located  is  commonly  referred  to  as 
the  host,  local  or  domestic  partner".  Shenkar  and  Zeira  (1987)  elucidate  international 
joint  venture  as:  (Mead,  1994) 
"  The  IN  is  created  by  the  investments  of  two  or  more  parent  firms; 
"  It  is  a  separate  legal  organizational  entity,  and  belongs  entirely  to  neither  /  none  of  its 
parents; 
"  It  is  jointly  controlled  by  its  parents; 
"  These  parents  are  legally  independent  of  each  other; 
"  The  headquarters  of  at  least  one  parent  is  located  outside  the  country  in  which  the  IN 
operates. 
On  the  studying  of  generic  differences  between  equity  international  joint  ventures  (EIJV), 
international  acquisitions  and  international  Greenfield  investments,  Newburry  and  Zeira 
(1997a)  define  the  EIN  as  below 
"An  equity  international  joint  venture  is  a  separate  legal  organizational  entity 
representing  the  partial  holdings  of  two  or  more  parent  firms,  in  which  the 
headquarters  of  at  least  one  is  located  outside  the  country  of  operation  of  the 
joint  venture.  This  entity  is  subject  to  the  joint  control  of  its  parent  firms, 
each  of  which  is  economically  and  legally  independent  of  the  other.  "  (Shenkar 
and  Zeira,  1987,  p.  547). 
From  above  relative  literatures,  this  study  compiled  different  definitions  of  joint  venture 
into  Table  1.3.1. 
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According  to  the  above  literature  and  the  purpose  of  this  study,  the  international  joint 
venture  should  encompass  such  characteristics  as: 
"  International  joint  venture  is  formed  by  two  or  more  partners; 
"  At  least  one  of  the  parent's  headquarters  is  located  outside  the  joint  venture's  country 
of  operation; 
.  At  least  two  parents  of  different  nationality  hold  at  least  five  percent  of  the  equity. 
Therefore,  this  study  refers  to  the  international  joint  venture  as:  a  newly  legal 
organizational  which  is  created  by  two  or  more  partners.  These  parents  share  the  control 
over  the  joint  venture.  And  at  least  one  of  the  parent's  headquarter  is  located  outside  the 
country  in  which  international  joint  venture  operates. 
1.4  Organisation  of  the  Study 
This  dissertation  is  organized  into  nine  chapters.  Chapter  One  demonstrates  the  research 
background,  objectives  of  the  study,  the  definition  of  international  joint  venture,  and  the 
organisation  of  this  study. 
Chapter  Two  begins  by  describing  the  historical  development  of  Taiwan  including  the 
political  background,  economic  policy,  and  political  system.  It  also  examines  the  trends 
of  foreign  investments  up  to  date  and  the  general  characteristics  of  foreign  investments  in 
Taiwan.  The  chronological  sequence  of  relevant  legislation  and  government  policy  are 
described  briefly. 
Chapter  Three  examines  the  theoretical  foundations  for  the  present  research.  The 
literature  review  provides  a  critical  analysis  of  the  control  in  international  joint  ventures. 
Literature  relating  to  management  control  and  theoretical  and  empirical  literatures  with 
respect  to  control  in  joint  ventures  is  reviewed. 
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Chapter  Four  describes  the  antecedents  of  control  in  international  joint  ventures 
separately.  Alternative  theoretical  rationales  for  international  joint  ventures  in  terms  of 
resource  dependence  theory,  transaction  cost  theory,  strategic  contingency  theory, 
organizational  learning  theory  are  reviewed.  The  research  framework  and  testing 
hypotheses  are  developed  in  this  chapter. 
Chapter  Five  describes  the  research  design  and  methodology  employed  in  this  study.  An 
overview  of  the  research  process  is  examined  first.  The  research  design  then  is 
developed  for  this  study.  The  research  design  is  divided  into  ten  subsections  which 
include  the  purpose  of  the  study,  types  of  investigation,  extent  of  researcher  interference, 
time  horizon,  study  setting,  unit  of  analysis,  sampling  design,  measurement,  data 
collection  and  data  analysis  methods.  Each  of  ten  topics  is  examined  in  detail.  The 
profile  of  the  sample  characteristics  derived  from  this  study  is  examined. 
Chapter  Six  analyzes  the  questionnaire  derived  from  this  empirical  survey  of  Taiwanese 
international  joint  ventures.  There  are  five  core  research  dimensions  in  this  study  which 
are  control,  ownership,  bargaining  power,  contribution  and  motivation.  Each  core 
research  dimension  is  examined  by  its  empirical  results  and  its  relationships  with  the 
characteristics  of  the  sample  which  encompasses  nationality  or  region,  industry,  size  of 
the  host  country  parents,  ages  of  the  host  country  parents  and  the  joint  ventures,  and  the 
number  of  board  members  in  the  joint  ventures.  The  important  results  derived  from  each 
core  research  dimension  of  this  empirical  survey  are  examined. 
Chapter  Seven  focuses  on  the  relationships  between  control  and  its  antecedents  which 
are  motivation,  contribution,  bargaining  power  and  ownership.  It  details  the  analytical 
processes  and  results  between  control  and  its  antecedents.  The  hypotheses  are  examined 
in  this  chapter. 
Chapter  Eight  outlines  the  empirical  results  derived  from  this  study.  Further  research  is 
suggested  by  considering  an  extension  of  this  study.  It  closes  by  considering  possible 
constraints. 
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Chapter  Nine  examines  the  finding's  implications  for  both  theory  and  managerial 
implication. 
1.5  Summary 
This  chapter  has  indicated  the  background  and  objectives  of  this  study;  it  provides  a 
definition  of  the  international  joint  venture  and  gives  an  outline  of  the  chapters.  Most 
research  has  focused  on  the  motivation,  contribution,  partner  selection/characteristics, 
control/conflict,  and  stability/  performance.  However,  there  is  little  research  on  the 
relationship  between  bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control.  And  there  are  very  few 
studies  focusing  on  these  issues  in  the  Newly  Industrialized  Country  (NIC)  context.  The 
primary  purpose  of  this  study  is  not  to  develop  the  theory  relating  to  international  joint 
ventures.  It  is  an  attempt  to  investigate  the  relationships  between  motivations, 
contributions,  bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control  associated  with  the  international 
joint  venture  in  Taiwan.  This  research  is  one  of  the  few  studies  on  international  joint 
venture  issues  that  have  simultaneously  addressed  the  perceptions  of  motivation, 
contribution,  bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control  in  the  NIC  context. 
The  following  chapter  provides  an  overview  of  foreign  investments  in  Taiwan  which  can 
give  a  background  to  economic  development  before  it  launches  into  the  topic  of 
international  joint  ventures  in  Taiwan. 
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I  Referred  from  China  Post,  Dec.  17,1986,  at  7. 
2  Chinatimes,  April  22,2001,  at  6. 
3  Global  Views  Monthly,  March,  2004,  pp.  59-101. 
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Chapter  2 
FOREIGN  INVESTMENT  IN  TAIWAN 
2.1  Introduction 
r 
In  Chapter  1,  the  background  and  objectives  of  this  study  have  been  indicated  and  the 
definition  of  International  Joint  Venture  has  been  provided.  This  study  focuses  on  the 
IN  in  the  Taiwan  context;  therefore,  this  chapter  is  attempted  to  provide  an  overview  of 
economic  development  of  Taiwan  before  we  launch  into  the  topic  of  International  Joint 
Venture.  To  understand  the  economic  evolution  of  Taiwan,  it  is  necessary  to  view  the 
development  of  the  island  from  at  least  a  century-long  perspective.  Section  2.2 
introduces  the  territory,  population,  climate  and  major  cities  of  Taiwan.  Business 
environments  are  described  in  Section  2.3.  Three  subsections  focus  on  the  political 
background,  economic  situation  and  political  system  of  Taiwan.  Section  2.4  presents  an 
overview  of  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan,  including  the  trends  in  foreign  investment  in 
recent  times,  geographic  and  industry  characteristics  of  foreign  investment.  Taiwan's 
advantages  are  described  in  Section2.5.  Section  2.6  draws  a  brief  conclusion  of  this 
chapter. 
2.2  General  Introduction  of  Taiwan 
The  relevant  backgrounds  with  regard  to  Taiwan  are  described  in  this  section.  The 
territory,  population,  climate  and  major  cities  of  Taiwan  are  outlined  briefly  to  provide 
some  basic  understanding  of  Taiwan. 
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2.2.1  The  Territory  of  Taiwan 
The  Industrial  Development  &  Investment  Centre,  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  (2005) 
claims  that  the  territory  of  Taiwan  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Republic  of  China  (ROC) 
has  two  areas.  The  main  area  is  Taiwan  area,  which  includes  the  Taiwan  Island,  Penghu 
Islands,  Green  Island,  Lanyu  Island  and  the  Tiaoyutai  Island.  The  second  area 
encompasses  Kinmen  Island  and  Matsu  Island.  In  total  the  area  of  Taiwan  is  36,000 
square  kilometres. 
Taiwan  is  situated  at  a  strategic  position  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region,  linking  Northeast 
Asia  and  Southeast  Asia  and  facing  mainland  China.  The  Taiwan  Strait  separates  Taiwan 
and  mainland  China;  it  is  an  essential  passage  for  major  transportation  routes  of  East 
Asia.  Compared  with  Hong  Kong,  Shanghai  and  Singapore,  Taiwan  has  the  shortest 
sailing  time  to  five  major  Asia-Pacific  harbours.  Similarly,  Taiwan  also  has  the  shortest 
flying  time  to  seven  major  cities  in  the  Western  Pacific.  Obviously,  it  can  be  seen  that 
Taiwan  has  a  great  geographical  superiority. 
Taiwan  Island  is  shaped  like  a  leaf  and  stretches  386  kilometres  from  north  to  south. 
Roughly  two-thirds  of  the  island  is  hilly  and  mountainous  terrain,  only  approximately 
one-third  of  the  island  is  suitable  for  cultivation  (Richard,  2001).  22  million  people  live 
in  36,000  square  kilometres.  Although  the  rugged  landscape  and  population  growth  has 
imposed  limitations  for  agriculture,  Taiwan  can  still  provide  the  world  with  other 
products  and  most  computer  components.  Indeed,  Taiwan  as  a  whole  has  gone  from 
being  an  agricultural  base  to  a  densely  populated  urban  industrial  society  within  a  century 
(Richard,  2001). 
2.2.2  The  Population,  Climate  and  Major  Cities  of  Taiwan 
According  to  a  census  conducted  in  December  2003,  the  total  population  was  22.689 
million.  '  The  population  density  was  626.98  people  per  square  kilometer  at  that  time. 
It  is  apparent  that  Taiwan  is  one  of  the  most  densely  populated  areas  in  the  world. 
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The  Tropic  of  Cancer  passes  through  the  centre  of  Taiwan,  creating  two  distinct  climatic 
zones  in  Taiwan.  Therefore,  the  south  of  Taiwan  is  tropical  and  the  north  is  subtropical. 
The  general  climate  is  typically  hot  (averaging  20  degrees  Celsius),  rainy  and  with 
seasonal  typhoons.  *  However,  Taiwan  is  always  blessed  with  a  good  climate. 
The  administrative  areas  of  Taiwan  consist  of  21  cities  and  two  special  municipalities. 
These  two  special  municipalities  are  Taipei  City  and  Kaohsiung  City.  For  Taipei  City,  it 
is  surrounded  by  several  sub-municipalities  comprising  the  greater  Taipei  area. 
Especially,  the  central  government  of  the  ROC  is  located  in  Taipei  City,  and  most 
company  headquarters  are  also  located  in  Taipei,  making  Taipei  city  the  political  and 
commercial  centre  of  Taiwan.  As  for  Kaohsiung  City,  it  is  an  important  industrial  city  in 
southern  Taiwan.  In  the  past,  many  heavy  industries  have  located  in  or  around 
Kaohsiung  City,  and  oil  refineries,  steel  mills,  and  shipbuilding  yards  are  still  all  located 
in  this  area.  In  addition,  the  city  also  has  one  airport  and  one  harbour.  Shiaogang 
Airport  handles  both  international  and  domestic  flights,  Kaohsiung  harbour  is  the  largest 
harbour  in  the  ROC.  Therefore,  these  two  special  municipalities  play  an  important  role 
in  Taiwan's  economic  development. 
2.3  Business  Environments  in  Taiwan 
After  World  War  II,  the  success  of  the  economic  development  in  Taiwan  was  recognised 
worldwide,  and  its  experience  became  a  good  model  for  other  developing  countries 
wishing  to  create  similar  a  successful  economic  development.  Ranis  (2002)  identified 
Taiwan  as  a  role  model  of  economic  development  as  "neither  miracle  nor  crisis",  but 
favourable  initial  conditions  supported  with  the  sound  governance  of  flexible  policies. 
Ranis  (2002)  also  summarized  three  conclusions  as  follow:  (1)  the  success  of  Taiwan  is  a 
combination  of  favourable  initial  conditions  and  largely  induced  appropriate  policy 
responses,  therefore  the  experience  is  not  a  "miracle".  (2)  The  favourable  initial 
conditions  consist  of  three  points-a  Japanese  colonial  heritage,  the  condition  of 
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substantial  entrepreneurial  talents  as  well  as  capital  to  the  system's  total  resources  in 
1949,  and  the  virtual  absence  of  natural  resources.  (3)  The  eight  elements  of  policy 
decisions  that  helped  Taiwan  avoid  the  worst  of  the  East  Asian  crisis.  These  eight 
elements  of  policy  decisions  are  shown  below: 
(a)  Early  post-independence  land  reform  and  further  cementing  the  foundations  for 
"growth  with  equity"  in  the  rural  areas. 
(b)  A  mild  and  relatively  brief  version  of  the  inevitable  easy  import  substance  phase. 
(c)  Early  attention  to  the  increase  of  agricultural  productivity,  permitting  that  sector  to 
support  a  greater  increase  in  household  saving,  labour  absorption  and  exports. 
(d)  The  attention  paid  to  education,  marked  by  flexibility  in  adjusting  to  the  changing 
needs  of  the  economy,  from  primary  to  vocational  secondary  to  technical  junior 
colleges  and,  to  engineering  and  science-oriented  tertiary  education.  More 
importantly,  a  policy  of  bringing  back  highly  brained  overseas  Taiwanese  who  had 
migrated  to  the  United  States  was  established. 
(e)  A  decentralized  rural  industrialization  strategy  leading  to  a  workably  competitive 
industrial  sector. 
(f)  Modest  resort  to  foreign  capital  inflows,  especially  with  respect  to  short-term 
portfolio  capital,  while  substantial  foreign  exchange  reserves  were  built  up. 
(g)  A  relatively  flexible  exchange  rate  regime,  with  gradual  devaluations,  preceding  the 
crisis  by  several  years. 
Large  public  sector  R&D  support  led  to  large  foreign  exchange  reserves  that  helped 
ward  off  speculative  attacks  on  the  currency. 
However,  before  probing  into  the  Taiwan  economic  development,  it  is  necessary  to 
understand  the  historical  background.  Therefore,  this  section  introduces  the  political 
background  and  present  economic  policies  in  Taiwan. 
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2.3.1  The  Political  Background  of  Present  Economic  Policies 
Traditional  China  (i.  e.  now  the  People's  Republic  of  China)  is  a  country  with  an 
extensive  history  which  was  ruled  for  centuries  by  a  series  of  dynasties.  According  to 
China's  legend,  the  Qing  (Manchu)  Dynasty,  China's  last  dynasty,  was  overthrown  by  Dr. 
Sun  Yat  Sen  in  1911.  In  the  following  year,  the  Republic  of  China  (ROC)  was  founded  in 
1912  and  was  the  first  democratic  republic  in  Asia.  Unfortunately,  the  country  was  then 
embroiled  by  civil  war.  After  a  period  of  civil  war  between  Chiang  Kai-shek's 
Nationalist  Party  (Kuomintang  or  KMT)  and  Mao  Zedong's  Communists,  the 
Communists  eventually  defeated  the  rival  Kuomintang  (KMT)  nationalist  forces. 
Afterwards,  the  People's  Republic  of  China  (PRC)  was  established  in  1949  and  continues 
to  rule  mainland  China.  On  the  contrary,  the  central  government  of  the  Republic  of 
China  (ROC)  withdrew  to  Taiwan  in  the  same  year.  Despite  the  withdrawal,  led  by 
Chiang  Kai-shek,  Taiwan  still  calls  itself  the  Republic  of  China  and  lays  claim  to  the 
whole  of  the  territory  of  China.  However,  Taiwan  and  mainland  China  are  hostile  to  each 
other  which  results  in  political  uncertainty  in  Taiwan. 
In  the  20th  century,  Taiwan  has  experienced  two  cycles  of  regime  evolution:  the  Japanese 
colonial  regime  (1895-1945)  and  the  Nationalist  emigrant  regime  (1945-1996).  Each 
cycle  of  regime  evolution  consecutively  dominated  its  political  history  for  about  a 
century,  and  also  produced  substantially  different  outcomes  in  terms  of  the  development 
of  political  society  and  the  construction  of  a  collective  identity  (Chu  and  Lin,  2001). 
In  1895,  Taiwan  was  ceded  to  Japan  after  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  but  was  returned  to 
Chinese  sovereignty  after  Japan's  defeat  in  the  Second  World  War  in  1945.  For  the 
Japanese  colonial  period,  especially,  when  the  Europeans  withdrew  their  Asian  colonies 
during  the  First  World  War,  economic  expansion  boosted  Japanese  demand  for  rice, 
Taiwan  was  to  become  a  major  supplier.  In  keeping  with  their  rising  economic  status, 
the  colonial  government  launched  various  political  initiatives,  such  as  democracy  and 
self-determination.  In  the  meantime,  Taiwan  had  became  much  more  accommodating  to 
the  Japanese  in  the  previous  two  decades,  and  Japanese  was  no  longer  a  foreign  language 
to  Taiwan's  educated  class.  By  the  mid-1930s,  Japan  was  on  the  brink  of  a  war  with 
26 Chapter  2 
China,  Taiwan  had  been  transformed  from  a  supplement  to  Japan's  capitalist 
development  into  a  factory  for  military  supplies.  When  Japan  tried  to  break  out  through 
the  sea,  Taiwan's  role  was  changed  into  a  naval  military  base  (Chu  and  Lin,  2001). 
In  1936,  the  governor-generals  outlined  three  polices  for  the  colonial  government:  to 
"Japanize"  the  Taiwanese  people,  to  build  military  industries  and  to  turn  Taiwan  into  a 
base  for  southward  advance.  To  implement  the  assimilation  policy,  classical  Chinese  was 
totally  removed  from  the  curriculum  in  1937  and  all  private  schools  for  Chinese 
education  were  banned  in  1940.  Meanwhile,  native  society  was  fully  politicized  to 
ensure  the  success  of  the  new  policies,  even  every  street  corner  was  caught  in  the  war 
machine.  By  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War,  due  to  the  enforced  assimilation  policies 
of  the  colonial  government  for  more  than  two  decades,  the  impact  on  identity  formation 
varied  across  age  and  social  class.  Overall,  at  that  time  the  Taiwanese  often  wandered 
between  two  identities:  secondary  Japanese  or  non-Japanese  (Chu  and  Lin,  2001). 
Following  Japan's  defeat  in  1945,  Ching  and  the  KMT  retook  Taiwan,  and  began  to 
consolidate  power.  The  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  reported  a  country  profile  of 
Taiwan  in  2003.  It  provides  detailed  political  background  information.  In  1945,  Taiwan 
was  restored  to  Chinese  sovereignty,  the  Nationalist  regime  (lead  by  KMT)  started  from 
1945  until  1996.  Discontent  with  the  KMT  triggered  a  crackdown  starting  on  February 
28`h  1947,  this  event  commemorated  as  the  "2-28  incident"  (Pang  and  Haggard,  1994). 
Those  people,  who  lived  on  Taiwan  before  the  KMT  exodus  from  mainland  China,  call 
themselves  "natives".  The  KMT  refugees  and  their  families,  who  make  up  about  13%  of 
the  population,  are  called  mainlanders  or  outsiders.  Despite  intermarriage,  the  two 
communities  remain  largely  distinct  political  constituencies,  resulting  in  decades  of 
mistrust  and  hostility  between  "mainlanders"  and  the  "native"  Taiwanese. 
Regarding  the  promotion  of  economic  growth  from  1949,  the  KMT  initiated  a 
programme  of  land  reform  and  an  export-oriented  industrial  policy  and  the  results  were 
so  successful  that  the  US  stopped  granting  the  island  economic  aid  by  1965.  Political 
freedoms  were  suppressed  in  that  period,  martial  law  was  imposed  in  1949  and  was  not 
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lifted  until  1987.  When  the  US  built  a  relationship  with  mainland  China  in  1979,  the 
KMT  responded  by  tightening  martial  law  restrictions.  It  then  caused  the  "Kaohsiung 
incident"-a  violent  event  in  the  southern  city  of  Kaohsiung,  when  the  authorities 
arrested  many  people  running  a  democracy  movement,  who  subsequently  spent  several 
years  in  jail.  By  the  mid-1980s,  Chiang  Ching-kuo  (Chiang  Kai-shek's  son,  who  became 
president  in  1978)  moved  towards  political  liberalisation.  The  Democratic  Progressive 
Party  (DPP)  was  formed  in  1986.  In  1987  martial  law  was  lifted  and  political  prisoners 
were  released,  opposition  parties  were  legalised  over  the  next  two  years. 
After  Chiang  Ching-kuo  died,  Lee  Teng-hui  was  appointed  president  in  1988.  In  1996,  at 
Taiwan's  first  direct  presidential  election,  Mr  Lee  won  with  54  %  of  the  vote.  He 
supported  the  establishment  of  an  independent  "Republic  of  Taiwan",  which  expressed 
from  DPP.  Mr  Lee  is  also  subsequently  embarking  on  a  strategy  of  moulding  a  Taiwan 
national  identity.  In  1999  he  announced  that  Taiwan  had  still  not  abandoned  its  goal  of 
eventual  reunification  with  the  mainland,  but  that  any  future  negotiations  with  China 
would  be  conducted  on  a  "special  state-to  state"  basis. 
During  the  next  century,  the  people  of  Taiwan  will  continue  to  wrestle  with  competing 
claims  to  their  political  allegiance  and  cultural  identity.  The  consolidation  of  a 
Taiwanese  identity  will  be  complicated  and  will  be  deeply  influenced  by  the  economic 
interdependence  between  Taiwan  and  mainland  China,  an  increasing  number  of 
Taiwanese  businessman  and  migrants  in  China,  and  the  emergence  of  a  Mandarin-based 
media  industry  across  the  Straits. 
2.3.2  The  Economic  Policy 
During  the  years  of  colonial  rule,  the  Japanese  developed  Taiwan's  communication  and 
transport  networks  and  fostered  commerce  and  education.  After  the  withdrawal  from 
mainland  China,  the  KMT  devoted  its  efforts  to  building  up  the  island  with  a 
comparatively  well-developed  economic  and  social  infrastructure. 
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In  1950  the  Korean  War  broke  out,  resulting  in  the  East  and  the  West  confronting  each 
other.  Under  a  military  and  economic  consideration,  the  USA  recognised  Taiwan's 
government  and  provided  economic  aid  in  order  to  build  a  defensive  battle  line  with  the 
East.  Under  pressure  from  the  US,  the  government  of  Taiwan  executed  a  program  of 
land  reform  which  involved  rural  reconstruction  and  established  a  strong  foundation  for 
agricultural  growth.  The  import  aid  from  the  USA  gave  the  government  of  Taiwan  the 
impetus  to  develop  the  economy  and  international  trade. 
However,  because  the  balance  of  payments  deficit  of  the  USA  became  worse,  the  US  re- 
evaluated  their  economic  aid  policy  in  1957.  In  order  to  improve  the  investment  climate 
and  encourage  exports  and  in  response  to  pressure  from  the  USA  as  well,  an  export- 
oriented  industrial  policy  was  adopted  by  the  government  of  Taiwan.  The  USA  adjusted 
its  international  aid  policy  in  1958  and  finally  ceased  economic  support  to  Taiwan  in 
1965.  After  the  loss  of  economic  aid  from  the  USA,  Taiwan  experienced  a  succession  of 
setbacks  in  diplomatic  affairs.  In  1971,  Taiwan  signed  off  from  the  United  Nations  and 
broke  off  relationships  with  Japan.  During  that  period  of  time,  Taiwan  implemented  the 
export-oriented  industrial  policies  which  established  the  basic  structure  which  became  a 
solid  foundation  for  economic  growth. 
During  the  process  of  economic  development  in  Taiwan,  the  government  adopted  a  two- 
pronged  approach.  On  the  one  hand,  the  government  of  Taiwan  has  sought  to  keep 
micro-regulation  to  a  minimum  in  areas  such  as  the  labour  market,  thereby  facilitating  the 
development  of  a  vibrant  small  and  medium-sized  enterprise  sector  that  has  focused  on 
the  manufacture  of  goods  for  export.  On  the  other  hand,  the  government  has  used 
intervention,  regulation  and  bureaucratic  diktat  both  to  guide  the  direction  of  economic 
development  and  maintain  overall  economic  stability  in  the  face  of  the  military  threat 
from  mainland  China. 
Through  the  intervention,  regulation  and  bureaucratic  diktat,  two  important  factors  in 
creating  the  Taiwanese  phenomenon  were  the  practice  of  export-oriented  industrial 
policy  and  a  modernization  policy,  which  stimulated  the  development  drive  in  Taiwan. 
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The  first  being  the  importance  of  national  defence  and  the  creation  of  an  industrial 
infrastructure  to  serve  defence  needs.  The  second  was  the  government's  encouragement 
of  private  enterprise  and  the  concurrent  development  of  export  markets  for  products 
manufactured  in  Taiwan. 
In  order  to  facilitate  foreign  investment,  the  government  of  Taiwan  promulgated  two 
cornerstones  of  Taiwan's  legal  framework  for  joint  venture  participation  by  foreign 
investors.  There  are  the  "Statute  for  Investment  by  Foreign  Nationals"  (SIFN) 
promulgated  in  1954,  and  the  "Statute  for  Encouragement  of  Investment"  (SEI) 
promulgated  in  1960.  An  important  objective  of  these  statutes  is  to  simplify  the  process 
of  foreign  investment  in  order  to  achieve  specific  national  goals.  The  government  policy 
strongly  favours  the  importance  of  modern  technology  and  capital  intensive  industry. 
While  encouraging  investment  of  all  kinds,  the  government  has  extended  special 
privileges  to  joint  ventures  whose  production  will  fill  domestic  needs  or  whose 
production  of  export  trade  can  be  expected  to  earn  foreign  exchange. 
For  example,  according  to  article  5  of  the  SIFN  which  was  amended  in  19862,  overseas 
investments  shall  be  confined  to  those  which  fall  in  any  one  of  the  following  categories: 
(1)  Investments  in  manufacturing  enterprises  which  make  products  needed  domestically; 
(2)  Investments  in  service  enterprises  which  are  needed  domestically; 
(3)  Investments  in  enterprises  which  have  an  export  market; 
(4)  Investments  which  complement  important  industrial,  mining,  or  communications 
enterprises; 
(5)  Investments  in  enterprises  which  are  engaged  in  scientific  and  technical  research  and 
development  ;  and, 
(6)  Investments  in  other  enterprises  which  are  conducive  to  the  economic  and  social 
development  of  Taiwan. 
Traditionally,  the  government  has  encouraged  joint  ventures  in  light  industry  along  with 
investment  in  industries  specifically  identified  as  vital  to  national  development  (such  as 
mining  and  communications).  Only  joint  ventures  in  specified  industries  qualify  for  the 
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privileges  and  protections  of  SIFN.  Moreover,  the  joint  venture  statutes  also  encourage 
investment  in  industries  which  the  government  perceives  as  vital  to  national  welfare 
(such  as  defence  industries  and  industries  requiring  a  high  degree  of  technical  know- 
how). 
In  order  to  encourage  foreign  investment,  the  government  will  occasionally  invite  foreign 
and  domestic  enterprises  to  form  joint  ventures  for  particular  products.  For  example,  in 
December  1986,  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  encouraged  the  formation  of  joint 
ventures  for  26  industrial  products,  including  seven  types  of  electrical  machinery,  three 
types  of  industrial  materials,  nine  types  of  information  and  electrical  textile  products'. 
Over  the  years,  the  government  of  Taiwan  has  revised  the  positive  policy  on  investment 
during  which  both  the  domestic  and  international  economic  environment  have  changed. 
For  example,  when  the  expiration  of  Statute  of  Encouragement  of  Investment  was  due  at 
the  end  of  1990,  the  government  of  Taiwan  immediately  formulated  the  "Statute  for 
Upgrading  Industries"  to  encourage  business  investment. 
Basically,  the  economic  development  process  and  the  trade  policy  in  Taiwan  can  be 
divided  into  five  main  stages.  These  are 
1.1949-1957:  After  the  KMT  moved  to  Taiwan,  the  government  intervened  in  political 
and  economic  systems  using  strong  control. 
2.1958-1970:  The  USA  adjusted  its  foreign  aid  policy  in  1958  until  Taiwan  signed  off 
from  the  United  Nations  in  1971.  During  this  particular  period,  Taiwan 
adopted  an  export-oriented  industrial  policy. 
3.1971-1983  :  The  government  of  Taiwan  adopted  a  free  trade  economic  policy  when 
confronted  with  international  political  and  economic  changes  during  the 
petroleum  crisis  period.  During  that  period,  the  government  also 
embarked  upon  a  series  of  economic  reforms  in  order  to  accelerate 
economic  development. 
4.1984-1994:  The  government  of  Taiwan  announced  an  economic  and  trade 
liberalization  policy  in  economy  and  trade  in  1984.  It  included  two 
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main  parts;  one  was  the  foreign  free  trade  policy,  and  the  other  was  the 
annulment  of  the  restraint  of  the  domestic  economy  including  the 
liberalization  of  finance,  property  development  and  investment.  In 
1990,  the  government  also  started  to  pursue  membership  of  the  World 
Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  motivated  in  part  by  the  desire  to  liberalise 
the  domestic  economy.  In  membership  negotiations,  the  government 
pledged  to  open  up  Taiwan's  domestic  markets  to  foreign  competition. 
5.  After  1994  :  The  government  of  Taiwan  set  the  deregulation  of  economy  and  the 
open  market  policy  into  action.  Deregulation  of  the  economy  was  also 
an  aim  of  the  plan  launched  in  1994  to  turn  Taiwan  into  an  Asia-Pacific 
Regional  Operations  Centre  (APROC).  As  originally  formulated, 
APROC  envisaged  Taiwan  becoming  a  regional  centre  for  multinational 
companies  in  six  areas:  manufacturing,  telecommunications,  air 
transport,  sea  transport,  financial  services  and  mass  media. 
The  government  implements  a  series  of  economic  reform  policies,  but  the  government 
does  not  completely  abandon  its  interventionist  approach  to  economic  management.  The 
government  has  played  a  particularly  active  role  in  the  development  of  Taiwan's  world- 
class  high-technology  sector.  For  example,  government-funded  research,  carried  out  by 
the  Industrial  Technology  Research  Institute  (ITRI),  formed  the  genesis  of  Taiwan's 
semiconductor  industry.  ITRI  has  played  an  important  part  in  the  development  of  the 
island's  computer  industry.  Also  under  the  "Statute  for  Industrial  Upgrading",  high- 
technology  firms  have  benefited  from  various  kinds  of  official  largesse,  such  as  tariff-free 
imports  and  tax  holidays.  Under  the  support  of  economic  and  trade  policies  of  the 
government,  Taiwan  has  become  one  of  the  world's  largest  producers  of  computer- 
related  products.  In  recent  years,  Taiwan  has  also  become  an  increasingly  important 
producer  of  semiconductors. 
During  the  past  forty  years,  Taiwan  has  risen  rapidly  to  the  status  of  a  "Newly 
Industrialized  Economy.  "  This  achievement  can  be  traced  to  a  number  of  unique  social, 
political,  cultural,  and  geographic  factors  which  cannot  easily  be  duplicated  by  other 
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developing  countries.  '  According  to  the  classification  of  countries  in  the  World 
Economic  Outlook  published  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (USAF);  Taiwan  was 
grouped  among  developing  countries  before  1997.  As  Taiwan  begins  to  share  a  number 
of  important  characteristics  with  industrial  countries  and  prove  itself  successful,  Taiwan 
was  reclassified  into  a  group  of  advanced  economies  by  IMF  in  1997. 
As  a  result  of  the  successful  economic  reforms  and  continuous  economic  development, 
Taiwan  is  recognized  as  one  of  the  key  economic  countries  in  the  Asia-Pacific  Rim. 
2.3.3  Political  System 
Founded  in  1912,  the  Republic  of  China  is  the  first  democratic  republic  in  Asia.  The 
political  system  is  set  up  according  to  Dr.  Sun  Yat-Sen's  Five  Powers  and  Three 
Principles  of  the  People,  which  form  the  foundation  of  the  ROC  Constitution. 
Besides  continuously  promoting  economic  growth  and  upgrading  the  development  of 
technology,  the  government  also  works  to  carry  out  democratic  politics  and 
constitutional  reform.  Following  the  end  of  martial  law  in  1987,  Taiwan  embarked  upon 
a  series  of  political  reforms.  The  first  direct  election  of  the  president  and  vice  president 
was  held  in  March  1996,  bringing  to  realization  the  principle  of  sovereignty  of  the  people. 
As  a  result  of  the  election  in  2000,  the  Democratic  Progressive  Party  (DPP)  took  over 
the  reins  of  power  in  May  2000,  bringing  to  realization  the  principle  of  transfer  of  power 
between  political  parties  and  making  the  Republic  of  China  in  Taiwan  a  modem 
democratic  country. 
China  is  a  big  issue,  which  has  a  significant  effect  on  global  economic  development.  In 
1991,  the  Democratic  Progressive  Party  (DPP)  called  for  the  establishment  of  an 
independent  Republic  of  Taiwan.  This  aspiration  of  the  DDP  is  widely  feared  in  Taiwan, 
because  it  makes  the  cross-strait  relationship  with  mainland  China  more  difficult.  This 
situation  became  worse  when  Mr.  Chen  who  represents  the  DPP  party  won  the  election 
in  2004  and  become  the  president  of  the  Republic  of  China  (ROC).  This  is  the  second 
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time  that  Taiwan  has  non-KMT  rule,  resulting  in  an  unprecedented  degree  of  domestic 
political  instability  which  also  affects  Taiwan's  economic  development.  Taiwan  has  its 
historical  background  with  mainland  China,  but  the  unstable  political  situation  obstructs 
its  economic  development  with  mainland  China.  This  phenomenon  continues  to 
adversely  affect  Taiwan's  economy. 
2.4  An  Overview  of  Foreign  Investment  in  Taiwan 
The  principle  objective  of  this  section  is  to  provide  a  profile  of  foreign  investment  in 
Taiwan.  The  encouragement  of  foreign  investment  has  always  been  a  major  policy  of  the 
government  in  Taiwan.  Therefore,  Taiwan  places  great  importance  on  foreign  and 
overseas  Chinese  investment.  Laws  and  regulations  governing  such  investments  are 
amended  in  a  timely  fashion,  and  every  effort  is  made  to  remove  investment  obstacles 
and  improve  investment  conditions.  The  government  also  provides  other  assistance  to 
foreign  nationals  and  overseas  Chinese  investing  in  Taiwan.  Aanalysis  of  foreign 
investment  patterns  can  provide  an  overview  of  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan.  It  can 
reveal  the  trends  in  foreign  investment,  which  sectors  foreign  investors  prefer,  and  what 
differences  exist  between  investor  nations.  Holding  this  overview  can  help  to  give  a 
general  idea  of  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan,  then,  moving  onto  the  specific  area  of 
foreign  investment  in  Taiwan  which  is  the  International  Joint  Venture  (IM. 
2.4.1  Trends  of  Foreign  Investment  in  Taiwan  over  time 
The  government  of  Taiwan  has  long  maintained  an  openly  welcoming  attitude  towards 
investment,  especially  in  the  hi-tech  sector.  Throughout  the  second  half  of  the  20th 
century,  investment  patterns  in  Taiwan  have  been  marked  by  steady  progression  in  value- 
adding  and  knowledge-intensive  production.  As  a  result  of  heightened  competition, 
mainly  from  China,  the  government  has  highlighted  areas  such  as  biotechnology,  opto- 
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electronics  and  nanotechnology  as  development  targets  to  attract  foreign  investment  into 
Taiwan. 
All  foreign  investment  ventures  must  be  incorporated  and  certified  by  the  Investment 
Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  (CMEA).  According  to  the  statistics  of 
the  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  the  total  amount  of 
foreign  investment  was  US$  52,625  million  from  1951  to  2003  and  the  number  of 
foreign  investment  applications  from  1951  to  2003  was  13,102,  as  shown  in  Table  2.4.1. 
The  trend  of  foreign  investment  is  shown  in  Figure  2.4.1.  From  the  data,  the  total 
amount  of  foreign  investment  increased  steadily  at  the  beginning  of  the  1980's.  After 
1984,  there  was  a  rapid  rise  in  foreign  investment.  The  reason  for  this  may  have  been  the 
government's  economic  policy  which  has  always  been  to  encourage  foreign  investment. 
As  described  in  section  2.3.2,  the  government  promulgated  the  "Statute  for  Investment 
by  Foreign  Nationals"  in  1954  to  encourage  foreign  investments  into  Taiwan.  The 
government  took  another  step  ahead  to  announce  a  liberalization  policy  in  economy  and 
trade  in  1984  and  also  ended  martial  law  in  1987.  All  these  efforts  were  aimed  at 
attracting  foreign  investment. 
The  results  showed  that  foreign  investments  grew  quickly  after  1984,  especially  after 
1987.  However,  due  to  the  worldwide  economic  slowdown,  this  trend  diminished  after 
1991  and  rose  again  in  1994,  with  the  growth  of  the  international  economy.  Since  1984, 
the  trend  in  foreign  investments  has  risen  more  steeply.  However,  the  trend  showed  a 
fall  in  1998  because  of  the  financial  crisis  in  Asia  area.  It  dips  again  because  of  a  global 
economic  depression  since  2001  and  fell  further  in  2002.  Well  over  half  (51%)  of  the 
total  sum  was  invested  in  the  five  years  from  1997  to  2001,  which  was  the  most 
significant  and  rapid  growth  of  the  decade.  The  steeply  rising  trend  explained  by  the 
government's  policy  which  launched  the  deregulation  of  economy  and  opened  the  market 
in  1994.  However  foreign  investment  fell  again  because  of  the  world  economic 
slowdown.  From  the  trend  of  foreign  investment,  we  can  find  that  the  government's 
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economic  policy  has  undergone  timely  amendment  in  order  to  accelerate  economic 
development  in  tandem  with  the  international  economy. 
Table  2.4.1  The  Cases  and  Amount  of  Foreign  Investment 
Year  Case 
Amount 
(US$1,000) 
1952  0  0 
1953  2  2,041 
1954  5  2,092 
1955  2  4,423 
1956  2  1,009 
1957  4  48 
1958  3  1,116 
1959  2  145 
1960  8  14,338 
1961  5  5,964 
1962  26  3,543 
1963  16  10,347 
1964  13  11,890 
1965  36  35,140 
1966  52  20,904 
1967  107  38,666 
1968  123  53,445 
1969  111  81,938 
1970  71  109,165 
1971  46  125,147 
1972  52  100,190 
1973  150  193,688 
1974  83  108,736 
1975  43  70,940 
1976  45  102,032 
1977  50  95,186 
Year  Case 
Amount 
S$  1,000) 
1978  66  136,719 
1979  73  181,483 
1980  71  243,380 
1981  73  356,294 
1982  82  320,286 
1983  100  375,382 
1984  101  518,971 
1985  107  660,702 
1986  206  705,574 
1987  363  1,223,069 
1988  438  1,061,161 
1989  477  2,241,026 
1990  376  2,081,657 
1991  324  1,558,957 
1992  338  1,149,228 
1993  261  1,089,975 
1994  332  1,523,927 
1995  370  2,756,786 
1996  448  2,290,385 
1997  639  3,879,166 
1998  1059  3,554,037 
1999  1053  4,099,024 
2000  1370  7,557,355 
2001  1145  5,081,306 
2002  1117  3,226,787 
2003  1056  3,560,739 
Source:  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  ROC 
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2.4.2  Geographic  Characteristics  of  Foreign  Investment  in  Taiwan 
The  major  national  sources  of  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan  include  the  United  States, 
Japan,  British  Possessions  in  Central  America,  Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  Holland,  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  etc.  In  order  to  consider  the  statistical  analysis,  foreign  companies 
which  invested  into  Taiwan  were  grouped  into  six  groups;  there  were  Asian  countries, 
American  countries,  European  countries,  Oceanic  countries,  African  countries,  and 
others  shown  in  Table  2.4.2.  The  highest  proportion  of  approved  foreign  investment 
came  from  American  countries,  which  was  46%  of  the  total  investment  figure.  The 
second  source  of  investment  was  contributed  by  Asian  countries,  which  have  over  one- 
third  of  the  total  amount.  Counted  together,  the  investment  sum  contributed  by 
American  countries  and  Asian  countries  indicated  that  84%  of  the  total  foreign 
investment  total  came  from  these  two  areas.  The  third  area  of  foreign  investment 
sources  was  European  countries  which  had  14%  of  the  total  foreign  investment. 
Tnh1e  247  Statistics  on  Annroved  Foreign  TnvectmPnt  by  e,,,,,.,,,  "  -AT,.,  A  tee.,  TTn:  f"  TTCC  1  AAA 
Year 
Asia 
Countries 
American 
Countries 
European 
Countries 
Oceania 
Countries 
Africa 
Countries  Others  Total 
1951-1960  1,681  23,531 
...  ... 
25,212 
1961-1970  90,227  227,879  52,663  233 
..  .. 
371,002 
1971-1980  462,802  651,184  225,264  1,944  16,307  1,357,501 
1981-1990  4,187,130  3,401,128  1,313,786  143,544  498,534 
.. 
9,544,122 
1991  704,674  671,723  161,421  5,383  15,756  1,558,957 
1992  635,265  328,647  164,963  6,606  13,747 
.. 
1,149,228 
1993  489,882  355,849  209,974  19,896  14,374  1,089,975 
1994  804,082  421,649  243,590  26,699  27,907  1,523,927 
1995  747,686  1,633,112  334,887  26,627  14,474 
...  2,756,786 
1996  1,013,348  1,047,430  197,016  15,502  14,144  2,945  2,290,385 
1997  1,486,894  1,278,707  399,957  656,248  51,505  5,855  3,879,166 
1998  1,070,816  2,011,696  363,156  22,319  81,757  4,293  3,554,037 
1999  1,012,492  2,497,007  460,205  66,217  63,103 
. 
4,099,024 
2000  2,367,451  3,903,436  1,200,305  63,012  10,051  13,100  7,557,355 
2001  1,357,848  2,468,715  1,181,760  60,706  10,013  2,264  5,081,306 
Total  16,432,278  20,921,693  6,508,947  1,114,936 
, 
831,672  28,457  45,837,983 
Source:  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  ROC 
As  shown  in  Figure  2.4.2  and  Figure  2.4.3,  the  top  three  geographic  regions  of  foreign 
investment  were  American  Countries  of  which  the  main  country  is  America,  Asian 
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Countries  of  which  the  main  country  is  Japan  and  European  Countries  of  which  the  main 
countries  are  Britain,  Germany  and  Holland.  There  are  6751  (51%)  and  US$  18,503 
million  (35%)  of  foreign  investment  applications  from  Asian  Countries.  American 
Countries  contributed  4568  cases  (34%)  and  US$  24,115  million  (45%)  of  foreign 
investment  in  Taiwan. 
870,091 
1,342,962  2%  42,102 
7,752,844  3%  )  0% 
15% 
18,502  928 
35% 
24,114,582 
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Q  Oceania  Countries     Africa  Countries  IS  Others 
Figure  2.4.2  Statistics  on  Approved  Foreign  Investment  by  Amount  and  by  Area 
Sources:  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  ROC 
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Figure  2.4.3  Statistics  on  Approved  Foreign  Investment  by  Cases  and  by  Area 
Sources:  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  ROC 
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The  largest  amount  of  foreign  investment  was  invested  by  American  countries,  mostly  by 
the  United  States.  This  phenomenon  maybe  can  be  explained  by  the  relationship  between 
the  United  States  and  the  government  of  the  Republic  of  China.  When  the  government 
of  Republic  of  China  withdrew  from  mainland  China  to  Taiwan,  the  United  States 
provided  economic  aid.  From  that  time,  Taiwan  built  a  close  relationship  with  United 
States,  even  though  Taiwan  signed  off  from  the  United  Nations  in  1971.  Because  of  this 
historical  background,  the  majority  of  foreign  investment  was  invested  by  the  United 
States. 
Asian  countries  were  the  second  catogory  which  accounted  for  more  than  a  half  of 
foreign  investment  cases.  One  possibility  was  that  the  government  in  Taiwan  had 
encouraged  overseas  Chinese  to  invest  into  Taiwan  and  overseas  Chinese  who  had 
immigrated  to  nearby  countries  were  encouraged  because  of  location.  Another 
possibility  was  that  Taiwan  was  under  Japan's  control  for  a  long  time,  the  Japanese 
companies  already  invested  in  Taiwan  and  they  wanted  to  continue  their  business  with 
Taiwanese  companies.  On  the  other  side,  Japanese  companies  control  the  key 
components  of  manufacturing  and  the  Taiwanese  companies  have  to  cooperate  with 
them  in  order  to  obtain  these  components  or  key  technology.  Therefore,  the  historical 
background  can  maybe  explain  that  Asian  countries  and  American  countries  had  over 
82%  of  the  cases  and  the  amount  involved  in  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan.  European 
countries  are  the  third  category  of  foreign  investment  applications  both  on  the  amount 
and  the  corporate  cases.  As  a  result  of  the  great  distance,  those  European  countries  had 
less  investment  and  a  smaller  amount  in  Taiwan. 
As  above,  a  similar  analysis  shows  the  main  regions  of  foreign  investment  are  American 
countries  and  Asian  countries.  As  shown  in  Figure  2.4.4,  from  1952  until  1995,  the 
Asian  countries  were  the  leading  countries  based  on  the  amount  of  inbound  foreign 
investment  in  Taiwan  compared  with  other  regions.  However  from  1995  onwards, 
American  countries  became  prime  investors.  But  when  calculated  on  the  number  of 
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cases,  Asian  countries  are  still  the  main  area  of  inbound  foreign  investment  applications, 
as  shown  in  Figure  2.4.5. 
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2.4.3  Industry  Characteristics  of  Foreign  Investment  in  Taiwan 
Foreign  investors  in  Taiwan  are  mainly  involved  in  the  Electronic  &  Electrical 
Appliances  industry.  As  shown  in  Figure  2.4.6,  the  top  five  industries  that  attracted  the 
most  inbound  foreign  investment  are  the  Electronic  &  Electrical  Appliances  industry 
(25%),  the  Banking  &  Insurance  industry  (16%),  the  Services  industry  (11%),  the 
Chemical  industry  (8%)  and  the  Wholesale  &  Retail  industry  (8%). 
1,291,415 
1,911,052 
4% 
2,358,  ( 
4% 
2,599,2C 
5%  , 
325 
IV, 
Unit:  US$1.000 
   Electronic  &  Electric  Applicances     Banking  &  Insurance  Q  Service 
Q  Chemicals     Whole  Sale  &  Retail     Trade 
   Basic  metals  &  Metal  products  Q  Machinery  Equipment     Food  &  Beverage  Processing 
   Total  Others 
Figure  2.4.6  Statistics  on  Approved  Foreign  Investment  by  Amount  and  by  Industry 
Source:  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  ROC 
On  the  other  hand,  Figure  2.4.7  shows  the  top  five  industries  in  terms  of  the  numbers  of 
invested  cases  are  the  Services  industry  (16%),  the  Trade  industry  (14%),  the  Electronic 
&  Electrical  Appliances  industry  (15%),  the  Wholesale  &  Retail  industry  (19%),  and  the 
Banking  &  Insurance  industry  (15%).  This  means  that  the  service  sectors  have  more 
investment  numerically  but  a  smaller  investment  sum  than  the  industrial  sectors. 
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Figure  2.4.7  Statistics  on  Approved  Foreign  Investment  by  Cases  and  by  Industry 
Sources:  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  ROC 
In  addition,  the  government  report  shows  that  the  percentage  of  GDP  constituted  by  the 
agricultural,  industrial  and  service  sectors  stood  at  27.25%,  26.57%  and  45.98% 
respectively  in  1961;  but  the  percentages  changed  to  2.1%,  32.4%  and  65.5%  in  20004. 
According  to  government  reports,  prior  to  1990,  most  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan  was 
in  manufacturing.  After  that  year,  Taiwan  opened  up  the  service  industry  and  brought 
about  a  structural  change  in  foreign  investment  coming  into  the  island.  The  proportion 
of  foreign  investment  flowing  into  manufacturing  steadily  declined,  while  that  flowing 
into  services  increased  rapidly;  from  1991  to  2003,  the  amount  of  approved  foreign 
investment  in  services  exceeded  that  in  manufacturing.  The  foreign  investment  in  the 
service  sector  was  increasing  and  becoming  more  important. 
To  consider  the  Industry  and  the  Area  together  shown  in  Table  2.4.3,  the  data  represents 
that  the  different  country  Area  is  involved  more  in  different  industries.  Firstly,  for  Asian 
countries  the  most  important  industry  is  the  Electronic  &  Electrical  Appliances  industry, 
followed  by  Wholesale  &  Retail  industry  and  then  Banking  &  Insurance  industry.  In  the 
case  of  the  American  countries,  the  major  industry  is  the  Service  industry,  followed  by 
the  Electronic  &  Electrical  Appliances  industry  and  Wholesale  &  Retail  industry.  In 
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European  countries,  these  are  the  three  most  important  industries  in  which  they  are 
heavily  involved  -  the  Banking  &  Insurance  industry,  then  the  Food  &  Beverage 
Processing  industry  and  the  Wholesale  &  Retail  industry. 
Table  2.4.3  Statistics  on  Annrnved  Fnreivn  Tnvestment  by  Industry  and  by  Area  Unit:  USS1.000 
Industries 
Asian 
Countries 
American 
Countries 
European 
Countries 
Oceania 
Countries 
Africa 
Countries 
Others  Total 
Agriculture  &  Forestry  8,222  16,514  1,415  ... 
26,151 
Fishery  &  Animal 
Husbandry 
11,177  11,450  ... 
22,627 
Mining  44,669  2,322  2,097  2,349  .. 
51,437 
Food  &  Beverage 
Processing  438,165  419,966  245,525  448  187,311  ... 
1,291,415 
Textile  173,984  158,678  31,718  5,744  7,643  377,767 
Garment  &  Footwear  104,765  53,136  4,103  2,443 
..  .. 
164,447 
Leather  &  Fur  Products  9,819  168,682  4,254  2,592  ... 
185,347 
Lumber  &  Bamboo 
Products 
68,179  16,962  8,255  93,396 
Paper  Products  & 
printing 
33,648  63,509  5,069  44,137 
... 
146,363 
Chemicals  1,056,194  1,819,258  1,066,383  62,690  214,640  6,326  4,225,491 
Rubber  products  291,210  99,722  56,764  682 
.. 
448,378 
Plastic  Products  54,218  79,415  53,428  25,133  89  44  212,327 
Non-Metallic  Minerals  318,812  169,517  89,734  1,923  725 
... 
580,711 
Basic  metals  &  Metal 
products 
985,681  543,327  128,845  675,558  25,272 
...  2,358,683 
Machinery  Equipment  1,028,058  663,369  157,920  8,067  53,638 
..  1,911,052 
Electronic  &  Electrical 
Appliances 
4,636,387  6,811,043  1467  265  63,086  2,564  4,506  12,984851 
' 
Transport  Equipment  637,271  184,972  64,533 
..  21,920 
... 
908,696 
Precision  Instruments  211,307  278,650  42,745  1,841 
... 
10,651  545,194 
Construction  267,967  299,236  94,073  3,396 
... 
664,672 
Wholesale  &  Retail  1,394,346  1,738,139  799,853  46,045  28,356  1,765  4,008,504 
Trade  1,298,817  857,931  324,522  111,166  2,777  3,995  2,599,208 
Restaurant  63,885  87,879  18,626 
...  ... 
170,390 
Transportation  125,872  563,087  74,564  464  154,284 
..  918,271 
Storage  5,898  10,175  6,302  7,686  2,274 
..  32,335 
Banking  &  Insurance  1,680,478  4,865,557  1,876,761  116,159  13,459  5,911  8,558,325 
Service  2,377,003  2,419,848  863,109  150,825  155,139  8,904  5,974,828 
Others  1,176,896  1,712,238 
' 
264,981 
, 
10,528 
... 
3,164,643 
Total  18,502,928  124,114  , 
582  1  7,752,844  1,342,962  870,091  42,102  52,625,509 
Sources:  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  ROC 
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From  the  above  profile  analysis  of  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan,  we  can  form  a  general 
idea  that  American  countries  are  the  main  region  in  terms  of  investment  amount  and 
focus  more  on  the  Service  industry  and  Electronic  &  Electrical  Appliances  industry. 
Because  of  location,  Asian  countries  were  the  earliest  investors  and  have  the  most  cases 
in  the  region  of  foreign  investment,  and  they  contribute  more  in  manufacturing,  especially 
in  the  Electronic  &  Electrical  Appliances  industry.  European  countries  entered  Taiwan 
very  late  and  focus  more  on  the  Service  industry.  It  might  be  because  of  the  effects  of 
culture  distance  or  psychic  distance  and  physical  distance,  and  their  ability  to  specialize  in 
the  field  of  service. 
2.5  Taiwan's  Advantages 
Taiwan  not  only  has  great  geographic  superiority,  it  also  has  a  good  investment 
environment  that  is  amenable  to  foreign  enterprises.  The  Industrial  Development  and 
Investment  Center  (IDIC)  has  a  publication  to  introduce  the  investment  environment  of 
Taiwan  to  foreign  investors.  4  According  to  the  2002  global  competitiveness  ranking 
published  by  the  World  Economic  Forum  (WEF),  among  the  80  countries  covered, 
Taiwan  ranked  third  in  the  world,  behind  only  the  U.  S.  and  Finland,  and  first  in  Asia.  In 
2003-2004,  Taiwan  ranked  fifth  out  of  102  economies  maintaining  its  high  rank.  In  its 
report  for  April  2003,  Business  Environment  Risk  Intelligence  (BERI)  of  Switzerland 
ranked  Taiwan  investment  environment  fourth  in  the  world  and  second  in  Asia.  In  the 
assessment  published  in  April  2003  by  the  Political  and  Economic  Risk  Consultancy 
(PERC)  of  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan's  business  environment  is  given  fourth  place  in  the  Asian 
region.  In  the  category  of  Innovation  Potential,  Taiwan  ranked  fourth  in  the  world  in  the 
number  of  U.  S.  patents  granted.  The  assessments  compiled  by  these  institutions,  all  of 
which  enjoy  a  high  degree  of  public  trust,  make  it  clear  that  Taiwan  has  a  low  risk 
investment  environment  and  is  suitable  for  investment.  These  evaluations  once  again 
identify  Taiwan  as  one  of  the  most  favourable  environments  for  investment  in  Asia. 
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As  mentioned  above,  because  of  the  superiority  of  Taiwan's  geography  and  investment 
environment,  Taiwan  lends  itself  to  foreign  investment.  In  the  eyes  of  foreign  investors, 
Taiwan's  greatest  advantages  are  its  close  proximity  to  the  mainland  Chinese  market,  its 
excellent  geographic  location,  convenient  sea  and  air  transportation,  a  complete  network 
of  peripheral  industries,  high  efficiency,  abundant  manpower,  highly  efficient  shipment 
and  logistical  services,  a  complete  infrastructure,  and  strong  support  capabilities. 
After  more  than  50  years  of  economic  development,  Taiwan  has  built  up  a  highly 
liberalized  economic  system  with  highly  advantageous  conditions,  shown  as  the 
following.  5 
1.  Solid  industrial  infrastructure,  strong  vertical  integration  capability  in  IT  and 
electronics  industries. 
Over  the  past  20  years,  Taiwan's  development  has  focused  on  information  technology 
(IT)  as  the  economy's  driving  force,  and  has  become  an  integral  link  in  the  global  high 
technology  industry  supply  chain. 
In  2003,  products  for  which  Taiwan  was  the  world's  largest  supplier  included  following,: 
(1)  eighteen  products  ranked  as  the  world  number  one,  such  as  Notebook  PCs,  cable 
modems,  LCD  monitors,  IC  packaging  etc.  (2)  Six  products  ranked  as  the  world  number 
two,  such  as  IC  design,  digital  steel  cameras,  polyester  filament,  purified  terephthalic 
acid  etc.  (3)  Four  products  ranked  as  the  world  number  three,  such  as  DRAM,  flat  panel 
displays,  nylon  fibre,  and  screws  and  nuts. 
2.  Strong  industrial  research  and  development  capability 
Taiwan  has  placed  an  ever-increasing  emphasis  on  improving  R&D  capabilities.  National 
expenditure  on  R&D  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  rose  from  1.66  %  in  1990  to  2.30  %  in 
2002.  Also  Taiwan  was  granted  5,431  US  patents,  the  fourth  largest  quantity  in  the 
world  after  the  US,  Japan  and  Germany. 
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3.  A  corporate  sector  with  a  strong  spirit  of  entrepreneurship  and  innovation,  and 
experience  in  international  competition. 
4.  A  leading  position  in  Asia  in  venture  capital 
Venture  capital  can  flexibly  integrate  technology,  personnel,  market  opportunities  and 
capital  investment  in  new  technology  industries.  In  2003,  Taiwan's  venture  capital 
industry  had  become  the  largest  in  Asia7.  By  the  end  of  2003,  Taiwan  had  209  venture 
capital  firms,  and  had  raised  a  total  of  NT$158.346  billion  in  venture  capital.  The 
investment  projects  mainly  focused  on  the  semiconductor,  IT,  telecoms,  electronics  and 
fibre  optics  industries. 
5.  Complete  information  and  communications  infrastructure. 
Taiwan  began  privatization  of  the  industry  in  1998  in  order  to  response  to  a  general 
worldwide  trend  toward  telecoms  privatization,  and  to  provide  the  public  with  a  greater 
choice  of  telecoms  providers.  The  telecoms  industry  had  enjoyed  rapid  growth  since 
1998.  By  the  end  of  2003,  there  were  590.8  telephone  line  subscribers  per  1,000  people, 
and  1,109.9  mobile  phone  subscribers  per  1,000  people.  According  to  statistics  from  the 
International  Telecommunications  Union  (ITU),  Taiwan's  mobile  phone  saturation  at 
1,109.9  per  1,000  is  now  the  highest  in  the  world  for  the  second  year,  which  is  far  higher 
than  the  US  (at  488.1  mobile  phones  per  1,000  people),  Japan  (636.6  per  1,000  people) 
and  South  Korea  (679.5  per  1,000  people)  (year  2000  figures)8. 
With  increasing  computer  ownership,  Internet  accounts  in  2003  reached  7.84  million 
users,  reflecting  an  average  growth  of  36.2%  per  year  over  the  last  five  years.  ADSL 
broadband  subscribers  also  have  a  huge  increase  over  the  1999  figure  and  reached  3.01 
million  in  2003.  These  figures  illustrate  the  huge  achievements  Taiwan  has  made  in 
establishing  telecommunications,  information  technology  and  Internet  infrastructure. 
6.  Complete  harbour  infrastructure  and  a  central  location  at  the  hub  of  Asian 
transportation  routes. 
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In  March  2004,  legislation  was  passed  to  designate  Kaohsiung  Port  and  Keelung  Port  as 
free  trade  zones.  This  measure  will  speed  up  customs  procedures;  increase  the  flow  of 
goods  and  lower  business  operating  costs. 
7.  High  extent  of  industrial  computerization  and  digitization,  appreciable  trend 
toward  knowledge  and  technology  industries. 
8.  Large  numbers  of  enterprises  with  experience  in  international  and  mainland 
Chinese  markets,  making  it  certain  that  these  enterprises  will  play  a  key  role  in 
the  future  process  of  integration  in  the  Asian  region. 
With  a  high  level  of  management  capabilities,  Taiwanese  companies  have  established 
mutually-beneficial  collaborative  relationships  with  many  leading  European  and 
American  multinational  corporations,  thus  becoming  a  vital  link  in  the  global  supply 
chain.  For  example,  major  foreign  companies  operating  in  Taiwan  include  DuPont, 
Corning,  Applied  Materials,  Texas  Instruments,  Toshiba,  NEC,  Philips,  General 
Instrument,  Mitsubishi,  Samsung,  and  Siemens. 
The  government  continues  to  approve  related  plans  and  regulations  in  order  to  make 
Taiwan  become  the  ideal  location  for  transactional  corporations  to  undertake  regional  or 
global  logistics  management. 
2.6  Summary 
This  chapter  attempts  to  provide  a  profile  of  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan  from  1951  to 
2003.  It  might  help  in  understanding  the  background  of  Taiwan's  economic 
development  before  looking  at  specific  sections  of  international  joint  ventures. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Taiwan  has  a  complicated  historical  relationship  with  mainland 
China  which  makes  for  an  unstable  political  situation  that  obstructs  Taiwan's  economic 
development.  However,  Taiwan  still  develops  its  economy  and  has  risen  rapidly  to  the 
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status  of  a  "Newly  Industrialized  Country".  Many  assessments  compiled  by  world 
famous  institutions,  make  it  clear  that  Taiwan  has  a  low  risk  investment  environment  and 
is  suitable  for  investment.  They  once  again  identify  Taiwan  as  one  of  the  most 
favourable  environment  for  investment  in  Asia. 
The  encouragement  of  foreign  investment  has  always  been  a  major  policy  of  the 
government  of  Taiwan.  The  government  of  Taiwan  has  long  maintained  an  openly 
welcoming  attitude  towards  investment  and  provides  assistance  to  foreign  nationals  and 
overseas  Chinese  to  encourage  foreign  investment  into  Taiwan.  For  example,  in  2004, 
the  government  has  highlighted  areas  such  as  biotechnology,  opto-electronics  and 
nanotechnology  as  development  targets  to  attract  foreign  investment  into  Taiwan. 
The  main  regions  of  foreign  investment  are  American  countries  and  Asian  countries, 
especially  the  United  States  and  Japan.  The  majority  amount  of  foreign  investment  is 
most  invested  by  the  United  States.  The  top  five  industries  in  which  foreign  investors  are 
mainly  involved  are  the  Service  industry,  the  Electronic  &  Electrical  Appliances  industry, 
the  Banking  &  Insurance  industry,  the  Wholesale  &  Retail  industry,  and  the  Chemical 
industry. 
From  the  viewpoint  of  foreign  investors,  Taiwan's  greatest  advantages  are  its  close 
proximity  to  the  mainland  Chinese  market,  its  excellent  geographical  location,  convenient 
sea  and  air  transportation,  a  complete  network  of  peripheral  industries,  high  efficiency, 
abundant  manpower,  highly  efficient  shipment  and  logistical  services,  a  complete 
infrastructure,  and  strong  support  capabilities. 
This  chapter  provides  a  basic  introduction  to  the  backgrounds  of  Taiwan  and  an 
overview  of  foreign  investment  before  we  move  on  to  international  joint  ventures.  The 
theories  related  to  the  international  joint  venture  are  discussed  in  the  following  chapter. 
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1  Monthly  Bulletin  of  Statistics,  Directorate-General  of  Budget,  Accounting  and  Statistics,  Executive 
Yuan,  R.  O.  C.  [On-line]  Available-http:  //www.  dgbas.  gov.  tw 
2r  Statute  for  Investment  by  Foreign  National  Amended  time  and  articles 
Revision  Article  Content 
time 
1959  Article  5  The  investment  is limited  to  invest  the  following  industries: 
1.  Investments  in  manufacturing  enterprises  which  make  products  needed  domestically, 
2.  Investments  in  enterprises  which  have  an  export  market; 
3.  lnvestments  in  enterprises  which  complement  important  industrial,  mining,  or 
communications; 
4.  Investments  in  other  enterprises  which  are  conducive  to  the  economic  and  social 
development 
1979  Article  5  The  investment  is limited  to  invest  the  following  industries: 
1.  Investments  in  manufacturing  enterprises  which  make  products  needed  domestically, 
2-Investments  in  enterprises  which  have  an  export  market; 
3.  Investments  in  enterprises  which  complement  important  industrial,  mining,  or 
communications; 
4-Investments  in  enterprises  which  are  engaged  in  scientific  and  technical  research 
and  development  ; 
5-Investments  in  other  enterprises  which  are  conducive  to  the  economic  and  social 
development  of  Taiwan. 
1986  Article  5  The  scope  of  investment  is  the  following  industries: 
I-Investments  in  manufacturing  enterprises  which  make  products  needed  domestically, 
2.  Investments  in  service  enterprises  which  are  needed  domestically; 
3.  Investments  in  enterprises  which  have  an  export  market; 
4.  lnvestments  in  enterprises  which  complement  important  industrial,  mining,  or 
communications; 
5.  Investments  in  enterprises  which  are  engaged  in  scientific  and  technical  research 
and  development  ; 
6.  Investments  in  other  enterprises  which  are  conducive  to  the  economic  and  social 
development  of  Taiwan. 
1989  Article  5  The  investor  is  prohibited  from  investing  in  the  following  industries: 
1.  Those  which  may  negatively  affect  public  order 
2.  Those  which  may  negatively  affect  good  customs  and  practices 
3.  Those  which  are  high  pollution 
4.  Those  which  monopolize  by  law  or  are  prohibited  by  the  law. 
The  investor,  who  applies  to  invest  in  the  following  industries,  shall  obtain  an 
approval  thereof  or  a  consent  thereto  from  the  competent  authority  in  charge  of  the 
industry  in  question. 
1.  The  public  service  industries 
2.  The  financial  and  insurance  enterprises 
3.  The  journalist  and  publish  enterprises 
4.  Those  which  are  prohibited  by  the  law 
The  industries  prohibited  under  Paragraph  1  above  or  restricted  under  Paragraph  2 
above  shall  be  prescribed  by  the  Executive  Yuan. 
1997  Article  7  The  investor  is  prohibited  from  investing  in  the  following  industries: 
I.  Those  which  may  negatively  affect  national  security,  public  order,  good  customs  and 
practices,  or  national  health;  and 
2.  Those  which  are  prohibited  by  the  law. 
The  investor,  who  applies  to  invest  in  an  industry  in  which  investment  is  restricted  by 
law  or  by  an  order  given  under  the  applicable  law,  shall  obtain  an  approval  thereof  or 
a  consent  thereto  from  the  competent  authority  in  charge  of  the  industry  in  question. 
The  industries  prohibited  under  Paragraph  I  above  or  restricted  under  Paragraph  2 
above  shall  be  prescribed  and  reviewed  on  a  regular  basis  by  the  Executive  Yuan. 
Sources:  Industrial  Development  &  Investment  Center,  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  Republic  of  China. 
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3  China  Post,  December  17,1986,  at  7. 
The  Industrial  Development  &Investment  Centre,  Ministry  of  Economic  affairs,  ROC 
[On-line]  Available-http:  //www.  idic.  gov.  tw/htm/einto-l.  htm 
The  Industrial  Development  &Investment  Centre,  Ministry  of  Economic  affairs,  ROC 
[On-line]  Available-http:  //www.  idic.  gov.  tw/content/doc/ROC_edoc_2.  doc 
6  The  Industrial  Development  &Investment  Centre,  Ministry  of  Economic  affairs,  ROC 
[On-line]  Available-http:  //www.  idic.  gov.  tw/content/doc/ROC_edoc_2.  doc 
Products  ranked  as  the  world  number  one 
World  Number  1  World  Number  2  World  Number  3 
1.  Notebook  PCs  1.  IC  Design  1.  DRAM 
2.  Wireless  LAN  2.  Digital  Still  Cameras  2.  Flat  Panel  Displays 
3.  xDSL  Modems  3.  Polyester  Filament  3.  Nylon  Fiber 
4.  Cable  Modems  4.  Polyster  Staple  Fiber  4.  Screws  and  Nuts 
5.  Foundry  5.  Purified  Terephthalic  Acid 
6.  IC  Packaging  6.  Polyurethanes  Synthetic  Leather 
7.  SOHO  Routers 
8.  LCD  Monitors 
9:  Optical  Disk  Drives 
10.  Motherboards 
11.  Recordable  Optical  Disks 
12.  Network  Interface  Cards 
13.  Hubs 
14.  ABS  Copolymers 
15.  Glass  Fiber 
16.  Bicycles 
17.  Ethernet  Switches 
Power  Chaires 
7  The  Industrial  Development  &Investment  Centre,  Ministry  of  Economic  affairs,  ROC 
[On-line]  Available-http:  //www.  idic.  gov.  tw/content/doc/ROC-edoc_2.  doc 
The  Industrial  Development  &Investment  Centre,  Ministry  of  Economic  affairs,  ROC 
[On-line]  Available-http:  //www.  idic.  gov.  tw/content/doc/ROC_edoc_2.  doc 
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Chapter  3 
ANTECEDENTS  AND  RATIONALES  OF 
CONTROL  IN  INTERNATIONAL 
JOINT  VENTURES 
3.1  Introduction 
After  the  introduce  about  Taiwan's  history  and  the  development  of  foreign  investment 
and  Taiwan's  advantages,  in  this  chapter,  we  move  on  to  the  topic  of  antecedents  and 
rationales  of  control  in  IJVs.  Although  this  study  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  issue  of 
control  in  international  joint  ventures  and  its  antecedent  factors  in  particular,  it  is 
necessary  to  have  a  basic  discussion  concerning  management  control.  There  are  two 
reasons.  First,  management  control  is  a  core  concept  in  management  it  is  necessary  to 
refer  to  theoretical  and  empirical  studies.  Second,  a  variety  of  theoretical  approaches  in 
management  show  management  literature  can  offer  useful  theories  of  management 
control  and  we  can  use  relative  theoretical  studies  to  illustrate  aspects  of  control  in 
international  joint  ventures.  This  chapter  is  organized  into  five  sections.  General 
theories  of  management  control  are  presented  in  section  3.2.  Then  the  relevant  theories 
and  empirical  studies  of  control  in  international  joint  venture  are  reviewed  in  section  3.3. 
Section  3.4  briefly  discusses  control  and  its  antecedent  factors  and  a  research  framework 
for  this  study  is  proposed.  Finally,  we  summarise  the  empirical  studies  and  provide  a 
brief  conclusion  in  the  final  section  3.5. 
3.2  General  Theories  of  Management  Control 
As  there  is  a  vast  amount  of  research  which  is  relevant  to  management  control,  this 
research  will  only  concentrate  on  the  definition  of  control  and  the  types  of  control  which 
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are  relevant  to  this  study.  First,  the  relevant  studies  regarding  the  definition  of  control 
are  reviewed  then  different  types  of  control  are  examined. 
3.2.1  The  Definition  of  Control 
The  issue  of  control  has  long  been  a  topic  of  interest  in  organization  theory  (Eisenhardt, 
1985)  and  has  been  broadly  discussed  in  the  literatures  of  both  organization  theory  and 
international  management.  Management  control  is  referred  to  as  a  procedure  that  an 
entity  employs  to  affect  its  subsidiary  or  members  behavior  in  order  to  achieve 
organizational  objectives  (Yan  and  Gray,  1994;  Flamholtz,  Das  and  Tsui,  1985;  Arrow, 
1974).  Anthony  (1965)  defines  management  control  as  "the  process  by  which  managers 
assure  that  resources  are  obtained  and  used  effectively  and  efficiently  in  the 
accomplishment  of  the  organization's  objectives".  Lowe  (1971)  describes  the  control 
broader  as  "a  system  of  organizational  information  seeking  and  gathering,  accountability 
and  feedback,  designed  to  ensure  that  the  enterprise  adapts  to  changes  in  its  substantive 
environment  and  that  the  work  behavior  of  its  employees  is  measured  by  reference  to  a 
set  of  operational  sub-goals  so  that  the  discrepancy  between  the  two  can  be  reconciled 
and  corrected".  Machin  (1983)  defines  control  as  "...  the  process  by  which  managers 
assure  that  resources  are  obtained  and  used  effectively  and  efficiently  in  the 
accomplishment  of  the  organization's  objectives".  Child  (1984)  defined  management 
control  as  "a  process  whereby  management  and  other  groups  are  able  to  initiate  and 
regulate  the  conduct  of  activities  so  that  their  results  accord  with  the  goals  and 
expectations  held  by  those  groups".  Simons  (1987)  defined  control  as  the  formalised 
routines  and  procedures  that  use  information  to  maintain  or  alter  patterns  in 
organizational  activity. 
After  reviewing  the  existing  literature,  Geringer  and  Hebert(1989)  demonstrate  that 
control  is  a  process  in  which  one  entity  influences,  to  varying  degrees,  the  behaviour  and 
output  of  another  entity,  through  the  use  of  power  and  authority  (Etzioni,  1965)  and  a 
wide  range  of  bureaucratic,  cultural  and  informal  mechanisms  (Jaworski,  1988  ;  Baliga 
and  Jaega,  1984). 
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With  regard  to  international  joint  ventures,  Hebert  and  Beamish  (1994)  define  the  control 
of  IN  as  "the  process  by  which  the  behaviour  and  output  of  the  venture  are  influenced 
by  an  IN  partner.  "  Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  also  describe  management  control  as  the 
process  by  which  an  organization  influences  its  sub-units  and  members  to  behave  in  ways 
that  lead  to  the  attainment  of  organizational  objectives.  The  extent  of  influence  exercised 
by  each  partner  over  the  following  three  dimensions  of  control:  strategic,  operational  and 
structural  (Flamholtz,  Das,  and  Tsui,  1985;  Ouchi,  1977;  Arrow,  1974).  Driscoll  and 
Paliwoda  (1997),  in  investigating  the  different  dimensions  of  the  mode  of  entry  decision 
and  the  determinants  which  bear  on  mode  choice,  identify  control  as  one  of  the  key 
underlying  dimensions  of  the  choice  of  mode  of  entry.  In  their  study,  they  define  the 
term  "control"  as  "the  extent  to  which  a  firm  desires  authority  over  both  operational  and 
strategic  decision-making  responsibilities  in  the  host  market.  " 
The  definitions  of  control  have  been  described  in  a  wide  variety  of  research  fields. 
Numerous  empirical  studies  have  given  many  definitions.  We  compile  these  definitions 
as  shown  in  Table  3.2.1. 
Tnh1e  121  The  Definition  of  Control 
Authors  Year  Term  Definition 
Management  the  process  by  which  managers  assure  that  resources  are 
Anthony  1965 
control 
obtained  and  used  effectively  and  efficiently  in  the 
accomplishment  of  the  organization's  objectives 
A  system  of  organizational  information  seeking  and  gathering, 
accountability  and  feedback  designed  to  ensure  that  the 
Lowe  1971  Control  enterprise  adapts  to  changes  in  its  substantive  environment 
and  that  the  work  behavior  of  its  employees  is  measured  by 
reference  to  a  set  of  operational  sub-goal's 
The  process  by  which  managers  assure  that  resources  are 
Machin  1983  Control  obtained  and  used  effectively  and  efficiently  in  the 
accomplishment  of  the  organization's  objectives 
A  process  whereby  management  and  other  groups  are  able  to 
Child  1984 
Management  initiate  and  regulate  the  conduct  of  activities  so  that  their 
control  results  accord  with  the  goals  and  expectations  held  by  those 
groups 
Simons  1987  Control 
The  formalised  routines  and  procedures  that  use  information  to 
maintain  or  alter  patterns  in  organizational  activity 
The  process  by  which  one  entity  influences,  to  varying 
Geringer  degrees,  the  behaviour  and  output  of  another  entity  through 
and  1989  Control  the  use  of  power  and  authority  (Etzione,  1965)  and  a  wide 
Hebert  range  of  bureaucratic,  cultural  and  informal  mechanisms 
ali  a&  Jae  a  1984 
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Tnh1P  Il  1  The.  Tlpfinitinn  of  f  nntrnl  (rnntinnel 
Authors  Year  Term  Definition 
Hebert  The  process  by  which  behaviour  and  output  of  the  venture  are 
and  1994  Control  influenced  by  an  IN  partner 
Beamish 
The  process  by  which  an  organization  influences  its  subunits  Yan  and  1994 
Management 
and  members  to  behave  in  ways  that  lead  to  the  attainment  of  Gray  y  Control 
organizational  objectives 
Driscoll  The  extent  to  which  a  firm  desires  authority  both  over 
and  1997  Control  operational  and  strategic  decision-making  responsibilities  in 
Paliwoda  the  host  market. 
Source:  this  study  compiled  from  relative  articles 
In  multinational  companies,  the  concept  of  control  has  been  given  different  terms,  for 
example,  it  has  been  named  as  control,  organization  control,  control  system,  strategic 
control,  communication  control  or  control  mechanism.  Researchers  have  used  the  term 
of  control  differently;  however,  they  have  the  same  perception  of  the  intention  of  control 
that  the  objective  of  control  is  to  reduce  the  varied  behaviour  of  an  organization's 
subsidiary  or employee  in  order  to  achieve  focused  organizational  objectives. 
Therefore,  in  this  study  the  term  of  "control"  or  "management  control"  only  focuses  on 
the  definition  in  relation  to  international  joint  ventures  and  is  used  interchangeably.  In 
this  study,  the  term  of  control  is  referred  to  as  "a  process  that  parents  of  international 
joint  venture  utilise  to  affect  its  venture's  behaviour  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  venture 
conforms  to  its  organizational  objectives  (Ding,  1997;  Schaan,  1983). 
3.2.2  The  Type  of  Control 
Due  to  the  large  number  of  studies  on  the  issues  of  management  control,  this  review  will 
therefore  mainly  highlight  the  representative  studies  of  different  types  of  control  in 
relation  to  international  joint  ventures. 
Ouchi  (1977)  classified  control  into  "behavior  control"  and  "output  control",  shown  as 
Table  3.2.2.  Behavior  control  is  where  the  supervisor  is  personally  observing  and 
checking  the  behavior  of  subordinates.  In  contrast,  output  control  is  involved  with  the 
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extent  to  which  data  on  sales,  returns,  exchanges,  and  so  on  is  used  to  monitor 
operations. 
Tah1e"  Z79  (`nnfrnl  Time  nnA  itc  AntprPrlrnt  Cnnditinnc 
Knowledge  of  Transformation  processes 
Perfect  Imperfect 
Availability  of  output  measures 
High 
Behavior  control 
Or 
Output  control 
Output  control 
Low  Behavior  control  Ritual 
Source:  Ouchi,  W.  G.  (1977).  The  relationship  between  organizational  structure  and  organizational 
control,  Administrative  Science  Quarterly,  22:  95-113. 
Integrating  organizational  theory  and  transaction  cost  theory;  Ouchi  (1979)  describes 
three  fundamentally  different  mechanisms  which  organizations  can  employ  to  effect 
organizational  control  in  order  to  achieve  organizational  objectives.  These  three 
mechanisms  are  referred  to  as  the  market  mechanism,  the  bureaucratic  mechanism  and 
the  clan  mechanism  (an  informal  social  mechanism). 
.  Market  mechanism:  deals  with  the  control  problem  through  their  ability  to  precisely 
measure  and  reward  individual  contributions. 
.  Bureaucratic  mechanism:  depends  on  a  mixture  of  close  evaluation  and  a  socialized 
acceptance  of  common  objectives.  It  involves  close  personal  surveillance  and 
direction  of  subordinates  by  superiors.  The  information  necessary  for  task  completion 
is  contained  in  rules  which  concern  processes  to  be  completed  or  by  specifying  the 
standards  of  output  or  quality. 
.  Clan  mechanism:  relies  on  a  deep  level  of  common  agreement  between  members  on 
what  constitutes  proper  behavior,  and  it  requires  a  high  level  of  commitment  on  the 
part  of  each  individual  to  those  socially  prescribed  behaviors. 
On  the  basis  of  the  management  and  accounting  reviews,  Jaworski  (1988)  identifies  two 
broad  classes  of  control:  formal  controls  and  informal  controls.  He  identifies  formal 
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controls  as  the  written,  management-initiated  mechanisms  that  influence  the  individual  or 
group  behaviour,  which  was  classified  into  three  types:  the  input,  the  process,  and  the 
output  controls.  In  contrast,  informal  controls  are  unwritten,  worker-based  mechanisms 
that  influence  the  individual  or  group  behaviour,  also  classified  into  three  categories:  self- 
control,  social  control,  and  cultural  controls.  Extending  Jaworski's  (1988)  results, 
Jaworski,  Stathakopoulos  and  Krishnan  (1993)  identify  four  combinations  of  controls:  (1) 
a  traditional  bureaucratic  management  control  system  whose  primary  emphasis  is  on 
formal  controls,  (2)  a  clan  system  control  whose  primary  emphasis  is  on  informal 
controls,  (3)  a  low  control  system  whose  low  formal  control  is  combined  with  low 
informal  control,  and  (4)  a  high  control  system  whose  high  formal  control  is  combined 
with  high  informal  control. 
Parker  and  Lewis  (1995)  summarized  the  classical  model  of  control  using  the  following 
concepts  (Parker,  1986a,  1986b). 
.  Authority-based  control:  This  is  centralized  control  exercised  through  formal  lines  of 
authority  and  positions  of  responsibility  at  each  point  in  the  organizational  hierarchy. 
.  Disciplinary  control:  This  approach  involves  restriction,  prohibition,  direction  and 
transactions  for  non-compliance.  Budgetary  control  has  been  often  employed  as  a 
part  of  disciplinary  control. 
"  Coordinative  control:  This  targets  the  coordination  of  various  key  organizational 
functions  through  the  exercising  of  the  supervisors'  authority  and  self-adjustment 
between  subordinates.  Mechanisms  include  specification  of  objectives,  tasks,  lines  of 
authority,  spans  of  control,  costing,  budgeting  and  transfer  pricing. 
"  Controls:  This  sees  effective  control  being  achieved  via  the  employment  of  `control' 
such  as  rules  of  behavior,  workplace  procedure,  technical  standards  and  budget 
targets. 
"  Exception  control:  This  involves  the  detection  of  significant  variances  from  planned 
targets  and  the  correction  of  such  variances.  Variances  in  actual  operating  results 
from  predetermined  standards  or  targets  are  seen  as  denoting  inefficiency  and 
ineffectiveness. 
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Emmanuel  et  al.  (1990)  classifies  control  into  a  number  of  major  types: 
"  Behavior  (or  action)  control:  Actual  behaviors  are  monitored  and  compared  with 
specified  desirable  behaviors.  Although  suitable  for  programmed  or  routine  tasks, 
generally  such  controls  have  limited  applicability  to  managerial  work. 
"  Output  (or  result)  control:  Actual  results  are  monitored  against  those  that  are  desired. 
Where  available,  such  controls  are  often  preferred  for  much  managerial  work,  as 
evidenced  by  the  widespread  use  of  profit  centers. 
"  Input  controls:  comparison  of  resources  used  in  task  performance  against  pre-set 
budgets. 
"  Personnel  controls:  desirable  behavior  is  encouraged  by  the  selection,  recruitment  and 
training  of  appropriate  people  to  help  ensure  that  they  conduct  themselves  in 
predictable  and  desirable  ways. 
"  More  general  social  controls:  appropriate  behavior  patterns  are  encouraged  by  the 
development  of  a  cultural  ethos  which  controls  individual  behavior  by  means  of  the 
establishment  of  appropriate  norms  and  values,  which  are  monitored  on  a  general  and 
random  basis. 
Anthony  (1988)  describes  one  management  control  system  as  three  coexisting  control 
systems,  which  include  management  control,  task  control  and  strategic  planning. 
Anthony  and  Govindarajan  (1998)  also  explore  the  relationship  between  the  operation  of 
management  control  systems  and  the  actors'  power  resources  in  multinational  companies. 
Based  on  the  organizational  theory  literature  in  multinational  companies,  they  distinguish 
three  types  of  control  namely;  "personal  control",  "bureaucratic  control"  and  "social"  or 
"cultural"  control. 
"  Personal  control:  relies  on  direct  close  personal  supervision  of  lower  levels  by  higher 
(Child,  1984). 
"  Bureaucratic  control:  relies  on  the  deployment  of  social  control  mechanisms  to  make 
employees  operate  effectively.  It  is based  on  formalized  procedures  and  systems  such 
as  budgeting,  investment  appraisal,  or  formal  human  resource  management  policies. 
Child  (1984)  emphasizes  the  budgetary  and  standard  cost-variance  accounting 
controls  within  a  bureaucratic  mechanism. 
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"  Social  or  Cultural  control:  depends  on  developing  a  manager's  identification  with  and 
commitment  to  the  values  and  objectives  of  the  corporation. 
According  to  the  object  of  control,  Groot  and  Merchant  (2000)  classify  control 
mechanisms  as  actions,  results,  or  personnel/cultural  shown  as  Table  3.2.3. 
Table  3.2.3  Tvne  of  Control  Mechanisms  Classified  by  the  Ohiect  of  Control 
Action  Controls  Results  Controls  Personnel/Cultural  Controls 
Require  adherence  to  specific  Set  performance  targets  and  Select  partner(s)  who  can  be 
actions  defined  in  legal  monitor  performance  reports.  trusted  (e.  g.,  reliable  history, 
contracts.  Ask  for  explanations  and  give  shared  management 
advice  where  appropriate.  philosophy). 
Require  adherence  to  pre-  Set  performance  targets  and  Place  qualified,  loyal  personnel 
specified  policies  and  monitor  performance  reports.  in  key  operating  positions. 
procedures  (with  checking  by  Intervene  when  necessary. 
auditors  and  penalties  for  non- 
adherence). 
Review  and  approve  certain  Set  performance  targets  and  Require  specified  training. 
planned  decisions  (e.  g.,  promise  and  provide  rewards  for 
proposed  investments).  good  performance. 
Source:  Groot,  T.  L.  C.  M.  &  merchant,  K.  A.,  (2000).  Control  of  International  Joint  Ventures, 
Accounting  Organizations  and  Society,  25(6):  579-607. 
Yan  and  Gray  (1994,2001)  state  that  parent  firms  can  exercise  control  in  three  ways  (1) 
strategic  control  by  the  IN's  board  of  directors,  (2)  operational  control  by  the  joint 
venture's  top  management;  and  (3)  structural  control  by  imposing  the  procedures  and 
routines  of  the  parent  companies  in  the  IJV. 
Stewart  (2002)  examines  management  control  systems  that  are  used  by  a  US  physicians 
group.  Reviewing  the  existing  literature,  he  describes  an  effective  set  of  formal  controls 
that  includes  three  major  mechanisms:  operational  plans,  performance  measurement 
systems  and  feedback  mechanisms. 
.  Operational  plans:  include  the  company's  annual  master  budget  and  the  related 
supporting  work  plans  and  are  the  standard  for  operating  performance. 
.  Performance  measurement  systems:  report  the  financial  results  and  operating  data  of 
the  work  activities  on  a  periodic  basis. 
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.  Feedback  mechanisms:  report  the  variances  that  generated  from  the  comparison  of 
actual  and  planned  performance  within  the  organization  periodically  through  various 
interim  reports. 
In  summary,  this  review  of  the  existing  literature  suggests  that  various  mechanisms  or 
types  of  management  control  developed  by  scholars  are  well  documented.  We  compile 
the  relative  literatures  of  control  mechanism  in  Table  3.2.4. 
Table  3.2.4  The  Relative  Literatures  of  Control  Mechanism 
Authors  Year  Control  mechanisms 
Ouchi  1977  Behavior  control 
Output  control 
Market  mechanism 
Ouchi  1979  Bureaucratic  mechanism 
Clan  mechanism 
Authority-based  control 
Disciplinary-based  control 
Parker  1986  Coordinative  control 
Controls 
Exception  controls 
Management  control 
Anthony  1988  Task  control 
Strategic  planning  control 
Jaworski  1988 
Formal  controls 
Informal  controls 
Behavior  (action)  control 
Output  (result)  control 
Emmanuel  et  al.  1990  Input  controls 
Personnel  controls 
Social  controls 
Authority-based  control 
Disciplinary  control 
Parker  and  Lewis  1995  Coordinative  control 
Controls 
Exception  control 
Anthony  and 
Personal  control 
Govindarajan  1998  Bureaucratic  control 
Social  or  culture  control 
Action  controls 
Groot  and  Merchant  2000  Results  controls 
Personnel/culture  controls 
1994 
Strategic  control 
Yan  and  Gray  ,  Operational  control  2001  Structure  control 
Operational  control 
Stewart  2002  Performance  measurement  systems 
Feedback  mechanisms 
Source:  this  study  compiled  from  relevant  articles 
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Based  on  the  above  literature  review,  this  study  uses  the  decision-making  and  the 
appointment  of  high-level  management  to  discuss  the  control  of  international  joint 
venture  in  Taiwan. 
3.3  Theoretical  and  Empirical  Studies  Relating  to  Control 
of  International  Joint  Ventures 
An  international  joint  venture  agreement  legally  creates  aN  through  a  contract  and 
identifies  the  major  rights  and  obligations  of  the  partners.  However,  the  legal  agreement 
in  an  IN  cannot  ensure  that  the  partner's  objectives  will  be  observed  precisely. 
Therefore,  the  joint  venture's  partners  typically  rely  on  various  control  mechanisms  to 
ensure  their  objectives  are  achieved.  Control  is  a  crucial  organizational  process  and  also 
a  complex  and  multidimensional  concept.  Control  is  desirable  to  improve  a  firm's 
competitive  position  and  maximize  the  returns  on  its  assets  and  skills  (Agarwal  and 
Ramaswami,  1992).  It  plays  an  important  role  in  the  successful  management  and 
performance  of  international  joint  ventures.  For  example,  Killing  (1983)  found  that  if 
one  partner  has  dominant  control,  the  IN  will  be  operated  more  successful  and  have 
higher  performance.  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  also  suggest  that  the  exercise  of 
control  by  a  parent  company  over  some  or  all  of  an  international  joint  venture's  activities 
helps  to  protect  it  from  the  risk  of  prematurely  exposing  its  technological  or  other 
proprietary  assets  to  the  other  partner. 
Some  researchers  deem  control  as  the  authority  over  decision-making  responsibilities 
(Driscoll  and  Paliwoda,  1997;  Hill  et  al.,  1990;  Young  et  al.,  1989;  Klein,  1989; 
Anderson  and  Gatignon,  1986;  Philips,  1982).  Driscoll  and  Paliwodä  (1997),  in 
investigating  the  different  dimensions  of  the  mode  of  entry  decision  and  the  determinants 
which  bear  on  mode  choice,  define  the  term  "control"  as  "the  extent  to  which  a  firm 
desires  authority  both  over  operational  and  strategic  decision-making  responsibilities  in 
the  host  market.  "  They  elucidate  control  as  having  some  benefits  for  the  partners.  First, 
control  can  be  used  to  safeguard  supplies  of  essential  inputs  to  the  production  process, 
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coordinate  activities,  ensure  the  quality  of  end  products,  and  influence  the  logistical  and 
marketing  activities  for  the  production  for  the  target  market.  Second,  control  can  enable 
firms  to  make  more  precise  decisions  in  response  to  the  demands  of  the  market,  and  in 
turn  to  increase  the  satisfaction  of  the  customers.  Third,  control  enables  the  firm  to 
anticipate  and  respond  to  the  strategies  of  competitors. 
Prior  research  has  also  found  that  many  international  joint  ventures  fail.  Kogut  (1988) 
found  that  32%  of  one  sample  of  joint  ventures  failed  within  the  first  10  years.  In  a 
sample  of  over  5000  subsidiaries  of  180  large  US  multinationals,  Gomes-Casseres  (1987) 
found  that  31%  of  joint  ventures  were  unstable.  Some  authors  have  suggested  that 
control  problems  are  one  of  the  primary  causes  of  international  joint  venture  failures 
(Dacin,  Hitt  and  Levitas,  1997;  Parkhe,  1993;  Kogut,  1989;  Beamish,  1988).  However, 
only  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  international  joint  venture  research  has  focused  on 
control  issues.  For  example,  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  wrote 
"The  issue  of  control  has  received  only  fragmented  and  unsystematic  attention 
in  joint  venture  literature  and  managers  have  received  minimal  guidance  about 
when  and  how  to  use(the  various  control  options),  as  well  as  about  the 
potential  trade-offs  between  alternative  control  options".  (Geringer  and 
Hebert,  1989,  p237,  p250) 
Glaister(1995)  argues  that  the  relevant  literature  on  joint  ventures  basically  focuses  on 
two  parts:  emphasizing  on  general  issues  in  the  management  of  joint  ventures  where  the 
problems  are  often  running  them(Ohmae,  1989;  Datta,  1988;  Contractor  and  Lorange, 
1988;  Koot,  1988;  Otterbeck,  1981;  Peterson  and  Shimade,  1978;  )  and  providing 
guidelines  as  to  how  joint  ventures  should  be  managed  (Lorange,  1988;  Schaan,  1988; 
Devlin  and  Bleackley,  1988;  Lorange  and  Probst,  1987;  Killing,  1982;  Holton,  1981). 
After  reviewing  previous  literature,  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  identify  three 
dimensions  of  joint  venture  control:  the  mechanism  of  control,  the  extent  of  control  and  a 
focus  of  control. 
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(1)  Mechanism  of  control 
The  mechanism  of  control  refers  to  the  methods  by  which  control  is  exercised.  Initial 
researches  show  that  firms  frequently  rely  on  majority  ownership  or  on  voting  rights  to 
achieve  effective  management  control  of  an  IN's  activities  (Stopford  and  Wells,  1972; 
Friedman  and  Beguin,  1971;  Tomlinson,  1970).  Behrman  (1970)  and  Friedman  and 
Beguin  (1971)  suggest  that  control  is  not  a  strict  and  automatic  consequence  of 
ownership.  It  is  a  variety  of  mechanisms  which  are  available  to  firms  in  exercising 
effective  control  such  as  the  right  of  veto,  representation  in  management  bodies  and 
special  agreements  related  to  either  technology  or  management.  Parent  firms  might  also 
be  able  to  depend  on  their  technical  superiority  and  managerial  skills  as  a  means  of 
guaranteeing  participation  in  the  management  of  operations.  Methods  of  exercising 
managerial  control  can  also  be  found  in  the  appointment  of  a  joint  venture's  general 
manager  and  key  functional  managers,  and  the  employment  of  different  ownership 
structure  arrangements  (Rafii,  1978;  Gullander,  1976;  ). 
Doz  and  Prahalad  (1981,1984)  demonstrate  a  series  of  administrative  mechanisms  which 
can  be  used  by  the  MNCs  to  gain  control  over  subsidiary  operations  and  to  influence 
their  strategies  over  time.  They  identify  three  kinds  of  mechanisms  which  help  to  acquire 
the  control:  (1)  data  management  mechanisms  which  structure  and  provide  data  that  are 
relative  to  the  global  performance  of  the  company,  (2)  managers'  management 
mechanisms  which  shift  the  expectations  of  managers  to  meeting,  and  (3)  conflict 
resolution  mechanisms  which  resolve  the  conflicts  triggered  by  the  necessary  tradeoffs 
among  national  subsidiaries. 
Cullen  and  Johnson  (1995)  in  a  study  of  Japanese  companies,  use  three  mechanisms  of 
control  and  the  extent  of  control  of  decision-making  to  evaluate  the  commitment  to  IJVs 
of  both  Japanese  and  local  partners.  They  indicate  that  mechanisms  of  control  include 
equity  share,  voting  control  and  strategic  placement  of  key  personnel  in  an  IJV. 
Therefore,  they  represent  the  mechanisms  of  control  as:  the  proportion  of  ownership  by 
each  partner,  the  proportion  of  IN  managers  assigned  by  each  partner  and  the 
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proportion  of  IN  directors  from  each  partner.  Yan  and  Child  (2004)  argue  that  parent 
firms  can  use  the  appointment  of  key  management  in  an  IN  to  protect  their  strategic 
resources  or  to  safeguard  the  delegation  of  their  technology  and  management  and  also  to 
increase  their  power  by  creating  dependency  on  the  parent  firms.  They  also  illustrate 
that  the  occupancy  of  key  IN  management  positions  are  important  factors  in  IN  control. 
Schaan  (1983)  classifies  several  control  mechanisms  in  joint  ventures  as  follows: 
representation  on  the  board  of  directors,  formal  agreements,  the  appointment  of  key 
personnel,  participation  in  the  joint  venture's  planning  process  and  reporting 
relationships.  He  makes  a  significant  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  joint  venture 
control  by  identifying  control  mechanisms  into  positive  and  negative  types.  Positive 
controls  are  mechanisms  which  parent  companies  use  to  promote  certain  joint  venture 
behaviours.  In  contrast,  negative  control  mechanisms  tend  to  be  imposed  by  parent 
companies  to  stop  or  to  prevent  the  joint  venture  from  implementing  certain  activities  or 
decisions.  He  found  that  positive  control  was  most  exercised  through  informal 
mechanisms. 
Child  (1984)  identifies  four  mechanisms  of  control  including  personal  supervision, 
formalization,  targeting  systems,  and  cultural  control.  Based  on  a  67  samples  of 
international  joint  ventures  in  China,  Child  and  Yan  (1999)  distinguish  strategic  control 
and  operational  control.  They  describe  strategic  control  as  "control  over  the  means  and 
methods  on  which  the  whole  conduct  of  an  organization  depends  (Child,  1984)" 
including  the  deployment  of  capital,  the  determination  of  strategic  priorities  and  the 
making  of  senior  appointments.  Operational  control  is  "control  over  the  production 
process  within  an  organization,  in  the  sense  of  determining  how  the  employees  of  an 
organization  perform  their  work  (Child,  1984)".  Operational  control  focuses  on 
production  related  activities  such  as  purchasing,  sales  and  distribution,  and  quality.  Their 
results  showed  that  equity  share  is  the  major  driver  for  the  exercise  of  strategic  control 
and  also  influences  operational  control  through  its  effects  on  the  appointment  of  board 
members  and  appointments  to  key  executive  positions.  Also,  non-capital  resources  have 
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a  direct  effect  on  operational  control  in  addition  to  an  indirect  effect  through 
appointments  to  key  executive  positions. 
Previous  studies  of  alliances  have  examined  control  mechanisms  within  the  framework  of 
cultural  controls,  behavioural  actions  controls,  and  outcome  results  controls  (Groot  and 
Merchant,  2000;  Mjoen  and  Tallman,  1997).  Chalos  and  O'Connor  (2004)  have  studied 
the  effects  of  determinants  on  the  usage  of  various  types  of  control  mechanisms  in  US- 
Chinese  joint  ventures.  They  used  various  control  mechanisms  which  included:  (1) 
cultural  controls  which  include  expatriate  staffing  and  socialisation  practices  encourage 
the  alignment  of  partner  values  and  interests;  (2)  behavioural  controls  which  include 
delegated  decision-making  responsibilities  and  parent  company  communications  control 
and  monitor  managers;  and  (3)  output  controls  which  include  management  performance 
incentives  to  motivate  managers  to  meet  strategic  goals  and  objectives. 
According  to  prior  research  results  (Kumar  and  Seth,  1998;  Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989; 
Schaan,  1983),  Jaussaud,  Schaaper  and  Zhang  (2001)  suggest  that  partners  can  use 
several  mechanisms  to  exert  effective  control  over  the  activities  of  joint  ventures. 
"  Active  participation  in  the  joint  venture's  board  of  directors.  Exercising  control 
depends  on  the  capacity  of  certain  administrators  to  influence  the  points  of  view  of 
other  board  members. 
"  Holding  directorship  positions.  Partners  who  keep  total  control  on  certain  key 
functions  can  prevent  misappropriation  and  can  ensure  the  resources  transferred  from 
parent  to  joint  venture  are  utilized  effectively. 
"  Training  and  socialization  of  managers  and  other  employees  of  the  joint  venture. 
"  Special  technology  transfer  agreements  or  supply  of  specific  component  parts  between 
the  partners  of  the  joint  ventures. 
"  Close  contacts  between  the  managers  of  both  partners,  by  installing  committees  and 
working  groups  to  solve  problems  that  the  joint  venture  may  encounter. 
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(2)  Extent 
The  extent  of  control  is  the  degree  to  which  a  parent  company  exercises  control  over  the 
joint  venture  at  strategic  and  operational  levels  (Killing,  1983;  Tomlinson,  1970).  Lyles 
and  Reger  (1993)  suggest  that  the  extent  of  control  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  the 
degree  to  which  joint  venture  managers  enjoy  autonomy  from  the  parent  companies. 
Using  a  sample  of  153  EIJVs  located  in  China,  Newburry,  Zeira  and  Yeheskel  (2003) 
found  that  a  JV's  autonomy  and  effectiveness  had  strong  relationships.  Their  results 
revealed  that  joint  ventures  with  higher  autonomy  have  increased  effectiveness.  Their 
results  imply  that  the  extent  of  control  affects  the  JV's  performance,  and  more  freedom 
will  result  in  greater  effectiveness  of  the  joint  venture. 
In  his  study  of  37  joint  ventures  in  developed  countries,  Killing  (1983)  defines  control  in 
terms  of  the  decision-making  role  of  joint  venture  management.  He  identifies  nine  types 
of  decisions:  pricing  policy,  product  design,  production  scheduling,  manufacturing 
process,  quality  control  replacement  of  managers,  sales  targets,  cost  budgeting  and 
capital  expenditures.  Killing  investigates  whether  each  decision  was  made  by  the  JV 
general  manager  alone,  by  the  local  parent  alone,  by  the  foreign  parent  alone,  by  the  N 
general  manager  with  input  from  the  local  parent,  or  from  the  foreign  parent,  or  from 
both  parents.  He  identifies  three  types  of  control,  namely,  dominant  parent,  shared  and 
independently  controlled. 
(a)  Dominant  parent  control:  Killing  (1983)  states  that  dominant  parent  ventures  are 
managed  much  like  wholly-owned  subsidiaries.  The  dominant  parent  makes  all 
operating  and  strategic  decisions  and  all  functional  managers  will  come  from  or  be 
selected  by  the  dominant  parent. 
(b)  Shared  management  control:  The  use  of  shared  control  is  the  notion  of  split  control. 
Both  parents  manage  and  play  an  active  role  in  the  management  of  joint  ventures. 
Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  provide  empirical  support  for  this  view.  Dunning  and 
Cantwell  (1984)  suggest  that  it  is  possible  to  obtain  the  benefits  of  each  partner's 
expertise  by  dividing  or  splitting  decision-making. 
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(c)  Independent  control:  A  joint  venture  is  relatively  free  of  the  interference  from  either 
parent.  Such  ventures  receive  little  direction  from  either  parent  and  the  venture's 
management  team  is  highly  autonomous. 
From  his  research,  Killing  (1983)  argues  that  dominant  joint  ventures  were  easier  to 
manage  than  shared  joint  ventures,  because  one  parent  was  willing  to  play  a  passive  role. 
Beamish  (1984)  applies  Killing's  scale  analysis  in  an  examination  of  joint  ventures  in 
developing  countries.  However,  his  results  do  not  support  Killing'  findings.  The  main 
reasons  associated  with  the  extent  of  control  are:  (a)  the  percentage  of  equity  committed 
by  the  partners;  (b)  the  joint  venture  general  manager's  autonomy  which  tends  to  be 
controlled  and  influenced  by  how  much  the  joint  venture  fits  into  the  parent  company's 
organizational  structure;  and  (c)  the  balance  of  technology,  management  expertise  and 
distribution  network  contributed  by  the  partners. 
(3)  Focus 
The  focus  of  control  describes  the  areas  of  the  joint  venture's  operation  in  which  control 
is  exercised.  It  suggests  that  partners  tend  to  seek  control  over  specific  activities  rather 
than  over  the  whole  joint  venture.  Schaan  (1983)  explicitly  defines  control  as  "the 
process  through  which  a  parent  company  ensures  that  the  way  a  joint  venture  is  managed 
conforms  to  its  own  interest".  He  finds  that  partners  may  choose  to  exercise  control 
over  a  relatively  wide  or  narrow  scope  of  the  IN's  activities.  Geringer's  (1986) 
research  of  90  joint  ventures  in  developed  countries,  provides  confirmation  that  selective 
control  can  be  used  when  a  parent  exercises  control  over  a  joint  venture.  According  to 
the  literature,  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  note  that  effective  control  should  emphasize 
selective  control  over  those  dimensions  that  a  parent  perceives  as  critical,  rather  than 
attempting  to  control  the  entire  range  of  the  joint  venture's  activities.  In  investigating 
the  control  and  performance  of  INs  in  China,  Luo,  Shenkar  and  Nyaw  (2001)  clarify 
control  into  two  constructs,  namely,  specific  control  and  overall  control.  They  claim  that 
overall  control  is  designed  to  monitor  the  entire  range  of  an  IN's  activities,  whereas 
specific  control  emphasizes  the  selective  areas  which  are  strategically  important  for 
achieving  a  partner's  objectives.  From  their  empirical  investigation,  they  found  that 
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foreign  partners  achieve  more  overall  and  specific  controls  in  joint  ventures  while 
Chinese  parents  have  more  specific  control  in  joint  ventures  in  order  to  acquire 
knowledge  and  skills  from  foreign  partners. 
Control  involves  various  partners  and  each  partner  of  an  international  joint  venture  has 
their  own  objectives;  therefore,  how  to  exercise  control  over  its  joint  venture  plays  an 
important  role  in  successful  cooperation.  However,  little  relevant  literature  on 
international  joint  ventures  has  been  directed  at  the  questions  related  to  what  constitutes 
control  and  what  factors  will  affect  the  degree  of  control  and  also  what  is  the  relationship 
with  the  factors. 
This  study  to  intends  to  add  to  the  knowledge  of  international  joint  ventures  by  focusing 
on  the  nature  of  control  exercised  by  Taiwanese  parent  firms  over  the  joint  ventures  and 
the  relationship  between  control  and  its  antecedent  factors,  in  terms  of  the  parent's 
contributions,  ownership,  bargaining  power  and  motivation. 
3.4  The  Antecedents  of  Control  in  International  Joint 
Ventures 
As  noted  previously,  other  researchers  demonstrate  that  control  is  an  important  function 
of  an  international  joint  venture  and  it  can  be  affected  by  various  factors  such  as  parent's 
contributions,  ownership,  bargaining  power  and  motives.  In  this  section,  the  links 
between  control  and  its  antecedents  are  briefly  explained  and  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in 
Chapter  4. 
Substantial  studies  have  investigated  the  relationship  between  ownership  and  control  of 
IJVs  (Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Pan,  1997;  Lin,  1995;  Meier,  Perez  and  Woetzel,  1995; 
Blodgett,  1991;  Harrign,  1986;  Killing,  1983;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982;  Youseff,  1975; 
Stopford  and  Wells,  1972)  and  most  of  these  research  results  indicate  that  ownership  is 
the  main  method  for  the  IN's  parents  to  gain  control  over  their  joint  ventures.  Although 
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some  studies  have  inconsistent  results,  the  main  argument  of  researchers  suggests  that 
equity  ownership  is  not  the  only  factor  explaining  the  variations  in  control.  Some  other 
factors  will  complement  minority  equity  shares  and  in  turn  affect  control  (Lecraw,  1984). 
Based  on  most  research  results,  the  relationship  between  control  and  ownership  is 
proven  by  most  researchers  (Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Pan,  1997;  Lin,  1995;  Meier,  Perez 
and  Woetzel,  1995;  Blodgett,  1991;  Harrign,  1986;  Killing,  1983;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982; 
Youseff,  1975;  Stopford  and  Wells,  1972).  This  also  shows  that  there  is  a  positive 
relationship  between  the  parent  ownership  and  their  extent  of  control  in  joint  ventures. 
Previous  research  also  suggests  that  the  bargaining  power  of  partners  is  a  critical  variable 
in  determining  patterns  of  control  in  joint  ventures  (Yan  and  Gray,  1994;  Blodgett,  1991; 
Harrigan  and  Newman,  1990;  Lecraw,  1984;  ).  Cooperating  partners  have  increased 
power  to  influence  the  outcome  of  a  negotiation  process  (Brouthers  and  Bamossy,  1997; 
Schelling,  1956;  ),  and  in  turn  can  affect  control  and  the  proportion  of  equity  shares 
(Lecraw,  1984).  Bargaining  power  stems  from  important  advantages  or  assets  such  as 
technology,  export  potential  ability  or  marketing  capability  which  are  important 
resources  for  each  partner  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Yan  and  Gray,  1994;  Grosse  and 
Behrman,  1992;  Blodgett,  1991;  Eiteman,  1990;  Gomes-Casseres,  1990;  Harrigan  and 
Newman,  1990;  Fisher  and  Ury,  1987;  Kobrin,  1987;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982).  Some 
research  results  show  that  bargaining  power  will  affect  control  of  IJVs  (Yan  and  Gray, 
1994;  Lecraw,  1984;  ).  Based  on  prior  studies,  this  study  measures  the  relationship 
between  bargaining  power,  control  and  ownership. 
According  to  a  resource-dependency  perspective,  the  extent  of  control  is  affected  by  the 
resource  contributions  which  are  required  for  the  international  joint  venture  to  succeed 
(Chalos  and  O'Connor,  2004;  Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Mjoen  and  Tallman,  1997;  Lin,  1995; 
Killing,  1983).  For  example,  Child  and  Yan's  (1999)  empirical  investigations  show 
parents  contributing  the  necessary  resources  to  a  joint  venture  which  will  gain  more 
control  over  the  IN  subject.  Various  researchers  find  that  different  resource 
contributions  by  each  partner  will  result  in  a  different  scope  of  control  by  each  partner  in 
exercising  control  to  protect  their  assets  and  investments  (Yan  and  Child,  2004;  Chalos 
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and  O'Connor,  2004;  Yan  and  Ku,  1997;  Lin,  1995).  Some  researchers  also  found  that 
resource  contributions  to  a  joint  venture  may  affect  the  proportion  of  parent's  equity 
shares  (Pan,  1996;  Lin,  1995;  Blodgett,  1991;  Gomes-Casseres,  1990;  Fagre  and  Wells, 
1982).  The  resources  contributed  by  each  parent  provide  a  different  source  of  power 
and  a  different  scope  of  influence  on  control  and  ownership.  Thus,  this  study  intends  to 
explain  the  relationships  between  resource  contribution,  control  and  ownership. 
The  motives  for  forming  an  IN  has  investigated  by  many  researchers  (Glaister,  2004; 
Yan  and  Luo,  2001;  Pan  and  Tse,  1996;  Glaister  and  Buckley,  1996;  Sheth  and 
Parvatiyar,  1992;  Hung,  1992;  Hennart,  1991;  Contractor  and  Lorange,  1988;  Kogut, 
1988;  Harrigan,  1985,1988;  Beamish,  1985;  Mariti  and  Smiley,  1983).  However,  there 
are  very  few  studies  examining  the  relationship  between  motives  and  control 
simultaneously.  Lin  (1995)  reported  that  different  motives  for  joint  venture  formation 
have  different  extents  of  control  and  found  that  the  partner  who  has  learning  motivation 
would  have  greater  control  in  order  to  specifically  acquire  knowledge  from  foreign 
partners.  Chalos  and  O'Connor  (2004)  describe  the  difference  in  partner  perceptions  of 
control  mechanisms  as  determined  largely  by  their  respective  motives.  They  found  that 
knowledge  dependency  and  asset  specific  transaction  costs  to  be  the  determinants  of 
varying  degrees  of  control  for  each  partner.  When  the  partners  have  different  objectives, 
normally  they  will  exercise  various  modes  of  behaviour  to  achieve  their  objectives.  One 
mode  is  exercising  control  over  their  ventures.  Therefore,  this  study  proposes  that  the 
motives  for  forming  an  IN  will  affect  its  control,  and  will  measure  their  relationship. 
As  an  attempt  to  integrate  the  concepts  of  control,  ownership,  bargaining  power, 
resource  contribution,  and  motivation  of  forming  IJVs,  this  study  proposes  a  research 
framework  to  represent  the  main  linkages  which  are  drawn  from  the  literature.  The 
research  framework  of  this  study  is  shown  in  Figure  3.4.1. 
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Figure  3.4.1  The  Research  Framework 
In  the  framework,  it  is  postulated  that  there  are  significant  relationships  between  control 
and  its  antecedent  factors,  namely,  motivation,  contribution,  bargaining  power  and 
ownership.  Ownership  is  also  a  function  of  motivation,  contribution  and  bargaining 
power.  More  details  of  relationships  between  permutations  of  the  dimensions  will  be 
elucidated  in  Chapter  4. 
3.5  Summary 
This  study  mainly  focused  on  the  control  of  international  joint  ventures,  and  considered 
what  antecedent  variables  will  affect  control.  This  chapter  reviews  the  relevant  literature 
with  respect  to  the  general  theories  of  management  control  and  the  definition  and  types 
of  control.  In  this  study,  the  term  "control"  refers  to  "a  process  used  by  parents  of 
international  joint  venture  to  affect  the  venture's  behaviour  in  order  to  ensure  that  the 
venture  conforms  to  its  organizational  objectives  (Schaan,  1983;  Ding,  1997).  " 
The  reviews  of  the  prior  literature  provide  examples  of  various  types  of  management 
control.  Most  types  of  management  control  are  grouped  into  one  of  three  classes,  i.  e. 
action  controls,  results  controls,  and  personnel/cultural  controls  (Groot  and  Merchant, 
2000).  Yan  and  Gray  (1994,2001)  state  that  parent  firms  can  exercise  control  in  three 
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ways:  strategic  control,  operational  control;  and  structural  control.  This  study  adopts 
Yan  and  Gray's  results:  utilizing  strategic  control  and  operational  control  to  discuss  the 
control  of  international  joint  venture  in  Taiwan. 
Due  to  the  large  number  of  studies  on  the  issues  of  international  joint  ventures  and  this 
study  only  concentrate  on  the  control  of  IN;  therefore,  the  relevant  literatures  on  the 
control  of  IN  have  been  reviewed  only  and  the  antecedents  of  control  associated  with 
motives,  parent's  resource  contributions,  bargaining  power,  and  ownership  have  been 
described  briefly.  In  order  to  represent  the  relationship  between  control  and  its 
antecedent  factors,  a  research  framework  is  proposed  and  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in 
Chapter  4. 
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Chapter  4 
THE  ANTECEDENTS  OF  CONTROL  IN 
INTERNATIONAL  JOINT  VENTURES 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter  3  has  reviewed  briefly  on  the  definitions  of  control  and  its  antecedent  factors  in 
international  joint  ventures.  In  this  chapter,  we  focus  on  the  factors  which  affect  the 
control  of  international  joint  ventures.  Therefore,  the  following  sections  demonstrate  the 
relevant  literature  associated  with  the  antecedents  of  control  in  the  context  of  the  IN  in 
Taiwan.  This  chapter  is  organized  into  five  sections.  In  each  subsection,  relevant 
literature  is  reviewed  first  and  then  hypotheses,  in  relation  to  the  control  of  IN,  are 
proposed.  Section  4.2  describes  the  ownership  and  discusses  the  determinants  of  equity 
ownership  and  its  relationship  with  control.  Section  4.3  explains  the  bargaining  power 
and  its  relationship  with  control  and  ownership.  Section  4.4  describes  the  contribution 
which  is  derived  from  parents  and  the  type  of  resources  contributed  by  parents.  The 
effect  of  this  contribution  is  discussed  and  the  relationship  among  control,  ownership, 
and  bargaining  power  is  expressed.  Section  4.5  first  examines  alternative  theoretical 
rationales  for  international  joint  venture  and  then  moves  onto  the  empirical  literature 
relating  to  the  motives  for  the  formation  of  an  IN.  The  relationship  between  the 
motivation  for  formation  of  an  IN,  control  and  other  factors  are  discussed.  Finally,  a 
research  framework  of  this  study  is  proposed.  In  the  next  section,  we  start  to  describe 
the  antecedents  of  control. 
4.2  Ownership  of  International  Joint  Ventures 
Funding  is  the  basic  resource  for  building  a  business.  The  issue  of  ownership  is  central 
to  any  theory  of  multinational  enterprises  and  an  important  issue  in  international  business 
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studies  (Pan,  1996,2002;  Pan  and  Li,  2000;  Hennart,  1991;  Blodgett,  1991;  Contractor, 
1990;  Gomes-Casseres,  1989,1990;  ).  For  the  international  joint  venture,  the  amount  of 
investment  in  the  venture  represents  the  equity  ownership  in  the  ventures  held  by  the 
partners.  The  equity  ownership  of  a  joint  venture  will  affect  the  number  of  N  board  of 
directors,  which  board  members  serve  as  a  communication  and  information-processing 
channel  between  the  parent,  and  the  joint  venture  (Leksell  and  Lindgren,  1982)  and  so 
affect  the  important  decisions  of  joint  ventures.  Therefore,  equity  ownership  has  a  very 
important  meaning  for  the  parent  of  joint  ventures.  Under  Taiwan's  company  law,  the 
corporate  control  of  a  joint  venture  can  be  exercised  through  the  voting  rights  of  the 
shareholders,  and  the  inherent  powers  of  the  board  chairman.  The  amount  and  type  of 
shares  held  determine  voting  rights  in  the  company.  Usually,  one  share  has  one  vote; 
thus,  the  most  effective  method  of  gaining  control  is  to  gain  shares. 
4.2.1  The  Determinants  of  Equity  Ownership 
In  the  pioneering  work  of  Vernon  (1971),  Stopford  and  Wells  (1972),  and  Franko 
(1971),  four  factors  were  seen  as  major  determinants  of  the  level  of  equity  ownership  of 
multinationals  in  their  subsidiaries;  (a)  the  desired  ownership  level  of  the  multinational,  (b) 
the  bargaining  power  of  the  multinational,  (c)  the  desired  level  of  local  equity 
participation  of  the  host  country,  and  (d)  the  bargaining  power  of  the  host  government 
(including  the  bargaining  power  of  locally-owned  firms  in  the  host  country).  Lecraw 
(1984)  stated  that  the  desired  ownership  structure  of  a  multinational  firm  for  its 
subsidiaries  in  LDCs  is  a  function  of  its  firm-specific  advantages,  internalization 
advantages,  and  host  country  advantages.  He  stresses  that  when  the  complexity  of  the 
managerial  technology  increases,  the  multinational  increases  its  desire  for  a  higher  degree 
of  equity  ownership  and  control.  Conversely,  host  governments  may  push  for  increased 
local  equity  participation  in  order  to  increase  the  management  expertise  of  their 
entrepreneurs  and  managers. 
Yan  (1997)  indicates  that  the  ownership  rights  have  three  dimensions.  The  first  is 
ownership  rights  associated  with  the  range  of  resources  valued  as  equity  investments 
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committed  by  the  owning  companies.  The  second  is  the  structure  of  a  contract  for  the 
range  of  resources  provided  by  the  partners  in  terms  which  usually  depend  on  the  local 
legal  system,  social  customs  and  the  technical  attributes  of  the  assets  involved.  The  third 
is  the  configuration  of  a  range  of  resources  provided  on  a  non-contractual  basis  and 
which  represent  the  level  of  commitment  of  the  owning  companies  to  their  joint  ventures. 
Yan  and  Gray  (1994b,  1996)  regard  equity  as  the  provision  of  a  "capital  resource"  to  a 
joint  venture  by  its  partner  companies,  typically  finance  and  sometimes  land  and  buildings. 
They  distinguish  and  categorize  the  resources  as  "capital  resource"  and  "non-capital 
resource",  the  latter  includes  technology,  management  expertise,  local  knowledge,  raw 
material  procurement  channels,  product  distribution  and  marketing  channels,  and  global 
services  support.  On  the  study  of  the  impact  of  country  of  origin  on  equity  ownership, 
Yan  (2002)  finds  that  the  equity  ownership  tends  to  be  higher  when  the  parent  firms' 
country  of  origin  has  a  strong  currency,  low  cost  of  borrowing,  strong  export  capability 
and  political  stability. 
In  general  terms,  the  choice  of  ownership  structure  for  a  subsidiary  depends  on  MNE's 
strategy  and  on  the  costs  of  different  ways  to  implement  this.  Gomes-Casseres  (1989) 
argues  that  various  studies  on  the  ownership  structure  of  foreign  subsidiaries  suggest 
that  the  costs  and  benefits  of  different  ownership  structures  depend  on  three  types  of 
factors.  These  factors  are  motivation  for  cooperation,  transaction  costs  of  cooperating 
through  contractual  means  and  the  organization  costs  of  equity  joint  ventures.  These 
three  types  of  factors  are  reflected  implicitly  in  some  empirical  studies  (Buckley  and 
Casson,  1988;  Hennart,  1988;  Gomes-Casseres,  1985;  Stopford  and  Wells,  1972; 
Tomlinson,  1970;  Friedmann  and  Kalmanoff,  1961).  Using  the  transaction  cost 
perspective,  Gomes-Casseres  (1989)  indicate  that  the  ownership  preferences  of  MNEs 
are  driven  by  a  combination  of  three  factors.  These  are  (a)  the  relevant  capabilities  of  the 
MNEs  and  host  country  firms;  (b)  the  transaction  cost  of  transferring  each  partner's 
capability  to  a  cooperative  venture;  and  (c)  costs  due  to  shirking  by  partners  and 
conflicts  between  partners  do  not  outweigh  the  benefits  of  joint  ownership. 
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An  examination  of  the  literature  suggests  that  the  subsidiary  ownership  decision  could  be 
a  very  complex  function  of  numerous  factors  spanning  host  country  characteristics, 
industry  characteristics,  product  characteristics  and  firm  characteristics  (Root,  1994; 
Gatignon  and  Anderson,  1988;  Robinson,  1978).  Erramilli  (1996)  explores  the  notion 
that  a  multinational's  nationality  influences  its  foreign  subsidiary  ownership  decisions. 
From  their  research  sample,  Stopford  and  Wells  (1972)  find  that  U.  S.  multinationals  have 
a  predominant  preference  for  wholly  owned  subsidiaries.  Weinstein  (1977)  finds  that 
62%  of  the  subsidiaries  are  either  fully  or  majority  owned  in  his  sample  of  American 
multinational  advertising  agencies.  Gatignon  and  Anderson  (1988)  explore  that 
American  multinationals  have  an  intrinsic  tendency  to  prefer  wholly  owned  subsidiaries, 
after  testing  a  transaction  cost  model  to  explain  the  MNE's  degree  of  control  over 
foreign  subsidiaries.  After  analyzing  the  joint  venture  ownership  in  developed  and 
developing  countries,  Beamish  (1985)  finds  that  the  foreign  firms  have  equal-equity 
ownership  in  developed  countries  and  contrastingly  have  majority  or  minority  equity 
ownership  in  developing  countries,  see  Table  4.2.1. 
Tnhie  421  Joint  Venture  Ownershin  in  Develoned  and  fPvP1nnino  rn￿ntripc 
Countries  Frequency  of  equal- 
_equity 
(50-50)  ventures 
Frequency  of  majority  or 
minority  equity  ventures 
Developed  Mergers  &Acquisitions  43  57 
countries  (153) 
samples  Killing  (40)  50  50 
Geringer  (86)  70  30 
Developing  Mergers  &Acquisitions  20  so 
countries  (47) 
samples  Beamish(66)  10  90 
Reynolds  (51)  20  80 
Source:  Beamish,  P.  W.  (1988),  Multinational  Joint  Ventures  in  Developing  Countries, 
New  York:  Routledge,  p.  16. 
Fagre  and  Wells  (1982)  and  Lecraw  (1984)  explain  that  the  wide  variation  in  the 
ownership  of  foreign  affiliates  mainly  lies  in  industry  or  firm-specific  independent 
variables,  as  well  as  in  country-specific  variables  (Kobrin,  1987).  In  his  sample,  Kobrin 
(1987)  explores  how  host  government-imposed  limits  and  performance  requirements 
induce  a  greater  use  of  minority  and  50-50  affiliate, 
, 
particularly  in  the  developing 
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countries.  And  larger  market  size  increases  the  propensity  to  use  50-50  and  minority 
affiliates,  particularly  in  industrialized  countries.  Al-Saadon  and  Das  (1996)  develop  a 
model  to  explain  that  the  ownership  shares  are  determined  as  the  outcome  of  Nash 
bargaining  between  a  multinational  firm  and  a  host  country  firm.  They  deem  that  the 
pattern  of  ownership  distribution  between  the  foreign  parents  and  the  host  parent  firms 
may  be  influenced  by  the  tax/subsidy  policy  of  the  host  country's  government.  Using  the 
Nash  bargaining  model,  they  conclude  that  the  equity  share  of  the  foreign  parents  is 
negatively  related  to  the  fixed  cost  of  the  JVs  and  positively  related  to  the  size  of  the 
market  that  the  JV  serves. 
Using  neural  networks  analysis  in  a  Sino-foreign  joint  venture,  Hu,  Zhang  and  Chen 
(2004)  found  that  equity  ownership  is  basically  a  form  of  control  that  the  foreign  parent 
exercises  over  its  overseas  operations.  Their  results  also  revealed  that  the  time 
commitment  in  terms  of  the  duration  of  the  joint  venture  and  the  regional  growth  rate 
could  be  the  most  significant  factors  for  equity.  They  explained  that  the  longer  duration 
of  the  joint  venture  may  create  more  economic  uncertainty  or  risks;  therefore,  the 
partners  would  consider  having  greater  ownership  to  compensate  for  these  risks. 
4.2.2  The  Relationship  between  Ownership  and  Control 
There  is  substantial  research  literature  to  describe  the  relationship  between  ownership 
and  control;  however,  some  research  results  are  conflicting.  Some  research  indicates 
that  equity  share  is  a  predictor  of  the  overall  control  held  by  IN  partners,  and  of  their 
control  over  strategic  decisions  in  particular  (Child,  2002;  Child  et  al.,  1997;  Yan  and 
Gray,  1996;  Lecraw,  1984;  Killing,  1983;  Youseff,  1975).  Equity  ownership  is  regarded 
as  the  most  direct  means  of  gaining  and  exercising  control  over  the  IN  (Killing,  1983; 
Pan,  1997).  Some  researchers  regard  ownership  as  a  proxy  of  control.  For  example, 
Stopford  and  Wells  (1972),  Fagre  and  Wells  (1982),  Blodgett  (1991)  all  use  ownership 
as  a  proxy  for  management  control  in  joint  ventures.  Some  studies  found  that  the  ability 
of  one  parent  to  influence  the  strategic  decisions  in  INs  is  associated  with  the  equity 
share  (Yan  and  Gray,  1996)  and  results  often  recommended  that  the  foreign  partners 
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should  hold  67%  or  more  of  the  equity  of  an  IN  (  Meier,  Perez  and  Woetzel,  1995). 
From  the  result  of  their  investigation  in  China,  Child  and  Yan  (1999)  indicate  that  equity 
share  is  the  major  lever  for  the  exercise  of  strategic  control  and  also  influences 
operational  control.  They  suggest  that  the  company  should  acquire  a  larger  equity  share, 
because  this  can  increase  the  parent's  ability  to  influence  the  strategic  direction  of  an 
international  joint  venture. 
However,  other  researchers  have  inconsistent  results.  Mjoen  and  Tallman  (1997)  find  no 
link  between  equity  and  strategic  controls  or  between  equity  and  operational  controls.  In 
his  research  sample,  Lecraw  (1984)  finds  that  the  link  between  the  level  of  ownership 
and  control  may  not  be  straightforward.  It  depends  on  the  type  of  technology 
transferred,  the  capabilities  of  the  local  partners,  and  host  government  policies. 
Multinational  enterprises  may  be  able  to  control  the  operations  of  its  subsidiary  without 
majority  ownership,  or,  conversely,  may  have  little  control  over  these  operations  despite 
majority  ownership.  In  addition,  Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  also  argue  that  equity  structure  is 
not  equivalent  to  management  control,  in  their  case  study.  Some  researchers  argue  that 
partner  equity  is  not  the  only  independent  variable  explaining  variation  in  the  uses  of 
behavioural  control  mechanisms  (Chalos  and  O'Connor,  2004;  Child  and  Faukkner, 
1998).  Chalos  and  O'Connor  (2004)  find  that  equity  ownership  seems  to  be  more 
descriptive  of  actual  N  control  mechanisms  rather  than  to  be  a  determinant  of  specific 
management  controls. 
Harrigan  (1986)  demonstrates  that  multinational  companies  intend  to  obtain  a  greater 
control  over  joint  ventures  by  committing  to  majority  equity  shares.  In  her  study  in  the 
Taiwan  context,  Lin  (1995)  finds  the  level  of  ownership  and  control  has  a  positive 
relationship.  Greater  ownership  represents  greater  control  over  the  ventures.  From  the 
Chinese  viewpoint,  the  ownership  of  the  venture  means  the  power  of  control.  On  the 
basis  of  the  alternative  arguments,  this  study  posits  that  ownership  and  control  have  a 
positive  relationship.  Therefore,  the  following  hypotheses  are  represented. 
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H  1:  There  is  a  significantly  positive  relationship  between  the  proportion  of  ownership 
and  the  extent  of  control. 
H  1.1:  The  higher  the  proportion  of  equity  ownership  held  by  host  country  parents 
the  stronger  their  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint 
venture. 
H  1_2:  The  higher  the  proportion  of  equity  ownership  held  by  host  country  parents 
the  stronger  their  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a 
joint  venture. 
4.3  Bargaining  Power  of  International  Joint  Ventures 
Prior  studies  have  demonstrated  that  bargaining  power  can  be  used  to  affect  the  outcome 
of  the  negotiation  process  (Mamossy  1997;  Lax  and  Sebinius  1986;  Schelling,  1956;  )  and 
can  be  derived  from  some  resource  contributions  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Grosse 
and  Behrman,  1992;  Eiteman,  1990;  Kobrin,  1987;  Fisher  and  Ury,  1987;  Fagre  and 
Wells,  1982).  Previous  researchers  also  suggest  that  the  bargaining  power  of  partners  is 
a  critical  variable  in  determining  patterns  of  control  in  joint  ventures  (Blodgett,  1991; 
Harrigan  and  Newman,  1990;  Lecraw,  1984).  Therefore,  this  section  stresses  the 
sources  of  bargaining  power  first,  and  then  discusses  its  relationship  between  control  and 
ownership. 
4.3.1  The  Sources  of  Bargaining  Power 
The  concept  of  bargaining  power  is  related  to  a  bargainer's  ability  to  favourably  change 
the  "bargaining  set"  (Lax  and  Sebinius,  1986),  to  obtain  accommodations  from  the  other 
party  (Dwyer  and  Walker,  1981),  and  to  influence  the  outcome  of  a  negotiation 
(Schelling,  1956).  In  their  study,  Brouthers  and  Bamossy  (1997)  state  that  bargaining 
power  exists  when  foreign  and  local  parties  possess  power  over  each  other  that  can  be 
used  to  affect  the  outcome  of  the  negotiation  process.  They  describe  bargaining  power 
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as  coming  from  three  domains:  (1)  the  bargaining  resources  of  each  party;  (2)  the 
importance  of  the  agreement  to  each  party;  and  (3)  the  degree  of  similarity  of  interests  of 
each  party  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Grosse  and  Behrman,  1992;  Eiteman,  1990; 
Fisher  and  Ury,  1987;  Kobrin,  1987;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982).  They  also  find  that  the 
host  government  can  cause  changes  in  the  levels  of  bargaining  power  of  the  participants 
due  to  the  dependency  of  the  IN  on  the  government  (Tallman  and  Shenkar,  1994; 
Ghoshal  and  Bartlett,  1990;  Lecraw,  1984). 
The  issue  of  the  determinants  of  bargaining  power  has  been  presented  by  some  studies. 
For  example,  Fagre  and  Wells  (1982)  find  that  the  bargaining  power  of  multinational 
firms  is  an  increasing  function  of  five  elements  which  are  the  multinational's 
technological  level,  the  product  differentiation,  the  access  provided  to  export  markets, 
the  invested  sum,  and  the  diversity  of  the  firm's  production  line.  Robinson  (1969) 
stresses  that  partner  contributions  are  important  to  the  process  of  joint  venture 
management  because  the  contributions  and  expected  benefits  of  the  participating  firms 
are  continually  adjusted  to  align  with  shifts  in  relative  power  between  the  partners. 
In  his  study,  Lecraw  (1984)  stresses  that  firm-specific  advantages  which  include  the 
proprietary  product  or  technology,  access  to  relatively  inexpensive  capital,  access  to 
export  markets,  and  management  expertise  may  give  the  multinational  bargaining  power 
over  the  host  country  and  competing  firms.  He  indicates  that  possession  of  a  proprietary 
product  of  technology  may  increase  a  multinational's  bargaining  power  over  the  host 
country,  particularly  if  other  multinationals  or  local  investors  cannot  supply  technology 
of  the  same  type  or  level  of  advancement.  Similarly,  Kobrin  (1987)  indicates  that  the 
sources  of  MNE  bargaining  power  can  be  derived  from  firm-specific  advantages  or 
assets.  He  has  used  several  variables  to  represent  the  sources  of  MNE  bargaining  power, 
such  as  technology,  parent  size,  subsidiary  size,  employment,  and  export  potential.  In 
their  study  of  expectations  and  results  of  contractual  joint  ventures  by  US  and  UK 
MNCs,  Paliwoda  and  Liebrenz  (1984)  indicate  that  the  most  powerful  position  for  the 
MNCs  was  when  firms  hold  a  near  monopolistic  technology  which  could  yield  beneficial 
leverage  at  the  beginning  of  negotiations.  They  summarize  the  elements  which  are  useful 
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to  the  MNCs  in  maintaining  control  as,  cutting-edge  technologies,  additional  services 
such  as  marketing  expertise  or  sales  opening,  a  corporate  trademark,  or  being  the  sole 
proprietor  of  certain  technology. 
Using  bargaining  power  theory  and  transaction  costs  theory,  Gomes-Casseres  (1990) 
state  that  the  investment  size  increases  the  MNE's  bargaining  power  and  the 
attractiveness  of  the  territory  strengthens  the  host  country's  bargaining  power.  He  also 
suggests  that  the  bargaining  process  is  affected  by  several  factors,  such  as  R&D  intensity, 
marketing  intensity,  and  intra-system  sales  and  that  the  outcome  of  ownership 
negotiations  seems  to  be  affected  by  the  market  attractiveness  of  the  subsidiary. 
Focusing  on  their  domestic  joint  venture  research,  Harrigan  and  Newman  (1990)  state 
that  the  bargaining  power  of  potential  joint  venture  partners  is  determined  primarily  by 
what  each  partner  brings  to  the  venture.  Blodgett  (1991)  identifies  five  resources  that 
can  give  a  firm  bargaining  power  in  a  joint  venture.  These  five  elements  are  government 
persuasion,  technology,  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  and/or  marketing  expertise, 
control  of  intra-system  transfers,  and  financial  capital. 
With  regard  to  the  bargaining  power  of  host  parents,  this  mainly  derives  from  their 
control  of  the  environment  in  which  the  joint  venture  will  operate.  Lecraw  (1984)  states 
that  bargaining  power  of  the  host  country  increased  with  the  increasing  attractiveness  of 
its  local  market  and  the  degree  to  which  it  controlled  market  access  through  tariffs,  and 
the  possession  of  scarce  resources.  He  argues  that  the  greater  the  country-specific 
advantages  of  the  host  country,  the  greater  its  bargaining  power  and  the  higher  the  level 
of  local  ownership  it  may  gain  for  local  investors.  Kobrin  (1987)  demonstrates  that  the 
major  bargaining  power  resources  of  the  host  country  are  the  number  of  residents,  and 
its  size  of  Gross  Domestic  Product,  its  rate  of  growth,  its  per  capita  income,  and  its 
technological  and  managerial  capacity.  Inkpen  and  Beamish  (1997)  state  that  knowledge 
of  the  local  environment  is  not  only  a  key  resource  of  local  partners,  but  is  also  a  key 
source  of  bargaining  power. 
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Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  develop  an  integrative  model  of  international  joint  ventures  that 
encompass  two  context-based  and  seven  resource-based  components  of  bargaining 
power.  The  context-based  components  of  bargaining  power  are  stakes  and  availability  of 
alternatives.  A  stake  is  a  bargainer's  level  of  dependence  on  a  negotiation  relationship 
and  on  its  outcomes.  The  potential  partner  who  has  more  alternatives  is  more  powerful 
because  it  can  threaten  to  walk  away  and  exercise  its  best  alternative  to  negotiate  an 
agreement  (Fisher  and  Ury,  1987).  The  components  of  resources-based  bargaining 
power  constitute  the  resources  and  capabilities  committed  by  the  partners  to  a  joint 
venture.  The  more  critical  resources  contributed  to  an  organization  by  its  partner,  the 
greater  power  that  partner  has.  Luo  (2002)  indicates  that  the  market  power  of  foreign 
firms  in  home  or  international  markets  can  elevate  the  foreign  firm's  bargaining  power 
stemming  from  the  dependence  of  their  local  partners  (Yan  and  Gray,  1994;  Pfeffer  and 
Salancil,  1978).  From  the  above  relevant  empirical  studies,  the  major  determinants  of 
bargaining  power  are  summarized  in  Table  4.3.1. 
Tahle  AI1  Mainr  Determinants  of  Rarwainino  Pnw  r 
Author  Year  Sources  of  bargaining  power 
Fagre  and  Wells  1982  .  Technological  level 
.  Product  differentiation 
.  Access  to  export  markets 
.  Invested  amount 
.  Diversity  of  firm's  production  line 
Lecraw  1984  .  Proprietary  product  or  technology 
.  Access  to  relatively  inexpensive  capital 
.  Access  to  export  markets 
.  Management  expertise 
Kobrin  1987  .  Technology 
.  Parent  size 
.  Subsidiary  size 
.  Employment 
.  Export  potential 
Gomes-Casseres  1990  .  Investment  size 
.  Attractiveness  of  the  territory 
.  R&D  intensity 
Harrigan  and  Newman  1990  .  The  source  of  each  partner  brings  to  the  venture 
Blodgett  1991  .  Government  suasion 
.  Technology 
.  Knowledge  of  the  local  environment  and/or  marketing  expertise 
.  Control  of  intra-system  transfers 
.  Financial  capital  critical  resources 
Yan  and  Gray  1994  .  Context-based:  stakes  and  availability  of  alternatives 
Resources-based: 
Inkpen  and  Beamish  1997  .  local  environment  knowledge 
Source:  this  study  compiled  from  relevant  articles. 
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In  general,  according  to  the  pioneering  work  of  researchers,  bargaining  power  can  be 
classified  into  three  categories:  (1)  resource-based:  bargaining  power,  which  can  stem 
from  the  contribution  of  critical  resources,  such  as  technology,  marketing  expertise, 
access  to  financial  markets,  control  of  internetwork;  (2)  capability-based:  when  investing 
firms  have  the  ability  to  affect  outcomes  or  to  get  things  done;  (3)  equity-based:  when 
investing  companies  are  characterized  as  having  a  strong  preference  for  major  ownership 
in  their  overseas  subsidiaries,  and  in  most  cases  their  perceived  relatively  strong 
bargaining  positions  allow  them  to  realize  those  ownership  options. 
4.3.2  The  Relationship  between  Bargaining  Power,  Control  and 
Ownership 
Adopting  the  negotiations  perspective  to  explain  the  distribution  of  control  between  the 
partners  in  a  joint  venture,  previous  researchers  suggest  that  the  bargaining  power  of 
partners  is  a  critical  variable  in  determining  patterns  of  control  in  joint  ventures  (Blodgett, 
1991;  Harrigan  and  Newman,  1990;  Lecraw,  1984).  For  example,  using  the  perspective 
of  bargaining  power  to  discuss  the  control  of  IN,  Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  indicate  that  the 
bargaining  power  between  parents  will  affect  the  control  of  IN  including  the  proportion 
of  board  membership,  the  nomination  of  general  managers,  structural  control  and 
perceived  overall  control. 
Moreover,  Lecraw  (1984)  finds  a  significant  association  between  bargaining  power  and 
control.  He  finds  bargaining  power  that  was  influenced  by  technical  leadership, 
advertising  intensity  and  export  capability  of  the  multinational  partner  had  a  significant 
contribution  to  control.  On  the  basis  of  the  alternative  literature,  this  study  posits  that 
there  is  a  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  control.  Therefore,  the  hypothesis 
is  represented  as  follows. 
H2:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the  extent  of  control 
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Fagre  and  Wells  (1982)  use  a  bargaining  power  framework  to  explore  the  relationship 
between  the  multinational  firms'  characteristics  and  the  percentage  equity  ownership 
position.  They  regard  equity  ownership  as  an  outcome  of  negotiation,  and  a 
representation  of  relative  power  between  participating  interests.  Also,  it  is  influenced  by 
the  number  of  multinational  competitors  active  in  the  industry. 
In  his  empirical  study,  Lecraw  (1984)  finds  that  the  bargaining  power  of  multinational 
firms  and  host  LDCs  have  a  strong  influence  on  the  percentage  equity  ownership.  He 
deems  that  the  greater  the  country-specific  advantages  of  the  host  country,  the  greater  its 
bargaining  power  and  the  higher  the  level  of  local  ownership  it  may  gain  for  local 
investors.  By  following  the  bargaining  approach,  Lee  (2004)  assumes  that  the  equity 
share  of  an  IN  firm  is  negotiated  between  the  MNC  and  the  local  government.  Lee 
indicates  that  the  multinational  corporations  will  hold  an  equity  share  of  IN  that  is  larger 
than  its  relative  bargaining  power,  because  the  MNC  has  a  cost  advantage  and  superior 
technology  over  its  local  partner. 
Based  on  alternative  literature,  this  study  posits  that  there  is  a  relationship  between 
bargaining  power  and  ownership.  Therefore,  the  hypothesis  is  represented  as  follow. 
H  3:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the  proportion  of 
ownership. 
4.4  Contributions  of  the  Joint  Venture  Parents 
A  contribution  is  defined  as  any  resource  input  from  the  foreign  parent  and  host  parent 
companies  to  the  joint  venture.  Establishing  an  organization  needs  many  kinds  of 
resources  such  as  capital,  human  resource,  technology  and  know-how,  etc.;  and  each  of 
these  resources  has  an  important  position  in  different  situations.  Kogut  (1988)  defines-a 
joint  venture  as:  "a  joint  venture  occurs  when  two  or  more  firms  pool  a  portion  of  their 
resources  within  a  common  legal  organization".  For  a  joint  venture,  the  needed 
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resources  are  derived  from  different  parent  entities.  For  example,  capital  must  firstly  be 
contributed  from  each  parent  when  they  decide  to  cooporate  under  different  motives. 
Many  previous  research  points  out  that  one  of  the  motivations  for  forming  a  joint 
venture  is  resources  dependence  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Harrigan,  1985;  Beamish, 
1985;  Killing,  1983;  Pfeffer  and  Salabcik,  1978;  Zald,  1970;  Aiken  and  Hage,  1968; 
Thompson,  1967;  Blau,  1964;  Emerson,  1962;  Selznick,  1948).  In  his  sample  of  sixty- 
six  joint  ventures  in  less  developed  countries,  Beamish's  (1985)  results  showed  that  the 
reasons  for  creating  a  joint  venture  are  skills  acquisition  and  assets  or  attributes  needed. 
Next,  we  will  discuss  what  type  of  resources  the  parent  contributes  to  joint  ventures. 
4.4.1  The  Type  of  Resources  Contributed  by  Parents 
There  is  a  wide  range  of  resources  that  each  parent  might  contribute  to  a  joint  venture 
and  each  type  of  resource  potentially  provides  a  different  source  of  power  and  different 
scope  of  influence.  Several  categorisations  of  resource  levels  have  been  mentioned  in  the 
relevant  literature.  Grant  (1991)  identifies  six  categories  of  company  resources:  financial, 
physical,  human,  technological,  reputation,  and  organisational.  Barney  (1991)  groups 
the  resources  into  three  categories:  physical,  capital  and  human  capital  resources. 
Chatterjee  and  Wernerfelt  (1991)  identify  resources  into  three  categories:  physical, 
invisible  and  financial. 
Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  state  that  primary  resources  contributed  by  foreign  partners 
generally  involve  technology,  management  expertise,  and  global  support.  For  local 
partners,  the  main  resource  contribution  is  expertise  in  areas  such  as  local  sourcing, 
domestic  distribution  and  personal  management.  Sharp  and  Barz  (1997)  indicate  that  the 
foreign  parents  typically  provide  two  types  of  support  to  their  joint  ventures:  (1) 
technical  support  which  including  process  and  product  technology,  and  (2)  managerial 
support  which  including  entailing  administrative  know-how,  managerial  expertise,  and 
marketing  direction. 
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Referring  to  a  survey  of  a  hundred  US  MNEs,  UNCTC  (1987)  ranked  the  order  of  the 
importance  of  local  partner's  contributions  as  shown  in  Table  4.4.1. 
Tahle  441  Rank  Orderine  of  Local  Partners'  Contributions  to  the  Joint  Venture 
Rank  Contribution 
1  Knowledge  of  the  political  situation,  economy  and  customs  of  the  country 
2  General  management 
3  Access  to  markets  for  goods  produced  in  the  country 
4  Marketing  personnel  and  expertise 
5  Local  capital 
6  Contacts  and  relationships  with  governments  of  host  countries 
7  Plants,  facilities  and  land  of  local  partners 
8  Capability  of  recruiting  local  labor  and  dealing  with  labor  unions 
9  Access  to  local  materials 
10  Access  to  local  financial  institutions 
Source:  UNCTC  (1987),  Arrangements  between  Joint  Venture  Partners  in  Developing  countnes, 
UNCTC,  New  York,  p18. 
UNCTC  (1987)  argues  that  the  complementary  contribution  of  resources  by  the  partners 
provides  a  firm  basis  for  a  viable  joint  venture  between  firms  from  a  developed  and  a 
developing  country.  The  major  contributions  of  the  MNE  are  its  manufacturing 
technology,  product  know-how,  patents,  business  expertise,  technical  training  and 
management  development.  The  local  partner's  main  contributions  include  capital, 
management,  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  and  country,  contacts  with  host 
governments,  financial  institutions,  local  suppliers  and  labour  unions  and  local  marketing 
capabilities. 
For  local  partners,  Inkpen  and  Beamish  (1997)  also  indicates  that  contributions  revolve 
around  an  understanding  of  the  local  market,  cultural,  and  environmental  conditions.  In 
the  study  of  the  effect  of  foreign  partner  contributions  on  IN  performance,  Luo  (2002) 
classifies  the  foreign  partner  attributes  into  three  categories,  namely  strategic 
(technological  capability,  market  power,  and  marketing  expertise),  organizational 
(managerial  skills,  international  expertise  and  corporate  reputation),  and  financial  (cost 
control,  capital  allocation,  and  asset  management).  Luo  (2002)  argues  that  strategic 
attributes  can  improve  a  local  partner's  operational  skills  and  competitive  resources 
(Geringer,  1991),  technological  and  production  capabilities  (Dyer,  1997),  and  market 
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power  and  competitive  position  (Hamel,  1991).  Organizational  attributes  contributed  by 
a  foreign  partner  may  improve  the  local  partner's  managerial  efficiency,  organizational 
legitimacy  and  corporate  reputation.  His  research  findings  revealed  that  Chinese  firms 
look  for  strategic  or  organizational  attributes  but  not  financial  competency  when  they 
cooperate  with  foreign  firms  and  suggested  that  Chinese  firms  are  expansion-driven, 
rather  than  focused  on  maximizing  returns  or  minimizing  costs. 
From  the  above  relevant  literatures,  this  study  compiles  the  relevant  results  with  regard 
to  resource  contribution  of  international  joint  ventures  as  shown  in  Table  4.4.2. 
Tah1P  ddl  Main  P&  nnrcr  f  nntrihntM  by  PartnPrc 
Company  resources  Author 
Variables 
UNCTC 
(1987) 
Grant 
(1991) 
Barney 
(1991) 
Chatterjee  and 
(19911)  ) 
Wernerfelt 
(19 
Yan  and 
Gray 
(199  944) 
men 
and 
Beamish 
(1997) 
Financial 
Physical 
Human 
Technological 
Reputation 
Organisational 
Invisible 
Domestic 
distribution 
Global  support 
Knowledge  of  the 
local  environment 
Source:  this  study  compiled  from  relevant  articles 
With  reference  to  the  prior  works  of  other  researchers,  this  study  chooses  more  common 
variables  based  on  the  variables  in  Table  4.4.2  above.  Resource  contributions  can  be 
classified  into  five  categories:  (1)  Physical  resources;  (2)  Invisible  resources;  (3) 
Financial  resources;  (4)  Human  resources;  and  (5)  Organizational  resources.  This  study 
will  use  these  five  resource  categories  to  measure  the  resource  contributions  supplied  by 
host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents. 
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4.4.2  The  Relationship  between  Contribution,  Control,  Ownership 
and  Bargaining  Power 
Resource-dependence  theory  suggests  that  the  extent  of  the  stakeholders  control 
depends  on  their  ability  to  provide  the  resources  needed  for  the  international  joint 
venture  to  succeed.  Child  and  Yan  (1999)  suggest  that  the  foreign-investing  enterprise 
should  provide  key  non-capital  resources  which  can  significantly  increase  the  ability  of  a 
partner  to  influence  the  quality  of  the  joint  venture  management  process  through  an 
active  managerial  presence.  From  their  empirical  investigation,  the  results  show  that  the 
resource  dependence  perspective  has  considerable  theoretical  power  for  predicting  and 
explaining  the  control  of  international  joint  ventures  when  parents  from  developed  and 
developing  countries  are  involved.  In  such  cases,  it  means  the  parent  contributing  the 
necessary  resources  will  gain  more  control  over  the  international  joint  venture  entity. 
Killing  (1983)  reported  that  the  partners'  respective  contributions  shaped  the  control 
structure  of  the  joint  venture.  Lin  (1995)  found  the  contribution  supplied  by  each 
partners  not  only  affects  the  ownership  but  also  the  control.  She  also  found  that  different 
contributions  inputted  by  each  partner  resulted  in  a  different  scope  of  control  by  each 
partner.  For  example,  one  partner  predominates  in  the  marketing  strategy;  the  other 
partner  makes  the  manufacturing  decisions.  Mjoen  and  Tallman  (1997)  suggest  that 
parents  who  supply  the  most  critical  resources  and  have  greater  expertise  can  have 
higher  control  over  joint  ventures.  Chalos  and  O'Connor  (2004)  assert  that  the  partner 
with  greater  specific  assets  in  the  venture  is  naturally  more  likely  to  exercise  control  over 
these  assets.  They  found  that  specific  asset  investments  which  include  employee 
development,  supplier  relationships,  regulatory  agency  relationships,  availability  of 
alternative  partners  and  local  investment  in  land,  buildings  and  special  purpose  machinery 
had  significant  effects  on  the  control  mechanisms  from  the  perspective  of  the  Chinese 
partners.  Child,  Yan  and  Ku  (1997)  also  suggest  that  Chinese  partners  may  focus  on 
specific  controls  to  protect  their  investments  in  the  ventures.  Yan  and  Child  (2004) 
claimed  that  the  ability  of  one  party  to  provide  better  resources  than  its  partners  and/or 
control  resources  will  give  that  party  power  over  the  IN. 
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There  is  a  wide  range  of  resources  that  each  parent  might  contribute  to  an  international 
joint  venture  and  each  type  of  resource  potentially  provides  a  different  source  of  power 
and  different  scope  of  influence.  Thus,  this  study  posits  that  there  has  a  relationship 
between  contribution  and  control.  The  hypotheses  are  represented  as  follows: 
H  4:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  contributions  of  host  country 
parents  and  the  extent  of  control  they  exercise  in  a  joint  venture 
H  4.1a:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  41b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  42,:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  4_2b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  43i:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  financial  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  4-3b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  financial  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
venture 
H44.:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  a.  ab:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  human  resource  contribution  to  the 
venture  will  have  a  stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers  in  a  joint  ventures. 
H4-5.:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  organizational  resource  contribution  to 
the  venture  will  have  a  stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making 
activity  in  a  joint  venture. 
H  4-5b:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  organizational  resource  contribution  to 
the  venture  will  have  stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers  in  a  joint  venture. 
Blodgett  (1991)  indicates  that  the  type  of  expertise  that  a  company  contributes  to  a  joint 
venture  may  affect  the  amount  of  equity  it  holds.  The  results  of  her  study  revealed  that 
ownership  patterns  vary  with  the  combination  of  resources  contributed  to  a  venture.  Pan 
(1996)  indicates  that  the  foreign  partner  who  is  capable  of  contributing  more  to  the  initial 
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capital  sum  acquires'  stronger  bargaining  power  for  a  higher  equity  share  (Gomes- 
Casseres,  1990;  Harrigan,  1985;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982).  Lin  (1995)  demonstrates  that 
the  level  of  contribution  supplied  by  each  stakeholder  will  affect  their  proportion  of 
ownership  in  the  joint  venture.  Therefore,  the  proposed  research  hypothesis  can  be 
phrased  as  follows. 
H5:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  resource  contribution  of  host  country 
parents  and  their  proportion  of  ownership  in  a  joint  venture 
H  s_l:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource  contribution  will  have  a 
higher  proportion  of  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  5_2:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource  contribution  will  have  a 
higher  proportion  of  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  5.3:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  financial  resource  contribution  to  the 
venture  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of  N  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  s.  4:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  human  resource  contribution  to  the 
venture  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of  N  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  5-4:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organizational  resource  contribution  will 
have  a  higher  proportion  of  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
Gomes-Casseres  (1987b)  states  that  participants  gain  power  from  their  commitment  of 
various  resources,  such  as  technology,  marketing  expertise,  control  of  intra-network 
sales,  access  to  financial  markets,  and  geographical  or  industrial  experience.  Robinson 
(1969)  stresses  that  partner  contributions  are  important  in  the  process  of  joint  venture 
management  because  the  contributions  and  expected  benefits  of  the  participating  firms 
are  continually  adjusted  to  align  with  shifts  in  relative  power  between  the  partners. 
Blodgett  (1991)  suggests  that  a  contributed  resource  is  likely  to  result  in  greater 
bargaining  power  if  the  partner  cannot  easily  appropriate  it.  She  identifies  five  resource 
contributions  that  give  a  firm  bargaining  power  in  a  joint  venture  as,  government  suasion, 
technology,  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  and/or  marketing  expertise,  control  of 
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intrasystem  transfers,  and  financial  capital.  Lecraw  (1984)  indicates  that  possession  of  a 
proprietary  product  or  technology  may  increase  the  bargaining  position  of  a  multinational 
over  the  host  country.  Kobrin  (1987)  indicates  that  the  sources  of  MNE  bargaining 
power  can  be  derived  from  the  firm-specific  advantages  or  assets.  Harrigan  and 
Newman  (1990)  assert  that  the  bargaining  power  of  potential  joint  venture  partners  is 
determined  primarily  by  what  each  partner  brings  to  the  venture. 
Based  on  the  alternative  literature,  this  study  posits  that  there  is  a  relationship  between 
contribution  and  bargaining  power.  Therefore,  the  hypothesis  is  represented  as  follows: 
H  6:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  contributions  of  host  country 
parents  and  bargaining  power 
4.5  The  Motives  for  Forming  International  Joint  Ventures 
The  motives  for  engaging  in  international  joint  ventures  are  quite  varied  (Glaister,  2004; 
Glaister  and  Buckley,  1996;  Contractor  and  Lorange,  1988).  Why  does  one  company 
want  to  cooperate  with  other  firms?  Several  theoretical  explanations  of  this  particular 
form  of  inter-company  cooperation  have  been  proposed  to  explain  why  international  joint 
ventures  are  formed.  The  principal  theoretical  perspectives  regarding  the  motives  or 
reasons  for  forming  international  joint  venture  relate  to  (a)  resource  dependence  theory 
(Glaister,  2004;  Harrigan,  1985;  Pfeffer  and  Nowak,  1976),  (b)  transaction  cost  theory 
(Glaister,  2004;  Hennart,  1988,1991;  Buckley  and  Casson,  1988),  (c)  strategic 
contingency  theory  (Teece,  1992;  Contractor  and  Lorange,  1988;  Harrigan,  1985,1988), 
(d)  organizational  learning  theory  (Kogut,  1988;  Hamel,  1991;  Mody,  1993).  In  this 
section,  a  number  of  alternative  theories  for  the  motives  for  joint  venture  formation  are 
described  first,  and  then  the  relevant  empirical  studies  relating  to  the  motives  of 
international  joint  ventures  are  reviewed.  Finally,  hypotheses  in  relation  to  the  motives 
for  the  formation  of  international  joint  ventures  are  presented. 
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4.5.1  Alternative  Theoretical  Rationales  for  International  Joint 
Ventures 
This  section  first  reviews  the  alternative  theoretical  rationales  for  international  joint 
venture  formation.  There  are  a  number  of  theoretical  perspectives  on  IN  formation 
which  are  (a)  resource  dependence  theory,  (b)  transaction  cost  theory,  (c)  strategic 
contingency  theory,  (d)  organizational  learning  theory.  Each  theory  will  be  described  in 
the  following  sections. 
4.5.1.1  Resource  Dependence  Theory 
Resource  dependence  analysis  concentrates  on  resource  scarcity.  It  illustrates  that 
organizations  must  assume  some  strategies  when  they  face  an  uncertain  environment  in 
order  to  obtain  resources  that  are  required  for  survival  but  constrained  by  external 
organizations.  Some  international  joint  ventures  are  motivated  by  the  belief  that  the 
parent  of  an  international  joint  venture  can  better  obtain  the  target  resources  through 
cooperation.  This  implies  that  the  combined  resources  of  the  two  companies  can 
increase  the  organization's  competition. 
A  number  of  authors  (Pfeffer  and  Salabcik,  1978;  Zald,  1970;  Thompson,  1967;  Blau, 
1964;  Emerson,  1962;  Selznick,  1948)  have  provided  an  integrated  context  of  the 
resource  dependence  framework.  Aiken  and  Hage  (1968)  indicate  that  cooperation 
between  organizations  results  from  resource  dependence  which  creates  a  dependent 
relationship  within  organizations.  Pfeffer  and  Salabcik  (1978)  identify  the  command  of 
critical  resources  as  the  basis  for  exercising  power  within  and  between  organizations. 
Harrigan  (1985)  suggests  joint  ventures  can  be  resource-aggregating  and  resource- 
sharing  mechanisms,  which  allow  investing  companies  to  concentrate  resources  in  those 
areas  where  they  possess  the  greatest  respective  strengths.  Studying  the  choice  of 
foreign  market  entry  mode,  Agarwal  and  Ramaswami  (1992)  find  that  the  smaller  and 
less  experienced  multinational  firms  prefer  entry  into  foreign  markets  through  a  joint 
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venture  because  they  need  to  complement  their  resource  needs  with  the  host  county 
firms.  Inkpen  and  Beamish  (1997)  stated  that  dependence  can  be  a  source  of  power  for 
controlling  key  resources  because  each  firm  can  increase  or  withhold  resources  that  are 
attractive  to  its  partner  (Bacharach  and  Lawler,  1980). 
Utilising  resource  based  theory,  Glaister  (2004)  stresses  that  there  are  three  mechanisms 
for  acquiring  resources  and  capabilities:  (1)  buying  resources  or  hiring  people  with  the 
required  knowledge  from  other  organisations,  (2)  internally  creating  them,  and  (3) 
through  combinations  of  complementary  resources  and/or  capabilities.  However, 
Glaister  (2004)  mentions  that  internal  development  or  acquisition  methods  are  sometimes 
costly  and  problematic.  Therefore,  he  suggests  that  an  alliance  is  an  attractive  means 
which  can  provide  access  to  certain  capabilities,  specific  assets  or  systems.  Madhok  and 
Tallman  (1998)  also  point  out  that  there  are  three  considerations  in  play  when  an  alliance 
is  formed.  First,  the  firm  does  not  have  the  resources  and  capabilities  which  can  improve 
its  competency  and  cannot  develop  them  internally  in  an  acceptable  time  or  cost 
perameter.  Second,  markets  cannot  transmit  organisational  learning  of  embedded 
knowledge  effectively.  Third,  acquiring  and  fully  integrating  another  firm  is  not  feasible. 
Therefore,  if  firms  cannot  create  capabilities  or  posses  the  resources  on  their  own,  they 
can  acquire  the  resources  and  capabilities  through  an  alliance.  Using  data  on  US 
investment  banking  firms,  Chung,  Singh  and  Lee  (2000)  found  that  resource 
complementarity  has  a  significant  influence  on  the  formation  of  alliances.  They  argue 
that  the  complementarity  of  capabilities  implies  the  possibility  of  synergy  when  the 
partner's  resources  are  pooled  together,  which  thus  enhances  the  likelihood  of  alliance 
formation. 
From  the  perspective  of  a  resource  based  rationale,  the  recognition  of  acquiring  the 
resources  and  capabilities  provides  a  strategic  motive  for  N  formation.  The 
collaboration  provides  the  firm  with  access  to  complementary  capabilities  which  are 
either  not  available  through  market  transaction  or  are  too  costly  or  slow  to  generate 
internally. 
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4.5.1.2  Transaction  Cost  Theory 
Transaction  cost  theory  is  concerned  with  the  cost-effectiveness  of  organizing 
international  economic  activities.  The  origins  of  transaction  cost  economics  are 
associated  with  the  early  writings  of  Coase  (1937).  Its  framework  has  been  most  fully 
developed  by  Williamson  (1975,1985).  Casson  (1982)  states  that  markets  and 
hierarchies  are  alternative  modes  of  governance  that  offers  the  transaction  as  the  basic 
unit  of  analysis.  Williamson  (1975)  argues  that  firms  choose  how  to  manage  their 
transactions  according  to  the  criteria  of  minimizing  the  sum  of  production  and 
transaction  costs.  Production  costs  may  differ  between  firms  due  to  the  scale  of 
operations,  learning,  and  proprietary  knowledge.  Transaction  costs  refer  to  the  expenses 
incurred  in  searching  out  new  suppliers  or  customers,  for  writing,  negotiating  and 
enforcing  contracts  and  for  administering  a  transaction.  Williamson  (1985)  employed  the 
transaction  cost  framework  to  explain  that  a  firm  may  choose  to  exercise  more  or  less 
control  over  its  investment. 
Transaction  cost  theory  is  seen  as  a  means  to  decide  whether  a  joint  venture  is  the  best 
option  according  to  the  sum  of  production  costs  and  transaction  costs  (Pan  and  Tse, 
2000).  According  to  Williamson's  perspective,  some  theorists  developed  the 
internalization  theory  to  explain  the  strategic  contents  of  the  wholly  owned  subsidiary, 
the  joint  venture  and  licensing.  Transaction  costs  will  affect  the  choice  of  entry  mode 
into  a  foreign  market  (Belderbos,  2003;  Yu  and  Tang,  1992;  Gomes-Casseres,  1990; 
Hennart,  1988).  Teece  (1986)  finds  that  firms  adopt  a  joint  venture  as  a  cooperation 
mode  when  the  transaction  costs  are  less  than  the  internal  costs  of  a  wholly  owned 
subsidiary  and  a  joint  venture  is  the  best  option  when  a  firm  possesses  high  specific 
resources  (Hennart,  1991;  Kogut,  1988). 
Transaction  cost  theory  provides  sound  reasons  for  the  formation  of  a  joint  venture; 
however,  it  sometimes  incurs  costs  in  another  situation  when  pursuing  the  minimum 
transaction  costs.  Additionally,  the  measure  of  transaction  costs  has  limitations  in  terms 
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of  its  ability  to  explain  transaction  cost  theory.  Kogut  (1988)  summarizes  the  argument 
on  transaction  costs  and  joint  ventures  as  follows: 
"The  critical  dimension  of  a  joint  venture  is  its  resolution  of  high  levels  of 
uncertainty  over  the  behaviour  of  the  contracting  parties  when  the  assets  of 
both  parties  are  specialized  to  the  transaction  and  the  hazards  of  joint 
cooperation  are  outweighed  by  the  higher  production  or  acquisition  costs  of 
100  percent  ownership".  (Kogut,  1988,  p  321) 
4.5.1.3  Strategic  Behaviour  Theory 
Strategic  behaviour  theory  emphasises  how  strategic  behaviour  influences  the 
competitive  positioning  of  a  firm.  On  studying  the  motivation  of  foreign  direct 
investment,  some  researchers  have  suggested  that  the  strategic  motives  for  firms  entering 
new  international  markets  mainly  relate  to  acquisition  of  resources  or  advantages  that 
could  improve  their  competitive  position  in  the  global  marketplace  (Randoy  and  Dibrell, 
2002;  Chandprapalert,  2000;  Chen  and  Chen,  1998;  Kim  and  Hwang,  1992;  Sheth  and 
Parvatiyar,  1992;  Beamish  and  Banks,  1987).  On  the  study  of  the  IJV,  researchers  also 
find  that  firms  using  a  joint  venture  strategy  improve  their  competitive  positioning  in  the 
market  and  maximizing  profits  (Contractor  and  Lorange,  1988)  or  increase  the  value  of 
firms'  assets  (Kogut,  1988).  Vernon  (1983)  views  the  joint  venture  as  a  form  of 
defensive  investment  by  which  a  firm  hedges  against  strategic  uncertainty,  especially  in 
industries  of  moderate  concentration  where  collusion  is  difficult  to  achieve.  Vickers 
(1985)  considers  joint  ventures  as  a  way  to  deter  the  entry  of  competitors  through  pre- 
emptive  patenting,  and  shows  that  for  small  innovations,  a  joint  venture  is  an  effective 
mechanism  to  deter  market-entry  investment  of  competitors.  For  large  innovations,  it  is 
in  the  interest  of  each  firm  to  pursue  its  own  research  if  the  expected  pay-off  justifies  the 
costs.  Kogut  (1988)  indicates  that  the  purpose  of  forming  joint  ventures  is  to  prevent 
the  entry  of  rivals  or  to  enervate  the  competitive  position  of  its  rivals. 
With  regard  to  transaction  cost  and  strategic  behaviour  perspectives,  Kogut  (1988) 
deems  that  these  two  perspectives  are  complementary  rather  than  substitutive.  He 
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explores  that  the  differences  between  these  theories  are  the  motivation  for  cooperative 
and  the  standard  for  partner  selection.  Transaction  cost  theory  predicts  that  matching 
between  partners  should  reflect  minimizing  costs;  in  contrast,  strategic  behaviour  theory 
predicts  that  joint  venture  partners  will  be  chosen  to  improve  the  competitive  positioning 
of  the  parties,  whether  through  collusion  or  through  depriving  competitors  of  potentially 
valuable  allies. 
4.5.1.4  Organizational  Learning  Theory 
Organizational  learning  theory  views  joint  venture  as  a  mode  by  which  firms  learn  (or 
seek)  to  retain  their  capabilities.  Several  studies  on  IJVs  show  that  the  role  of 
organizational  learning  is  an  important  determinant  for  the  formation  of  strategic 
alliances  (Glaister,  Husan  and  Buckley,  1998,2003;  Shenkar  and  Li,  1999;  Inkpen  and 
Beamish,  1997;  Kogut  and  Zander,  1993;  Hamel,  1991;  Badaracco,  1991;  Ciborra  1991;. 
Kogut,  1988).  Numerous  studies  have  suggested  that  firms  may  enhance  their 
competitive  position  through  acquiring  tacit  experiential  knowledge,  new  skills  and 
capabilities  from  partner  firms.  Polanyi  (1967)  argues  that  joint  ventures  allow  "tacit 
knowledge"  to  be  transferred.  The  characteristics  of  tacit  knowledge  should  be 
simultaneously  valuable,  difficult  to  imitate  and  limited  in  prevalence  among  the 
competitors  (Barney,  1991).  Robson,  Leonidou  and  Katsileas  (2002)  identify  knowledge 
as  being  useful  to  parent  firms  in  three  ways:  (1)  it  can  strengthen  the  strategic, 
operational,  and  tactical  aspects  of  their  businesses;  (2)  it  can  enhance  experience  in  the 
design,  implementation,  and  management  of  IJV  business;  and  (3)  it  can  be  embedded  in 
specific  processes  and  outputs  of  the  IJV  and  benefit  the  venture  itself.  Joint  ventures 
are  the  most  effective  mode  for  transferring  and  integrating  tacit  knowledge  since  many 
employees  from  both  parent  companies  are  working  together  and  are  communicating 
frequently  and  directly  and  are  able  to  share  experience  (Mowery  et  al.,  1996;  Hedlund, 
1994;  Parkhe,  1991;  Hamel,  1991;  Hennart,  1988;  Kogut,  1988). 
Kogut  (1988)  states  that  other  forms  of  transfer,  for  example,  licensing,  are  ruled  out, 
not  because  of  market  failure  or  high  transaction  costs,  but  because  the  knowledge  being 
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transferred  is  organizationally  embedded.  He  argues  that  a  joint  venture  is  encouraged 
under  two  conditions:  one  or  both  firms  desire  to  acquire  the  other's  organizational 
know-how,  or  one  firm  wishes  to  maintain  an  organizational  capability  while  benefiting 
from  another  firm's  current  knowledge  or cost  advantage. 
Hamel  (1991)  argues  that  collaboration  may  provide  an  opportunity  for  one  partner  to 
internalize  the  skills  of  the  other  and  thus  improve  its  position  both  within  and  without 
the  alliance.  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982)  explore  whether  a  firm  may  decide  on  a  joint 
venture  in  order  to  retain  its  capability  of  organizing  specific  activities  while  benefiting 
from  the  superior  production  techniques  of  a  partner.  Therefore,  a  firm  may  choose  a 
joint  venture  in  preference  to  a  less  costly  option,  in  order  to  exploit  these  capabilities  at 
a  later  stage. 
Harrigan  (1984)  argues  that  firms  will  cooperate  in  forming  joint  ventures  only  if  the 
needs  of  each  partner  are  great  enough  and  if  they  can  add  resources  which  are 
complementary  to  the  other's  attributes.  Luo  (2002)  indicates  that  Chinese  firms 
perceive  foreign  partner  competence  in  strategic  and  organizational  attributes  as 
significantly  critical  to  achieving  their  goals  of  IN  formation.  Chinese  firms  are  more 
focused  on  market  expansion  and  knowledge  acquisition  considerations  rather  them 
transaction  cost  concerns.  By  contrast,  foreign  companies  often  aim  at  market 
penetration  in  China.  Swierczek  and  Dhakal  (2004)  define  learning  as  the  utilization  of 
knowledge  by  joint  ventures  as  demonstrated  by  the  improved  performance  of  joint 
venture  in  accomplishing  its  objectives.  They  assert  that  learning  involves  interaction 
among  parent  firms  and  a  joint  venture  when  an  entity  is  built  to  achieve  the  parent  firm's 
objectives  and/or  interests  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997). 
In  conclusion,  transaction  costs,  strategic  behaviour,  resource  dependence  and 
organization  learning  provide  distinct  explanations  of  joint  venture  behaviour. 
Transaction  costs  and  strategic  behaviour  theory  are  economic  analysis  perspectives;  in 
contrast,  resource  dependence  and  organizational  learning  theory  are  resource-based 
aspects.  Transaction  costs  theory  views  joint  ventures  as  efficient  solutions  to  the  hazard 
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of  economic  transactions.  Strategic  behaviour  theory  places  joint  ventures  in  the  context 
of  competitive  rivalry  and  collusive  agreement  to  enhance  market  power.  Resource 
dependence  theory  sees  joint  ventures  as  stemming  from  resource  dependence,  which 
creates  a  dependent  relationship  within  organizations.  Organization  learning  theory 
views  joint  ventures  as  a  vehicle  by  which  organizational  knowledge  is  exchanged  and 
imitated. 
4.5.2  The  Empirical  Studies  Relating  to  Motives  for  International 
Joint  Venture  Formation 
The  empirical  finding  of  strategy  motives  in  a  variety  of  studies  supports  the  theories  of 
the  formation  of  international  joint  ventures  (Glaister,  2004;  Yan  and  Luo,  2001;  Pan  and 
Tse,  1996;  Glaister  and  Buckley,  1996;  Sheth  and  Parvatiyar,  1992;  Hung,  1992; 
Hannart,  1991;  Contractor  and  Lorange,  1988;  Kogut,  1988;  Harrigan,  1985,1988; 
Beamish,  1985;  Mariti  and  Smiley,  1983).  Mariti  and  Smiley  (1983)  identify  a  number  of 
core  strategic  motives  for  joint  venture  formation.  These  are  risk  sharing,  product 
rationalization,  transfer  of  complementary  technology  and  conformance  to  host 
government  policy.  Some  researchers  perceive  risk  sharing  as  a  fundamental  motive  for 
cooperative  alliances  (Pan  and  Tse,  1996;  Brouthers  and  Wilkinson,  1995;  Sheth  and 
Parvatiyar,  1992;  Harrigan,  1988).  Pan  and  Tse  (1996)  classify  the  risk  into  two  types: 
the  contextual  risks  which  mainly  relate  to  the  external  macro-environment  of  the  host 
country,  and  transactional  risks  which  are  associated  with  the  internal  nature  of  the 
cooperative  partnership.  They  find  that  when  the  risks  of  the  host  country  increase, 
foreign  companies  are  more  likely  to  cooperate  with  other  partners  in  order  to  reduce  the 
investment  risk. 
In  his  sample  of  thirty-four  joint  ventures  in  developed  countries  (DCs),  Killing  (1983) 
divides  the  reasons  for  creating  a  joint  venture  into  three  groups:  (a)  government  suasion 
or  legislation;  (b)one  partner's  needs  for  another  partner's  skills;  and  (c)  one  partner's 
needs  for  the  another  partner's  attributes  or  assets.  Beamish  (1985)  compares  his  own 
findings,  based  on  a  sample  of  sixty-six  joint  ventures  in  less  developed  countries  (LDCs), 
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with  those  of  Killing  and  identifies  different  motivations  between  developed  and  less 
developed  countries.  Table  4.5.1  shows  that  government  suasion/legislation  is  a 
significantly  more  important  influence  on  joint  venture  formation  in  less  developed 
countries  than  developed  countries. 
Table  4.5.1  Relationshins  of  Stage  of  Develonment  to  Ventnre_Creatinn  Rntinnalec 
Rationale  Developed  country  °/a  e  Less  developed  coun 
government  suasion  /legislation  17  57 
Skills  needed  64  38 
Assets  or  attributes  needed  19  5 
a  based  on  sample  of  34  Joint  ventures  by  Killing 
b  Based  on  sample  of  66  joint  ventures  by  Beamish 
Source:  Derived  from  Beamish,  P.  W.  (1985)  "The  Characteristics  of  Joint  Ventures  in  Developed  and 
Developing  Countries",  Columbia  Journal  of  World  Business,  Fall,  20(3),  p.  14. 
Janger  (1980)  obtains  a  similar  result  in  LDCs,  noting  that  nearly  half  of  the  companies 
forming  joint  ventures  stemmed  from  government  requirement.  Gullander  (1976)  adds 
that  the  political  reason  maybe  why  foreign  companies  in  LDCs  form  joint  ventures. 
Tomlinson  (1970),  in  his  sample  of  joint  venture  in  India  and  Pakistan,  also  stresses  that 
the  main  reason  for  using  a  joint  venture  structure  is  either  explicit  or  implicit 
government  pressures.  In  some  cases  government  policies  have  given  more  lucrative 
incentives  to  encourage  local  firms  in  cooperating  with  foreign  companies  to  acquire 
foreign  technology  (Contractor,  1989).  In  his  study  on  the  characteristics  of  joint 
ventures  in  China,  Beamish  (1993)  found  that  joint  ventures  in  China  are  frequently 
created  due  to  government  pressure.  Similarly,  in  studying  the  strategic  alliance  of 
Chinese  and  Hungarian  companies,  Child  and  Markoczy  (1993)  and  Child,  Markoczy 
and  Cheung  (1994)  found  that  strategic  alliances  between  the  host  country  and  foreign 
partners  have  been  encouraged  by  both  governments.  From  these  empirical  studies,  we 
can  find  one  of  the  motivations  for  forming  an  IN  is  government  encouragement. 
From  the  perspective  of  small  business,  Barrett  (1992)  suggests  that  the  formation  of  an 
IN  can  bring  small  firms  some  benefits  which  he  groups  into  three  categories.  First,  by 
sharing  the  development  of  an  export  program  with  an  IN  partner,  small  company 
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owners  can  enhance  growth  prospects.  Second,  an  international  partner  in  an  IN  can 
bring  to  the  enterprise  a  range  of  cultural  skills  and  knowledge  required  for  trading  in 
international  markets,  enhancing  competitiveness.  Third,  small  firms  can  overcome 
financial  constraints  when  a  number  of  government-assisted  financing  programs  are 
available  to  form  the  export  ventures. 
Franko  (1972),  Robock  and  Simmonds  (1983),  and  Killing  (1983)  all  observe  a  similar 
pattern  in  joint  ventures.  They  demonstrate  that  joint  ventures  are  formed  as  a  result  of 
uncertainty  concerning  a  new  market;  apparent  learning  about  the  market  and  need  for  a 
partner. 
Daniels  et  al.  (1985)  indicate  that  investing  companies  engage  in  foreign  direct 
investment  for  two  main  reasons.  These  are  generally  concerned  with  either  expanding 
their  markets  by  exporting  abroad,  or  acquiring  foreign  resources.  Berlew  (1984) 
suggests  that  a  small  firm  can  choose  a  joint  venture  to  establish  itself  overseas  because 
the  mode  of  joint  venture  brings  advantages  to  a  small  firm,  including  (1)  sharing  in  the 
venture's  income  and  growth,  (2)  enjoying  preferred  treatment  in  developing  countries, 
(3)  having  better  accesss  to  the  market,  (4)  keeping  its  capital  contribution  low  by 
supplying  technical  expertise,  (5)  experiencing  less  drain  on  its  managerial  resources,  and 
(6)  creating  equity  value  for  the  parent.  Porter  and  Fuller  (1986)  identify  four  strategic 
benefits  of  joint  venture  formation  which  are  reducing  risks,  economies  of  scale  or 
learning,  access  to  knowledge  or  ability,  and  shaping  competition.  They  stress  that  joint 
ventures  are  seen  as  an  attractive  mechanism  for  hedging  risk  because  neither  partner 
bears  the  full  risk  and  cost  of  the  alliance  activity. 
Harrigan  (1985)  classifies  the  various  uses  of  joint  ventures  into  three  broad  categories 
shown  as  Table  4.5.2.  There  are:  (a)  internal  uses  associated  mainly  with  cost  reduction 
and  the  sharing  of  resources;  (b)  competitive  uses  aimed  at  improving  the  firms'  strategic 
positions  through  forcing  their  industries'  structures  to  evolve  in  a  favourable  manner, 
pre-empting  competitors  such  as  developing  defensive  strategies  in  mature  industries; 
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and  (c)  strategic  uses  aimed  at  implementing  changes  in  the  firms'  strategic  postures 
through  access  to  new  technology  or  diversification. 
Table  4.5.2  Motivations  for  Joint  Venture  Formatinn 
Internal  uses  1.  Cost  and  risk  sharing  (uncertainty  reduction) 
2.  Obtain  resources  where  there  is  no  market 
3.  Obtain  financing  to  supplement  firm's  debt  capacity 
4.  Share  outputs  of  large  minimum  efficient  scale  plants 
"  avoid  wasteful  duplication  of  facilities 
"  utilize  by  products,  processes 
"  shared  brands,  distribution  channel,  wide  product  lines,  etc. 
5.  Intelligence:  obtain  window  on  new  technologies  and  customers 
"  superior  information  exchange 
"  technological  personnel  interactions 
6.  Innovative  managerial  practices 
"  superior  management  systems 
"  improved  communications  among  strategic  business  units  (SBUs) 
7.  Retain  entrepreneurial  employees 
Competitive  uses  1.  Influence  industry  structure's  evolution 
"  pioneer  development  of  new  industries 
"  reduce  competitive  volatility 
"  rationalize  mature  industries 
2.  Pre-empt  competitors  (first  mover  advantages) 
"  gain  rapid  access  to  better  customers 
"  capacity  expansion  or  vertical  integration 
"  acquisition  of  advantageous  terms,  resources 
"  coalition  with  best  partners 
3.  Defensive  response  to  blurring  industry  boundaries  and  globalization 
"  ease  political  tensions  (overcome  trade  barriers) 
"  gain  access  to  global  networks 
4.  Creation  of  more  effective  competitors 
"  hybrids  possessing  parents'  strengths 
"  fewer,  more  efficient  firms 
"  buffer  dissimilar  partners 
Strategic  uses  1.  Creation  and  exploitation  of  synergy 
2.  Technology  (or  other  skills)  transfer 
3.  Diversification 
"  toehold  entry  into  new  markets,  products,  or  skills 
"  rationalization  (or  divestiture)  of  investment 
"  leverage-related  parents'  skills  for  new  uses 
Source:  Harrigan,  K.  R.  (1985),  Strategies  for  Joint  Ventures,  Lexington  Books,  D.  C.  Heath  &  Co., 
Lexington,  Mass.,  p28. 
Hung  (1992)  studied  110  strategic  business  alliances  between  Canadian  and  Pacific  Asia 
companies  and  identified  22  "motives  and  fundamental  objectives",  which  are  shown  in 
Table  4.5.3.  Based  on  Hung's  study,  Groot  and  Merchant  (2000)  refined  Hung's  studies 
to  four  main  categories  of  objectives:  (1)  reducing  costs,  (2)  obtaining  market  access,  (3) 
obtaining  access  to  technological  developments  or expertise,  or  (4)  reducing  risks. 
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Table  4.5.3  The  Main  Categones  of  objectives 
1.  Gain  access  to  local  market 
2.  Become  "global"  more  quickly 
3.  Share  the  business  risk 
4.  Overcome  trade  barriers 
5.  Develop  cultural  familiarity 
6.  Minimize  capital  investment 
7.  Stabilize  earnings 
8.  Share  regional  markets 
9.  Reduce  cost  of  product  development 
10.  Make  use  of  foreign  labour 
11.  Generate  new  ideas  to  stimulate  internal 
innovation 
of  strategic  Alliances 
12.  Increase  contribution  to  the  company's  fixed 
investments 
13.  Gain  political  protection 
14.  Reduce/share  cost  of  research 
15.  Reduce  competition 
16.  Satisfy  personal  ambition 
17.  Acquire  foreign  technology 
18.  Gain  knowledge  on  how  other  companies 
manage 
19.  Circumvent  investment  restrictions 
20.  Integrate  the  company's  operations 
21.  Make  use  of  under-utilized  equipment 
22  Secure  material  supplies 
Source:  Groot,  T.  L.  C.  M.  &  Merchant,  K.  A.,  (2000),  Control  of  International  Joint  Ventures, 
Accounting  Organizations  and  Society,  25(6):  579-607 
Joint  ventures  are  also  deemed  as  an  attractive  mechanism  for  the  sharing  of  risks. 
Contractor  and  Lorange  (1988b)  identify  the  ways  in  which  a  joint  venture  can  reduce  a 
partner's  risk.  These  include:  (a)  spreading  the  risk  of  a  large  project  over  more  than 
one  firm;  (b)  enabling  product  diversification  and  the  faster  establishment  of  a  presence 
in  the  market,  which  in  turn  allows  a  more  rapid  payback  on  investment;  (c)  cost  sub- 
addivity,  i.  e.  the  cost  of  the  partnership  is  less  than  the  cost  of  investment  undertaken  by 
each  firm  alone.  A  joint  venture  can  lower  the  total  investment  cost  of  a  particular 
project  or  the  assets  at  risk,  by  combining  expertise  and  slack  facilities  in  the  parent  firms. 
Kogut  (1988a)  stresses  the  use  of  international  joint  ventures  stems  from  theories  on 
how  strategic  behaviour  influences  the  competitive  positioning  of  the  firm.  From  the 
strategic  behaviour  perspective,  he  argues  that  joint  ventures  are  a  mode  of  organization 
that  maximizes  profits  through  improving  a  firm's  competitive  position. 
Datta  (1988)  argues  that  there  are  a  number  of  economic  reasons  why  firms  are 
increasingly  required  to  accept  and  work  with  joint  ventures.  The  motives  for  a 
multinational  to  enter  into  a  joint  venture  agreement  are:  (a)  to  enter  new  and  potentially 
profitable  markets;  (b)  to  share  heightened  economic  risks  in  new  business  ventures;  (c) 
to  satisfy  nationalistic  demands  and  reduce  the  risks of  expropriation;  and  (d)  to  pool 
organizational  know-how  and  gain  various  synergistic  benefits. 
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A  study  by  the  United  Nations'  Economic  Commission  for  Europe  (1988)  identifies  the 
range  of  potential  objectives  of  foreign  companies  that  enter  into  joint  ventures  with 
local  partners  to  be:  (a)  to  reduce  the  capital  cost  (and  risk)  of  setting  up  a  new  capacity; 
(b)  to  penetrate  a  specific  geographic  market;  (c)  to  acquire  managerial  know-how  about 
local  market  conditions;  (d)  to  enter  a  new  field  of  business;  (e)  to  achieve  the  vertical 
integration  of  existing  products;  (f)  to  acquire  a  manufacturing  base  or  raw  material 
sources;  (g)  to  expand  existing  product  lines;  (h)  to  learn  about  newly  developing  market 
needs;  (i)  to  acquire  a  means  of  distribution;  (j)  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  existing 
marketing;  (k)  to  avoid  cyclical  or  seasonal  instability  and  (1)  to  take  advantage  of  lower 
input  costs. 
Hagedoorn  (1993)  identifies  the  motives  for  strategic  technology  partnering  as  increased 
complexity  and  the  intersectional  nature  of  emerging  technologies,  technological 
synergies,  access  to  scientific  knowledge,  complementary  technologies,  reduction  and 
minimizing  of  uncertainty  in  R&D,  capturing  a  partner's  tacit  knowledge  and  technology 
transfer.  In  studying  the  case  of  Chrysler  and  the  Beijing  jeep  corporation,  Aiello  (1991) 
found  that  the  Chinese  partner's  main  strategy  for  entering  into  corporation  with  the 
West  was  to  absorb  as  much  technology  and  management  skills  as  possible;  in  contrast, 
the  foreign  partner's  main  motive  was  to  get  access  to  the  Chinese  market. 
Beamish  et  al.  (1994)  summarized  four  basic  purposes  that  lead  companies  to  the 
creation  of  joint  ventures.  These  are:  (a)  to  strengthen  the  firms'  existing  business;  (b)  to 
take  the  firm's  existing  products  into  new  markets;  (c)  to  obtain  new  products  that  can 
be  sold  in  the  firm's  existing  markets;  (d)  to  diversify  into  a  new  business.  Beamish  and 
Inkpen  (1995)  find  that  a  primary  motive  for  forming  an  IN  is  the  need  for  access  to 
specific  local  knowledge.  This  knowledge  contribution  of  local  partners  has  strategic 
value  to  the  foreign  partners,  as  they  continue  to  depend  on  local  partners  for  specialized 
local  knowledge. 
Mead  (1994)  demonstrates  that  forming  an  international  joint  venture  (IJV)  may  give 
both  partners  opportunities  to:  (a)  create  greater  market  power  by  combining  resources; 
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(b)  reduce  risk  by  sharing  costs  of  investment  and  production  (c)  cooperate  and  avoid 
competition,  which  might  incur  greater  costs  than  those  incurred  by  forming  the  IN  and 
(d)  cooperate  with  a  potentially  dangerous  competitor. 
Pennings  (1981)  indicates  three  types  of  motivation  when  organizations  process  the 
exchange:  (a)  efficiency  driven-sharing  cost  and  risk;  (b)  competitive  driven- 
improving  the  competitive  position;  (c)  resource  driven-controlling  scarce  resources, 
enlarging  present  resources  and  finding  complement  resources. 
Lin  (1995)  classifies  the  motivation  for  forming  international  joint  ventures  into  three 
categories,  as  follows;  (a)  efficiency  driven-  based  on  transaction  cost  theory  including 
sharing  cost  and  risk,  obtaining  capital,  overcoming  legislation,  acquiring  economic  scale 
of  production  or  sale,  etc.;  (b)  competitive  driven---based  on  resource  dependence 
theory  and  strategic  behaviour  theory  including  entering  foreign  or  domestic  markets, 
maintaining  the  partner's  relationship,  stabilizing  supply  of  resource  materials  and 
components,  shortening  the  time  from  the  product  design  to  market  entry  and  increasing 
market  share;  (c)  learning  driven-based  on  organization  learning  theory  including 
acquiring  technology,  management  knowledge,  marketing  knowledge  and  educating 
employees  in  research  and  development. 
Based  on  the  relevant  literature,  Glaister  and  Buckley  (1996)  identify  the  most  important 
motives  relating  to  the  strategic  motivation  for  alliance  formation  which  are  (1)  risk 
sharing,  (2)  product  rationalization  and  economies  of  scale,  (3)  transfer  of 
complementary  technology  /  exchange  of  patents,  (4)  shaping  competition,  (5) 
conforming  to  host  government  policy,  (6)  facilitating  international  expansion,  (7) 
vertical  linkages,  and  (8)  consolidation  of  market  position.  They  also  provide  16 
strategic  motives  for  alliance  formation  by  UK  firms  with  partners  in  Western  Europe, 
the  United  States  and  Japan  and  group  them  into  5  categories  which  are  configured  as 
technology  development,  market  power,  market  development,  resource  specialization 
and  large  project  completion.  The  details  of  these  motivations  are  shown  in  Table  4.5.4. 
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Tnh1P  ASA  Ctrateair  Mntivatinnc  fnr  Tnternatinnal  Alliance  Fnrmatinn 
Technology  .  Share  R&D  costs 
development  .  Exchange  of  complementary  technology 
.  Exchange  of  patents/  territories 
Market  power  "  Compete  against  common  competitor 
.  Maintain  market  position 
.  Produce  at  lowest  cost  location 
.  Reduce  competition 
Market  "  Facilitates  international  expansion 
development  "  Faster  entry  to  market 
.  Gain  presence  in  new  market 
.  Conform  to  foreign  government  policy 
Resource  "  Concentrate  on  higher  margin  business 
specialization  "  Economies  of  scale 
.  Faster  payback  on  investment 
Large  project  .  Spread  risk  of  large  project 
completion  "  Product  diversification 
Source:  Glaister,  K.  W.  and  Buckley,  P.  J.  (1996).  Strategic  motives  for  international  alliance  formation, 
Journal  of  Management  Studies,  33(3),  pp301-332. 
In  the  study  of  UK  international  joint  ventures,  Glaister,  Husan  and  Buckley  (1998) 
group  the  purposes  underlying  IN  formation  into  three  classifications,  namely,  non- 
marketing-  related,  marketing-related  and  service  provision.  Their  results  revealed  that 
most  IJVs  were  formed  in  order  to  carry  out  a  service  activity  (Glaister  and  Buckley, 
1994). 
Yan  and  Luo  (2001)  indicate  that  the  primary  reasons  for  N  formation  for  Chinese 
partners  are  the  acquisition  of  the  US  partner's  knowledge  which  includes  the  technical, 
production,  marketing  and  operational  knowledge.  Tidd  and  Izumimto  (2002)  claimed 
that  a  firm  was  likely  to  have  multiple  motives  for  an  alliance.  The  reasons  for 
collaboration  include  the  reduction  of  cost  and  risk  of  technological  or  market 
development,  to  reduce  time  to  market,  and  the  exploitation  of  economies  of  scale. 
From  the  perspective  of  newly-industrializing  country  firms,  Chen  and  Chen  (2003) 
argue  that  the  motive  for  the  creation  of  strategic  alliances  with  advanced-country  firms 
is  to  gain  market  access  and  new  technologies.  Beamish  and  Berdrow  (2003)  also  found 
that  sharing  risks  and  gaining  market  access  are  key  motivations  for  IN  activity,  but 
their  results  revealed  that  the  accessing  knowledge  and  learning  new  skills  are  secondary 
motives  to  market  positioning  and  sharing  risks. 
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Glaister  (2004)  examines  the  rationale  for  the  formation  of  international  equity  joint 
ventures  from  the  perspectives  of  the  transactions  cost  and  resource  based  theories,  and 
his  findings  indicate  that  both  aspects  of  the  transactions  cost  and  resource  based  views 
influence  the  decision  to  form  a  joint  venture.  He  agues  that  the  transactions  cost  and 
resource  based  perspectives  on  N  formation  should  be  regarded  as  complementary 
views  rather  than  substitute  views  (Tidd  and  Izumimoto,  2002). 
From  the  relevant  literature  above,  the  major  motivations  for  joint  venture  are  identified 
as:  cost  sharing,  risk  reduction,  economics  of  scale,  resource  implementation,  market 
entry,  shaping  competition,  legislation,  organization  learning,  etc.  Table  4.5.5 
summarizes  the  core  strategic  motives  for  joint  venture  formation. 
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Killing  1983  #  *  # 
Beamth  1985 
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UNECE  1988  *  *  *  *  # 
Bemishetal  19% 
Lin  1995  *  #  #  *  #  #  # 
Source:  this  study  compiled  from  relevant  articles 
According  to  above  research  of  the  motivation  for  the  formation  of  joint  ventures,  there 
are  some  different  results.  These  differences  may  stem  from: 
(a)  Different  partner  aspects:  multinational  firms  and  local  firms  in  general  have  different 
objects.  To  the  former,  a  joint  venture  may  present  a  way  into  new  markets,  reduce 
risk  and  provide  economies  of  scale.  To  the  latter,  a  joint  venture  may  be  the  way  to 
acquire  capital,  to  obtain  technology  skills,  to  learn  management  and  marketing 
knowledge.  Additionally,  developed  countries  and  less  developed  countries  will  have 
different  objectives. 
(b)  Different  approach  aspects:  using  different  approaches  will  result  in  different  results, 
for  example,  transaction  cost  theory  emphases  minimizing  the  transaction  costs.  In 
contrast,  strategic  behaviour  theory  concentrates  on  maximizing  profits. 
(c)  Differences  in  research  sample:  some  research  investigates  the  manufacturing 
industry  only  which  provides  different  results. 
In  sum,  there  are  many  possible  explanations  of  the  motivation  for  forming  international 
joint  ventures.  Many  of  these  explanations;  however,  are  variants  of  four  theoretical 
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perspectives,  namely,  transaction  costs,  strategic  behaviour,  resource  dependence,  and 
organizational  learning.  From  the  literature  review  and  the  theories  on  international  joint 
ventures,  this  study  implies  that  different  motivations  encompass  different  meanings  for 
the  investors  (the  parents).  Therefore,  this  study  also  attempts  to  identify  the  variables 
which  measure  the  motivation  for  creating  international  joint  ventures  in  a  Taiwan 
context  and  discusses  the  relationship  among  motivation  and  other  constructs. 
4.5.3  The  Relationship  between  Motivation,  Control,  Ownership  and 
Contribution 
Copious  literature  exists  on  the  investigation  of  joint  ventures  solely  in  terms  of  an 
examination  of  either  motivation  or  control  (Mariti  and  Smiley,  1983;  Beamish,  1985; 
Contractor  and  Lorange,  1988;  Kogut,  1988;  Harrigan,  1985,1988;  Hennart,  1991; 
Sheth  and  Parvatiyar,  1992;  Hung,  1992;  Pan  and  Tse,  1996;  Glaister  and  Buckley,  1996; 
Yan  and  Luo,  2001;  Glaister,  2004).  Very  few  studies  have  examined  the  relationship 
between  motivations  and  control  simultaneously.  Chalos  and  O'Connor  (2004)  describe 
partner  differences  in  their  perceptions  of  control  mechanisms  as  determined  largely  by 
their  respective  motives.  They  found  knowledge  dependency  and  asset  specific 
transaction  costs  to  be  the  determinants  of  controls  to  varying  degrees  for  each  partner. 
Based  on  the  study  of  US-  Chinese  joint  ventures,  they  found  that  US  partners  have 
higher  controls  when  they  consider  protecting  their  knowledge  and  have  lesser  control 
mechanisms  to  protect  their  specific  asset  investments.  In  contrast  to  the  US  partner, 
they  found  that  Chinese  partners  increase  their  controls  when  their  specific  asset 
investments  increase  and  have  less  controls  when  they  are  knowledge  dependent  on  the 
foreign  partners. 
Lin  (1995)  reported  that  a  different  motivation  for  joint  venture  formation  has  a  different 
extent  of  control.  In  her  study,  she  found  that  the  partner  who  has  the  learning 
motivation  would  have  higher  control  in  order  to  learn  specific  knowledge  from  a  partner. 
Based  on  relevant  research's  results,  this  study  posits  that  that  there  is  relationship 
between  motivation  and  control.  The  hypothesis  is  presented  as  follows: 
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H  7:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host  country  parents 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their  control  over  a  joint  venture 
The  parents  of  a  joint  venture  usually  have  different  backgrounds  and  different  business 
operating  strategies  which  affects  the  choice  of  ownership  structure  (Harrigan,  1985  ; 
Killing,  1983).  Gomes-Casseres  (1989)  address  the  motivation  for  cooperation  as  the 
result  of  a  different  ownership  structure  of  foreign  subsidiaries.  Lin  (1995)  also  reported 
that  different  motivation  for  creating  a  joint  venture  will  affect  the  proportion  of 
ownership  in  such  venture.  She  found  that  learning  driven  motivation  has  a  higher 
proportion  of  ownership  than  competitive  driven  and  efficiency  driven  motivation  has  a 
lower  proportion  of  ownership.  Thus,  this  study  posits  that  there  is  a  relationship 
between  motivation  and  ownership.  The  hypothesis  is  represented  as  follows: 
H  s:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host  country  parents 
forming  joint  ventures  and  their  ownership  in  a  joint  venture 
Establishing  an  organization  needs  many  kinds  of  resources  such  as  capital,  human 
resources,  technology  and  know-how,  etc.;  and  these  resources  have  important  positions 
in  different  situations.  Kogut  (1988)  defines  a  joint  venture  thus:  "a  joint  venture  occurs 
when  two  or  more  firms  pool  a  portion  of  their  resources  within  a  common  legal 
organization".  For  a  joint  venture,  the  needed  resources  are  derived  from  different 
parent  entities.  For  example,  the  capital  must  be  firstly  contributed  from  each  parent 
when  they  decide  to  corporate  under  different  motives.  Therefore,  firms  will  cooperate 
in  forming  joint  ventures  when  they  can  benefit  from  another  partner's  knowledge  or 
advantages  (Hamel,  1991;  Badaracco,  1991;  Ciborra,  1991;  Kogut,  1988;  Harrigan, 
1984;  Nelson  and  Winter,  1982). 
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Much  existing  research  points  out  that  one  of  the  motivations  for  forming  a  joint  venture 
is  resource  dependence  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Beamish,  1985;  Harrigan,  1985; 
Killing,  1983;  Pfeffer  and  Salabcik,  1978;  Zald,  1970;  Aiken  and  Hage,  1968;  Thompson, 
1967;  Blau,  1964;  Emerson,  1962;  Selznick,  1948).  In  his  sample  of  sixty-six  joint 
ventures  in  less  developed  countries,  Beamish's  (1985)  results  showed  that  the  reasons 
for  creating  a  joint  venture  are  skills  needed  and  assets  or  attributes  needed.  On  the  basis 
of  the  relevant  literature's  results,  this  study  posits  that  there  is  a  significant  relationship 
between  motivation  for  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  resource  contribution 
supplied  by  host  country  parents.  The  hypothesis  is  represented  as  follows: 
H  9:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host  country  parents 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their  resource  contribution  to  a  joint 
venture 
As  already  noted  previous  research  demonstrates  that  control  is  an  important  function  in 
an  international  joint  venture  and  it  can  be  affected  by  its  antecedent  factors  which  are 
parent's  contributions,  ownership,  bargaining  power  and  motivations.  Based  on  the 
previous  discussion,  this  study  proposes  a  research  framework  that  links  the  control  and 
the  antecedent  factors  as  shown  in  Figure  4.5.1. 
Motivation 
H9 
Contribution 
HS 
H7 
Hs 
Ownership 
H1 
Figure  4.5.1  The  Research  Framework  of  this  Study 
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In  this  framework,  it  is  postulated  that  there  is  a  significant  relationship  between  control 
and  its  antecedent  factors  which  are  motivation,  contribution,  bargaining  power  and 
ownership.  Ownership  is  also  a  function  of  motivation,  contribution  and  bargaining 
power.  The  relationship  between  the  motivation  and  contribution  and  bargaining  power 
will  be  measured.  Nine  hypotheses  are  proposed  to  test  their  relationship  between  every 
two  dimensions.  These  hypotheses  are  summary  in  Table  4.5.6. 
Table  4.5.6  Summary  of  the  Research  Hvnntheces 
Research  Hypotheses 
Constructs 
H1:  There  is  a  significantly  positive  relationship  between  the  proportion 
of  ownership  and  the  extent  of  control 
H  1.1:  The  higher  proportion  of  equity  ownership  held  by  host 
Ownership  country  parents  the  stronger  their  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H  1.2:  The  higher  proportion  of  equity  ownership  held  by  host 
country  parents  the  stronger  their  control  of  the  appointment 
of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint  venture 
H2:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the 
i  i  B  extent  of  control 
arga  n  ng  H3:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the 
proportion  of  ownership 
H4:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  contribution  of 
host  country  parents  and  the  extent  of  control  they  exercise  in  a 
joint  venture 
H  4.1,:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H 
41b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the  appointment 
of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint  venture 
H  42a:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource 
Contribution  contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H  42b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the  appointment 
of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint  venture 
H  43k:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  finance  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H 
4.3b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  finance  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the  appointment 
of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint  venture 
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Table  4.5.6  Summary  of  the  Research  Hvnotheses  (continued) 
H  44,:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H  mob:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the 
appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint  venture 
H  45,:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organization  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H  45b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organization  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the 
appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint  venture 
H5:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  resource 
contribution  of  host  country  parents  and  their  proportion  of 
ownership  in  a  joint  venture 
Contribution 
H  s-1:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource 
contribution  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of  equity  shares 
in  a  joint  venture 
H  5.2:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource 
contribution  to  the  venture  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of 
equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  5.3:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  financial  resource 
contribution  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of  equity  shares 
in  a  joint  venture 
H  5.4:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resource 
contribution  to  the  venture  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of 
equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  s.  s:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organizational  resource 
contribution  to  the  venture  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of 
equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  6:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  resource 
contribution  of  host  country  parents  and  bargaining  power 
H  7:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host 
country  parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their 
control  over  a  joint  venture 
H  g:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host 
Motivation  country  parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their 
ownership  in  a  joint  venture 
H  9:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host 
country  parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their 
resource  contribution  to  a  joint  venture 
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4.6  Summary 
This  research  mainly  focuses  on  the  issue  of  control  in  international  joint  ventures,  and 
considers  what  antecedent  variables  affect  control.  Drawing  on  previous  literature,  this 
chapter  reviews  the  relevant  literature  on  international  joint  ventures  and  centres  on  the 
antecedents  of  control  associated  with  motivation,  parent's  contribution,  bargaining 
power,  and  ownership.  The  research  framework  is  proposed  after  the  literature  reviews 
and  hypotheses  are  developed  to  test  the  relationship  between  control  and  its  antecedents 
which  are  motivation,  parent's  contribution,  bargaining  power,  and  ownership. 
Hypotheses  HI.  1  and  111.2  are  built  to  test  the  relationship  between  ownership  and  the 
control  on  operational  decision-making  activities  and  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers  in  joint  ventures. 
Hypotheses  1  12  H3  are  constructed  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the  firm's 
bargaining  power,  control  on  operational  decision-making  activities,  the  appointment  of 
high-level  managers  in  joint  ventures,  and  to  test  the  relationship  between  the  firm's 
bargaining  power  and  ownership. 
Hypotheses  H4.  Hs  and  ü6  are  posited  to  examine  the  relationship  between  the 
contribution  supplied  by  host  country  parents  and  control,  ownership  and  bargaining 
power. 
Hypotheses  117,  Ha  and  ßi9  are  proposed  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the 
motivation  for  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  control,  ownership  and 
contribution. 
In  the  next  chapter,  an  empirical  investigative  methodology  is  designed.  The  relevant 
topics  of  the  research  design  are  demonstrated  in  the  following  chapter. 
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RESEARCH  DESIGN 
5.1  Introduction 
According  to  the  research  objectives  indicated  in  Chapter  1,  this  study  is  designed  to 
examine  the  issue  of  control  in  international  joint  ventures,  and  to  test  the  relationship 
between  control  and  its  antecedents  which  discussed  in  Chapter  3  and  Chapter  4).  To 
achieve  the  goal  of  the  study,  a  appropriate  research  design  can  lead  to  a  success  of  the 
study.  Therefore,  the  main  objectives  of  this  chapter  are  to  discuss  the  research  design 
employed  in  this  study.  It  is  organised  into  six  sections.  Section  5.2,  an  overview  of  the 
research  process  is  examined  first.  In  section  5.3,  the  research  design  is  divided  into  ten 
subsections  which  included  the  purpose  of  the  study,  types  of  investigation,  extent  of 
researcher  interference,  time  horizon,  study  setting,  unit  of  analysis,  sampling  design, 
measurement,  data  collection  and  data  analysis  methods.  Each  of  ten  topics  is  examined 
in  detail.  Section  5.4  give  a  brief  summary  of  the  research  design  of  this  study.  Section 
5.5  examines  the  profile  of  the  sample  characteristics  derived  from  this  study.  Finally 
Section  5.6  draws  a  brief  conclusion. 
5.2  An  Overview  of  Research  Process 
What  is  business  research?  Sekaran  (2003)  defines  the  business  research  as  "an  organized, 
systematic,  data-based,  critical,  objective,  scientific  inquiry  or  investigation  into  a  specific 
problem,  undertaken  with  the  purpose  of  finding  answers  or  solutions  to  it".  It  can  be 
described  as  a  systematic  and  organized  effort  to  investigate  a  specific  problem  or 
opportunity  encountered  in  the  work  setting  that  needs  a  solution  (Cavana,  Delahaye  and 
Sekaran,  2001).  In  essence,  business  research  involves  a  series  of  scientific  activities 
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designed  and  executed  carefully.  Thus,  scientific  research  focuses  on  solving  problems 
and  pursues  a  step-by-step  logical,  organized,  and  rigorous  method  to  identify  the 
problems,  gather  data,  analyze  them,  and  draw  valid  conclusions  there  from  (Sekaran, 
2003). 
In  the  research  process,  Hussey  (1997)  identifies  six  fundamental  stages  which  are 
common  to  all  scientifically  based  investigations.  These  research  stages  encompass: 
identify  research  topic,  define  research  problem,  determine  how  to  conduct  research, 
collect  research  data,  analyze  and  interpret  research  data  and  write  thesis  which  shown  in 
Figure  5.2.1. 
Identify  research  topic 
Define  research  problem 
Determine  how  to  conduct  research 
Collect  research  data 
Analyze  and  interpret  research  data 
Write  dissertation  /  thesis 
Figure  5.2.1  Stages  in  the  Research  Process 
Source:  Hussey,  J.  and  Hussey,  R.,  (1997).  Business  Research,  Macmillan  Press 
Ltd. 
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Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias  (2000)  identify  seven  main  stages:  problem  definition, 
hypothesis,  research  design,  measurement,  data  collection,  and  data  analysis.  They 
provide  an  overview  of  what  is  involved  in  the  research  process  and  depict  key  research 
activities  and  their  interrelationships.  Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran  (2001)  state  that 
business  research  involves  11  steps.  These  are  the  catalyst  for  research,  preliminary 
information  gathering  and  literature  survey,  problem  definition,  framework  development, 
research  objectives,  research  design,  data  collection,  data  analysis,  interpretation  of 
findings,  report  preparation  and  presentation  and  management  action. 
Kumar  (2000)  develops  a  general  model  of  research  process  which  includes  eight  main 
steps.  There  are:  Step  1:  to  formulate  a  research  problem,  Step  2:  to  conceptualize  a 
research  design,  Step  3:  to  construction  an  instrument  for  data  collection,  Step  4:  to 
selecting  a  sample,  Step  5:  to  write  a  research  proposal,  Step  6:  to  collection  data,  Step  7: 
to  processing  data,  and  Step  8:  to  writing  a  research  report. 
Similarly,  Sekaran  (2003)  outlines  the  research  process  for  basic  and  applied  research  in 
a  systematic  way  which  includes  (1)  the  identification  of  the  broad  problem  area;  (2) 
preliminary  information  gathering,  especially  through  unstructured  and  structured 
interviews  and  literature  survey;  (3)  problem  definition;  (4)  evolving  a  theoretical 
framework;  (5)  deriving  testable  hypotheses;  (6)  scientific  research  design;  (7)  data 
collection,  analysis,  and  interpretation;  (8)  deduction  the  results;  (9)  report  writing;  (10) 
report  presentation;  (11)  managerial  decision  making.  These  11  phases  are  shown  in 
Figure  5.2.2  (see  next  page). 
The  research  process  of  this  study  follows  the  method  Sekaran  (2003)  outlines.  In  the 
previous  chapters,  the  research  problems  are  identified,  a  research  framework  is  evolved 
and  testable  hypotheses  are  derived.  Following  Sekaran's  research  process,  the  next 
phase  is  turned  to  the  research  design  and  data  collection,  data  analysis  and  interpretation. 
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5.3  Research  Design 
Research  design  is  the  "science  (and  art)  of  planning  procedures  for  conducting  studies 
so  as  to  get  the  most  valid  findings"  (Vogt,  1993).  Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias 
(2000)  define  the  research  design  as  "the  `blueprint'  that  enables  the  investigator  to  come 
up  with  solutions  to  these  problems  and  guides  him  or  her  in  the  various  stages  of  the 
research"  (p.  89).  Babbie  (2002)  indicates  that  the  research  design  involves  a  set  of 
decisions  regarding  what  topic  is  to  be  studied  among  what  population  with  what 
research  methods  for  what  purpose.  In  other  words,  research  design  involves  a  detailed 
plan  which  can  guide  the  research  methods  to  be  employed.  To  provide  a  general 
introduction  of  research  design,  Sekaran  (2003)  outlines  it  in  a  systematic  way  shown  in 
Figure  5.3.1(see  next  page). 
As  shown  in  Figure  5.3.1,  the  various  issues  involved  in  the  research  design  include  the 
key  decisions.  These  are 
"  Purpose  of  the  study:  studies  may  be  either  exploratory  in  nature  or  descriptive,  or 
may  be  conducted  to  test  hypotheses. 
"  Type  of  investigation:  what  types  of  investigation  employed  in  the  study. 
"  Extent  of  researcher  interference:  how  the  researcher  manipulates  and  controls  the 
study. 
"  Study  setting:  where  the  study  will  be  conducted. 
"  Time  horizon:  the  temporal  aspects  of  the  study. 
"  Unit  of  analysis:  the  level  at  which  the  data  will  be  analyzed. 
"  Sampling  design:  the  types  of  sample  to  be  used. 
"  Quantification  and  measures:  how  to  measure  the  related  variables. 
"  Data-collection  method:  how  the  data  will  be  collected. 
"  Data  analysis:  how  the  concepts  and  variables  will  be  analyzed. 
The  research  design  of  this  study  adopted  Sekaran's  model  and  each  issue  involved  in  the 
research  design  is  described  in  the  following  subsections. 
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5.3.1  The  Purposes  of  the  Study 
In  the  field  of  social  science,  there  are  many  reasons  for  research.  For  conducting 
empirical  research,  Kidder  et  al.  (1986)  classify  the  purpose  of  research  into  discovery, 
demonstration,  refutation,  and  replication.  According  to  the  research  purpose,  Hussey 
(1997)  classifies  research  into  four  types  of  research  which  are  exploratory  research, 
descriptive  research,  analytical  research  and  predictive  research.  Churchill  (1999) 
divides  the  research  types  into  exploratory,  descriptive,  and  causal  (or  explanatory) 
research.  According  to  the  nature  of  the  study,  Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran  (2001) 
classify  the  research  into  exploration  study,  description  study,  hypothesis-testing  study 
and  case  study.  In  general,  the  most  common  and  useful  purposes  of  social  research 
include  exploration,  description,  and  explanation.  Often  research  studies  combine  more 
than  one  purpose  (Babbie,  2002).  Each  type  of  research  is  examined  below  in  order  to 
understanding  their  characteristics. 
Exploratory  study  is  undertaken  when  a  research  problem  or  issue  is  novel  or  when  no 
information  can  be  referred  from  earlier  studies.  This  approach  typically  occurs  when  a 
researcher  examines  a  new  interest  or  when  the  subject  of  study  itself  is  relatively  new 
(Babbie,  2002).  The  aim  of  this  type  of  study  is  to  look  for  patterns,  ideas,  or 
hypotheses,  rather  than  testing  or  confirming  a  hypothesis  (Hussey,  1997;  Churchill, 
1999).  Babbie  (2002)  describes  exploratory  studies  as  the  attempt  to  develop  an  initial, 
rough  understanding  of  some  phenomenon,  which  is  done  mostly  for  three  purposes:  (1) 
to  satisfy  the  researcher's  curiosity  and  desire  for  better  understanding,  (2)  to  test  the 
feasibility  of  undertaking  a  more  extensive  study,  and  (3)  to  develop  the  methods  to  be 
employed  in  any  subsequent  study.  Typical  techniques  used  in  exploratory  research 
include  case  studies,  observation  and  historical  analysis.  Such  techniques  are  highly 
flexible,  unstructured  and  qualitative.  As  such,  exploratory  study  is  particularly  helpful 
to  better  comprehend  the  nature  of  the  problem  when  initial  ideas  and  insights  into  a 
research  issue  are  required  and  it  can  give  guidance  on  what  type  of  future  research 
should  be  conducted. 
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Descriptive  study  is  used  to  identify  and  obtain  information  on  the  characteristics  of  a 
particular  problem  or  issue,  to  describe  the  characteristics  of  certain  groups,  to  estimate 
the  proportion  of  people  in  a  specified  population  who  behave  in  a  certain  way,  or  to 
make  a  specific  prediction  (Churchill,  1999;  Hussey,  1997).  Basically,  descriptive  study 
is  undertaken  to  ascertain  and  describe  the  characteristics  of  the  pertinent  issues.  Babbie 
(2002)  states  that  descriptive  study  is  the  precise  measurement  and  reporting  of  the 
characteristics  of  some  population  or  phenomenon  under  study.  Therefore,  the  goal  of  a 
descriptive  study  is  to  offer  a  profile  or  to  describe  relevant  aspects  of  the  phenomenon 
of  interest  to  the  researcher  from  different  perspectives.  Quantitative  and  statistical 
techniques  are  usually  used  to  collect  the  data,  for  example,  surveys,  field  studies  and 
content  analysis,  and  also  to  summarize  the  information. 
Explanatory  study  or  hypotheses  testing  (cf.  Sekaran,  2003)  is  used  to  understand 
phenomena  by  discovering  and  measuring  causal  relations  among  variables,  to  discover 
and  report  the  relationships  among  different  aspects  of  the  phenomenon  (Babbie,  2002). 
In  other  words,  explanatory  study  is  concerned  with  establishing  cause-and-effect 
relationships  in  an  attempt  to  explain  the  variance  in  the  dependent  variable  or  to  predict 
organizational  outcomes.  Hypothesis  testing  can  offer  an  enhanced  understanding  of  the 
relationships  the  exit  among  variables  and  also  can  establish  the  cause  and  effect 
relationships  (Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran,  2001),  and  it  can  better  explain  the  causal 
links  between  the  characteristics. 
The  process  of  identifying  and  selecting  the  most  appropriate  research  design  for  this 
study  is  driven  by  the  nature  of  the  research  objectives.  The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to 
explain  the  relationships  between  motivation,  contribution,  ownership,  bargaining  power 
and  control  in  international  joint  venture  issue.  Therefore,  an  explanatory  /hypothesis 
testing  methodology  was  employed  in  this  study.  The  next  section  turns  to  the  different 
types  of  investigation. 
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5.3.2  Types  of  Investigation:  Causal  Versus  Correlational 
When  deciding  on  the  type  of  investigation,  the  researcher  can  consider  whether  a  causal 
or  a  correlation  study  is  needed.  A  correlation  relationship  indicates  that  at  least  two 
concepts  or  variables  move  simultaneously  and  a  causal  relationship  indicates  that  one 
concept  or  variable  causes  a  movement  in  another  concept  or  variable  (Cavana,  Delahaye 
and  Sekaran,  2001).  In  other  words,  when  the  researcher  is  intending  to  delineate  the 
important  variables  that  are  associated  with  the  problem,  then  it  is  a  correlational  study. 
In  contrast,  when  the  researcher  wants  to  know  how  one  variable  causes  or  determines 
the  values  of  other  variables,  then  the  study  is  called  a  causal  study.  However,  it  is 
important  to  bear  in  mind  that  it  is  not  just  one  or  more  variables  that  cause  a  problen}. 
At  most  times  there  are  multiple  factors  that  influence  one  another  and  the  problem. 
Therefore,  the  researcher  might  identify  the  critical  factors  first  which  are  associated  with 
the  problem,  rather  than  establish  a  causal  relationship.  The  cause  and  effect 
relationships  can  be  established  through  certain  types  of  correlation  or  regression 
analyses,  such  as  cross-lagged  correlations  and  path  analysis  (Sekaran,  2003). 
The  aim  of  this  study  is  intended  firstly  to  delineate  the  important  variables  which  are 
associated  with  control.  Once  the  variables  associated  with  control  are  identified,  then  a 
causal  relationship  will  be  tested  between  those  variables  and  control.  Therefore,  the 
correlation  and  causal  study  will  be  used  in  this  study. 
5.3.3  Extent  of  Researcher  Interference 
Sekaran  (2003)  indicates  that  there  could  be  varying  degrees  of  interference  by  the 
researcher  in  the  manipulation  and  control  of  variables  in  the  research  study,  either  in  the 
natural  setting  or  in  an  artificial  research  setting.  Exploratory  and  descriptive  studies  are 
conducted  in  the  natural  environment  of  the  organization,  the  researcher  usually 
interfering  minimally  with  the  normal  flow  of  work.  In  addition,  most  correlation  designs 
are  carried  out  in  natural  settings  with  a  normal  flow  of  events;  therefore,  the  extent  of 
researcher  interference  can  be  reduced  to  the  minimum. 
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This  study  is  conducted  in  Taiwan  by  administering  postal  questionnaires  to  the 
companies  who  engage  in  international  joint  ventures.  Thus,  the  research  interference  is 
minimised. 
5.3.4  Study  Setting 
Business  research  can  be  conducted  in  the  natural  environment  which  is  called  a  non- 
contrived  setting  or  in  an  artificial  environment  which  is  called  a  contrived  setting. 
According  to  Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran's  (2001)  description,  exploratory, 
descriptive  studies  are  invariably  conducted  in  non-contrived  settings,  whereas  rigorous 
causal  studies  are  undertaken  in  contrived  lab  settings.  The  above  authors  also  examine 
the  difference  between  a  field  study,  a  field  experiment  and  a  lab  experiment. 
Description,  exploratory,  descriptive  and  some  correlation  studies  undertaken  in 
organizations  are  called  "field  studies"  where  research  is  conducted  in  non-contrived 
settings  with  minimal  researcher  interference.  Research  studies  conducted  to  establish 
cause  and  effect  relationships  using  the  same  natural  environment  where  employees 
normally  function  are  called  "field  experiments"  which  are  conducted  in  a  non-contrived 
setting  but  with  researcher  interference  to  a  moderate  extent.  Experiment  studies  done 
to  establish  cause  and  effect  relationships  would  create  an  artificial,  contrived 
environment  in  which  all  the  extraneous  factors  are  strictly  controlled.  These  studies  are 
referred  to  as  "lab  experiments"  which  are  conducted  in  a  contrived  setting  with 
excessive  researcher  interference. 
In  this  study,  the  survey  of  the  sample  of  host  country  parents  is  undertaken  by 
employing  mailed  questionnaires.  Hence,  it  is  a  field  study  in  a  non-contrived  setting 
with  minimal  researcher  interference. 
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5.3.5  Time  Horizon 
In  social  science  research,  two  studies  with  regard  to  time  are  usually  used,  namely 
cross-sectional  studies  and  longitudinal  studies.  Hussey  (1997)  defines  cross-sectional 
studies  as  a  positivistic  methodology  designed  to  obtain  information  on  variables  in 
different  contexts,  but  at  the  same  time.  Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran  (2001)  also 
suggest  that  cross-sectional  studies  can  be  carried  out  in  which  the  data  is  gathered  just 
once  over  a  period  of  days,  weeks,  or  months.  Babbie  (2002)  stresses  that  a  cross- 
sectional  study  is  based  on  observations  made  at  one  time  and  involves  observations  of  a 
sample,  or  of  a  population  or  phenomenon  that  are  made  at  one  point  in  time. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  longitudinal  study  involves  the  study  of  variables  or  a  group  of 
subjects  over  a  long  period  of  time.  The  aim  of  longitudinal  studies  is  to  research  the 
problem  deeply  by  investigating  the  same  situation  or  people  several  times  over  a  period 
of  time  in  which  the  problem  runs  its  course.  Longitudinal  is  often  the  best  way  to  study 
changes  over  time  (Babbie,  2002).  Well-planned  longitudinal  studies  could  help  to 
identify  cause  and  effect  relationships  and  take  account  of  social  processes  instead  of 
concentrating  only  on  individuals  and  offer  some  good  insights.  However,  longitudinal 
studies  are  very  time-consuming  and  expensive  to  conduct  compared  with  cross- 
sectional  studies.  Most  of  the  field  studies  conducted  is  cross-sectional  in  nature  because 
of  the  time,  effort  and  costs  involved  in  collecting  data  over  several  time  periods.  The 
researcher  determines  the  appropriate  decisions  based  on  the  problem  definition,  the 
research  objectives  and  the  time  and  cost  considerations. 
Due  to  the  purpose  of  this  research  and  the  limited  time  and  resources,  this  study  is  a 
cross-sectional  study  and  it  is  conducted  to  gather  data  using  questionnaires  in  a  single- 
time  frame. 
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5.3.6  Units  of  Analysis 
The  unit  of  analysis  refers  to  the  level  of  aggregation  of  the  data  collected  during  the 
subsequent  stage  of  data  analysis  (Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran,  2001).  Hussey  (1997) 
defines  the  term  of  unit  of  analysis  as:  "the  kind  of  case  to  which  the  variables  or 
phenomena  under  study  and  the  research  problem  refer,  and  about  which  data  is 
collected  and  analyzed.  "  Neuman  (2000)  demonstrates  that  the  unit  of  analysis  refers  to 
the  type  of  unit  a  researcher  uses  when  measuring.  Common  units  of  analysis  in  social 
science  research  are  the  individual,  the  group,  the  organization,  and  nations  (Wu  and  Lin, 
2000;  Bailey,  1993).  The  research  objective  will  determines  the  unit  of  analysis  which 
can  be  shifted  from  individuals  to  groups,  organizations  and  nations.  The  unit  of  analysis 
has  to  be  clearly  identified  because  the  data  collection  methods,  sample  size  and  the 
variables  may  sometimes  be  determined  or  guided  by  it.  In  addition,  sampling  plan 
decisions  will  also  be  governed  by  the  unit  of  analysis.  Therefore,  the  unit  of  analysis 
should  be  given  serious  consideration  in  the  research  design. 
In  this  study,  the  unit  of  analysis  is  Taiwanese  parent  companies  who  engage  in 
international  joint  ventures  and  where  the  secondary  organization  (the  joint  venture) 
locates  in  Taiwan. 
5.3.7  Sampling  Design 
The  survey  is  only  useful  and  powerful  in  finding  answers  when  the  data  is  collected  from 
the  right  people,  events,  or  objects  which  can  provide  the  correct  answers.  Therefore, 
selecting  the  right  individuals,  objects,  or  events  for  the  study  is  very  important.  The 
process  of  selection  is  known  as  "sampling"  and  it  is  a  fundamental  element  of  a  study. 
The  relative  terms  of  a  sample  have  to  be  examined  first.  A  population  refers  to  a  body 
of  people  or  to  any  other  items  under  consideration  for  research  purposes  (Hussey,  1997) 
or  refers  to  the  entire  group  of  people,  events,  or  things  of  interest  that  the  research 
wishes  to  investigate'  (Sekaran,  2003).  McDaniel  and  Gates  (2001)  define  the  term 
population  or  population  of  interest  as  the  total  group  of  people  from  whom  we  need  to 
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obtain  information.  They  also  make  a  definition  of  the  census  and  the  sample.  The  term 
census  refers  to  whose  situations  where  data  are  obtained  from  or  about  every  member 
of  the  population  (McDaniel  and  Gates,  2001).  A  sample  is  a  subset  of  the  population. 
Information  is  obtained  from  or  about  a  subset  of  the  population  to  make  estimates  about 
various  characteristics  of  the  total  population.  It  comprises  some  members  selected  from 
the  population. 
McDaniel  and  Gates  (2001)  stress  that  the  process  of  developing  a  sampling  plan  can  be 
separated  into  seven  steps  which  are  (1)  defining  population  of  interest,  (2)  choosing  the 
data  collection  method,  (3)  choosing  the  sampling  frame,  (4)  selecting  the  sampling 
method,  (5)  determining  the  sample  size,  (6)  developing  and  specifying  the  operational 
plan  for  selecting  sample  elements  and  (7)  execute  the  operational  sampling  plan.  The 
sampling  frame  (or  population  frame)  is  a  listing  of  all  the  elements  in  the  population 
from  which  all  the  sampling  units  are  drawn  (Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran,  2001). 
Sampling  is  the  process  of  selecting  a  sufficient  number  of  elements  from  the  population 
(Sekaran,  2003).  It  is  important  to  ensure  that  the  sample  is  not  biased  and  is 
representative  of  the  population  from  which  it  is  drawn. 
There  are  various  methods  which  can  be  used  to  select  a  sample.  Basically,  there  are 
two  types  of  sampling  designs:  probability  and  non-probability  sampling.  The  often  used 
and  useful  probability  sampling  is  simple  random,  systematic,  stratified,  and  clustered 
sampling.  Non-probability  sampling  can  be  divided  into  the  broad  categories  of 
convenience  sampling  and  purposive  sampling  which  includes  judgment  sampling,  snow 
ball  sampling  and  quota  sampling. 
In  this  study,  the  data  is  collected  from  the  entire  qualified  organizations  because  the 
sample  is  not  very  large  relative  to  the  international  joint  venture  in  Taiwan.  Although 
there  are  the  constraints  of  time,  cost,  and  other  human  resources,  this  study  still  tries  to 
overcome  difficulties  in  order  to  produce  more  reliable  results.  In  order  to  identify  the 
population  frame,  some  procedures  are  conducted  which  are  described  below. 
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The  international  joint  venture  in  the  sample  varies  in  terms  of  pattern  of  cooperation. 
The  research  first  designates  a  population  of  interest.  According  to  the  definition  of  the 
international  joint  venture,  the  main  criteria  used  in  the  selection  of  an  international  joint 
venture  are: 
"  International  joint  venture  is  formed  by  two  or  more  partners; 
"  At  least  one  of  the  parent's  headquarters  is  located  outside  the  joint  venture's  country 
of  operation; 
"  At  least  two  parents  of  different  nationality  hold  at  least  five  percent  of  the  equity 
shares; 
In  Taiwan,  a  list  of  qualifying  international  joint  ventures  is  not  available.  It  is  very 
difficult  to  collect  identifying  data  on  international  joint  ventures  directly  from  any  source. 
The  researcher  tried  to  create  a  database  by  getting  a  list  of  the  firm's  names  that 
cooperate  with  foreign  partners  to  establish  a  joint  venture  in  Taiwan.  There  are  two 
main  sources  that  are  used  to  identify  the  samples:  (a)  the  1999/2000  edition  of  the 
Directory  of  Business  Groups  in  Taiwan,  and  (b)  the  1999  edition  of  the  Directory  of 
Foreign  Investment  in  Taiwan,  published  by  the  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry 
of  Economic  Affairs.  For  the  directory  of  business  groups,  Taiwanese  partners  of 
international  joint  ventures  are  identified  by  using  the  criteria  above.  A  business  group 
usually  invests  in  different  areas  or  industries;  therefore,  the  company  will  be  eliminated 
when  firms  have  duplicate  investment.  Finally,  66  of  the  parent  companies  whom  engage 
in  international  joint  ventures  were  identified. 
More  difficulties  were  encountered  when  identifying  the  potential  respondents  from  the 
second  source--the  Directory  of  Foreign  Investment  in  Taiwan.  According  to 
government  regulations,  all  foreign  investors  must  register  and  obtain  an  agreement 
when  they  plan  to  invest  in  Taiwan.  The  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of 
Economic  Affairs  publishes  the  list  of  foreign  investment  each  year.  The  researcher 
wrote  a  letter  to  request  the  database  of  that  directory,  but  was  rejected  the  first  time. 
Then  a  formal  letter  was  written  from  the  department  of  Business  Administration  of 
National  Kaohsiung  University  of  Applied  Sciences  that  is  the  researcher's  home  institute, 
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but  the  request  was  still  rejected.  Finally,  a  personal  approach  to  senior  government 
officials  was  used  in  order  to  request  the  database. 
The  database  has  been  acquired.  However,  the  list  not  only  includes  joint  venture 
enterprises  but  also  individual  companies  and  contains  all  types  of  organization.  A  two- 
stage  process  was  launched  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  a  joint  venture  had  been  formed. 
At  the  first  stage,  the  companies  were  eliminated  when  they  did  not  meet  the  criteria  that 
the  shareholders  hold  less  than  five  percent  or  over  eighty  percent.  As  a  result,  2466 
firms  were  selected  from  about  6300  organizations.  All  the  firms  were  checked  on  the 
Internet  that  connected  to  the  database  of  the  Department  of  Commerce  of  the  Ministry 
of  Economic  Affairs  (MEA). 
Several  problems  were  encountered  during  the  process.  That  was  because  the  Directory 
of  Foreign  Investment  is  never  amended  by  the  government  department.  The 
government  only  records  the  application  of  foreign  investment,  but  never  fellows  up  the 
result  of  these  application  cases.  Therefore,  there  are  some  problems  when  we  used  the 
government  data  base.  Firstly,  some  firms  cancelled  their  application  and  some  firms 
were  dissolved.  Secondly,  in  some  cases,  some  of  the  companies  were  merged  with 
other  companies.  Thirdly,  some  firms  changed  their  addresses.  Fourthly,  some  firms 
have  the  same  address  because  of  the  same  parent.  Finally,  some  of  the  sample  did  not 
exist.  After  checking  the  detail  of  2466  firms,  a  total  of  1459  companies  were  finally 
verified. 
The  second  stage  was  conducted  to  ascertain  if  these  selected  companies  were  joint 
ventures  or  not.  A  mailed  questionnaire  with  pre-addressed/pre-paid  envelopes  was  sent 
to  a  total  of  1459  companies.  A  copy  of  the  questionnaire  is  presented  in  Appendix  II  A. 
354  completed  questionnaires  were  received  from  respondents. 
At  stage  1,  a  large  quantity  of  manpower  and  a  substantial  amount  of  the  time  was 
involved  in  checking  the  data.  Stage  2,  this  phase  involved  printing,  labelling,  paper- 
clipping,  inserting  into  the  envelopes  and  sealing.  This  required  a  great  deal  of  time,  cost 
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and  effort.  The  reason  for  all  this  effort  is  to  collect  as  large  a  sample  as  possible  in 
order  to  conduct  a  statistically  significant  analysis  and  to  identify  the  correct  sample  with 
as  much  relevant  data  as  possible  which  is  crucial  to  the  success  of  this  research. 
All  the  respondent  questionnaires  were  checked  against  the  Directory  of  Business 
Groups  in  order  to  eliminate  the  respondent  with  the  same  parent  companies.  Finally,  a 
list  of  227  firms  were  identified.  Figure  5.3.2  shows  the  procedure  of  the  sample 
identification. 
The  Directory  of  Business 
Groups  in  Taiwan 
Using  criteria  to  identify  ventures' 
companies 
"  International  joint  venture  is 
formed  by  two  or  more  partners; 
"  at  least  one  of  parent's 
headquarters  is  located  outside 
the  joint  venture's  country  of 
operation; 
"  at  least  two  different 
nationality's  parents  hold  at 
least  five  percent  of  the  equity 
Obtain  66  firms 
The  Directory  of  Foreign 
Investment  in  Taiwan 
1.  Eliminate  the  firm  which 
has  an  equity  share  less  than 
five  percent  or  greater  than 
eighty  percent.  2466 
Stage  1 
companies  were  selected 
from  6300  firms. 
2.  Check  the  2466  firms  on 
Internet  and  1459 
companies  have  been 
Obtain  1459  fines 
Questionnaires  with  prepared 
Stage  2 
envelops  were  sent  to  a  total  of 
1459  companies.  354  responses 
of  joint  venture  with  Taiwanese 
partners  were  received. 
.  Eliminate  the  same  parent 
company. 
.A  list  of  227  samples  has 
been  identified. 
Obtain  227  samples 
Figure  5.3.2  The  Procedure  of  Sample  Identification 
Obtain  354  cases 
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In  this  section,  we  examine  the  sampling  design  decisions  which  are  important  aspects  of 
research  design.  The  population  frame  is  used  in  this  study  in  order  to  obtain  more 
reliable  results.  Some  procedures  are  used  to  identify  the  list  of  sample  and  cases  for  this 
study  and  a  final  list  of  sample  frame  is  obtained.  In  the  next  section,  we  will  discuss 
how  the  variables  can  be  measured. 
5.3.8  Measurement  of  Variables 
Measurement  of  the  variables  is  an  integral  part  of  research  and  is  a  fundamental  aspect 
of  quantitative  research.  Unless  the  variables  can  be  measured  precisely,  the  research 
hypotheses  cannot  be  tested  correctly  to  find  the  right  answers  to  the  research  issues. 
Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias  (2000)  define  the  measurement  as  the  assignment  of 
numerals  to  variables,  properties,  or  events  according  to  a  prescribed  set  of  rules,  of 
which  a  rule  is  to  specify  the  procedure  a  researcher  uses,  to  assign  numerals  or  numbers 
to  objects  or  events. 
There  are  at  least  two  types  of  variables:  one  can  be  objective  and  measured  precisely 
such  as  blood  pressure  and  body  temperature;  the  other  is  more  intangible  and  cannot  be 
measured  directly  such  as  attitudes  and  perceptions.  One  technique  is  to  reduce  the 
unobservable  concepts  to  observable  behaviour  or  characteristics.  This  technique  is 
called  an  operational  definition.  Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias  (2000)  define  an 
operational  definition  as:  a  set  of  procedures  a  researcher  can  follow  in  order  to  establish 
the  existence  of  the  phenomenon  described  by  a  concept  (p.  29).  When  a  phenomenon 
cannot  be  observed  directly,  the  researcher  needs  to  use  the  operational  definition  to 
reduce  the  concepts  so  that  a  phenomenon  can  be  measured  in  a  tangible  way.  In  general, 
operational  definitions  specify  how  variables  relevant  to  a  concept  will  be  measured 
(Babbie,  2002). 
Once  the  concepts  are  defined  operationally,  then  the  measurement  scales  have  to  be 
developed  to  measure  them.  Scale  classifications  employ  the  characteristics  of  the  real 
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numbers  system.  The  most  accepted  and  basic  types  of  measurement  scale  are  namely 
the  nominal,  ordinal,  interval  and  ration  scale  (Emory  and  Cooper,  1991).  A  researcher 
must  choose  from  four  types  of  measures  that  capture  increasing  amounts  of  information. 
The  most  appropriate  level  depends  on  the  purpose  of  the  measurement.  As  we  move 
from  the  nominal  scale  to  the  ratio  scale,  we  can  obtain  greater  precision  in  quantifying 
the  data  and  greater  flexibility  in  using  more  powerful  statistical  tests. 
According  above  description,  this  study  includes  theoretical  concepts  which  are 
motivation,  contribution,  bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control.  Therefore,  the 
operational  definition  of  each  variable  or  construct  is  described  first  and  then  the 
measurement  is  developed. 
5.3.8.1  Control 
On  the  basis  of  the  literature  reviewed  in  chapter  3,  the  operational  definition  of  control 
refers  to  the  process  that  one  entity  affects  the  behaviour  and  output  of  another 
organization  through  the  use  of  power  and  authority  in  order  to  reach  its  objects  (Yan 
and  Gray,  1994;  Das  and  Tsui,  1985;  Ohchi,  1977;  Arrow,  1974).  Reviewing  relevant 
literatures,  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  identify  three  dimensions  of  joint  venture  control 
that  are  the  mechanism  of  control,  the  extent  and  the  focus.  These  classifications  of 
control  are  the  most  frequently  mentioned  and  used  in  the  studies  of  international  joint 
ventures.  Moreover,  this  study  adopts  these  three  dimensions  to  measure  the  concept  of 
control. 
5.3.8.1.1  The  Mechanism  and  Focus  of  Control 
Several  empirical  studies  have  attempted  to  directly  or  indirectly  use  Killing's  (1983) 
framework  in  explaining  the  control  of  INV  with  regard  to  the  mechanism,  the  extent  and 
the  focus  of  control  (Geringer,  1986;  Beamish,  1984).  Killing  (1983)  defines  control  in 
terms  of  the  decision-making  role  of  joint  venture  management  on  37  joint  ventures  in 
developed  countries  and  identifies  nine  types  of  decisions.  The  decision-making  role  of 
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the  joint  venture  management  and  the  appointment  of  high-level  management  are  used  to 
measure  the  focus  and  mechanisms  of  control  over  joint  ventures. 
The  mechanism  of  control  refers  to  the  methods  by  which  control  is  exercised  over  the 
joint  venture.  On  the  basis  of  the  literature  reviewed  in  chapter  3.3,  the  methods  of 
exercising  managerial  control  can  be  achieved  through  the  appointment  of  the  joint 
venture's  general  manager  and  key  functional  managers  (Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Child, 
1984;  Schaan,  1983,  Killing,  1983;  Gullander,  1976;  Rafli,  1978).  Therefore,  the 
appointment  of  high-level  managers  such  as  general  manager,  vice  general  manager, 
production  managers,  marketing  managers,  financial  managers,  human  resource 
managers,  R&D  managers  and  the  head  of  engineering  were  ascertained  by  use  of 
questionnaire  in  order  to  measure  the  mechanism  of  control  over  the  joint  venture. 
The  focus  of  control  refers  to  the  areas  of  the  joint  venture's  operation  in  which  control 
is  exercised.  Several  researchers  have  found  that  effective  control  should  emphasize 
selective  control  over  the  joint  venture's  activities  (Jaussaud,  Schaaper  and  Zhang,  2001; 
Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Geringer,  1986;  Dunning  and  Cantwell,  1984;  Schaan,  1983). 
The  variables  which  Killing  (1983)  used  to  measure  the  focus  of  control  are  used  in  this 
study.  These  are  pricing  policy,  product  design,  production  scheduling,  manufacturing 
process,  quality  control,  sales  targets,  cost  budgeting  and  capital  expenditure.  The  focus 
of  control  is  measured  by  the  decision-making  processes  as  made  by  whom  in  above  9 
areas. 
The  measure  scale  of  mechanism  and  focus  of  control  are  measured  by  these  decision- 
making  activities  and  appointment  of  high-level  management  as  made  by  whom.  These 
are 
1.  Taiwanese  parent  alone 
2.  Foreign  parent  alone 
3.  Joint  venture  alone 
4.  Taiwanese  parent  and  joint  venture 
5.  Foreign  parent  and  joint  venture 
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6.  Taiwanese  parent  and  foreign  parent 
7.  Both  parents  and  joint  venture 
This  study  uses  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  as  the  mechanism  of  control  and 
nine  types  of  decisions  are  used  to  measure  the  focus  of  control.  After  identifying  the 
variables  for  measuring  the  mechanism  and  focus  of  the  control;  next,  we  turn  to 
examine  the  variables  for  the  extent  of  control. 
5.3.8.1.2  The  Extent  of  Control 
The  extent  of  control  refers  to  the  degree  to  which  a  parent  company  exercises  control 
over  the  joint  venture  at  strategic  and  operational  levels  (Lyles  and  Reger,  1993; 
Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Dunning  and  Cantwell,  1984;  Beamish,  1984;  Killing,  1983; 
Tomlinson,  1970).  On  his  empirical  study  of  37  joint  ventures  in  developed  countries, 
Killing(1983)  identifies  three  types  of  control,  namely,  dominant  parent,  shared  and 
independent  control  according  to  the  decision-making  role  of  joint  venture  management 
by  using  nine  types  of  decisions(pricing  policy,  product  design,  production  scheduling, 
manufacturing  process,  quality  control,  replacement  of  managers,  sales  targets,  cost 
budgeting  and  capital  expenditures)  with  each  decision  made  by  whom(the  general 
manager  alone,  by  the  local  parent  alone,  by  the  foreign  parent  alone,  by  the  JV  general 
manager  with  input  from  the  local  parent  ,  or  from  the  foreign  parent  ,  or  from  both 
parents). 
Using  Killing's  results  and  considering  the  weight  of  the  involvement  by  parents  and  joint 
venture,  Wu  (1994)  identifies  four  kinds  of  control  in  his  study,  namely,  dominant  host 
parent,  dominant  foreign  parent,  shared  management  and  independent  control. 
In  his  empirical  study  in  Taiwan,  Chang  (1996)  points  out  that  Killing  deems  the 
importance  of  each  decision  as  equal,  but  he  argues  that  the  control  is  not  a  dichotomous 
context;  it  is  a  continuant  idea.  Therefore  he  revises  the  method  of  clarification  of 
control  used  by  Killing.  He  clarifies  four  kinds  of  control  in  his  study,  namely,  dominant 
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host  parent,  dominant  foreign  parent,  shared  management  and  independent  control 
according  to  the  degree  that  each  activity  will  be  effected  by  host  parent  and  foreign 
parent  and  the  weight  of  importance  of  each  activity.  Wu  (1994),  Chang  (1996)  and 
Chen  (1999),  in  investigating  the  relationship  between  control,  conflict  management  and 
satisfaction  of  IN  in  Taiwan,  they  also  clarify  four  kinds  of  control  as  dominant  host 
parent,  dominant  foreign  parent,  shared  management  and  independent  control. 
Based  on  the  relevant  literature,  this  study  integrates  Wu's  (1994)  and  Chang's  (1996) 
classification  in  which  control  can  be  divided  into  four  types,  described  as  follows. 
1.  Independent  control:  A  joint  venture  has  high  freedom  from  both  parents  and  has 
extensive  decision  making  autonomy 
2.  Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control:  A  joint  venture  is  controlled  by  the  dominant 
host  partner  who  makes  all  the  venture's  decisions  and  plays  an  active  role  in 
decisions.  Foreign  partners  effectively  delegate  authority  to  host  partners 
3.  Dominant  foreign  parent  control:  A  foreign  partner  plays  a  strong  role  in  decision 
making  and  with  high  authorization  from  host  partners 
4.  Shared  management  control:  Both  parents  play  an  active  role  in  the  management  of 
the  joint  venture. 
This  study  also  adopts  Wu's  (1994)  method  to  measure  the  extent  of  control. 
The  score  of  Taiwanese  parent  =E  Slj  +  WE  S4j  +1/2Z  S5j  +1/3E  S7j 
The  score  of  foreign  parent  =E  S2j  +  1/2E  S4j  +1/2E  S6j  +1/3E  S7j 
The  score  of  joint  venture  =E  S3j  +  1/2E  S5j  +  1/2E  S6j  +  1/3E  S7j 
Si  to  S7  represent  the  possible  of  decision  maker. 
j  means  the  items  of  important  decisions,  j=1,2,.....,  9 
When 
Max  0{  score  of  joint  venture,  score  of  Taiwanese  parent,  score  of  foreign  parent  } 
=  the  score  of  Taiwanese  parent 
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Or  ©  score  of  Taiwanese  parent  equal  score  of  joint  venture 
4  Then  the  type  of  control  is  Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control 
When 
Max  0{  score  of  joint  venture,  score  of  Taiwanese  parent,  score  of  foreign  parent  } 
=  the  score  of  Foreign  parent 
Or  0  score  of  foreign  parent  equal  score  of  joint  venture 
4  Then  the  type  of  control  is  Dominant  Foreign  parent  control 
When 
Max  0{  score  of  joint  venture,  score  of  Taiwanese  parent,  score  of  foreign  parent  } 
=  the  score  of  joint  venture 
4  Then  the  type  of  control  is  Independent  control 
When 
Max  0{  score  of  joint  venture,  score  of  Taiwanese  parent,  score  of  foreign  parent  } 
=  the  score  of  Taiwanese  parent  equal  score  of  foreign  parent 
4  Then  the  type  of  control  is  Share  management  control 
Based  on  above  discussion,  Table  5.3.1  below  summarises  the  operational  definition  of 
control  and  measurement  of  variables. 
Table  5.3.1  Onerational  Definition  and  Meamirement  of  Cnntrnl 
Control  Operational  Key  relevant  Measure  Items  Measurement 
Definition  researchers 
control  is  exercised  Killing  (1983)  Measuring  the 
in  which  high-level  Beamish(1984)  appointment  of  8 
Mechanism  of  managers  are  Child(1984)  fuActions 
control  appointed  Schann  (1988)  managers  made  Nominal 
Geringer  (1986)  by  whom 
Child  and  Yan  (1999) 
control  is  exercised  Killing  (1983)  Measuring  8 
in  which  area  of  Schaan  (1983)  decision-making 
Focus  of  control  joint  venture's  Dunning  and  made  by  whom  Nominal 
operation  Cantwell  (1984) 
Geringer  1986 
the  degree  of  Killing  (1983)  the  score  of 
Extent  of  control  control  over  a  JV  is  Wu  (1994)  control 
Interval 
exercised  by  Chang(1996)  4  tvVe  of  control 
Nominal 
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parents 
Control  is  the  main  part  of  this  study.  According  to  the  literature,  it  can  be  measured  by 
the  mechanism,  the  extent  and  focus  of  control.  Using  the  above  formula,  it  can  be 
classified  into  four  types  namely;  dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control,  dominant  foreign 
parent  control,  shared  management  control,  and  independent  control.  In  the  following 
section  we  describe  how  ownership  can  affect  the  extent  of  control. 
5.3.8.2  Ownership 
In  formal  terms,  ownership  is  the  legal  possession  of  assets.  Therefore,  the  term 
ownership  is  measured  by  the  percentage  of  equity. 
Beamish  (1985)  finds  that  the  foreign  firms  have  equal-equity  ownership  in  developed 
countries  and  contrastingly  have  majority  or  minority  equity  ownership  in  developing 
countries.  Kobrin  (1987)  explores  how  host  government-imposed  limits  and 
performance  requirements  induce  a  greater  use  of  minority  and  50-50  affiliate, 
particularly  in  the  developing  countries.  Blodgett  (1991)  finds  that  most  joint  ventures 
are  50-50  joint  ventures  in  his  study  of  the  form  of  equity. 
The  proportion  of  equity  means  the  ownership  of  the  joint  venture  held  by  a  single  parent. 
According  to  the  classification  of  prior  studies,  this  research  classifies  the  equity 
shareholding  into  three  groups:  more  than  50  level,  50-50  level  and  less  than  50  level. 
1.  More  than  50  level:  Firms  who  hold  more  than  50  percent  proportion  of  the  equity  of 
joint  venture. 
2.50-50  level:  Firms  who  hold  equal  percentage  proportion  of  the  equity  of  joint 
venture. 
3.  Less  than  50  level:  Firms  who  hold  less  than  50  percent  proportion  of  the  equity  of 
joint  venture. 
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Based  on  above  discussion,  Table  5.3.2  below  summarises  the  operational  definition  and 
measurement  of  ownership. 
Tahle  5.3.2  Operational  Definition  and  Measurement  of  Chvnershin 
Dimension  Operational  Definition 
Key  relevant 
researchers 
Measure  Items  Measurement 
"  The  share  of  equity  held 
The  share  of  equity 
by  the  host  country  Measured  as  Ownership 
held  by  the  parents  a  percentage 
"  The  share  of  equity  held 
by  the  foreign  parents 
Ownership  was  ascertained  by  asking  respondents  to  indicate  the  percentage  of  equity 
shares  they  hold  in  the  joint  ventures.  Then,  the  percentage  of  equity  shares  is  classified 
into  three  groups  according  above  criteria.  The  percentage  of  equity  shares  and  the  type 
of  ownership  are  used  in  future  analysis. 
5.3.8.3  Bargaining  power 
Bargaining  power  is  defined  as  a  bargaining  ability  possessed  by  foreign  and  local  parties 
that  can  be  used  to  change  the  `bargaining  set',  to  obtain  accommodations  from  the  other 
party,  and  to  affect  the  outcome  of  a  negotiation  (Mjoen  and  Tallman,  1997;  Brouthers 
and  Bamossy,  1997;  Yan  and  Gray,  1994;  Blodgeet,  1991;  Lax  and  Sebinius,  1986; 
Dwyer,  Orville  and  Walker,  1981). 
Fagre  and  Wells  (1982)  indicate  that  the  bargaining  power  of  multinational  firms  can  be 
increased  through  five  elements  which  are  the  multinational  technological  level,  the 
product  differentiation,  the  access  provided  to  export  markets,  the  investment  amount, 
and  the  diversity  of  the  firm's  production  line.  Lecraw  (1984)  states  that  a  firm  will  have 
bargaining  power  over  the  host  country  that  stems  from  a  proprietary  product  or 
technology,  access  to  relatively  inexpensive  capital,  access  to  export  markets,  and 
management  expertise.  Kobrin  (1987)  indicates  that  the  MNE  can  derive  bargaining 
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power  from  the  firm-specific  advantages  or  assets  such  as  technology,  parent  size, 
subsidiary  size,  employment,  and  export  potential. 
Gomes-Casseres  (1990)  find  that  investment  size  and  attractiveness  of  the  territory  affect 
bargaining  power.  He  also  suggests  that  the  bargaining  process  is  affected  by  several 
factors,  such  as  the  intensity  of  R&D,  marketing  intensity,  and  intrasystem  sales. 
Blodgett  (1991)  identifies  five  resource  contributions  that  give  a  firm  bargaining  power 
in  the  joint  venture.  The  five  elements  are  government  lobbying,  technology,  knowledge 
of  the  local  environment  and/or  marketing  expertise,  control  of  intrasystem  transfers,  and 
financial  capital.  Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  classify  the  bargaining  power  into  context-based 
and  resource-based  components. 
Basing  on  the  review  of  relevant  literature,  this  study  referring  to  Fagre  and  Wells  (1982), 
Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  and  the  results  of  the  relevant  literature,  measures  the  bargaining 
power  by  the  following  variables:  technological  ability,  innovative  ability,  investment 
amount,  access  to  financial  resources,  level  of  equity  share,  management  experience, 
knowledge  of  the  local  markets,  access  to  export  markets,  access  to  sales  distribution 
channels,  the  influence  of  the  host  government.  Table  5.3.3  summarises  the  operational 
definition  and  measurement  of  bargaining  power. 
Table  5.33  C  perational  Definition  and  Meacnrement  of  Rnraninino  Pnwer 
Dimension 
Operational 
Definition 
Key  relevant 
researchers 
Measure  Items  Measurement 
"  Technological  ability 
"  Innovative  ability 
"  Investment  amount 
"  Access  to  financial 
The  power  that  can  Faltre  and  Wells  (1982)  resources 
"  Level  of  equity  share 
Bargaining  be  used  to  affect  the 
Lecraw  (1984) 
Kobrin  (198'  "  Management  e  fence  5-points 
Power  outcome  of  the  Gomcs-Casseres  (1990)  "  Knowledge  of  the  local  scale 
negotiations  Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  markets 
"  Access  to  export  markets 
"  Access  to  sales  distribution 
channel 
"  Influence  of  host 
government 
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These  items  affecting  the  bargaining  power  are  measured  on  a  scale  of  1-5,  with  5= 
`extremely  strong',  4=  `strong',  3=  `average',  2=  `weak',  1=  `very  weak'. 
The  respondents  express  their  perceptions  on  each  item  using  above  scales. 
5.3.8.4  Contribution 
The  contribution  is  defined  as  any  resource  input  from  the  foreign  parent'  firms  and  host 
parent  companies  to  the  joint  venture.  Several  categories  of  resource  levels  have  been 
mentioned  in  the  relevant  literature.  Grant  (1991)  identifies  six  categories  of  company 
resources:  financial,  physical,  human,  technological,  reputation,  and  organisational. 
Barney  (1991)  groups  the  resources  into  three  categories:  physical,  capital  resources  and 
human  capital  resources.  Chatterjee  and  Wernerfelt  (1991)  identify  the  resource  into 
three  categories  which  are  physical,  invisible  and  financial. 
According  to  prior  research,  this  study  compiles  the  relevant  results  with  regard  to  the 
IN  parent's  resources  contribution  (see  Chapter  3.4.3)  and  classifies  the  resources 
contributed  from  parents  into  five  groups,  namely,  physical,  invisible,  financial,  human 
resource,  and  organisational  ability. 
1.  Physical  resources:  including  two  measured  items:  key  components  and  raw 
material,  and  land,  machinery  and  equipment 
2.  Invisible  resources:  including  three  items:  brands  or  patent,  know-how,  and 
knowledge  of  management 
3.  Financial  resources:  including  two  measured  items:  financial  resources  and  access 
to  external  capital 
4.  Human  resources:  including  two  measured  items:  high-level  expertises  and 
expertise  of  employees 
5.  Organisational  resources:  including  seven  measured  items:  marketing  and  operation 
ability,  technology  or  R&D  resources,  access  to  public  relations  with  local 
government,  and  access  to  environmental  knowledge 
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Based  on  the  review  of  the  relevant  literature,  Table  5.3.4  summarises  the  operational 
definition  and  measurement  of  resource  contribution. 
Tahle  5IA  Oneratinnal  Definitinn  and  Measurement  of  Resource  Contribution 
Dimension 
Operational 
Definition 
Key  relevant 
researchers 
Measure  Items  Measurement 
Grant  (1991)  14  items  including  the  5 
The  any  resources  Barney(1991),  categories  below: 
Resource 
input  from  the 
foreign  parent  firms 
Chatterjee  and 
"  Physical  resources 
"  Invisible  resources  5-point 
Contribution 
and  host  country 
Wernerfelt(1991)  "  Financial  resources  scale 
parent  firms  Yan  and  Gray  "  Human  resources 
"Organisational  resources  (1994) 
This  study  measures  the  resource  contribution  by  the  types  of  resources  which  are  input 
to  the  joint  venture  from  each  parent.  A  five  point  scale  is  used  to  measure  the  14 
contribution  items  on  the  scale,  with  5=  `extremely  high',  4=  `high',  3=  `average',  2= 
`low',  1=  `very  low' 
,0  means  no  contribution  from  each  parent. 
Respondents  were  asked  to  assess  the  extent  of  resources  that  have  been  contributed  into 
the  joint  venture  and  also  asked  to  evaluate  from  their  perceptions,  what  degree  of 
resources  have  been  contributed  by  foreign  parents. 
5.3.8.5  Motivation 
The  motivation  of  a  joint  venture  indicates  the  main  reason  for  companies  to  cooperate 
with  other  firms  to  establish  a  new  firm  in  order  to  reach  some  goals.  A  variety  of 
strategic  objectives  have  been  suggested  to  explain  a  firm's  motives  for  forming  an 
international  joint  venture.  From  previous  literature  reviews  (see  chapter  3  and  chapter 
4),  some  empirical  studies  report  the  strategic  motivations  for  forming  an  international 
joint  venture.  The  principal  theories  relating  to  IN  formation  are  (1)  resource 
dependence  theory  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Agarwal  and  Ramaswami,  1992; 
Harrigan,  1985;  Bacharach  and  Lawler,  1980;  Pfeffer  and  Salabcik,  1978),  (2)  transaction 
cost  theory  (Yu  and  Tang,  1992;  Hennart,  1988,1991;  Kogut,  1988;  Teece,  1986; 
Williamson,  1975,1985;  Casson,  1982),  (3)  strategic  behaviour  theory  (Contractor  and 
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Lorange,  1988;  Kogut,  1988;  Vernon 
, 
1983),  (4)  organizational  learning  theory  (Hamel, 
1991;  Badaracco 
, 
1991;  Ciborra,  1991;  Kogut,  1988). 
Glaister  and  Buckley  (1996)  argue  that  the  motivation  for  alliance  formation  cannot  be 
straightforwardly  mapped  to  the  theoretical  approaches  directly,  but  can  relate  individual 
theoretical  perspectives  to  motives  indirectly.  Based  on  the  relevant  literature,  Glaister 
and  Buckley  (1996)  identify  the  most  important  motives  relating  to  the  strategic 
motivation  for  alliance  formation  as,  (1)  risk  sharing,  (2)  product  rationalization  and 
economies  of  scale,  (3)  the  transfer  of  complementary  technology  /  exchange  of  patents, 
(4)  shaping  of  competition,  (5)  conforming  to  host  government  policy,  (6)  to  facilitate 
international  expansion,  (7)  vertical  linkages,  and  (8)  to  consolidate  market  position. 
They  also  provide  16  strategic  motives  for  alliance  formation  by  UK  firms  with  partners 
in  Western  Europe,  the  United  States  and  Japan  and  group  them  into  5  categories  which 
are  configured  as  technology  development,  market  power,  market  development,  resource 
specialization  and  large  project  completion. 
Based  on  prior  empirical  studies  relating  to  motives  for  forming  an  IJV,  this  study 
compiles  the  relevant  results  (see  Chapter  3.4.4)  and  classifies  these  motives  into  four 
groups  according  to  their  theoretical  roots. 
1.  Resource  dependence 
"Sharing  a  large  sum  of  fixed  costs 
"Spreading  the  financial  risk 
"Reducing  the  risk  caused  by  environmental  uncertainty 
.  Sharing  the  risk  of  the  business  cycle 
"Acquiring  low  cost  materials  and  components 
*Acquiring  sufficient  capital 
"Sharing  partner's  resource 
2.  Transaction  cost  explanations 
"  Technology  transfer 
*Acquiring  technology 
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*Acquiring  partner's  manufacturing  technology 
"Acquiring  partner's  brands  or  patents 
"Acquiring  partner's  manufacturing  equipment  and  technology 
.  Acquiring  the  economies  of  scale  of  production  and  sale 
3.  Strategic  positioning 
.  Expanding  the  market  and  entering  new  markets 
"Extending  the  range  of  products  and  services 
.  Reducing  competition 
*Maintaining  or  improving  the  competitive  position 
Shortening  the  time  from  the  product  development  to  market  entry 
"Conforming  to  host  government  policy 
*Facilitating  diversified  development 
4.  Organisational  learning 
"Learning  international  business  knowledge 
.  Learning  marketing  knowledge 
.  Improving  new  product  design  ability  from  partner 
*Learning  management  knowledge 
"Learning  partner's  human  resource  management 
"Improving  ability  on  developing  new  technology 
Basing  on  the  review  of  relevant  literature,  Table  5.3.5  summarises  the  operational 
definition  and  measurement  of  motivation  of  forming  IN. 
Tah1e  53  5  Orieratinnnl  nefinitinn  antiMe"acnrpment  nfMntivatinn  nfPnrmino  TTl1 
Dimension 
Operational 
Definition 
Key  relevant 
researchers 
Measure  Items  Measurement 
Harrigan  (1985)  26  items  including  the  4 
The  motives  of  UNECE  (1988)  categories  below 
companies  to  Lin  (1995) 
"  Resource  dependence 
"  Transaction  cost 
Motivation  cooperate  with  other  Glaister  &  Buckley  explanations 
5-point 
firms  to  establish  a  (1996)  "  Strategic  positioning  scale 
joint  venture  Groot  &  Merchant  "  Organizational  learning 
2000 
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This  study  uses  a  scale  of  1=5  to  measure  the  26  motivating  factors  with  5=  `extremely 
important',  4=  `important',  3=  `somewhat  important',  2=  `not  important,  and  1=  `not 
at  all  important'.  The  questions  score  responses  at  interval  level  of  measurement  to 
correspond  to  multivariate  statistical  approaches  in  data  analysis. 
In  order  to  provide  an  overall  view  of  the  measurements  used  in  this  study,  Table  5.3.6 
summary  the  variables  with  reference  sources,  if  any. 
Once  the  measurement  of  variables  is  decided,  the  next  step  is  identifying  the  sample 
which  is  elucidated  in  the  following  section. 
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5.3.9  Data  Collection 
There  are  two  main  sources  of  data:  original  data  and  secondary.  Original  data  is  known 
as  primary  data,  which  is  data  collected  at  source.  Secondary  data  is  data  which  already 
-  exists,  such  as  books,  documents  and  films.  Details  are  given  below. 
5.3.9.1  Secondary  Data  Collection 
Secondary  data  are  one  of  the  cheapest  and  easiest  means  of  access  to  information  and 
can  be  obtained  from  various  sources  (Hussey  and  Hussey,  1997).  This  can  be  obtained 
from  company's  internal  records,  such  as  cost  information,  customer  feedback,  sales 
results,  and  external  sources,  such  as  data  published  by  government,  periodicals,  books, 
standardized  sources  of  marketing  data,  and  the  Internet.  Based  on  different  researchers' 
classifications  for  secondary  data,  Saunders,  Lewis  and  Thornhill  (2003)  group  the 
secondary  data  into  three  main  subgroups:  documentary  data  (ie,  books,  newspapers, 
reports),  survey-based  data  (ie,  government  censuses  and  government  surveys),  and 
those  compiled  from  multiple  sources  (ie,  industry  statistics  and  reports).  The  amount  of 
secondary  data  available  is  overwhelming  and  researchers  have  to  locate  and  utilize  the 
data  that  are  relevant  to  their  research. 
This  study  has  used  the  secondary  data  such  as  the  government  censuses  and  government 
surveys  data,  which  provide  the  main  data  set  for  this  study.  These  government  surveys 
data  also  can  be  compared  with  the  findings  of  this  study  in  the  later  chapter. 
5.3.9.2  Primary  Data  Collection 
There  are  three  main  data  collection  methods  for  primary  data  which  are  interviewing, 
administering  questionnaires,  and  observing  people.  Observation  is  a  method  for 
collecting  data  associated  with  either  a  structured  or  non-structured  methodology  and 
can  take  place  in  a  laboratory  setting  or  in  a  natural  setting.  There  are  two  ways  in 
which  observation  can  be  conducted:  non-participant  and  participant  observation 
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(Saunders,  Lewis  and  Thornhill,  2003;  Hussey  and  Hussey,  1997).  The  purpose  of  non- 
participant  observation  is  to  observe  and  record  what  people  do  in  terms  of  their  actions 
and  their  behaviour  without  the  researcher  being  involved.  On  the  other  hand, 
participant  observation  is  a  method  of  collecting  data  where  the  researcher  is  fully 
involved  with  the  participants  and  the  phenomena  being  researched. 
Hussey  and  Hussey  (1997)  indicate  that  interviews  are  associated  with  both  positivist 
and  phenomenological  methodologies.  For  the  positivistic  approach  of  interviews,  the 
structured  questions  are  prepared  beforehand.  By  contrast,  a  phenomenological 
approach  suggests  unstructured  questions.  Interviews  can  be  conducted  either  face  to 
face  or  by  telephone  or  online.  Based  on  the  level  of  formality  and  structure,  Saunders, 
Lewis  and  Thornhill  (2003)  categorise  the  interviews  into  three  types:  structured 
interviews,  semi-structured  interviews,  and  unstructured  interviews.  Structured 
interviews  use  questionnaires  based  on  a  predetermined  and  standardised  set  of  questions. 
By  comparison,  semi-structured  interviews  and  unstructured  interviews  are  more 
informal  and  non-standardised.  Different  types  of  interviews  are  useful  for  different 
research  purposes.  Structured  interviews  can  be  used  in  survey  research  and 
unstructured  interviews  are  often  used  in  qualitative  research.  The  unstructured 
interviews  were  used  in  this  study.  Two  companies  which  are  the  Talee-Isetan 
department  store  and  COSTCO  Warehouse  Corporation  (see  Appendix  I-A  and 
Appendix  I-B)  were  interviewed  by  the  researcher  to  gather  detailed  information  with 
regard  to  the  management  of  international  joint  ventures  and  to  obtain  feedback  from  the 
company's  perspective  on  the  questionnaire. 
Survey  questionnaires  are  the  most  common  method  of  collecting  data  and  are  a  most 
useful  method  when  large  numbers  of  people  are  to  be  reached  in  different  geographical 
regions  and  have  the  advantage  of  obtaining  data  more  efficiently  in  terms  of  researcher 
time,  energy,  and  cost  (Sekaran,  2003).  Survey  questionnaires  can  be  conducted  either 
personally,  or mailed  to  the  respondents,  or  electronically  distributed.  The  data  obtained 
by  observation  are  rich  but  this  is  expensive  and  time  consuming.  All  of  them  have 
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advantages  and  disadvantages;  the  researcher  has  to  choose  the  one  which  is  the  most 
profitable  to  their  study. 
A  primary  data  collecting  technique  involves  the  gathering  of  data  from  a  sample  by 
questioning  people  and  recording  their  responses.  It  is  an  efficient  and  economic  method 
and  can  expand  geographical  coverage  at  a  fraction  of  the  cost  and  time  required  by 
other  methods  (Cooper  and  Emory,  1995). 
As  stated  above,  there  is  no  "best"  form  of  survey.  Each  method  has  a  range  of 
advantages  and  disadvantages.  By  considering  the  research  objectives  and  the  nature  of 
this  study,  the  postal  questionnaire  was  strongly  suited  to  collect  primary  data.  First,  this 
study  has  to  identify  the  samples  from  very  large  numbers  of  cases  which  cover  a  wide 
geographical  area  and  did  not  have  correct  records  of  company's  information. 
Compared  with  personal  interviews  and  telephone  interviews,  the  postal  questionnaire 
has  a  relatively  low  cost  and  best  met  the  research  objectives.  As  Hussey  and  Hussey 
(1997)  stress  that  the  questionnaire  survey  is  cheaper  and  less  time-consuming  than 
conducting  interviews  and  very  large  samples  can  be  taken.  Second,  the  nature  of  the 
data  to  be  collected  required  reflection  on  the  part  of  respondents.  Respondents  needed 
enough  time  to  think  about  their  replies  and  work  through  the  questions.  Especially, 
when  the  respondent  is  an  inaccessible  person,  a  mail  questionnaire  should  be  chosen 
because  it  allows  respondents  to  complete  questions  at  a  later  date.  Third,  a  mail 
questionnaire  can  allow  respondents  to  collect  facts  that  they  may  not  recall  immediately 
or  accurately.  Therefore,  the  mail  questionnaire  was  chosen  to  collect  primary  data  from 
host  country  parents. 
5.3.9.3  Questionnaire  Design 
Before  designing  the  questionnaire,  two  personal  interviews  were  conducted  in  order  to 
capture  the  enterprise's  viewpoints  on  how  the  international  joint  venture  was  formed. 
Two  international  joint  ventures  were  selected,  COSTCO  and  Talee-Isetan.  These  two 
154 Chapter  5 
cases  provide  the  researcher  some  useful  information  about  how  joint  ventures  are 
formed  and  how  they  manage  their  joint  ventures.  The  detailed  information  is  described 
in  appendix  I-A  and  appendix  I-B.  Then  the  researcher  starts  to  design  the  questions  for 
this  study.  The  questions  within  the  questionnaire  are  suggested,  in  part,  by  reference  to 
earlier  and  similar  research,  by  consulting  with  experienced  academic  researchers  and  by 
my  own  knowledge  of  Taiwan's  economic  environment.  For  this  study  two 
questionnaires  were  compiled.  The  first  questionnaire  is  designed  to  identify  the  joint 
venture  samples  in  order  to  capture  the  host  parent's  information.  The  second 
questionnaire  is  the  main  questionnaire  and  consisted  of  two  parts.  The  first  part  is  a 
page  of  information  for  the  respondent.  This  information  indicates  the  purpose  of  this 
study  and  the  meaning  of  international  joint  venture  by  giving  an  example.  The 
information  also  requests  the  respondent  to  provide  information  relating  to  an 
international  joint  venture  with  which  they  are  most  familiar. 
The  second  part  of  questionnaire  is  divided  into  six  sections:  motivation,  contribution, 
bargaining  power,  decision  making,  manager's  appointment,  and  company's  background. 
The  first  section  comprises  26  questions  designed  to  provide  responses  with  regard  to 
the  most  important  factor  for  the  formation  of  international  joint  venture. 
The  second  section  contains  16  items  related  to  the  contributions  from  each  parent  to  the 
joint  venture.  The  contributions  of  the  Taiwanese  parent  and  its  foreign  partner  are 
requested  from  the  Taiwanese  partner's  viewpoint.  The  third  section  measures  11 
variables  which  affect  the  bargaining  power.  The  fourth  and  fifth  sections  deal  with  the 
strategic  decisions  and  responsibility  for  the  appointment  of  managers.  And  the  final 
section  consists  of  a  number  of  questions  designed  to  capture  the  company's  background. 
All  the  questions  are  structured  as  appendix  II-B  and  II-B. 
5.3.9.4  Questionnaire  Pre-Testing 
Pre-testing  (or  Pilot  testing)  is  usually  considered  in  the  trial  investigations  of  specific 
research  problems  that  will  be  treated  more  intensively  at  a  later  date.  It  is  also 
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conducted  to  make  sure  that  the  questionnaire  works  and  yields  the  data  required. 
Emory  and  Cooper  (1991)  indicate  that  the  pilot  tests  are  conducted  to  detect 
weaknesses  in  the  study's  design,  instrumentation,  and  procedures.  They  suggest  that 
the  size  of  the  pilot  group  may  range  from  25  to  100  subjects  depending  on  the  method 
to  be  tested.  They  also  give  a  warning  that  in  very  small  populations  the  pilot  testing  has 
the  risk  of  exhausting  the  supply  of  respondents.  Thus,  this  study  chose  20  companies  as 
a  pilot  testing  sample  in  order  not  to  deplete  the  supply  of  respondents  and  also  used  two 
interview  cases  to  detect  any  weakness  for  the  purpose  of  refining  of  measuring 
instruments. 
A  random  number  table  was  used  to  select  20  Taiwanese's  parent  companies  as  the  pilot 
survey  sample.  The  questionnaires  were  posted  to  these  companies.  After  ten  days,  20 
companies  were  followed  up  by  telephone  to  confirm  that  the  questionnaire  has  been 
received  by  the  right  department  and  person.  But  only  two  companies  completed  the 
questionnaire  as  requested.  Two  firms  stated  that  their  headquarters  moved  to  a  new 
location  recently  and  the  questionnaire  had  to  be  sent  to  the  new  office.  Three  firms  said 
that  they  didn't  receive  the  questionnaire  and  the  researcher  had  to  use  Fax  to  send  the 
questionnaire  again.  However,  the  questionnaire  was  still  not  received.  Three 
companies  stated  that  they  receive  many  questionnaires  every  week  and  only  choose  a 
few  simple  questionnaires  to  answer.  Some  of  the  firms  said  that  they  did  not  answer 
questionnaires.  Some  of  firms  said  that  if  the  address  and  addressee  are  not  correct,  the 
questionnaire  may  simply  be  destroyed.  In  the  pre-testing  of  20  firms,  8  responses  were 
received. 
This  pre-testing  provides  some  valuable  experiences.  For  example,  the  original  version 
of  questionnaire  proved  to  be  too  long.  Also,  if  most  of  the  respondents  hold  a  high 
position  in  the  company  they  do  not  have  the  time  or  patience  to  complete  the 
questionnaire.  It  is  better  to  restructure  the  questionnaire  in  a  simpler  fashion  and  reduce 
the  number  of  pages.  As  all  researchers  know,  if  there  are  many  pages  in  a  questionnaire, 
the  risk  of  non-response  will  increase.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  is  not  enough 
information  included  in  the  questionnaire,  the  research  cannot  be  employed  successfully. 
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It  has  to  balanced  on  both  sides.  Four  to  six  pages  in  a  questionnaire  is  an  appropriate 
size  to  obtain  the  data  required. 
Another  useful  experience  from  pre-testing  was  to  make  a  phone  call  to  identify  the 
correct  department  and  named  person  before  the  questionnaire  was  sent  out.  This 
ensures  the  questionnaire  is  going  to  right  respondent  and  will  not  be  destroyed  during 
the  document  exchange.  It  is  also  easy  and  helpful  for  the  follow-up  stage.  This  pre- 
testing  provides  many  helpful  experiences  which  serve  in  the  final  version  of  the 
questionnaire  which  was  modified  on  the  basis  of  comments  received  during  the  pre- 
testing  phase. 
5.3.9.5  Respondent  Selection 
The  study  requires  respondents  with  specialised  knowledge  of  all  joint  venture  activities, 
from  motives  for  the  formation  of  international  joint  ventures,  contributing  resources  to 
N's  companies,  bargaining  power  of  each  parent,  control  and  ownership  over  the  N. 
Those  requirements  identify  respondents  as  managers  of  at  least  middle  to  senior 
positions  in  Taiwanese  partner  firms.  To  ensure  good  quality  responses  and  to  enhance 
the  response  rate,  telephone  contact  was  made  with  each  Taiwanese  partner  in  order  to 
identify  the  name  and  position  of  the  most  appropriate  senior  manager  in  the  organisation 
with  intimate  knowledge  of  the  N. 
5.3.9.6  Survey  Implementation 
Since  the  potential  samples  have  been  identified,  telephone  contact  was  made  to  confirm 
the  appropriate  respondent  and  correct  address.  The  questionnaires  were  sent  out  to  a 
total  of  227  companies  in  October  2001.  The  researcher  used  the  facilities  provided  by 
the  National  Kaohsiung  University  of  Applied  Science.  Each  questionnaire  is  mailed  by 
using  the  envelope  with  University's  title.  It  made  the  questionnaires  look  more  formal 
in  order  to  increase  the  response  rate.  Also  each  questionnaire  includes  a  pre-paid/pre- 
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addressed  envelope  and  a  cover  letter  which  highlights  the  nature  of  the  research  and 
requested  support  from  the  respondent.  A  first  round  of  82  questionnaires  was  collected. 
Follow-up  calls  were  made  to  firms  that  had  not  returned  a  completed  questionnaire.  By 
the  end  of  December  2001,  a  second  round  of  32  completed  questionnaires  had  reached 
the  University.  As  a  result,  a  total  number  of  114  completed  questionnaires  were 
collected.  The  total  of  114  eligible  respondents  represents  a  50.22%  (114/227)  response 
rate. 
5.3.10  Data  Analysis  Methods 
After  the  questionnaires  were  collected,  the  next  step  was  to  code  the  data  and  key  into  a 
computer  program.  Data  analysis  of  the  questionnaire  was  carried  out  using  the  SPSS 
statistical  package.  The  general  procedures  employed  included  descriptive  statistics, 
analysis  of  variance,  correlation  analysis,  factor  analysis  and  regression  analysis. 
5.3.10.1  Descriptive  Statistics  Analysis 
Descriptive  analysis  refers  to  the  transformation  of  the  raw  data  into  a  form  that  will 
make  for  easy  comprehension  and  interpretation  (Zikmund,  1997).  Descriptive  statistics 
are  used  to  express  the  most  fundamental  characteristics  of  location,  spread,  and  shape 
of  the  variables  and  factors.  Its  purpose  consists  of  understanding  the  contents  and 
construction  of  samples,  in  order  to  utilize  inference  statistical  analysis  in  the  next  stage. 
Descriptive  statistics  are  provided  by  frequencies,  measures  of  central  tendency,  and 
dispersion.  The  most  common  form  of  summarizing  data  is  the  average,  frequency 
distributions,  and  percentage  distributions  ((Zikmund,  1997). 
Frequencies  simply  refer  to  a  numerical  value  which  represents  the  total  number  of 
observations  for  a  variable  under  study  (Hussey,  1997).  The  frequencies  may  be 
summarised  by  calculating  the  average  and/or  the  percentage  frequencies  and  the 
information  can  also  be  presented  in  the  form  of  a  histogram  or  a  bar  chart.  In  business 
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research,  frequencies  are  generally  obtained  for  the  nominal  variables  such  as  gender  and 
educational  level  and  ordinal  variables  such  as  attitudes  or  opinions. 
Measures  of  central  tendencies  and  dispersions  enable  individuals  to  get  an  idea  of  the 
basic  characteristics  of  the  data  and  are  a  convenient  way  of  describing  a  large  frequency 
distribution  by  means  of  a  single  value  (Sekaran,  2003;  Hussey,  1997).  There  are  three 
measures  of  central  tendencies:  the  mean,  the  median  and  the  mode.  The  mean  is  the 
arithmetical  average  of  a  frequency  distribution.  The  median  is  the  mid-value  in  a 
frequency  distribution  which  has  been  arranged  in  size  order.  The  mode  is  the  most 
frequently  occurring  value  in  a  frequency  distribution  (Hussey,  1997). 
A  simple  measure  of  central  tendencies  can  not  give  us  any  idea  of  the  profile  of  the  data 
distribution;  thus,  the  measure  of  dispersion  can  help  us  to  describe  the  spread  of  values 
in  a  data  distribution.  The  three  measurements  of  dispersion  are  the  range,  the  variance, 
and  the  standard  deviation.  The  range  refers  to  difference  between  the  upper  extreme 
(highest)  values  and  the  lower  extreme  (lowest)  value  in  a  set  of  observations.  The 
variance  is  the  term  used  to  describe  the  mean  of  the  deviations  squared.  Standard 
deviation  is  a  very  commonly  used  measure  of  dispersion,  and  is  simply  the  square  root 
of  the  variance. 
In  summary,  descriptive  statistics  enable  the  researcher  to  summarize  and  organize  data 
in  an  effective  and  meaningful  way.  The  mean,  median  and  mode  can  be  useful  measures 
of  central  tendencies,  and  the  range  and  standard  deviation  are  useful  measures  of 
dispersion.  However,  most  of  the  time  we  would  be  interested  to  know  the  relationships 
or  differences  between  two  variables.  We  will  need  to  know  the  inferential  statistics 
which  are  described  in  the  next  section. 
5.3.10.2  Inferential  Statistical  Analysis 
Inferential  statistics  allow  researchers  to  determine  whether  an  expected  pattern 
designated  by  the  theory  and  hypotheses  is  actually  found  in  the  observations.  When  we 
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are  interested  to  know:  (1)  the  relationship  between  two  variables;  (2)  differences  in  a 
variable  among  different  subgroups;  and  (3)  how  several  independent  variables  might 
explain  the  variance  in  a  dependent  variable,  we  need  to  employ  inferential  statistics  to 
answer  these  questions  (Sakaran,  2003).  Cross-tabulation,  Chi-square  test,  t-test,  and 
Analysis  of  Variance  (ANOVA),  correlations,  regression  analysis  and  factor  analysis  are 
the  most  popular  statistical  tools  for  inferential  statistics. 
Cross-tabulation  is  a  technique  for  comparing  two  classification  variables,  such  as  gender, 
age,  and  profession,  etc.  The  purpose  of  categorization  and  cross-tabulation  is  to  allow 
the  inspection  of  differences  among  groups  and  to  make  comparisons  ((Zikmund,  1997). 
It  also  can  be  constructed  for  statistical  testing,  referred  to  as  contingency  tables,  and  the 
test  determines  if  the  classification  variables  are  independent. 
The  chi-square  test  is  probably  the  most  widely  used  nonparametric  test  of  significance. 
It  can  be  used  to  test  the  significance  of  nominal  data  or  higher  scales  and  can  also  help 
us  to  see  whether  or  not  two  nominal  variables  are  related.  The  chi-square  test  is  useful 
not  only  in  cases  of  one-sample  analysis  but  also  two-independent  samples  or  k 
independent  samples.  But  when  using  this  technique,  we  have  to  be  careful  of  three 
situations:  (1)  when  the  degree  of  freedom  equals  1,  each  expected  frequency  in  each  cell 
should  be  at  least  5  in  size;  (2)  if  the  degree  of  freedom  is  greater  than  1,  but  more  than 
20  percent  of  the  expected  frequencies  are  smaller  than  5,  then  the  Chi-square  test  should 
not  be  used;  (3)  when  any  expected  frequency  is  less  than  1,  the  Chi-square  test  should 
not  be  used. 
Agresti  (1996)  indicated  that  the  chi-squared  approximation  can  be  poor  when  the  tables 
contain  very  small  fitted  values  or  about  20%  of  the  cells  have  fitted  values  below  5. 
Agresti  and  Finlay  (1997)  mentioned  that  the  chi-squared  was  frequently  misused.  A 
common  misuse  was  to  apply  it  when  the  expected  frequencies  are  too  small.  In  other 
words,  when  situation  (2)  happens  but  there  has  to  be  a  significant  value,  the  Chi-square 
test  should  not  be  used  and  the  G2  test  can  be  used  to  solve  the  limit  of  Chi-square  test. 
The  G2  statistic  is  obtained  by  the  formula: 
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..  G2  =  2En,  log 
n° 
uij 
u#:  the  expected  value  of  ny  assuming  independence. 
A 
u;;  :  estimated  expected  frequencies. 
The  t-test  takes  into  consideration  the  means  and  standard  deviations  of  the  two  groups 
on  the  variable  and  tests  whether  or  not  there  is  a  significant  mean  difference  in  a 
dependent  variable  between  two  groups  (Sekaran,  2003). 
Analysis  of  Variance  (ANOVA)  is  a  technique  for  testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
means  of  several  populations  are  equal.  It  breaks  down  the  total  variation  among  scores 
into  between-groups  and  within-groups  variance.  The  F  ratio,  the  test  statistic, 
determines  if  the  differences  are  sufficiently  large  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis.  Analysis 
of  Variance  can  be  extended  from  One-way  Analysis  of  Variance  to  two-way  and  n-way 
Analysis  of  Variance. 
5.3.10.3  Correlation  Analysis 
Correlation  analysis  is  the  statistical  method  to  measure  the  direction  and  strength  of  the 
linear  relationship  between  two  quantitative  variables.  A  Pearson  correlation  coefficient 
(y)  is  a  technique  which  can  measure  the  direction,  the  strength  and  significance  of 
association  between  two  variables.  But  the  coefficient  does  not  distinguish  between 
independent  and  dependent  variables  (Emory  and  Cooper,  1991).  The  correlation  7  is 
always  a  number  between  -1  and  1.  Positive  y  indicates  positive  association  between  the 
variables,  and  negative  y  indicates  negative  association  (Hair  et  al.,  1998). 
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When  '=1  represents  a  perfect  positive  linear  association 
y=0  represents  no  linear  association 
y=  -1  represents  a  perfect  negative  linear  association 
Direction  represents  that  large  values  on  one  variable  are  associated  with  large  values  on 
the  other  (and  small  values  with  small  values),  in  other  words,  as  one  variable  increases, 
the  other  also  increases  (Emory  and  Cooper,  1991).  The  values  in  between  can  be 
graded  as 
IiI>0.7,  it  indicates  strong  degree  of  linear  relationship. 
0.3;  5  1y1S0.7,  it  indicates  middle  degree  of  linear  relationship. 
yI<0.3,  it  indicates  low  degree  of  linear  relationship. 
Correlation  coefficients  should  be  interpreted  with  care,  since  a  correlation  between  two 
variables  does  not  prove  there  is  a  causal  link  between  them. 
5.3.10.4  Factor  analysis 
Factor  analysis  refers  to  a  diverse  number  of  techniques  used  to  discern  the  underlying 
dimensions  or  regularity  in  phenomena  (Zikmund,  1997).  There  are  two  purposes  in 
factor  analysis:  data  reduction  and  substantive  interpretation.  The  first  purpose  is  used 
principally  to  summarize  the  important  information  in  a  set  of  observed  variables  by  a 
fewer  number  of  factors.  This  technique  is  usually  referred  to  as  "data  reduction.  "  The 
second  purpose  is  to  discover  the  underlying  constructs  that  explain  the  observed 
variance.  This  multivariate  statistical  technique  is  particularly  suited  to  this  study 
because  it  analyses  the  interrelationships  among  a  large  number  of  variables  and  then 
explains  the  relationships  within  the  data.  Four  steps  have  to  be  addressed  prior  to  the 
implementation  of  factor  analysis. 
The  first  step  for  running  a  factor  analysis  is  to  determine  and  extract  the  factors  which 
will  be  used  to  describe  the  data  set.  The  method  this  study  used  was  Principle 
Components  Analysis  (PCA).  The  principal  component  technique  is  the  most  frequent 
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approach  to  construct  a  new  set  of  principal  components.  Successive  components 
explain  progressively  smaller  portions  of  the  total  sample  variance,  and  are  all 
uncorrelated  with  each  other. 
The  second  step  is  to  determine  the  number  of  factors  necessary  to  account  for  the 
variation  in  the  data.  A  number  of  rules  have  been  advanced  for  deciding  how  many 
factors  to  retain  for  a  factor  analytic  solution.  The  most  popular  is  the  latent  root 
criterion.  The  latent  roots  criterion  holds  that  the  amount  of  variation  explained  by  each 
factor  must  be  greater  than  1.  Therefore,  factors  with  an  Eigenvalue  more  than  1  are 
selected. 
The  third  step  is  selected  a  rotation  procedure  which  is  used  to  clarify  the  factors.  There 
are  two  different  types  of  rotation  which  can  be  employed,  Orthogonal  and  Oblique. 
Orthogonal  rotation  refers  to  the  procedure  where  the  factors  are  uncorrelated  to  one 
another  and  preserves  the  right  angles  that  exist  among  the  factors  axes.  Oblique 
rotations  allows  for  some  correlation  between  the  factors,  which  means  that  the  factors 
themselves  can  be  correlated.  The  orthogonal  extraction  method  was  carried  out  in  this 
study.  SPSS  provides  a  number  of  alternative  algorithms  for  orthogonal  rötation.  The 
most  popular  orthogonal  rotation  scheme  is  the  Varimax  method  which  attempts  to 
minimise  the  number  of  variables  which  have  a  high  loading  on  a  factor  and  can  enhance 
the  interpretability  of  factors. 
The  final  step  was  to  assign  a  name  or  label  to  a  factor  that  accurately  reflects  the 
greatest  extent  possible.  In  order  to  name  the  factors  appropriately,  the  criteria  of  the 
significance  of  any  factor  loading  has  to  be  decided.  The  significance  of  any  loading  can 
be  judged  using  statistical  criteria.  Statistical  criteria  mean  that  the  loading  is  considered 
statistically  significant  at  some  specified  alpha  level,  typically  0.05.  For  the  samples  of 
less  than  100,  the  lowest  factor  loading  to  be  considered  as  significant  would  have  to  be 
greater  than  0.3  (Churchill  and  Iacobucci,  2002). 
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In  addition,  item-to-total  is  used  to  measure  the  correlation  coefficient  of  each  variable 
for  each  factor.  This  evaluation  would  be  in  terms  of  the  variable's  overall  contribution 
to  the  factor.  If  the  variable  is  of  minor  importance  to  the  factor  or  less  than  0.4,  it 
should  be  eliminated.  Then  the  Cronbach  a  coefficient  was  used  to  test  the  internal 
consistency  of  each  factor. 
5.3.10.5  General  Linear  Regression 
Regression  analysis  refers  to  the  techniques  used  to  derive  an  equation  that  relates  the 
dependent  variable  to  one  or more  independent  variables.  It  is  a  powerful  analytical  tool 
designed  to  explore  all  types  of  dependence  relationships  and  is  viewed  as  the  foundation 
for  business  forecasting  models  (Hair  et  al.,  1998).  There  are  two  kind  of  regression 
analysis,  one  is  called  simple  regression  analysis,  and  another  one  is  multiple  regression 
analysis.  The  classification  between  these  two  is  according  to  the  number  of  independent 
variables.  Simple  regression  analysis  is  the  analyzing  method  where  there  is  only  one 
independent  variable  in  the  regression  formula.  Multiple  regression  analysis  is  used  to 
analyze  the  relationship  between  a  single  dependent  variable  and  several  independent 
variables  in  the  regression  formula.  The  objective  of  multiple  regression  analysis  is  to 
predict  the  changes  in  the  dependent  variable  in  response  to  changes  in  several 
independent  variables. 
The  basic  formulation  of  multiple  regressions  is  shown  as  the  below: 
Y,  =a+ßß,  X1  +ß2X2  +.......  +ßnx"  +s, 
Where  Y,  :  is  the  dependent  variable 
Xi  :  is  indepentent  variables  i  =1,...,  n 
ß  :  is  the  regression  coefficien  tin 
c:  is  the  error  associated  with  the  i  th  observation 
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There  are  two  methods  to  estimate  a  and  ß,  one  is  called  ordinary  least  squares  method 
(OLSE);  and  the  other  one  is  called  maximum  likelihood  method.  The  coefficient  of 
determination  is  the  number  which  serves  as  an  evaluation  to  determine  the  fineness  of 
the  regression  model.  It  is  used  to  measure  the  overall  closeness  of  the  relationship,  and 
the  defining  capability  from  the  regression  model.  The  coefficient  of  determination  is 
denoted  by  R2 
. 
The  value  of  R2  ranges  from  0  and  1.  When  the  value  of  R2  is  closer  to  1,  it  means  a 
high  degree  of  variation  from  the  total  variation  is  attributed  to  the  regression  model. 
Hair  et  al.  (1998)  described  a  simplified  procedure  to  demonstrate  the  analysis  of  multiple 
regression  which  was  represented  in  Figure  5.3.3.  There  are  six  steps  in  the  analysis 
procedure.  These  are 
Step  1:  Select  the  independent  variables  to  examine:  the  correlation  matrix  can  be  used 
to  identify  which  independent  variables  are  most  closely  correlated  with  the 
dependent  variable.  The  independent  variable  with  the  highest  correlation  with 
the  dependent  variable  will  be  the  first  choice  into  the  regression  equation. 
Step  2:  Explain  the  statistically  significance  of  variation:  R2  is  used  to  indicate  the 
percentage  of  total  variation  of  the  dependent  variable  (Y)  explained  by 
independent  variable  (X). 
Step  3:  Consider  other  available  independent  variables:  when  other  potential  independent 
variables  remain  available  to  add  to  the  equation. 
Step  4:  Select  a  new  variable  to  be  added  to  a  predictive  equation:  partial  correlations 
and  t  valued  can  be  used  to  assess  the  potential  contribution  of  other  independent 
variables  to  improve  the  prediction  of  the  dependent  variable.  The  criterion  of 
selecting  variables  is  that  the  independent  variable  has  the  highest  partial 
correlation  with  the  dependent  variable. 
Step  5:  Assess  whether  the  variance  explained  by  all  variables  is  significant  or  not:  the  t 
value  of  variables  in  the  equation  which  measures  the  significance  of  the  partial 
correlation  of  the  variable  to  determine  whether  a  variable  should  be  dropped 
from  the  equation  once  a  variable  had  been  added. 
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Step  6:  Drop  non-significant  independent  variables:  when  the  partial  correlation  of 
independent  variables  is  very  small  and  has  no  statistical  significance,  drop  these 
non-significant  independent  variables. 
Sequence  of  Analysis 
1  Select  predictor  variable  to  examine  criterion: 
highest  correlation  with  dependent  variable 
No  prediction 
2  Is  percentage  variation  explained  statistically  NO  possible  with 
significant?  multiple 
regression 
YES 
Are  other  predictors  NO  Final  predicative  equation 
available? 
Tqý 
I 
YES 
Select  a  new  variable  to  be  added  to 
predictive  equation. 
Criterion:  highest  partial  correlation 
with  dependent  variable  Examine  appropriateness 
5  Is  variance  explained  by  all  variables 
now  significant? 
Criterion:  partial  F  tests  for  each 
variable  in  equation 
No 
6II  Drop  non-significant 
Figure  5.3.3  Simplified  Stepwise  Regression  Procedure  Used  by  HATCO 
Source:  Hair,  et  al.  (1998),  Multivariate  Data  Analysis  with  Readings,  New  York:  Macmillan,  p63. 
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The  above  procedure  of  analysis  can  provide  very  useful  guidelines  when  employing 
multiple  regression  analysis.  This  study  adopted  this  procedure  throughout  the 
regression  analysis. 
When  exercising  multivariate  regression  analysis,  the  researcher  must  be  aware  the 
impact  of  multi-collinearity  which  a  term  used  to  describe  a  situation  where  an 
independent  variable  is  related  to  one  or  more  of  the  other  independent  variables  in  the 
equation.  Two  measures  are  available  for  testing  the  impact  of  collinearity:  (1) 
calculating  the  tolerance  and  the  variance  inflation  factor  (VIF)  values,  and  (2)using  the 
condition  indices  and  decomposing  the  regression  coefficient  variance  (  Hair  et  al,  1998, 
p.  74).  The  tolerance  value  is  1  minus  the  proportion  of  the  variable's  variance.  As  the 
tolerance  value  grows  smaller,  the  independent  variables  become  more  highly  collinear 
with  the  other  variables.  VIF  is  an  indicator  of  the  effect  that  other  independent 
variables  have  on  the  variance  of  a  regression  coefficient.  Large  VIF  values  indicate  a 
high  degree  of  collinearity  among  the  independent.  There  are  a  number  of  ways  can  be 
used  to  deal  with  the  multicollinearity.  These  methods  include  (Hair  et  al,  1998): 
"  Collect  more  data.  This  is  one  of  the  best  methods  to  reduce  multicollinearity.  But  it 
is  not  practical  or  possible  for  a  researcher  to  employ  because  the  limits  of  cost,  time 
and  available  samples. 
"  Omit  one  or  more  highly  correlated  independent  variables  and  seek  others  to  help  the 
prediction. 
"  Use  the  simple  correlations  between  each  independent  and  the  dependent  variable  to 
understand  the  independent-dependent  variable  relationship. 
"  Use  the  model  with  the  highly  correlated  independent  variables  for  prediction  only. 
"  Use  more  sophisticated  methods  of  analysis  or  regression  on  principle  components  to 
obtain  a  model  that  more  clearly  reflects  the  simple  effects  of  the  independent  variables. 
5.3.10.6  Reliability  and  Validity 
Any  test  or  questionnaire  could  be  looked  upon  as  the  result  of  a  measure  from  random 
sampling,  whether  the  result  is  reliable  or  not.  It  is  important  to  ensure  the  instrument 
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can  measure  the  variable  accurately.  A  well-designed  instrument  will  ensure  more 
accurate  results,  which  in  turn  will  enhance  the  scientific  quality  of  the  research.  Hence, 
we  need  to  be  reasonably  sure  that  the  instruments  we  use  in  our  research  do  indeed 
measure  the  variables  and  measure  them  accurately  (Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran, 
2001).  In  social  science  research,  the  reliability  and  validity  are  most  commonly  used  to 
assess  the  "good"  of  the  measures  developed.  Sekaran  (2003)  states  that  validity  and 
reliability  of  the  measure  certifies  the  scientific  rigor  and  can  be  applied  to  the  research 
study.  She  provides  a  Figure  5.3.4  (see  next  page)  to  describe  the  various  forms  of 
validity  and  reliability.  There  four  methods  can  be  used  to  measure  the  reliability  which 
are  test-retest  reliability,  parallel-form  reliability,  inter-item  consistency  reliability  (or 
Cronbach's  alpha),  and  split-half  reliability.  The  types  of  validity  tests  include  the 
content  validity,  criterion-related  validity,  and  construct  validity.  The  next  subsection 
will  describe  reliability  and  validity  in  detail. 
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5.3.10.6.1  Reliability 
The  reliability  of  a  measure  indicates  the  extent  to  which  the  measure  is  without  bias  and 
hence  offers  a  consistent  measurement  across  time  and  across  the  various  items  in  the 
instrument  (Cavana,  Delahaye,  and  Sekaran,  2001).  Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias 
(2000)  define  the  reliability  as  "the  extent  to  which  a  measuring  instrument  contains 
variable  errors,  that  is,  errors  that  appear  inconsistently  between  observations  either 
during  any  one  measurement  procedure  or  each  time  a  given  variable  is  measured  by  the 
same  instrument.  "  Sekaran  (2003)  also  states  thet  the  reliability  of  a  measure  indicates 
the  extent  to  which  it  is  without  bias  (error  free)  and  hence  ensures  consistent 
measurement  across  time  and  across  the  various  items  in  the  instrument.  Wu  and  Lin 
(2000)  define  reliability  as  the  extent  of  a  measure  without  any  errors;  it  also  means  the 
degree  of  stability  and  consistency  of  a  measure. 
Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias  (2000)  define  reliability  as  a  measuring  tool  which 
includes  the  extent  of  variable  errors.  The  possible  resources  of  measurement  errors  are: 
1.  The  errors  resulting  from  respondent:  This  kind  of  errors  results  from  respondent.  For 
example,  because  of  different  race  and  social  level  some  respondents  are  unwilling  to 
express  true  recognition  or  attitude. 
2.  The  errors  resulting  from  different  circumstances:  The  resources  of  this  kind  of  error 
are  extensive;  any  matter  which  could  affect  the  measure  result  can  cause  errors.  For 
example,  if  there  is  another  person  beside  person  A  when  he  is  doing  the 
questionnaire,  this  circumstance  may  adversely  affect  person  A's  responses. 
3.  The  errors  resulting  from  measurers:  For  example,  the  interviewer's  explanation  about 
the  questionnaire  may  affect  the  interviewee's  understanding. 
4.  The  errors  resulting  from  measuring  instruments:  A  faulty  measuring  instrument  can 
result  in  a  measurement  error.  Or  an  error  results  from  using  the  inappropriate 
measuring  instrument  to  examine  specific  item. 
Reliability  could  be  explained  by  two  implications,  one  is  stability,  and  another  one  is 
internal  consistency.  The  stability  refers  to  whether  we  could  get  the  same  result  by 
repeating  the  same  measuring  instruments  on  one  particular  object  or  not.  And  the 
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internal  consistency  refers  to  the  degree  of  agreement  between  measurements  that 
measure  the  same  theoretical  concept.  There  are  two  common  methods  of  estimating 
stability  reliability  which  are: 
1.  Test-retest  method:  Test-retest  method  is  the  method  to  let  the  same  group  of 
respondents  to  be  tested  twice  on  the  same  measure,  and  find  the  coefficient  from  the 
two  tests.  This  coefficient  is  also  called  test-retest  reliability. 
2.  Parallel-form  method:  The  same  group  of  respondents  has  to  be  tested  twice  with  two 
similar  but  different  instruments.  The  correlation  coefficient  of  these  two  instruments 
is  called  coefficient  of  forms. 
Internal  consistency  can  be  measured  by  using: 
1.  Split-half  method  :  Split-half  method  is  the  method  to  split  the  questionnaire  into 
halves,  and  compare  the  questions  in  each  part.  It  estimates  reliability  by  measuring 
each  of  two  or  more  parts  of  a  measuring  instrument  on  a  separate  scale  (Frankfort- 
Nachmias  and  Nachmias,  2000).  If  these  two  halves  of  an  instrument  correlate  well,  it 
indicates  that  the  instrument  has  high  reliability. 
2.  Inter-item  method:  This  is  a  test  of  the  consistency  of  respondents'  answers  to  all  the 
items  in  a  measure.  The  most  popular  test  of  inter-item  consistency  reliability  is  the 
Cronbach's  coefficient  alpha.  Cronbach  (1951)  brings  up  the  famous  coefficient  alpha 
which  overcomes  some  defects  of  the  split-half  method. 
The  formula  of  Cronbach  alpha  is  shown  below: 
_k 
ST  _S; 
a=I 
SZ  J 
a:  the  estimated  reliability 
K:  total  questions  in  a  measure 
S2  :  is  the  total  variation  in  a  measure 
S2  is  the  variation  in  each  question 
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The  Cronbach  alpha  reliability  is  quite  commonly  used  in  business  research  (Cronbach, 
1955).  The  main  reason  is  that  either  the  test-retest  method,  the  split-half  method,  or  the 
equivalent-forms  method  has  low  practicality  in  testing  in  a  real  situation.  Therefore,  the 
Cronbach  alpha  is  a  useful  method  to  investigate  reliability.  This  study  will  use  the 
Cronbach  alpha  to  measure  the  reliability. 
5.3.10.6.2  Validity 
Validity  indicates  the  extent  to  which  an  instrument  can  measures  what  it  is  supposed  to 
measure.  In  other  words,  validity  indicates  whether  the  measurement  is  effective  or  not, 
according  to  the  purpose,  content  and  scope  of  the  research.  Several  types  of  validity 
test  are  used  to  test  the  goodness  of  measures. 
1.  Content  validity:  Content  validity  is  the  extent  to  which  a  test  measures  an  intended 
content  area  or  is  a  function  of  how  well  the  dimensions  and  elements  of  a  concept 
have  been  delineated.  There  are  at  least  three  ways  to  achieve  content  validity  -from 
literature,  from  qualitative  research  and  from  the  judgement  of  a  panel  of  experts. 
Face  validity  is  usually  tested  by  giving  the  questionnaire  to  a  respondent  to  measure 
their  reaction  to  the  items.  However,  most  researchers  do  not  treat  it  as  a  valid 
component  of  content  validity  (Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran,  2001).  Because  there 
are  no  precise,  replicable  procedures  for  evaluating  the  content  validity  of  face  validity 
and  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  repeat  the  evaluation  procedure  precisely  and  it  entirely 
relies  on  subjective  judgements  (Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias,  2000). 
2.  Criterion-related  validity:  Criterion-related  validity  is  the  ability  of  a  test  or  other 
measure  to  produce  results  in  keeping  with  those  of  the  same  criterion  observed  within 
the  same  time  frame.  Criterion  validity  can  be  either  concurrent  validity  or  predictive 
validity  (Sekaran,  2003;  Neuman,  2000).  Concurrent  validity  refers  to  the  criterion 
that  exists  at  the  same  time  as  the  measure,  whereas  predictive  validity  indicates  the 
ability  of  the  measuring  instrument  to  differentiate  among  individuals  on  a  future 
criterion. 
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3.  Construct  validity:  Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias  (2000)  indicate  that  construct 
validity  is  established  by  relating  the  measuring  instrument  to  a  general  theoretical 
framework  within  which  the  researcher  conducts  their  studies  in  order  to  determine 
whether  the  instrument  is  logically  and  empirically  tied  to  the  concepts  and  theoretical 
assumptions  they  are  employing.  Construct  validity  is  used  to  measure  how  well  the 
results  obtained  from  the  use  of  the  measure  fit  the  theories  around  which  the  test  is 
designed  (Sekaran,  2003).  Two  specific  forms  of  construct  validity  are  convergent  and 
discriminant  validity.  Convergent  validity  is  established  when  the  scores  obtained  by 
two  different  instruments  measuring  the  same  concept  are  highly  correlated. 
Discriminant  validity  is  established  when  two  variables  are  predicted  to  be  uncorrelated, 
and  the  scores  obtained  by  measuring  them  are  indeed  empirically  found  to  be  so 
(Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran,  2001). 
Some  of  the  methods  in  which  the  above  forms  of  validity  can  be  established  are  through: 
1.  Correlational  analysis:  which  can  be  used  in  the  case  of  establishing  concurrent  and 
predictive  validity  or convergent  and  discriminant  validity. 
2.  Factor  analysis:  a  multivariate  technique  would  confirm  the  dimensions  of  the  concept 
that  have  been  operationally  defined,  as  well  as  indicate  which  of  the  items  are  most 
appropriate  for  each  dimension.  In  factor  analysis,  we  need  to  calculate  the  factor 
structure  matrix  (not  pattern  matrix)  in  the  questionnaire;  then  ascertain  whether  the 
construct  validity  good  or  bad  could  be  determined  from  the  score  of  factor  loading. 
In  the  same  construct,  if  the  score  of  factor  loading  is  ascending,  (usually,  the 
particular  item  is  maintained  if  its  score  is  more  than  0.5,  otherwise  the  item  is  deleted 
and  the  factor  analysis  is  rank  again),  it  means  a  higher  level  of  convergent  validity 
3.  Multi-traits  multi-methods:  The  application  of  multi-traits  multi-methods  is  to  test  the 
same  group  of  samples  (or  interviewees)  twice  with  the  same  hetero-traits  measuring 
implements  in  a  different  method.  Sekaran  (2003)  indicates  that  the  multitrait, 
multimethod  matrix  of  correlations  derived  from  measuring  concepts  by  different 
forms  and  different  methods,  additionally  establishes  the  robustness  of  the  measure. 
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In  summary,  the  goodness  of  measures  can  be  obtained  through  different  kinds  of  validity 
and  reliability.  The  researcher  needs  to  use  well-validated  and  reliable  measures  to 
ensure  the  results  of  the  measures.  After  discussing  the  relative  methods  in  terms  of 
validity  and  reliability,  next  we  examine  the  reliability  and  validity  of  the  questionnaire 
derived  from  this  empirical  survey. 
5.3.10.6.3  Reliability  and  Validity  of  this  Questionnaire 
The  aims  of  this  subsection  is  to  analyze  the  reliability  and  validity  of  questionnaire 
derived  from  this  empirical  survey.  This  study  includes  motivation,  contribution, 
bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control  constructs.  Most  constructs  are  measured  by 
multi-questions  except  ownership. 
All  of  the  concepts  in  this  research  and  the  hypotheses  for  the  theory  construction  are 
mainly  referred  from  previous  research,  and  partly  from  practical  observation;  therefore, 
it  meets  the  requirements  of  content  validity.  In  addition,  this  study  uses  factor  analysis 
to  affirm  the  measuring  validity  of  motivation  and  bargaining  power.  As  mentioned 
above,  factor  analysis  would  confirm  the  dimensions  of  the  concept  that  have  been 
operationally  defined,  as  well  as  indicate  which  of  the  items  are  most  appropriate  for 
each  dimension.  In  this  study,  the  construct  validity  of  motivation  and  bargaining  power 
are  measured  by  using  factor  analysis.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  5.3.7. 
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Table  5.3.7  The  Summary  of  Construct  Validity  of  Motivation  and  Bargaining  Power 
Concepts  Factors  Variables 
Factor 
loading 
%  Cumulated 
Eigenvalue 
variance 
%  of 
Variance 
M24  0.953 
M25  0.949 
Fl 
M2Z  0 
6.02  23.15 
0 
. 
932 
M17  0.922 
M26  0.896 
M15  0.910 
M13  0.907 
F2  M12  0.891  3.91  15.06 
M16  0.855 
M14  0.630 
M2  0.920 
Motivation  F3 
M1  0.887 
3.32  12.76  82.56 
M4  0.884 
M3  0.829 
M8  0.902 
M7 
F4 
0.845 
3.12  12.00 
9  M  0.752 
M10  0.726 
M21  0.856 
F5 
M19  0.797 
2.85  10.95 
M18  0.762 
M5  0.804 
F6  M6  0.794  2.25  8.64 
M11  0.786 
Fl  B1  -0.928 
B2  -0.922  3.89  38.91 
B9  0.927 
F2 
B6  0.891 
Bargaining  Power 
B4  0.880  80.41 
F3  B5  0.868  2.67  26.68 
B  10  0.824 
B7  0.917 
F4  B3  0.905  1.48  14.82 
B8  0.644 
After  employing  factor  analysis,  the  factors  of  motivation  and  bargaining  power  are 
obtained  and  the  analysis  process  of  these  two  concepts  is  discussed  in  detail  in  the  next 
chapter.  The  results  of  factor  analysis  for  motivation  obtained  six  factors  and  for 
bargaining  power  have  four  factors.  Most  factors  loading  of  each  variable  is  over  0.7. 
Both  concepts  have  a  total  cumulated  percentage  of  variance  of  over  80  percent.  These 
results  indicate  that  there  is  good  construct  validity  of  the  measures  used  in  this  empirical 
study. 
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As  described  in  the  above  section,  the  reliability  of  empirical  measurement  can  be 
obtained  by  four  methods:  the  test-retest  method,  parallel-form  method,  inter-item 
consistency  method  (or  Cronbach's  alpha),  and  split-half  method  (Sekaran,  2003).  This 
study  uses  the  SPSS  to  analyze  the  data  and  the  reliability  of  the  concepts  in  this  study  is 
calculated  through  their  Cronbach  efficient  alpha.  The  results  of  the  reliability  of 
motivations,  contributions  and  bargaining  power  are  shown  in  Table  5.3.8. 
Table  5.3.8  Summaries  of  Reliability  of  Research  Constructs 
Constructs  Factors  Cronbach  a 
Technological  Acquiring(6  items)  0.9802 
Knowledge  Learning  (5  items)  0.9005 
Motivation 
Risk  Sharing  (4  items)  0.9117 
Competitive  Strategy  (3  items)  0.8641 
Resource  Complementarity  (4  items)  0.8222 
Market  Expanding  (3  items)  0.8380 
Physical  Resources  (2  items)  0.9112 
Invisible  Resources  (3  items)  0.8987 
Contribution  Financial  Resources  (2  items)  0.9034 
Human  Resources  (2  items)  0.9383 
Organization  Resources  (5  items)  0.8443 
Technological  Capability  (2  items)  0.9689 
Bargaining  Power 
Management  Capability  (2  items)  0.8894 
Financial  Capability  (3  items)  0.8564 
Marketing  Capability  (3  items)  0.7045 
As  shown  in  Table  5.3.4,  the  results  indicate  that  the  Cronbach's  alpha  of  all  the  factors 
is  over  0.8  except  the  marketing  capability  of  bargaining  power  which  for  Cronbach's 
alpha  is  0.7045.  Sekaran  (2003)  suggests  that  reliabilities  of  less  than  0.6  are  considered 
to  be  poor,  those  in  the  0.7  range  are  acceptable,  and  those  over  0.8  are  good. 
Therefore,  the  internal  consistency  reliability  of  the  measures  used  in  this  study  can  be 
considered  to  be  good. 
In  summary,  the  research  design  can  enable  the  researcher  to  obtain  the  data  they  desired. 
Research  deign  involves  a  detailed  plan  and  includes  many  key  decisions  such  as  the 
purpose  of  the  study,  type  of  investigation,  extent  of  researcher  interference,  studying 
setting,  time  horizon,  unit  of  analysis,  sampling  design,  measurement  and  measures,  data 
collection  method,  an  data  analysis.  Each  of  key  decisions  with  respect  to  the  research 
176 Chapter  5 
design  is  described  in  detail  in  this  section  and  it  can  guide  the  research  to  be  employed. 
In  the  next  section  we  start  to  analysis  the  data  which  was  derived  from  this  empirical 
survey. 
5.4  Summary  of  Research  Design  of  this  Study 
In  this  chapter  we  begin  with  the  description  of  research  process  which  is  used  to  guide 
the  study  from  its  concept  through  the  final  analysis,  recommendation,  and  ultimate 
action  (Kumar,  Aaker  and  Day,  2002).  A  research  process  can  provides  a  systematic, 
planned  approach  to  the  research  project.  This  study  adopted  a  Sekaran's  (2003)  step- 
by-step  process  to  ensure  that  all  aspects  of  this  study  are  consistent  with  re  research 
purpose  and  objectives.  Sekaran  (2003)  outlines  the  research  process  includes  11  steps 
which  are:  (1)  the  identification  of  the  broad  problem  area;  (2)  preliminary  information 
gathering,  especially  through  unstructured  and  structured  interviews  and  literature  survey; 
(3)  problem  definition;  (4)  evolving  a  theoretical  framework;  (5)  deriving  testable 
hypotheses;  (6)  scientific  research  design;  (7)  data  collection,  analysis,  and  interpretation; 
(8)  deduction  the  results;  (9)  report  writing;  (10)  report  presentation;  (11)  managerial 
decision  making.  Following  Sekaran's  research  process,  the  research  problems  are 
identified  (see  Chapter  1),  a  research  framework  is  evolved  and  testable  hypotheses  are 
derived  (see  Chapter  4). 
For  the  research  design  step,  it  is  very  important  step  because  a  poor  research  design  will 
lead  to  a  failure  of  the  study.  A  research  design  is  the  detailed  blueprint  to  guide  the 
research  study  towards  its  objectives.  The  research  design  of  this  study  adopted 
Sekaran's  model  and  each  issue  involved  in  the  research  design  is  described  in  the 
following. 
"  Purpose  of  this  study:  There  are  three  basic  types  research,  namely  exploratory, 
descriptive  and  causal  (hypothesis  testing).  The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  explain  the 
relationships  between  motivation,  contribution,  ownership,  bargaining  power  and 
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control  in  international  joint  venture  issue.  Therefore,  an  explanatory  /hypothesis 
testing  methodology  was  employed  in  this  study. 
"  Type  of  investigation:  Because  the  aim  of  this  study  is  first  to  delineate  the  important 
variables  which  are  associated  with  control.  If  the  variables  are  associated  with 
control,  then  a  causal  relationship  will  be  tested  between  the  variables  and  control. 
Therefore,  the  correlation  and  causal  study  will  be  used  in  this  study. 
"  Extent  of  researcher  interference:  This  study  is  conducted  in  Taiwan  by  administering 
questionnaires  to  the  companies,  thus,  the  research  interference  was  kept  to  the 
minimum. 
"  Study  setting:  In  this  study,  the  survey  of  the  sample  of  host  country  parents  is 
undertaken  by  employing  postal  questionnaires.  Hence,  it  is  a  field  study  in  a  non- 
contrived  setting  with  minimal  researcher  interference. 
"  Time  horizon:  Due  to  the  purpose  of  this  study  and  the  limited  time  and  resources, 
this  study  is  cross-sectional  study  and  it  is  conducted  to  gather  data  using 
questionnaires  in  a  single-time  frame. 
"  Unit  of  analysis:  In  this  study,  the  unit  of  analysis  is  Taiwanese  parent  companies  who 
engage  in  the  international  joint  ventures  with  the  child  (the  joint  venture)  located  in 
Taiwan. 
"  Sampling  design:  Basically,  there  are  two  types  of  sampling  designs:  probability  and 
non-probability  sampling.  In  this  study,  the  data  is  collected  from  the  entire 
population  because  the  sample  is  not  very  large  relative  to  international  joint  ventures 
in.  Taiwan.  Two  main  sources  were  used  to  identify  the  samples:  (a)  the  1999/2000 
edition  of  the  Directory  of  Business  Groups  in  Taiwan,  and  (b)  the  1999  edition  of  the 
Directory  of  Foreign  Investment  in  Taiwan.  A  list  of  227  firms  have  identified  in  this 
study. 
"  Quantification  and  measures:  This  study  includes  theoretical  concepts  of  motivation, 
contribution,  bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control.  Therefore,  the  operational 
definition  of  each  variable  or  construct  is  described  first  and  then  the  measurements 
are  developed  (see  Chapter  5.3.8). 
"  Data-collection  method:  There  are  three  main  primary  data  collection  methods  which 
are  interviewing,  administering  questionnaires,  and  observing  people.  By  considering 
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the  research  objectives  and  the  nature  of  each  survey  method,  the  mail  questionnaire 
was  chosen  to  collect  primary  data  from  host  country  parents.  In  addition,  two 
company  interviews  which  are  COSTCO  company  and  Talee-Isetan  company  were 
conducted  to  capture  the  enterprise's  viewpoints  on  how  the  IN  was  form. 
"  Data  analysis:  The  general  procedures  employed  included  descriptive  statistics  which 
include  mean,  median,  mode,  standard  deviation  and  inferential  statistics.  Statistics 
methods  used  in  this  study  include  cross-tabulation,  Chi-square  test,  t-test,  and 
Analysis  of  Variance  (ANOVA),  correlations,  regression  analysis  and  factor  analysis, 
etc. 
Following  the  research  design,  the  next  section  starts  to  analyze  the  data  which  was 
collected  from  this  study. 
5.5  Data  Analysis:  the  Profile  of  Sample  Characteristics 
After  data  was  collected  from  the  population,  the  next  step  is  analysis.  Sekaran  (2003) 
indicates  that  there  are  three  objectives  in  data  analysis,  namely,  getting  a  feel  for  the 
data,  testing  the  goodness  of  data,  and  testing  the  hypotheses.  Getting  a  feel  for  the  data 
is  a  necessary  first  step  in  all  data  analysis.  Therefore,  this  section  begins  to  analyse 
characteristics  of  the  sample  derived  from  this  empirical  survey.  The  unit  of  analysis  in 
this  study  is  a  firm.  Thus,  the  firm's  profiles  are  the  industry  in  which  they  are  involved, 
the  size  as  measured  by  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of  employees,  the  ages  of 
parents  and  the  joint  ventures  and  the  number  of  board  members.  Each  is  described  in 
following  sections. 
5.5.1  Industry  Characteristics 
The  industries  in  which  the  host  country  parents  are  involved  are  quite  varied,  thus  it  is 
necessary  to  categorize  industries  into  main  industry  sectors.  This  study  classifies  the 
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industry  into  19  sectors  which  are  Electronic,  Plastics,  Trade/General  Merchandise, 
Machinery  Equipment,  Electrical  Equipment/Cable,  Banking  &  Insurance,  Textile, 
Automobiles,  Chemicals,  Food,  Steel,  Construction,  Transportation,  Mining, 
Glass/Ceramic,  Paper  Product  &  Printing,  Rubber  Products,  Tourism  and  Others.  The 
number  of  host  country  parents  of  international  joint  ventures  formed  across  industries  is 
ranked  in  the  descending  order  of  frequency  and  is  shown  in  Table  5.5.1. 
Tah1e  551  Descrintive  Statistics  of  Industry  of  Resnnndents  Involved 
Industry  Frequency  Percent 
Electronic  15  13.20 
Plastics  12  10.50 
Trade/General  Merchandise  11  9.60 
Machinery  Equipment  9  7.90 
Electrical  Equipment/Cable  9  7.90 
Banking  &  Insurance  9  7.90 
Textile  8  7.00 
Automobiles  7  6.10 
Chemicals  6  5.30 
Food  5  4.40 
Steel  5  4.40 
Others  5  4.40 
Construction  4  3.50 
Transportation  4  3.50 
Mining  1  0.90 
Glass/Ceramic  1  0.90 
Paper  Product  &  Printing  1  0.90 
Rubber  Products  1  0.90 
Tourism  1  0.90 
Total  114  100.00 
As  shown  in  Table  5.5.1,  the  Electronics  industry  has  the  greatest  proportion  of 
international  joint  ventures  with  15  cases  which  is  13.2  %  of  the  sample.  Second  is  the 
Plastics  industry  with  12  cases,  10.5%  of  the  sample  Third  is  the  Trade/General 
merchandise  industry  with  11  cases,  9.6%  of  the  sample.  Machinery  Equipment, 
Electrical  Equipment/Cable,  Banking  &  Insurance  have  27  cases  together,  each  7.9%  of 
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the  sample.  The  other  industries  with  over  4  cases  are  Textile,  Automobiles,  Chemicals, 
Food,  Steel,  Construction,  Transportation  and  others. 
From  the  government  report,  the  major  recipients  of  foreign  investment  between  1952 
and  2003  are  Electronic  and  Electrical  Products  (24.67%),  Banking  and  Insurance 
(16.26%)  Services  (11.35%),  Chemical  Products  (8.03%),  and  Wholesaling  and 
Retailing  (7.62%)  (Described  detailed  in  Chapter  2). 
Compared  with  the  results  of  the  government's  report  and  the  survey  of  this  study,  the 
major  industries  receiving  foreign  investment  are  almost  the  same,  shown  in  Table  5.5.2. 
But  the  reader  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  result  of  the  government  report  is  derived 
from  all  the  foreign  investment  and  the  result  of  this  study  is  derived  from  a  part  of 
foreign  investment  and  only  focuses  on  cases  of  international  joint  venture. 
Table  5.5.2  Major  Industries  of  Foreign  Investment:  Compared  with  the  Government  Report  and  the 
Results  of  this  Study 
The  major  industries  of  international  joint 
ventures  derived  from  this  study 
The  major  industries  of  foreign  investment 
derived  from  government  report 
Electronic  Electronic  and  Electrical  Products 
Plastics  Banking  and  Insurance 
Trade/General  Merchandise  Services 
Banking  &  Insurance  Chemical  Products 
Electrical  Equipment/Cable  Wholesaling  and  Retailing 
Machinery  Equipment 
Textile 
Automobiles 
Chemicals 
However  some  industries  such  as  Mining,  Glass/Ceramic,  Paper  Product  &  Printing, 
Rubber  Products,  Tourism  industry  only  have  one  case,  it  might  be  because  the  industry 
sector  in  this  study  is  rather  scattered.  Therefore,  to  consider  the  analysis  method  of 
statistics,  the  industry  sector  is  aggregated  into  two  groups:  manufacturing  and  service 
group.  As  shown  in  Table  5.5.3,  a  75  %  of  the  total  international  joint  ventures  involved 
manufacturing  enterprises  and  accounts  for  25%  by  service  companies. 
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Tnhh  5S1  fr  ccrintive  Statistics  of  Resnnndents  by  Industry  Groun 
Industry  Group  Frequency  Percent 
Manufacturing  Group  85  74.60 
Service  Group  29  25.50 
Total  114  100.00 
From  the  above  description,  these  results  indicate  that  most  international  joint  ventures  in 
Taiwan  occurred  in  the  manufacturing  group.  This  probably  reflects  that  the  economic 
development  under  the  Government's  guidance  in  Taiwan  was  more  focused  on  the 
manufacturing  industry  since  1960.  So,  prior  to  1990  most  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan 
is  in  manufacturing.  Nevertheless,  the  government  of  Taiwan  implemented  an  open 
policy  on  the  service  industry  after  1990  which  resulted  in  a  structural  change  in  foreign 
investment.  The  ratio  of  foreign  investment  in  manufacturing  industries  steadily  declines, 
while  the  ratio  of  foreign  investment  in  the  service  industries  increases  rapidly  in  recent 
years. 
5.5.2  Nationality  Characteristics 
With  which  nationality  of  foreign  partners  do  Taiwanese  companies  cooperate  to  form  an 
international  joint  venture?  In  Table  5.5.4,  the  result  shows  that  the  major  nationality  of 
foreign  partners  is  Japan,  which  accounts  for  59.6%  of  total  cases  or  over  a  half  of  total 
foreign  partners.  American  partners  present  19.3%  of  the  sample,  followed  by  Singapore 
which  has  5.3%  of  the  sample. 
Again,  there  are  several  cells  with  fewer  than  five  percent,  thus  the  nationality  data  is 
divided  into  five  regions  which  are  Japan,  American,  European  countries,  Asian  countries 
and  others.  As  shown  in  Table  5.5.5,  Japan  and  other  Asian  countries  together  account 
for  67.5  %  of  total  cases.  The  next  is  American  which  has  22  cases,  19.3  %  of  the 
sample.  The  third  is  European  Countries  which  has  12  cases,  10.5%  of  the  sample. 
192 Chapter  5 
Table  5.5.4  Descriptive  Statistics  of  Nationality  of  Foreign  Partners 
Nationality  Frequency  Percent 
Japan  68  59.60 
American  22  19.30 
Singapore  6  5.30 
Holland  5  4.40 
United  Kingdom  4  3.50 
France  3  2.60 
Hong  Kong  3  2.60 
Others  3  2.60 
Total  114  100.00 
Table  5.5.5  Deccrintive  Statistics  of  Recnnnlentc  by  Natinnnlity  and  Area 
Nationality  Frequency  Percent 
Japan  68  59.60 
American  22  19.30 
European  countries  12  10.50 
Asian  countries  9  7.90 
Others  3  2.60 
Total  114  100.00 
These  results  indicate  that  most  international  joint  venture  events  in  Taiwan  are  heavily 
involved  with  Asian  countries.  There  are  probably  three  main  reasons.  Firstly,  because 
of  the  location,  historical  background  and  culture,  Japan  and  other  Asian  countries  have 
a  higher  percentage  of  foreign  investments.  Some  of  the  leaders  or  chief  executive 
officers  have  close  relationship  with  the  leader  or  managers  of  Japan's  enterprises 
because  they  were  educated  in  the  Japanese  education  system  in  Taiwan  or  had  studied 
in  Japan  in  an  earlier  period.  That  experience  helps  the  cooperation  later  on. 
Secondly,  the  cultural  distance  between  Japan  and  Taiwan  is  low  and  both  parent 
companies  have  built  trust  in  their  prior  cooperation  which  in  turn  influences  the 
opportunities  for  future  investments.  As  Gill  and  Butler  (2003)  found,  for  the  Japanese 
the  main  driver  for  joint  venture  stability  is  trust.  They  and  some  other  researchers  have 
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found  that  trust  and  personal  relations  are  the  key  factors  which  influence  future 
cooperation  (Aulakh,  Kotabe  and  Sahay,  1996).  Some  other  studies  have  also  found  that 
joint  ventures  with  Japanese  companies  tend  to  last  longer  than  ones  between  US  or 
British  partners.  The  above  empirical  study's  results  can  provide  an  explanation  of  why 
Japanese  enterprises  have  the  highest  proportion  of  foreign  investments  in  Taiwan. 
Thirdly,  most  Taiwanese  companies  obtained  technology  or  import  machinery  or 
components  from  Japan  in  an  earlier  period,  they  are  used  to  Japanese  products  or  are 
limited  by  Japanese's  specifications  of  special  key  products;  thus,  they  have  to  continue 
to  cooperate  with  Japanese  enterprises. 
Although  Japanese  enterprises  have  the  highest  proportion  of  foreign  investment  in 
Taiwan,  other  countries  have  increased  their  investments  in  recent  ten  years.  For 
example,  American  partners  represent  the  second  highest  proportion  of  foreign 
investment.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  2.4,  American  countries  are  the  main  and  fastest 
growth  area  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  inbound  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan  since  1998. 
5.5.3  Size  of  the  Host  Country  Parents 
The  host  country  parents  represented  in  the  sample  varied  in  size,  as  measured  by  capital, 
sales  volume  and  the  number  of  employees.  Based  on  the  company's  capital,  the  scale  of 
host  country  parents  is  classified  into  four  groups  shown  as  Table  5.5.6.  The  greatest 
numbers  of  host  country  parents  which  hold  capital  from  five  hundred  million  NT  dollars 
to  five  thousand  million  NT  dollars  represent  37.7  %  of  the  sample.  The  second  group 
of  companies  which  holds  capital  of  more  than  ten  billions  NT  dollars  constitutes  32.5% 
of  the  sample.  The  third  group  of  companies  holds  capital  of  less  than  five  hundred 
million  NT  dollars  equals  15.8%  of  the  sample. 
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Table  5.5.6  Descriptive  Statistics  of  the  Capital  of  Host  Country  Parents  Hold 
Unit:  NT$  million 
Capital 
Mean  Std.  Minimum  Maximum  Category  Frequency  Percent 
less  than  500  million  18  15.8 
501  -  5,000  million  43  37.7 
16405.0  38962.1  10  330000  5,001  -  10,000  million  16  14.0 
more  than  10,000  million  37  32.5 
Total  114  100 
According  to  the  revised  definition  of  small  and  medium  enterprises  promulgated  by 
Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  in  2000,  the  enterprise  in  the  manufacturing  industry  with 
paid-in  capital  of  less  than  NT$80  million  or  has  regular  employees  numbering  less  than 
200  will  be  referred  to  as  a  small  and  medium  enterprise(SME).  The  enterprise  in  the 
services  industry  which  has  sales  volume  less  than  NT$100  million  in  last  year  or  less 
than  50  regular  employees  is  defined  as  an  SME.  This  means  the  company  in  the 
manufacturing  industry  which  has  more  than  200  regular  employees  or  a  company  in  the 
service  industry  with  more  than  50  regular  employees  is  classified  as  a  big  enterprise. 
Therefore,  the  results  indicate  that  most  of  the  international  joint  ventures  occur  within 
large  companies  in  Taiwan. 
Based  on  the  company's  sales  volume,  the  host  country  parents  are  also  classified  into 
four  groups  shown  as  Table  5.5.7.  The  largest  group  of  host  country  parents  which  hold 
sales  volumes  of  more  than  ten  billions  NT  dollars  represents  40.4%  of  the  sample.  The 
second  group  which  achieves  sales  volumes  from  five  hundred  million  NT  dollars  to  five 
thousand  million  NT  dollars  presents  32.5  %  of  the  sample.  The  smallest  group  which 
has  sales  volumes  of  less  than  five  hundred  million  NT  dollars  amounts  to  13.2%  of  the 
sample.  Companies  whose  sales  volumes  are  over  five  thousand  million  NT  dollars 
represent  in  total  54.4%,  or  more  than  half  the  sample.  These  results  also  indicate  that 
most  of  the  international  joint  ventures  occur  within  high  sales  volume  companies  in 
Taiwan. 
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Table  5.5.7  Descriptive  Statistics  of  Sales  Volume  of  Host  Country  Parents 
Unit:  NT$  million 
Business  Volume 
Mean  Std.  Minimum  Maximum  Category  Frequency  Percent 
less  than  500  million  15  13.2 
501  -  5,000  million  37  32.5 
23278.4  63468.5  16  485202  5,001  -  10,000  million  16  14.0 
more  than  10,000  million  46  40.4 
Total  114  100 
The  results  of  calculating  the  size  of  host  country  parents  by  the  number  of  employees  is 
shown  in  Table  5.5.8.  The  largest  group  of  employees  of  more  than  one  thousand 
people  represents  41.2%,  or  two-fifths  of  the  sample.  The  second  group  is  21.1%  of  the 
sample,  with  five  hundreds  to  one  thousand  employees.  The  smallest  group  is  18.4%  of 
the  sample,  with  employees  numbering  less  than  two  hundreds.  Counted  together 
companies  with  employees  of  more  than  five  hundreds  represent  62.3%  of  the  sample. 
These  results  also  indicate  that  most  host  country  parents  are  big  companies. 
T.  d.  le  QG4  Tlacrr;  n4i.  ns  Cro*;  ct;  rc  of  the  Ah.  mhpr  of  PmAl  ,  %c  of  Anct  Cnnntrv  Parents 
Number  o  f  employees 
Mean  Std.  Minimum  Maximum  Category  Frequency  Percent 
less  than  200  21  18.4 
201-500  22  19.3 
2266.9  4624.1  20  31421  501-1000  24  21.1 
more  than  1000  47  41.2 
Total  114  100 
With  regard  to  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of  employees,  these  results  show 
that  most  host  country  parents  involved  in  international  joint  ventures  are  very successful 
companies  which  have  a  high  reputation  in  Taiwan  and  that  would  be  the  reason  why 
foreign  companies  choose  them  as  partners.  In  addition,  some  studies  have  indicated 
that  a  firm's  size  may  act  as  a  proxy  measure  for  the  quantity  of  resources  available 
(Glauster  abd  Buckley,  1997;  Hill,  Heang  and  Chan,  1990;  Caves  and  Mehra,  1986).  In 
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studying  the  characteristics  of  IJVs  in  Japan,  Burton  and  Saelens  (1982)  found  that 
larger  firms  tend  to  establish  their  first  affiliates  comparatively  earlier  than  smaller 
companies.  This  implies  that  large  Japanese  firms  had  earlier  access  to  sparsely  available 
technology.  Foreign  partners  may  like  to  cooperate  with  firms  who  have  different 
resources  available  to  complement  their  own  resources.  In  general,  large  firms  have 
more  ability  to  provide  resources.  This  might  explain  the  results  of  this  study  in  that 
most  Taiwanese  parents  are  large  companies. 
5.5.4  Ages  of  the  Host  Country  Parents  and  the  Joint  Ventures 
Do  the  companies  engaged  in  an  international  joint  venture  have  long-standing  history? 
From  the  empirical  result  shown  in  Table  5.5.9,  the  average  age  of  host  country  parents 
is  32.9  years.  Over  half  (60.5%)  of  the  total  number  of  host  country  parents  have  been 
established  for  more  than  30  years.  Only  5.3%  of  host  country  parents  are  less  than  10 
years  old.  It  is  clear  that  the  host  country  parents  tend  to  be  companies  that  have  more 
business  experience. 
Table  5.5.9  Descrintive  Statistics  of  Ages  of  Host  Crnmtrv  Parents 
Ages  of  Host  country  parents 
Mean  Std.  Minimum  Maximum  Category  Frequency  Percent 
1-5  years  2  1.8 
6-10  years  4  3.5 
32  9  13  2  3  74  11-20  years  15  13.2 
.  .  21-30  years  24  21.1 
more  than  30  years  69  60.5 
Total  114  100 
As  described  in  Chapter  2.2,  the  government  has  strongly  encouraged  Taiwanese 
enterprises  to  cooperate  with  foreign  investors  and  since  1954  has  promulgated  relative 
legal  statutes  to  encourage  foreign  investment.  These  results  indicate  that  most  host 
country  parents  operate  their  company  successfully  and  they  have  more  resources  and 
abilities  to  attract  foreign  investors  to  cooperate  in  an  IN.  This  infers  that  the  older  the 
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company  the  more  experiences  and  abilities  it  has,  and  in  turn  more  opportunities  to 
cooperate  with  foreign  investors. 
Next  we  turn  to  look  at  the  ages  of  the  joint  ventures.  As  shown  in  Table  5.5.10,  the 
average  age  of  a  joint  venture  is  14.2  years.  The  greatest  group  is  35.1%  of  the  sample, 
with  ages  of  11  to  20  years.  The  second  group  and  third  group  have  nearly  equal 
percentage  of  the  ages,  22.8%  for  the  age  from  6  to  10  years  and  21.1%  for  the  age  from 
1  to  5  years.  Over  half  (56.1%)  of  the  total  number  of  ventures  were  established  for 
more  than  10  years.  Especially,  14  cases  of  ventures,  12.28%  of  the  sample,  were 
formed  for  more  than  30  years. 
Tnh1e  55  10  Decerintive  Stnticticc  of  Aaec  of  the  Mint  Ventnrec 
Ages  of  the  Joint  Venture 
Mean  Std.  Minimum  Maximum  Category  Frequency  Percent 
1-5  years  24  21.1 
6-10  years  26  22.8 
2  14  10  5  1  49  11-20  years  40  35.1 
.  .  21-30  years  10  8.8 
more  than  30  years  14  12.3 
Total  114  100 
The  ages  of  joint  ventures  represent  the  number  of  years  that  host  country  parents  have 
cooperated  with  foreign  parents.  The  older  the  joint  venture,  the  longer  their 
cooperation.  From  the  literature,  we  know  that  international  joint  ventures  are  formed 
by  more  than  two  companies  which  have  different  cultures,  objectives,  and  management 
styles,  etc.;  and  this  will  cause  a  high  failure  rate  (Dacin,  Hitt  and  Levitas,  1997;  Parkhe, 
1993;  Kogut,  1989;  Beamish,  1988).  It  is  difficult  to  maintain  the  relationship  when 
there  is  conflict  between  the  partners.  The  age  of  joint  ventures,  imply  that  host  country 
parents  have  very good  relationships  with  foreign  parents  and  these  good  relationships 
will  affect  opportunities  for  future  cooperation  with  foreign  companies.  This  result 
might  explain  a  phenomenon  that  was  found  in  this  study  during  the  sample  identification, 
that  one  parent  is  involved  in  many  international  joint  ventures.  For  example;  the  Uni- 
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President  company  participates  in  18  international  joint  ventures.  These  results  reveal 
that  good  relationships  between  the  partners  will  affect  cooperation  in  the  future. 
5.5.5  Number  of  Board  Members 
Prior  researches  have  found  that  the  number  of  board  members  in  joint  ventures  will  be 
affected  by  the  equity  share  of  joint  ventures  held  by  parents.  The  board  directors  serve 
as  a  communication  and  information  processing  channel  between  the  parents  and  the 
child  (or  joint  ventures).  It  is  also  the  way  that  parents  exert  their  control  over  the 
ventures.  The  number  of  board  members  represented  by  parents  is  shown  in  Table 
5.5.11,  the  mean  score  of  the  number  of  board  members  that  the  host  country  parents 
represent  in  the  joint  venture  is  4.2  and  3.9  for  foreign  parents  respectively.  When 
counted  by  the  percentages  shown  in  Table  5.5.12,  host  country  parents  have  57%  and 
foreign  parents  have  43%.  The  host  country  parents  have  a  higher  percentage  of  board 
members  in  joint  ventures  than  foreign  parents.  The  paired  samples  test  shows  that  there 
is  a  significant  difference  in  the  percentage  of  board  members  in  joint  ventures  between 
the  host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents. 
Tnh!  5511  Nnmher  of  RnnrA  Memherc  in  Mint  VPntnrPC  RPnrecentM  by  Parents 
Parents  No.  Mean  Std.  Minimum  Maximum 
Host  country  parents  114  5.2  2.2  0  13 
Forei  parents  114  3.9  1.9  0  9 
TAM  55-12  Percentage  of  Board  Members  in  Inint  Ventures  Renresented  by  Parents 
Percentage  of  board  members  Mean 
Std' 
t  df 
Sig.  (2- 
Deviation  tailed) 
Percentage  of  Taiwanese  parent  represented  in 
JV's  board  members 
0.57  0.18 
4033  4  113  0  0000 
Percentage  of  Foreign  parent  represented  in  .  . 
N's  board  members 
0.43  0.18 
*p<0.05 
The  findings  reveal  that  host  country  parents  have  more  seats  on  the  board  of  directors 
of  joint  ventures.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  prior  research  results  suggest  that  partners 
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can  use  participation  in  the  joint  venture's  board  of  directors  to  exert  effective  control 
over  the  activities  of  the  joint  venture  (Jaussaud,  Schaaper  and  Zhang,  2001;  Kumar  and 
Seth,  1998;  Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Schaan,  1983).  Therefore,  this  study  infers  that 
host  country  parents  might  have  more  control  over  the  joint  venture  than  foreign  parents 
if  they  have  to  vote  when  different  objectives  and  conflicts  occurred  among  the  parents. 
The  relationship  between  the  number  of  board  members  and  control  will  be  discussed  in 
Chapter  6. 
In  the  majority  of  the  sample,  70%  of  the  total  sample  as  shown  in  Table  5.5.13,  most  of 
the  joint  venture's  general  manager  is  Taiwanese.  Researchers  suggest  that  holding  the 
key  executive  positions  can  ensure  the  parent's  objectives  be  achieved  (Jaussaud, 
Schaaper  and  Zhang,  2001;  Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Schaan,  1983).  This  result  also  implies 
that  the  host  country  parents  might  have  greater  control  than  its  partners  by  having  more 
general  managers. 
Table  5.5.13  Descrintive  Statistics  of  Nationality  of  7V's  General  Manager 
Nationality  of  JV's  general  manager  Frequency  Percent 
Taiwanese  80  70.18 
Foreigner  34  29.82 
Total  114  100.00 
All  the  characteristics  of  the  sample  derived  from  this  empirical  survey  are  summarized  in 
Table  5.5.14. 
Table  5.5.14  Descrintive  Statistics  of  the  Samnle  rharacterisficc 
Variables  Frequency  Percent 
I  d  t  G 
Manufacturing  Group  85  74.6 
n  us  roup  ry  Service  Group  29  25.9 
Japan  68  59.60 
American  22  19.30 
Nationality/ 
Region 
European  countries  12  10.50 
Asian  countries  9  7.90 
Others  3  2.60 
Capital  less  than  500  million  18  15.8 
501  -  5,000  million  43  37.7 
50,001  -  10,000  million  16  14.0 
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I  Imore  than  10,000  million  37  32.5 
Tah1e  55  14  Deccrintive  Staticticc  of  the  Samnle  Characteristics  (cnntinnedl 
Variables  Frequency  Percent 
less  than  500  million  15  13.2 
l  l 
501  -  5,000  million  37  32.5 
ume  Sa  es  vo 
50,001  -  10,000  million  16  14.0 
more  than  10,000  million  46  40.4 
less  than  200  21  18.4 
201-500  22  19.3 
Number  of  employees 
501-1000  24  21.1 
more  than  1000  47  41.2 
1-5  years  2  1.8 
6-10  years  4  3.5 
Ages  of  Host  country  parents  11-20  years  15  13.2 
21-30  years  24  21.1 
more  than  30  years  69  60.5 
1-5  years  24  21.1 
6-10  years  26  22.8 
Ages  of  the  joint  ventures  11-20  years  40  35.1 
21-30  years  10  8.8 
more  than  30  years  14  12.3 
Percentage  of  board  Host  country  parents  0.57 
members  in  joint  ventures  Foreign  parents  0.43 
Nationality  of  JV's  general  Taiwanese  80  70.18 
manager  Foreigner  34  29.82 
In  Table  5.5.14,  a  frequency  distribution  is  obtained  for  all  the  sample's  data  or 
classification  variables.  The  greatest  number  of  parents  of  international  joint  ventures  is 
present  in  the  manufacturing  group  and  most  of  the  foreign  partners  come  from  Japan. 
According  to  the  size  of  host  country  parents  as  measured  by  capital,  sales  volume,  and 
the  number  of  employees,  it  was  found  that  most  belong  to  big  companies.  About  60% 
of  host  country  parents  have  been  in  business  for  over  30  years  and  only  5%  of  host 
country  parents  have  run  the  business  for  less  than  10  years.  About  66%  of  international 
joint  ventures  have  been  established  for  over  10  years.  Host  country  parents  hold  about 
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57%  of  board  members  in  joint  ventures  and  about  70%  of  the  joint  venture's  general 
manager  is  Taiwanese. 
5.6  Summary 
This  chapter  examines  the  methods  associated  with  the  empirical  approach  employed  for 
this  study.  An  overview  of  research  processes  which  is  described  as  a  systematic  and 
organized  effort  to  investigate  a,  specific  problem  or  issues  (Cavana,  Delahaye  and 
Sekaran,  2001)  has  been  demonstrated  briefly  first. 
Then  the  research  design  which  specifies  the  procedures  for  collecting  and  analyzing  the 
data  has  been  explained  properly.  Research  design  involves  a  systematic  plan  which  can 
guide  the  research  to  be  employed.  Sekaran  (2003)  outlines  the  research  design  into 
various  critical  topics  which  include  the  purpose  of  the  study  ,  types  of  investigation, 
extent  of  researcher  interference,  time  horizon,  study  setting,  unit  of  analysis,  sampling 
design,  measurement  and  measures,  data  collection  method  and  data  analysis.  The 
research  design  of  this  study  adopts  Sekaran's  model  and  each  issue  involved  in  the 
research  design  is  described  in  the  relevant  sections. 
There  are  three  basic  types  research,  namely  exploratory,  descriptive  and  causal 
(hypothesis  testing).  The  process  of  identifying  and  selecting  the  most  appropriate 
research  design  for  this  study  is  driven  by  the  nature  of  the  research  objectives. 
According  to  the  purpose  of  this  study  which  is  to  explain  the  relationships  between 
motivation,  contribution,  ownership,  bargaining  power  and  control  in  international  joint 
ventures,  a  descriptive  study  and  hypotheses  testing  are  employed  in  this  study. 
The  type  of  investigation  of  this  study  includes  correlation  and  causal  study.  Because  the 
aim  of  this  study  is  first  to  delineate  the  important  variables  which  are  associated  with 
control.  If  the  variables  are  associated  with  control,  then  a  causal  relationship  will  be 
tested  between  the  variables  and  control.  Therefore,  the  correlation  and  causal  study  will 
be  used  in  this  study. 
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Sekaran  (2003)  indicates  that  the  extent  of  interference  by  the  researcher  is  depended  on 
what  kind  of  study  is  undertaken.  This  study  is  conducted  in  Taiwan  by  administering 
questionnaires  to  the  companies,  thus,  the  research  interference  was  kept  to  the  minimum. 
Business  research  can  be  conducted  in  non-contrived  settings  or  contrived  settings. 
Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran's  (2001)  describe  the  difference  among  a  field  study,  a 
field  experiment  and  a  lab  experiment  which  is  based  on  the  study  undertaken  in  a 
particular  environment.  In  this  study,  the  survey  of  the  sample  of  host  country  parents  is 
undertaken  by  employing  postal  questionnaires.  Hence,  it  is  a  field  study  in  a  non- 
contrived  setting  with  minimal  researcher  interference. 
With  regard  to  time,  there  are  usually  two  kinds  of  study,  ie.  cross-sectional  studies  and 
longitudinal  studies.  The  aim  of  longitudinal  studies  is  to  research  the  problem  deeply  by 
investigating  the  same  situation  or  people  several  times  over  a  period  of  time  in  which 
the  problem  runs  its  course.  A  cross-section  study  is  a  study  that  collects  data  just  once 
over  a  period  of  days  or  weeks.  Due  to  limited  time  and  resources,  this  study  is  cross- 
sectional  study  and  it  is  conducted  to  gather  data  using  questionnaires  in  a  single-time 
frame. 
The  unit  of  analysis  refers  to  the  level  of  aggregation  of  the  data  collected  during  the 
subsequent  data  analysis  stage  (Cavana,  Delahaye  and  Sekaran,  2001).  The  research 
objectives  will  determines  the  unit  of  analysis  which  can  be  shifted  from  individuals  to 
groups,  organizations  and  nations.  In  this  study,  the  unit  of  analysis  is  Taiwanese  parent 
companies  who  engage  in  the  international  joint  ventures  with  the  child  (the  joint  venture) 
located  in  Taiwan. 
Basically,  there  are  two  types  of  sampling  designs:  probability  and  non-probability 
sampling.  The  often  used  and  useful  probability  sampling  is  simple  random,  systematic, 
stratified,  and  cluster  sampling.  Non-probability  sampling  can  be  divided  into  the  broad 
categories  of  convenience  sampling  and  purposive  sampling  which  includes  judgment 
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sampling,  snow  ball  sampling  and  quota  sampling.  In  this  study,  the  data  is  collected 
from  the  entire  population  because  the  sample  is  not  very  large  relative  to  international 
joint  ventures  in  Taiwan.  In  order  to  identify  the  population  frame  for  this  study,  some 
procedures  were  conducted.  A  list  of  Taiwanese  international  joint  venture  enterprises 
was  obtained  by  using  two  main  sources:  (a)  the  1999/2000  edition  of  the  Directory  of 
Business  Group  in  Taiwan,  and  (b)  the  1999  edition  of  the  Directory  of  Foreign 
Investing  in  Taiwan.  A  two-stage  process  was  launched  to  identify  the  sample  and  a 
total  of  227  cases  were  identified  as  the  sample  frame  for  this  study. 
Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias  (2000)  define  the  measurement  as  the  assignment  of 
numerals  to  variables,  properties,  or  events  according  to  a  prescribed  set  of  rules  where  a 
rule  is  used  to  specify  the  procedure  a  researcher  uses  to  assign  numerals  or  numbers  to 
objects  or  events.  When  a  phenomenon  cannot  be  observed  directly,  the  researcher 
needs  to  use  the  operational  definition  to  reduce  the  concepts  so  that  a  phenomenon  can 
be  measured  in  a  tangible  way.  This  study  includes  theoretical  concepts  of  motivation, 
contribution,  bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control.  Therefore,  the  operational 
definition  of  each  variable  or  construct  is  described  first  and  then  the  measurements  are 
developed. 
There  are  three  main  data  collection  methods  which  are  interviewing,  administering 
questionnaires,  and  observing  people.  All  of  them  have  advantages  and  disadvantages; 
the  researcher  has  to  choose  the  one  which  is  the  most  appropriate  for  their  study. 
Questionnaires  are  the  most  common  method  of  collecting  data  and  are  a  most  useful 
method  which  can  be  administered  either  personally,  mailed  to  the  respondents,  or 
electronically  distributed  (Sekaran,  2003).  By  considering  the  research  objectives  and 
the  nature  of  each  survey  method,  the  mail  questionnaire  was  chosen  to  collect  primary 
data  from  host  country  parents.  Questionnaire  pre-testing  was  conducted  to  make  sure 
that  the  questionnaire  worked  and  yielded  the  data  required  for  this  study.  After  the  pre- 
testing,  a  total  of  227  questionnaires  were  sent  out  and  114  valid  responses  were 
received,  representing  a  50.22%  effective  response  rate. 
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Data  analysis  of  the  questionnaire  was  carried  out  using  the  SPSS  statistical  package. 
The  general  procedures  employed  included  descriptive  statistics  which  include  mean, 
median,  mode,  standard  deviation  and  inferential  statistics  which  include  cross-tabulation, 
Chi-square  test,  t-test,  and  Analysis  of  Variance  (ANOVA),  correlations,  regression 
analysis  and  factor  analysis,  etc. 
The  goodness  of  measures  can  be  obtained  through  the  different  kinds  of  validity  and 
reliability.  This  study  includes  motivation,  contribution,  bargaining  power,  ownership 
and  control  constructs.  Most  constructs  are  measured  by  multi-questions  except 
ownership.  Thus  the  analysis  of  reliability  and  validity  of  motivation,  contribution,  and 
bargaining  power  are  launched  and  the  results  were  considered  to  be  good. 
After  data  was  collected  from  the  sample,  the  next  step  was  to  analyze  them.  The  unit  of 
analysis  in  this  study  is  a  firm.  Thus,  the  characteristics  of  companies  are  analyzed  in 
order  to  get  a  feel  for  the  data.  The  company's  profiles  include  the  industry  in  which 
they  are  involved,  the  size  as  measured  by  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of 
employees,  the  ages  of  the  parents  and  the  ventures  and  finally  the  number  of  board 
members.  The  results  reveal  that  the  greatest  number  of  parents  of  international  joint 
ventures  is  involved  in  the  manufacturing  group  and  most  of  its  foreign  partners  are  from 
Japan.  The  size  of  host  country  parents  measured  by  the  capital,  sales  volume,  and  the 
number  of  employees  indicates  that  most  are  big  companies.  Most  host  country  parents 
have  run  the  business  for  over  30  years  and  most  of  international  joint  ventures  have 
existed  for  over  10  years.  Host  country  parents  hold  about  57%  of  board  members  in 
joint  ventures  and  in  about  70%  of  the  joint  ventures,  the  general  manager  is  Taiwanese. 
This  study  includes  five  main  dimensions;  (a)  control,  (b)  ownership,  (c)  bargaining 
power,  (d)  contribution,  and  (e)  motivation.  Each  dimension  will  be  examined  first  and 
the  relationship  between  these  dimensions  and  the  sample  characteristics  will  be  tested  in 
the  following  chapter. 
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DESCRIPTIVE  ANALYSIS  OF  CORE 
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6.2  Descriptive  Analysis  of  Core  Research  Dimensions 
6.3  Summary 
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Chapter  6 
DESCRIPTIVE  ANALYSIS  OF  CORE 
RESEARCH  DIMENSIONS 
6.1  Introduction 
According  the  research  framework  proposed  in  Chapter  4,  there  are  five  core  research 
dimensions  in  this  study  which  are  control,  ownership,  bargaining  power,  contribution 
and  motivation.  Following  the  research  design  steps  indicated  in  Chapter  5,  the  data  was 
collected  from  this  empirical  survey  of  Taiwanese  international  joint  ventures.  The 
purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  begin  the  analysis  of  the  data  and  also  to  describe  the 
general  descriptive  results.  Each  core  research  dimension  is  examined  in  its  empirical 
results  and  its  relationship  with  the  characteristics  of  the  sample.  Three  sections  are 
organized  in  this  chapter.  Section  6.2  describes  the  descriptive  analysis  of  each  core 
research  dimension.  The  characteristics  of  the  sample  encompass  nationality  or  region, 
industry,  size  of  the  host  country  parents,  ages  of  the  host  country  parents  and  the  joint 
ventures,  and  the  number  of  board  members  in  the  joint  ventures.  Section  6.3 
demonstrates  the  important  results  derived  from  each  core  research  dimension  of  this 
empirical  survey  and  provides  a  brief  conclusion. 
6.2  Descriptive  Analysis  of  Core  Research  Dimensions 
This  study  consists  of  five  core  dimensions  viz,  control,  ownership,  bargaining  power, 
contribution  and  motivation.  As  described  in  chapter  5.3.10,  descriptive  statistics  are 
used  to  express  the  most  fundamental  characteristics  of  variables  before  doing  inferential 
statistics.  Sekaran  (2003)  also  indicates  that  one  of  objectives  of  data  analysis  is  getting 
a  feel  for  the  data  which  can  help  the  researcher  have  a  basic  understanding  of  the  data 
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derived  from  an  empirical  survey.  Therefore,  this  section  starts  to  analysis  each  core 
research  dimension  and  their  relationship  with  the  characteristics  of  the  sample. 
6.2.1  The  Control  of  International  Joint  Ventures 
Control  is  a  crucial  core  dimension  in  this  study.  The  perspective  of  this  section  is  to 
present  the  empirical  results  of  the  nature  of  control  exercised  by  Taiwanese  parent 
companies  over  the  joint  ventures.  From  relevant  literature,  three  constructs  have  been 
identified  to  describe  the  control  of  international  joint  venture  (Geringer  and  Hebert, 
1989).  They  are  the  mechanism  of  control,  the  extent  of  control  and  the  focus  of  control. 
Thus,  the  first  subsection  starts  to  present  the  joint  venture  activities  over  which  the  host 
country  parents  exert  control.  The  second  subsection  describes  what  kinds  of 
mechanisms  are  employed  by  parents  over  the  activities  of  the  joint  ventures.  The  third 
subsection  examines  the  extent  to  which  the  host  country  parents  have  control  compared 
with  foreign  parents,  and  to  classify  the  type  of  control.  The  final  subsection  elucidates 
the  relationship  between  the  control  and  characteristics  of  the  sample. 
6.2.1.1  Focus  of  Control 
From  the  review  of  the  prior  literature,  the  parents  can  seek  control  over  the  whole  range 
of  a  joint  venture's  activities  or  instead  concentrate  on  controlling  specific  activities  of  a 
joint  venture.  Killing  (1983)identifies  nine  decisions  in  terms  of  product  design,  pricing 
policy,  production  scheduling,  manufacturing  process,  quality  control,  replacement  of 
managers,  sales  targets,  cost  budgeting  and  capital  expenditures.  He  uses  six  categories 
to  investigate  whether  each  decision  is  made  by  the  general  manager  alone,  by  the  local 
parent  alone,  by  the  foreign  parent  alone,  by  the  N  general  manager  with  input  from  the 
local  parent,  by  the  JV  general  manager  with  input  from  the  foreign  parent,  or  by  the  N 
general  manager  with  input  from  both  parents. 
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This  study  adopts  Killing's  scale  by  asking  host  country  parents  to  assess  decisions,  but  a 
question  about  the  replacement  of  managers  is  not  included.  Eight  categories  are  utilised 
including  Killing's  six  categories  plus  another  two  categories  which  are  decisions  made 
by  both  parents  and  not  applicable  in  any  case. 
The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.1.  Most  of  the  decisions  relating  to  production 
scheduling,  manufacturing  processes,  quality  standards,  and  cost  budgeting  are  taken  by 
the  joint  ventures  alone,  especially  they  have  nearly  50%  of  the  decision-making  on 
production  scheduling;  however,  on  the  other  side,  they  have  the  lowest  percentage  on 
the  decision  of  capital  expenditures,  only  0.88%  of  the  sample.  29.82%  of  foreign 
parents  in  the  sample  took  the  decision  regarding  product  design  and  actively  exercise 
control  on  the  product  design  decision.  This  might  be  because  most  of  the  foreign 
parents  regard  product  design  as  their  area  of  expertise  and  competitive  advantage. 
Tol.  ln  A911  Tlnricinn_Týifelrinn  of  PV'c  (lnpritino  Artih,  tinc  Mar1r+}Kv  Whnm 
Your  Foreign  JV  alone  Your  Co.  Your  Foreign  Your  Co.  Not 
company  Partner  &  foreign  company  Partner  &  foreign  applicable 
alone  alone  partner  &  JV  &  JV  partner  & 
iv 
NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  % 
1.  Product  design  12  10.53  34  29.82  15  13.16  30  26.32  11  9.65  11  9.65  1  0.88  0  0.00 
2.  Pricing  policy  14  12.281  8  7.02  25  21.93  22  19.30  26  22.81  15  13.16  4  3.51  0  0.00 
3.  Production 
2  1.75  2  1.75  53  46.49  0  0.00  12  10.53  11  9.65  0  0.00  34  29.82 
scheduling 
Manufacturing 
3  2.63  2  1.75  36  31.58  2  1.75  16  14.04  19  16.67  2  1.75  34  29.82 
process 
5.  Quality 
10  8.77  24  21.05  39  34.21  12  10.53  15  13.16  13  11.40  1  0.88  0  0.00 
standards 
Cost  budgeting  8  7.02  1  0.88  40  35.09  7  6.14  35  30.70  18  15.79  5  4.39  0  0.00 
Sales  targets  12  10.53  0  0.00  6  5.26  25  21.93  26  22.81  14  12.28  31  27.19  0  0.00 
8.  Capital 
14  12.28  0  0.00  1  0.88  39  34.21  6  5.26  3  2.63  51  44.74  0  0.00 
expenditures 
However,  these  results  reveal  that  both  parents  exercise  their  control  more  on  the  sales 
targets  and  capital  expenditure  decisions.  This  may  be  because  these  two  decisions 
largely  involve  the  financial  investment  and  performance  of  joint  ventures.  It  may  be 
presumed  that  parents  focussing  their  control  on  particular  activities  of  the  joint  venture 
partly  reflect  the  parent's  concerns  and  their  competencies.  For  example,  when  foreign 
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parents  took  more  responsibility  on  a  product  design  decision,  it  could  mean  that  they 
are  more  concerned  about  the  issue  and  have  more  competence  on  product  design. 
Next,  we  calculate  the  frequencies  of  operational  decision-making  activities  made  by  host 
country  parents,  foreign  parents  or  joint  ventures.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.2 
reveal  that  host  country  parents  have  an  extremely  high  percentage  on  capital 
expenditure  decisions  and  foreign  parents  also  attach  the  most  importance  to  this.  On 
the  other  hand,  joint  ventures  have  extremely  high  percentage  on  decision-making,  on 
production  scheduling  and  manufacturing  processes.  This  might  be  because  these  two 
activities  are  highly  related  to  the  joint  venture's  environment  and  have  to  fit  the  joint 
venture's  daily  operating  strategies. 
Tnh1P  A212  17ecicinn_Mnkino  of  IV'c  (lnerntinv  Artivitipc  Mar  h  by  Whnm 
Host  count  parents  Foreign  parents  Joint  venture 
No  %  No  %  No  % 
1.  Product  design  54  47.37  76  66.67  38  33.33 
2.  Pricing  policy  66  57.89  49  42.98  70  61.40 
3.  Production  scheduling  14  12.28  13  11.40  76  66.67 
. 
Manufacturin  processes  23  20.18  25  21.93  73  64.04 
5.  li  standards  38  33.33  50  43.86  68  59.65 
6.  Cost  budgeting  55  48.25  31  27.19  98  85.96 
7.  Sales  targets  94  82.46  70  61.40  77  67.54 
. 
8.  Cap  ital  expenditure,  110  96.49  93  81.58  61  53.51 
The  descriptive  results  indicate  the  decision-making  on  N's  operating  activities  influence 
a  broad  set  of  controls.  But  there  are  some  differences  among  host  country  parents, 
foreign  parents  and  the  joint  ventures.  The  host  country  parents  perceive  decision- 
making  responsibility  in  terms  of  capital  expenditure  and  sales  targets  activities,  whereas 
foreign  parents  take  more  responsibility  for  production  design  decisions.  Other  decisions 
regarding  production  scheduling,  manufacturing  processes,  cost  budgets,  pricing  policy, 
and  quality  standards  are  taken  by  varying  combinations  of  parents  and  joint  ventures, 
but  most  of  these  decisions  are  taken  primarily  by  joint  ventures. 
Consistent  with  the  evidence  of  control  in  relevant  studies,  these  findings  are  confirmed 
Schaan  (1983),  Geringer  (1986),  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  and  Glaister's  (1994) 
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suggest  that  parents  tend  to  seek  control  over  particular  activities  rather  than  over  the 
whole  range  of  a  joint  venture's  activities.  From  the  above  analysis,  one  can  conclude 
that  the  joint  venture's  parents  concentrate  on  controlling  specific  activities  instead  of 
controlling  all  the  activities  of  the  joint  ventures. 
6.2.1.2  Mechanism  of  Control 
Child  and  Yan's  (1999)  research  results  suggest  that  parents  could  exercise  effective 
control  through  the  appointment  of  board  members  and  key  executive  positions. 
Jaussaud,  Schaaper  and  Zhang  (2001)  also  suggest  that  partners  could  use  several 
mechanisms  to  exert  effective  control  over  the  activities  of  joint  ventures,  for  example, 
active  participation  in  the  joint  venture's  board  of  directors  or  by  holding  key  function 
directorship  positions.  Killing  (1983)  uses  the  responsibility  for  the  appointment  of  high- 
level  management  to  measure  the  mechanisms  of  control  over  joint  ventures.  This  study 
adopts  Killing's  scale  by  asking  host  country  parents  to  assess  the  responsibility  for  the 
appointment  of  high-level  managers. 
The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.3.  In  this  study,  about  one-third  of  host  country 
parents  appointed  the  general  manager  by  themselves,  and  just  over  30%  of  foreign 
parents  were  responsible  for  the  general  manager  appointments.  But  on  the  other  hand, 
more  than  one-third  of  the  general  managers  were  appointed  by  both  parents.  None  of 
the  general  managers  were  appointed  by  the  joint  ventures. 
These  findings  are  very  reasonable,  when  the  parents  make  the  agreement  to  form  a  new 
company,  they  have  taken  into  consideration  who  is  going  to  take  all  the  responsibility 
for  the  joint  ventures  and  how  to  make  sure  the  joint  venture  could  achieve  the  parent's 
objectives.  Basically,  the  general  manager  is  the  main  decision  maker  in  the  joint  venture 
company,  and  he  also  acts  as  the  communication  bridge  to  the  parent  companies.  Thus, 
the  general  manager  is  always  appointed  by  the  host  country  parents  or  foreign  parents 
or  even  both  partners. 
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These  findings  concur  with  Child  and  Yan  (1999)  and  Jaussaud,  Schaaper  and  Zhang 
(2001),  who  suggest  that  the  parents  use  the  appointment  of  the  joint  venture's  board  of 
directors  to  control  the  venture.  On  the  basis  of  the  above  discussion,  one  concludes 
that  the  parents  exercise  effective  control  through  the  appointment  of  key  executive 
members  of  the  joint  ventures. 
Tnh1P  r,  I1  '1  Annnintment  of  Niuh-T.  evel  Management  of  Joint  Ventures  Made  by  Whom 
Your  Foreign  JV  Your  Co.  Your  Foreign  Your  Co.  Not 
company  Partner  alone  &  company.  Partner  &  applicabl 
alone  alone  foreign  &  JV  &  JV  foreign  e 
partner.  partner 
&JV 
NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  %  NO  % 
1.  General  manager  39  34.21  35  30.70  0  0.00  40  35.09  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00 
2.  Vice  general  48  42.11  3  2.63  29  25.44  29  25.44  1  0.88  2  1.75  1  0.88  1  0.88 
manager 
3.  Production 
g  7.02  7  6.14  30  26.32  6  5.26  17  14.91  12  10.53  0  0.00  34  29.82 
manager 
4.  Marketing 
10  8.77  4  3.51  69  60.53  7  6.14  15  13.16  9  7.89  0  0.00  0  0.00 
manager 
5.  Financial 
37  32.46  4  3.51  33  28.95  16  14.04  19  16.67  4  3.51  1  0.88  0  0.00 
manager 
6.  Personnel 
10  8.77  3  2.63  70  61.40  6  5.26  17  14.91  8  7.02  0  0.00  0  0.00 
manager 
7.  R&D  manager  6  5.26  20  17.54  20  17.54  11  9.65  10  8.77  11  9.65  0  0.00  36  31.58 
8.  Head  engineer  2  1.75  6  5.26  45  39.47  0  0.00  9  7.89  5  4.39  0  0.00  47  41.23 
However,  Table  6.2.1.3,  shows  that  most  of  the  vice  general  managers  were  appointed 
by  the  host  country  parents,  i.  e.  42  %  of  the  sample.  Either  the  parents  or  the  joint 
venture  are  responsible  for  the  vice  general  manager  appointment  with  the  same 
percentage,  at  25.44%.  The  foreign  parents  have  the  lowest  percentage  regarding  the 
appointment  of  the  vice  general  manager.  These  results  indicate  that  the  appointment  of 
the  vice  general  manager  is  not  always  so  important  to  the  foreign  parents  if  the  general 
managers  originate  from  the  foreign  parents.  Another  possible  reason  might  be  the 
control  mechanism  must  be  finely  balanced  between  the  host  country  parents  and  the 
foreign  partners  and  they  had  agreements  that  the  general  managers  were  appointed  by 
foreign  partners  and  the  vice  general  managers  originated  from  host  country  parents. 
Normally,  the  vice  general  managers  have  to  take  more  responsibility  on  local  markets  or 
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operational  issues,  therefore  the  vice  general  managers  have  to  be  more  familiar  with 
local  markets  or  dealing  with  daily  operations.  Thus,  the  vice  general  managers  were 
better  appointed  by  host  country  parents  who  are  familiar  with  local  environments. 
According  to  the  above  discussion,  host  country  parents  were  positively  and  strongly 
associated  with  the  appointment  of  vice  general  managers.  In  addition,  vice  general 
managers  were  more  focused  on  the  operational  matters  of  the  joint  ventures. 
Accordingly,  the  joint  ventures  also  took  more  responsible  for  the  vice  general  manager 
appointment. 
Table  6.2.1.4  Appointment  of  High  Level  Management  of  Joint  Ventures  Made  by  Parents  and  Joint 
Ventures 
Taiwanese  parent  Forei  Parent  Joint  Venture 
No  %  No  %  No  % 
1.  General  manager  79  69.30%  75  65.79%  0  0.00% 
2.  Vice  general  manager  79  69.91%  35  30.97%  33  29.20% 
3.  Production  manager  31  38.75%  25  31.25%  59  73.75% 
Marketing  manager  32  28.07%  20  17.54%  93  81.58% 
5.  Financial  manager  73  64.04%  25  21.93%  57  50.00% 
. 
Personnel  manager  33  28.95%  17  14.91%  95  83.33% 
R&D  manager  27  34.62%  42  53.85%  41  52.56% 
8.  Head  engineer  11  16.42%  11  16.42%  59  88.06% 
Table  6.2.1.4,  considers  the  key  function  directors  but  except  the  general  and  vice 
general  managers,  it  shows  that  the  host  country  parents  command  stronger  control  over 
the  appointment  of  financial  directors.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  findings  in  Table 
6.2.1.2,  where  it  reveals  that  Taiwan  headquarters  also  have  stronger  power  over  the 
capital  expenditure  decisions.  Both  findings  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.4  and  Table  6.2.1.2 
indicate  that  the  host  country  parents  had  high  intervention  in  capital  expenditure 
decisions  and  the  appointment  of  financial  directors  in  their  invested  company.  One 
possible  reason  that  could  explain  this  phenomenon  is  that  fiscal  affairs  are  an  important 
issue  for  the  host  country  parents  to  estimate  the  performances  of  their  subsidiaries  and 
are  also  a  way  to  control  their  resources.  Therefore,  they  had  higher  intervention  in  that 
area. 
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In  the  appointment  of  R&D  managers,  we  also  find  that  the  foreign  parents  have  stronger 
control  on  this  issue;  additionally,  they  also  have  stronger  control  in  the  decision-making 
regarding  product  design  which  is  explained  in  the  above  section.  One  possible  reason  is 
that  foreign  parents  have  better  professional  skills  and  superiority  in  competition  of 
production  design  and  research.  Therefore,  they  master  a  stronger  control  in  R&D. 
On  the  other  aspect,  the  joint  ventures  have  more  power  in  production,  marketing,  and 
the  appointment  of  personnel  managers  and  head  engineers.  This  means  that  the  joint 
venture  has  more  autonomy  in  these  areas.  One  possible  reason  is  that  these  positions 
involve  daily  operating  actions,  and  it  is  more  appropriate  to  let  the  subsidiary  companies 
deal  with  this  matter,  because  they  require  someone  who  has  more  practical  experience 
in  the  operational  activities  of  the  company.  These  results  concur  with  the  result  of  Van 
Den  Bulcke  (1986)  who  finds  that  the  subsidiary  has  more  autonomy  on  the  matter  of 
production  and  personnel  management,  but  has  less  autonomy  on  financial  issues 
From  the  above  analysis,  one  can  conclude  that  most  parents  appoint  personnel  to  the 
general  manager  and  vice  general  manager  positions.  The  purpose  of  this  is  to  ensure 
that  the  policies  of  the  joint  venture  are  followed  up  and  are  well  practiced  by  the 
subsidiary  company.  From  this  empirical  survey,  it  is  clear  that  host  country  parents 
command  stronger  control  over  the  appointment  of  general  managers,  vice  general 
managers,  and  financial  managers. 
However,  the  foreign  parents  are  the  most  active  in  the  appointment  of  R&D  managers 
and  general  managers.  The  joint  venture  companies  have  more  autonomy  on  the 
appointment  in  terms  of  production,  marketing,  personnel  managers  and  head  engineers. 
Schaan  (1983)  argues  that  parents  might  choose  to  exercise  control  over  a  relatively 
broader  or  narrower  scope  of  the  joint  venture's  activities.  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989) 
note  that  effective  control  should  emphasize  selective  control  over  some  important 
dimensions  rather  than  attempting  to  control  the  entire  range  of  joint  venture's  activities. 
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Again,  these  findings  have  supported  the  results  suggested  by  Schaan  (1983),  Geringer 
(1986),  Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989)  and  Glaister's  (1994)  that  the  joint  venture's 
partners  tend  to  seek  control  over  particular  activities  of  the  joint  ventures  rather  than 
over  the  whole  range  of  the  joint  venture's  activities. 
6.2.1.3  Extent  of  Control 
Killing  (1983)  defines  control  in  terms  of  the  decision-making  role  of  joint  venture 
management  and  identifies  three  types  of  control,  namely,  dominant  parent,  share  and 
independent  control.  Wu  (1994)  and  Chang  (1996)  revise  the  method  of  clarification  of 
control  used  by  Killing  and  clarify  four  kinds  of  control  in  their  studies,  namely, 
dominant  host  parent,  dominant  foreign  parent,  shared  management  and  independent 
control.  This  study  adopts  Wu  (1994)  and  Chang's  (1996)  classification  to  represent  the 
extent  of  control. 
According  to  following  equations  and  the  identification  method  described  in  chapter 
5.3.8.1.2,  the  type  of  control  is  classified  into  the  following  four  categories,  dominant 
Taiwanese  parent,  dominant  foreign  parent,  shared  management  and  independent  control. 
The  score  of  Taiwanese  parent  =E  S1j+  1/2E  S4J  +1/2E  S5j  +1/3Z  Sij 
The  score  of  foreign  parent  =E  S2j  +  1/2E  S4j  +1/2E  S6j  +1/3E  Sr 
The  score  of  joint  venture  =E  S3J+  1/2E  S5J  +  1/2E  S66  +  1/3E  S7J 
S1  to  S7  represent  the  possibilities  of  decision  maker. 
j  stands  for  the  items  of  important  decisions,  j=1,2,.....,  9 
The  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.5  compare  the  percentage  of  decision-making  activities 
among  host  country  parents,  foreign  parents  and  joint  ventures.  The  results  show  that 
"Independent  control"  has  the  highest  percentage,  at  42.12%;  the  next  is  "Dominant 
Taiwanese  parent  control"  at  30.7%  of  the  sample.  "Dominant  foreign  parent  control" 
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accounts  for  24.6%  of  the  sample.  "Shared  management  control"  has  the  lowest 
percentage  which  is  only  3.5%. 
Tnh1e  6715  Tvne  of  Cnntrnl  Identified  by  T)ecicinn_Malcino  of  the  Mint  Vent￿rpe 
Decision-making  Frequency  Percent  Cumulative  Percent 
Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control  35  30.7  30.7 
Dominant  Foreign  parent  control  28  24.6  55.3 
Independent  control  47  41.2  96.5 
Share  management  control  4  3.5  100 
Total  114  100  100 
On  the  other  hand,  as  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.6,  comparing  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers  among  host  country  parents,  foreign  parents  and  joint  venture,  we  also  find 
that  "Independent  control  "has  the  highest  percentage  at  49.1%  of  the  sample.  The 
second  is  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control"  with  28.9%.  "Dominant  foreign  parent 
control"  represents  20.2%  of  the  sample.  The  lowest  is  "Shared  management  control", 
which  is  only  1.8%. 
Table  6.2.1.6  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  the  Appointment  of  High-Level  Managers  of  the  Joint 
Venture-, 
Appointment  of  high-level  manager  Frequency  Percent  Cumulative  Percent 
Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control  33  28.9  28.9 
Dominant  Foreign  parent  control  23  20.2  49.1 
Independent  control  56  49.1  98.2 
Share  management  control  2  1.8  100 
Total  114  100  100 
These  results  regarding  the  types  of  control  identified  by  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers  are  very  similar  to  the  results  identified  by  decision-making  in  the  joint 
venture's  activities.  But  the  factors  of  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control"  and 
"Dominant  Foreign  parent  control"  have  a  slightly  lower  percentage  when  based  on  the 
high-level  manager  appointment  than  that  based  on  the  decision-making  of  operating 
activities. 
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Because  the  number  of  "Shared  management  control"  has  fewer  than  five  observations,  it 
could  not  be  tested  by  inferential  statistical  analysis.  To  overcome  this  analysis  problem, 
the  data  is  reclassified  into  three  types  of  control  according  to  who  has  the  power  to 
appoint  the  general  manager.  If  the  joint  venture's  general  manager  is  appointed  by  the 
host  country  parents,  in  this  case  it  is  re-classified  to  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent 
control".  Using  the  same  criteria,  if  the  type  of  control  in  decision-making  and  the 
appointment  of  the  high-level  manager  of  the  joint  venture  is  re-categorized,  the  results 
are  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.7. 
T..  l.  ln  A111  Tvrt  of  rnntrnl  nApr  Do-Anccifit'  tine 
Type  of  Control 
Decision-making  of 
operating  activities 
Appointment  of  high-level 
managers 
Frequency  Percent  Freuen  Percent 
Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control  37  32.5  34  29.8 
Dominant  Foreign  parent  control  30  26.3  24  21.1 
Independent  control  47  41.2  56  49.1 
Total  114  100  114  100 
From  the  empirical  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.7,  "Independent  control'  has  the  highest 
score  on  both  decision-making  of  operating  activities  and  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers  with  41.2%  and  49.1%  respectively.  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control' 
has  about  30%  of  the  sample  and  "Dominant  foreign  parent  control"  has  just  over  25 
percent  of  the  sample  on  decision-making  of  operating  activities  and  around  20%  on 
high-level  manager's  appointment. 
Previous  empirical  studies  indicate  that  the  parents  work  as  "partners"  with  their  joint 
ventures  and  seek  to  control  particular  activities  which  they  perceive  to  be  critical  issues. 
These  results  are  not  consistent  with  some  prior  studies  and  some  other  studies  have 
different  conclusions  on  this  issue  (Glaister,  1994;  Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Geringer, 
1986;  Schaan,  1983).  The  results  are  puzzling.  There  are  some  possible  explanations. 
One  possible  explanation  might  be  that  the  different  research  context  resulted  in  a 
different  management  culture  in  toward  their  subsidiaries. 
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Another  possible  explanation  might  be  assigned  to  the  measurement  of  control.  As 
argued  by  Chang  (1996),  Killing  (1983)  deems  the  importance  of  each  decision  is  equal, 
but  Chang  argues  that  control  is  not  a  dichotomous  context,  it  is  a  continuant  idea. 
Parents  seek  to  control  particular  activities  which  they  perceive  as  critical  dimensions. 
Therefore,  each  decision  or  activity  should  be  weighted  by  its  importance.  This  study 
uses  a  different  method  to  measure  the  extent  of  control  by  modifying  Killing's  method 
and  considering  the  weighting  of  each  activity  in  which  the  parents  and  the  joint  venture 
are  involved  at  the  same  time. 
In  addition,  another  possible  reason  might  explain  the  different  results.  The  joint  venture 
is  an  independent  organization,  it  has  its  own  objectives  and  management  structures  even 
though  the  parents  are  involved  in  some  important  decisions.  The  joint  venture  still  has 
to  be  responsible  for  all  the  results  of  its  activities.  As  most  joint  ventures  have  been 
viable  for  more  than  10  years,  this  might  encourage  the  parents  to  have  trust  and  credit 
them  to  have  more  autonomy.  On  the  basis  of  the  above  analysis,  one  could  conclude 
that  in  most  international  joint  ventures  in  Taiwan,  the  joint  venture  has  high  autonomy 
to  manage  the  company. 
6.2.1.4  The  Analysis  of  Variance  between  Control  and  Sample  Characteristics 
The  main  goals  of  this  subsection  are  to  analyze  the  variance  between  the  type  of  control 
and  the  sample  characteristic  derived  from  this  survey.  The  sample  characteristics 
include  nationality  or  region,  industry,  size  and  the  age  of  host  country  parents,  and  the 
number  of  board  members  represented  in  the  joint  ventures.  Tests  are  approached  using 
appropriate  statistical  techniques. 
6.2.1.4.1  Nationality  /Regions 
Logically,  different  nationalities  of  foreign  parents  are  expected  to  exert  different  types 
of  control  in  their  respective  joint  ventures.  Child  et  al.  (1994b)  found  in  their  study  of 
IJV'S  in  China,  Hungary,  America,  Germany,  and  Japan  that  foreign  parents  of  different 
nationalities  tend  to  exercise  control  over  different  activities  of  joint  vestures.  For 
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example,  they  found  that  Chinese  managers  focus  more  on  the  production  targets  of  joint 
ventures.  From  a  study  of  UK  joint  ventures  with  partners  from  Western  Europe,  USA 
and  Japan,  Glaister  (1995)  finds  that  American  parent  companies  tend  to  have  tighter 
control  than  European  or  Japanese  companies.  Osland  (1994),  in  studying  the  US-China 
joint  venture's  performance,  also  found  that  the  nationality  of  foreign  partners  will  affect 
the  extent  of  control  in  joint  ventures.  Thus,  it  is  assumed  that  the  nationality  of  foreign 
parents  will  affect  the  types  of  control  they  exercise  over  their  joint  ventures  (Glaister, 
1995;  Osland,  1994;  Child  et  al,  1994b) 
The  results  of  this  survey  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.8,  based  on  the  type  of  control 
identified  by  decision-making.  We  find  that  when  the  foreign  parents  are  from  Singapore, 
the  host  country  parents  have  tighter  control  over  the  joint  ventures.  The  foreign  parents 
from  Hong  Kong  and  Holland  have  less  control  over  the  joint  ventures.  French  foreign 
parents  have  tighter  control  over  their  joint  ventures.  When  the  foreign  partners  are 
from  the  United  Kingdom,  it  shows  that  either  "Dominant  foreign  parent  control"  or 
"Independent  control"  is  adopted  by  the  foreign  parents. 
When  the  foreign  partners  are  from  Japan  and  America  which  represent  most  of  the  cases 
in  the  sample,  there  is  not  a  big  difference  among  these  three  types  of  control  but 
"Independent  control"  has  a  slightly  higher  preponderance  than  another  two  types  of 
control.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  Japan  which  represents  the  largest  proportion  of  this 
sample  the  results  show  that  when  the  foreign  partner  is  Japanese,  the  type  of  control 
leans  more  to  "Independent  control"  and  followed  by  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent 
control'  and  less  toward  "Dominant  Foreign  parent  control.  " 
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Tah1P  Al  1R  Crncs_tahnlatinn  of  the  Tvne  of  Control  identified  by  Decisinn_Makino  and  Natinnality 
Type  of  Control  Identified  by  Decisi  -making 
Nationality  Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent  control 
Total 
Japan  22(32.35%)  19(27.94%)  27(39.71%)  68 
America  8(36.36%)  5(22.731/o)  9(40.911/o)  22 
United  Kingdom  0(0.00.  /.  )  2(50.001/o)  2(50.00%)  4 
Hong  Kon  1(33.33%)  0(0.000/0)  2(66.67%)  3 
Singapore  5(83.33%)  0(0.00%)  1(16.67%)  6 
Holland  1(20.00%)  l(20.00%)  3(60.00%)  5 
Others  0(0.00%)  1(33.33%)  2(66.67%)  3 
Total  37(32.46%)  30(2  6.32%  47(41.23%)  114 
The  results  are  very  fragmentary.  It  might  be  because  some  foreign  parents  only 
represent  few  of  the  examples  in  this  survey,  excepting  Japan  and  American.  Therefore, 
from  these  findings  it  is  not  possible  make  a  clear  conclusion  on  the  relationship  between 
the  type  of  control  and  the  foreign  parent's  nationality. 
Since  some  of  the  cells  have  less  than  5  samples,  some  tests  could  not  be  performed. 
This  study  regroups  the  countries  into  three  regions  according  to  geographical  features 
and  the  new  result  is  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.9.  The  results  are  very  similar  to  Table 
6.2.1.8. 
Table  6.2.1.9  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  Decision-Making  and  Regions 
T  nrntinn  of  FnrPion  Partin-rc 
Type  of  Control  i  dentified  by  Decision-making 
Regions  Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
Asian  countries  28(3  6.36%  19(24.68%)  30(38.96%)  77 
American  countries  8  36.36%  5(22.731/o)  9(40.911/o)  22 
European  countries  1(6.67%)  6(401/o)  8(53.33%)  15 
Total  37(32.46%)  30(26.321/o)  47(41.23%)  114 
Chi-Square=  5.4230  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.2466 
After  regrouping,  the  Chi-Square  test  could  be  performed  and  the  null  hypothesis  (Ho) 
and  alternative  hypotheses  (Hl)  is  presented  as  follows. 
Ho:  The  origin  of  foreign  parents  and  the  type  of  control  identified  by  decision-making  is 
independent 
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Hl:  The  origin  of  its  foreign  parents  and  the  type  of  control  identified  by  decision-making 
is  associated 
The  value  of  statistic  is  5.423  and  the  significance  is  great  than  0.05,  so  the  null 
hypothesis  can  not  be  rejected.  One  could  conclude  that  there  is  no  significant  difference 
between  the  country  of  origin  of  foreign  parents  and  the  type  of  control  identified  in 
relation  to  decision-making. 
Same  analytical  processes  are  utilised  to  test  the  relationship  between  the  type  of  control 
in  relation  to  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  for  the  joint  ventures  and  the 
nationalities  of  foreign  parents.  From  Table  6.2.1.10,  the  results  are  very  similar  to  the 
results  which  are  described  with  respect  to  the  type  of  control  identified  by  decision- 
making  of  international  joint  ventures.  But  apart  from  these  results,  France  has  the 
highest  control  over  its  joint  ventures  in  terms  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers. 
The  two  main  sources  of  countries  of  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan,  Japan  and  America 
still  have  a  higher  proportion  on  "Independent  control",  followed  by  "Dominate 
Taiwanese  parent  control"  and  have  least  on  "Dominate  foreign  parent  control'.  United 
Kingdom  is  split  equally  on  "Dominate  foreign  parent  control"  and  "Independent 
control.  " 
Table  6.2.1.10  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  High-Level  Manager  Appointment 
and  Natinnality  of  Fnreivn  Partners 
Type  of  Control  identifi  ed  by  High-level  Ma  ger  Appointment 
Country  Dominant  Taiwanese 
arent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent  control 
Total 
Japan  21  (30.88%)  15(22.06%)  32(47.06%)  68 
American  7(31.82%)  4(18.181/o)  11(50.00%)  22 
United  Kingdom  0(0.000/.  )  2(50.00%)  2(50.00%)  4 
France  0  0.00%  3(100.00%)  0(0.00%)  3 
Hong  Kong  1(33.33%)  0(0.00%)  2(66.671/o)  3 
Singapore  4(6.67%)  0(0.00%)  2(33.33%)  6 
Holland  1(20.00%)  0(0.00%)  4(80.00%)  5 
Others  0(0.000/0)  0(0.000/.  )  3  100.00%  3 
Total  34(29.821/o)  24(21.05%)  56(49.121/o)  114 
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Because  some  of  cells  have  less  than  five  examples,  countries  have  again  been  regrouped 
into  three  regions.  After  regrouping  the  sample  the  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.11  are 
very  similar  to  the  table  above.  The  main  source  regions  of  foreign  investors,  Asian 
countries  and  American  countries  have  a  higher  proportion  on  "Independent  control" 
followed  by  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control".  In  contrast,  European  countries 
have  the  highest  proportion  of  "Independent  control"  comparing  with  Asian  countries 
and  American  countries,  followed  by  "Dominant  Foreign  parent  control'.  The  reason 
might  be  the  distance  as  described  before.  Therefore,  parents  from  European  countries 
let  their  joint  ventures  have  more  autonomy  or  they  exercise  "Dominant  foreign  parent 
control"  over  their  joint  ventures. 
After  regrouping  the  sample,  the  Chi-Square  test  was  performed.  The  value  of 
statistic  is  4.8315  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  one  could  conclude 
that  the  type  of  control  identified  by  appointment  of  high-level  managers  to  international 
joint  ventures  and  regional  location  of  foreign  parents  is  independent. 
Table  6.2.1.11  Cross  tabulation  of  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  High-level  Manager  Appointment  and 
Regions  Location  of  Foreign  Partners 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  High-level  Ma  ager  Appointment 
Regions  Dominant  Taiwan 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
Asian  countries  26(33.771/o)  15(19.48%)  36(46.75%)  77 
American  countries  7  31.82%  4(18.18%)  11(50.00%)  22 
European  countries  1(6.67%)  5(33.33%)  9(60.00%)  15 
Total  34  29.82%  24(21.050/"0)  56(49.121/o)  114 
Chi-Scare=  4.8315  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.3050 
From  the  Chi-Square  test,  it  is  therefore  concluded  that  nationalities  or  regional  location 
of  foreign  parents  is  not  associated  with  the  type  of  control,  or  the  control  which  is 
identified  by  decision-making  of  operating  activities  and  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers  of  international  joint  ventures. 
These  results  are  not  consistent  with  Child  and  Glaister's  results  that  the  nationalities  of 
foreign  parents  have  different  preferences  on  the  joint  venture's  control.  However,  from 
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this  empirical  investigation,  we  find  when  the  foreign  parents  come  from  Asian  and 
American  countries,  the  joint  ventures  have  higher  autonomy.  One  possible  explanation 
is  the  foreign  parents  from  Asia  and  America  have  long  term  cooperative  experiences  and 
a  close  relationship  with  the  host  country  parents,  thus  they  have  replicated  their 
management  procedures  in  Taiwanese  companies.  Therefore,  they  have  the  trust  and  the 
confidence  to  let  the  joint  ventures  have  more  autonomy.  In  fact,  in  Taiwan,  most 
company's  management  skills  are  learned  and  replicated  from  American  and  Japanese 
companies.  Thus,  in  the  Taiwan  context,  the  nationalities  of  foreign  partners  do  not 
affect  the  type  of  control  exercised  over  the  joint  ventures. 
6.2.1.4.2  Industry 
The  relationship  between  the  industry  that  host  country  parents  involved  and  the  type  of 
control  identified  by  decision-making  and  high-level  manager  appointment  are  tested. 
The  same  analytical  processes  as  described  above  are  employed  for  all  the  following 
subsections.  In  order  to  launch  the  Chi-square  test  for  the  industry  variable,  it  is 
classified  into  two  industry  groups,  namely  manufacturing  and  service.  The  result  from 
the  Chi-square  test  relating  to  the  industry  group  of  host  country  parents,  and  the  type  of 
control  identified  by  decision-making  is  represented  in  Table  6.2.1.12. 
Both  of  the  industry  groups  of  the  host  country  parents  have  the  greatest  number  of 
"Independent  control",  however,  the  service  group  has  slightly  higher  percentage  than 
manufacturing  group.  The  value  of  y  is  1.3216  and  the  significance  is  great  than  0.05; 
therefore,  it  is  concluded  that  the  industry  groups  of  the  host  country  parents  is  not 
associated  with  the  type  of  control  identified  by  decision-making. 
Table  6.2.1.12  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  Decision-Making  and  the  Industry 
Groups  of  the  Host  Country  Parents  Involved 
of  Control  identified  by  Decision-making 
- 
Type 
Industry  groups  Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
Manufacturing  group  30(35.291/o)  22(25.881/o)  33(38.82%)  85 
Service  group  7(24.141/o)  8(27.59%)  14(48.28%)  29 
Total  37(32.461/o)  30(26.32%)  47(41.23%)  114 
Chi-Scare=1.3216  D.  F.  =2  Significance=  0.5164 
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With  regard  to  the  type  of  control  identified  by  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers 
and  the  industry  group  of  host  country  parents,  the  output  from  a  Chi-square  test  is 
depicted  in  Table  6.2.1.13.  The  results  also  show  that  both  industry  groups  of  host 
country  parents  have  the  greatest  number  of  "Independent  control".  Also,  host  country 
parents  from  the  service  industry  have  the  highest  percentage  on  the  "Independent 
control".  The  value  of  x2  is  4.19  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is 
concluded  that  the  industry  groups  of  the  Taiwanese  parents  is  not  associated  with  the 
type  of  control  identified  by  a  high-level  manager  appointment. 
Table  6.2.1.13  Cross-  tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  High-level  Manager  Appointment 
and  the  Industry  Groups  of  the  Host  Country  Parents  Involved 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  High4evcl  Manager  Appointment 
Industry  Classification  Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
Manufacturing  group  28(32.94%)  20(23.53%)  37(43.53%)  85 
Service  group  6(20.69%)  4(13.79%)  19(65.52%)  29 
Total  34(29.82%)  24(21.051/o)  56(49.12%)  114 
Chi-Square=4.1900  D.  F.  =2  Significance=  0.12  31 
On  the  basic  analysis  of  the  Chi-Square  test,  one  could  conclude  that  the  industry  group 
of  the  host  country  parents  is  not  associated  with  the  type  of  control  identified  by 
decision-making  of  operating  activities  or  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  of 
international  joint  ventures.  However,  host  country  parents  in  the  service  industry  have  a 
higher  percentage  on  the  "Independent  control"  than  those  in  the  manufacturing  group. 
6.2.1.4.3  Size  of  the  Host  Country  Parents 
In  this  subsection,  werconduct  an  analysis  on  whether  the  size  of  the  host  country  parents 
would  affect  the  type  of  control  over  the  joint  venture.  The  size  of  the  host  country 
parents  encompasses  the  three  variables  of  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of 
employees.  The  relationship  between  the  type  of  control  and  these  variables  is  explained 
in  detail.  Firstly,  we  conduct  an  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the  Taiwanese 
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parent's  capital  and  the  type  of  control  related  to  decision-making.  The  output  from  the 
Chi-square  test  is  represented  in  Table  6.2.1.14. 
Table  6.2.1.14  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  Decision-Making  and  the  Capital 
of  Host  Country  Parents 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  Decision-making 
Capin 
Unit:  NT$  Dominate  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominate  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
less  than  500  million  6(33.33%)  3  16.67%  9(50.00%)  18 
501-  5,000  million  10(23.26%)  11(25.580/o)  22(51.16%)  43 
5,001  -  10,000  million  5(31.25%)  6  37.501/6  5(31.25%)  16 
more  than  10,000  million  16(43.24%)  10(27.031/6)  11(29.730/o)  37 
Total  37(32.46%)  30(26.32%)  47(41.230/o)  114 
Chi-Scare=6.8110  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.3387 
As  to  the  results  in  Table  6.2.1.14,  the  value  of  j  is  6.811  and  the  significance  is  greater 
than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is  concluded  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  capital  was  not 
associated  with  the  type  of  control  identified  by  decision-making. 
But  even  though  the  result  is  not  significant,  there  is  a  trend  showing  that  host  country 
parents  who  invest  higher  capital  appear  to  exercise  the  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent 
control"  more  than  others.  On  the  other  hand,  the  companies  who  provide  less  capital 
tend  to  let  their  joint  ventures  have  more  autonomy.  Where  the  host  country  parents 
input  higher  capital  this  normally  signifies  that  they  have  more  resources  and  abilities  to 
manage  the  business  by  themselves.  When  they  form  international  joint  ventures  with 
foreign  partners,  they  have  their  special  strategic  motivations.  Therefore,  this  study 
infers  that  at  the  time  when  they  are  exercising  higher  control  over  the  joint  venture,  this 
means  that  they  are  ensuring  that  their  strategic  objectives  are  observed  and  achieved. 
Next,  we  conduct  an  analysis  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  capital  and  the  type  of 
control  identified  by  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers.  The  output  from  Chi- 
square  test  is  presented  in  Table  6.2.1.15. 
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Table  6.2.1.15  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  High-Level  Manager  Appointment 
ýn.  i  the  (`antat  of  Hnct  rniintrv  Parente 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  High-level  Manage  r  Appointment 
Capital 
Unit:  NT$ 
Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
less  than  500  million  7  38.89%  4(22.221/o)  7(38.89%)  18 
501  -  5,000  million  8(18.60%)  8(18.60%)  27(62.79%)  43 
5,001  -  10,000  million  5(31.25%)  5(31.25%)  6(37.50%)  16 
more  than  10,000  million  14(37.840/o)  7(18.92%)  16(43.24%)  37 
Total  34(29.82%)  24(21.05%)  56(49.121/o)  114 
Chi-Square--6.8422  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.3357 
The  value  of  is  6.8422  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is 
concluded  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  capital  is  not  associated  with  the  type  of  control 
in  relation  to  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers. 
Although  the  result  is  not  significant  and  very  similar  to  the  result  of  analysis  conducted 
on  the  decision-making  of  operating  activities,  there  reveals  part  of  a  different  trend. 
Table  6.2.1.15  shows  that  at  the  time  when  Taiwanese  parent's  capital  increase,  the  type 
of  "Independent  control'  is  exercised  more,  but  there  is  an  exception  when  the 
companies  who  are  in  the  NT$  501-5,000  million  capital  group  have  the  highest 
percentage  on  "Independent  control". 
Secondly,  we  conducted  an  analysis  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  sales  volume  and 
the  type  of  control  identified  in  relation  to  decision-making.  The  output  from  the  Chi- 
square  test  is  presented  in  Table  6.2.1.16. 
Table  6.2.1.16  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  Decision-Making  and  the  Sales 
Volume  of  Host  Country  Parents 
Type  of  Control  on  Decision-Makin 
Sales  Volume 
Unit:  NT$ 
Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
less  than  500  million  4(26.67%)  4(26.67%)  7(46.671/o)  15 
501  -  5,000  million  5(13.51%)  10(27.03%)  22(59.461/o)  37 
5,001  -  10,000  million  8(50.00%)  4(25.00%)  4(25.001/o)  16 
more  than  10,000  million  20(43.48%)  12(26.09%)  14(30.43%)  46 
Total  37(32.46%)  30(26.32(/1o)  47(41.23%)  114 
Chi-Square=12.9163  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.0444* 
3  cells  (250/16)  have  expected  count  less  than  5. 
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From  the  analysis  of  Table  6.2.1.16,  we  find  that  the  host  country  parents  who  achieved 
more  than  5,001  million  NT  dollars  of  sales  volume  appeared  to  exercise  greater 
"Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control"  than  others.  The  companies  whose  sales  volume 
is  less  than  5,000  million  NT  dollars  tend  to  adopt  a  greater  degree  of  "Independent 
control". 
The  value  of  is  12.9163  and  the  significance  is  slightly  less  than  0.05.  However,  there 
are  25%  of  the  cells  whose  expected  count  is  less  than  5.  Therefore,  the  G-Square  Test 
is  used  instead  of  the  Chi-Square  Test  detailed  in  chapter  5.3.10.2.  The  G2  statistic  is 
obtained  by  the  formula  and  will  be  used  in  the  relevant  sections. 
n. 
G2  =  2En,  log  ' 
u" 
u!  :  the  expected  value  of  ny  assuming  independence. 
A 
u,;:  estimated  expected  frequencies. 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.17,  the  value  of  G2  statistic  is  13.6402  and  the  significance  is 
less  than  0.05.  Therefore,  it  is  concluded  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  sales  volumes  are 
associated  with  the  type  of  control  in  relation  to  decision-making.  The  host  country 
parents  with  higher  sales  volumes  tend  to  have  higher  control  over  the  joint  venture.  In 
other  words,  the  host  country  parents  who  have  lower  sales  volume  have  more 
"Independent  control".  One  possible  reason  might  be  the  same  as  described  in  the 
discussion  relating  to  the  capital  provided  by  the  host  country  parents.  Host  country 
parents  might  have  their  special  objectives  for  forming  international  joint  ventures  and 
therefore  desired  stronger  control  over  their  joint  ventures  to  ensure  their  objectives  are 
achieved. 
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Table  6.2.1.17  G-Squared  Test  of  the  Type  of  Control  of  Host  Country  Parents  Identified  by  Decision- 
MakinQ  and  Sales  Volumes  of  Host  Country  Parents 
Sales  Volume 
Type  of  Control  on  Decision-Making 
Dominant 
Dominant  Foreign  Independent 
Unit:  NT$  Taiwanese 
control  parent  control 
_parent 
control 
Count  4  4  7 
less  than  NT$500  million 
Expected  Count  4.87  3.95  6.18 
Count  5  10  22 
NT$501  -  5,000  million 
Expected  Count  12.01  9.74  15.25 
Count  8  4  4 
NT$5,001  -  10,000  million 
Expected  Count  5.19  4.21  6.60 
Count  20  12  14 
more  than  NT$  10,000  million 
Expected  Count  14.93  12.11  18.96 
G-Square=13.6402  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.0339* 
Regarding  the  type  of  control  identified  by  the  appointment  of  high  level  managers  and 
the  sales  volume  of  the  host  country  parents,  the  output  from  Chi-square  test  and  G- 
square  test  is  represented  in  Table  6.2.1.18. 
Table  6.2.1.18  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  High-Level  Manager  Appointment 
nn  A  thr  Colpc  Vnlnma  of  T-inct  (`nnntrv  Pirnntc 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  Hi  h-level  mans  er  Appointment 
Sales  volume 
Unit:  NT$  Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
less  than  500  million  6(40.00%)  5(33.331/6)  4(26.67%)  15 
501  -  5,000  million  3(8.11%)  8(21.62%)  26(70.270/o)  37 
5,001  -  10000  million  8(50.00%)  3(18.75%)  5(31.25%)  16 
more  than  10,000  million  17(36.960/o)  8  17.39%  21(45.65%  46 
Total  34(29.821/o)  2421 
. 
05%  56(49.12%)  114 
Chi-Square=16.8147  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.0100* 
4  cells  (33.3%)  have  expected  count  less  than  5. 
G-S  uare=16.6645  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.0048* 
The  value  of  G2  is  16.6645  and  the  significance  is  less  than  0.05;  therefore,  we  might 
conclude  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  sales  volumes  are  associated  with  the  type  of 
control  identified  by  a  high-level  manager  appointment. 
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Thirdly,  we  conducted  an  analysis  of  the  number  of  employees  of  the  host  country 
parents  and  the  type  of  control  identified  in  relation  to  Decision-making.  The  output 
from  the  Chi-square  test  is  represented  in  Table  6.2.1.19. 
Table  6.2.1.19  Cross-tabulation  of  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  Decision-Making  and  Taiwanese 
Pnrenf'c  Rmnlnver  Nnmherc 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  Decision-  ing 
Number  of  employee  Dominant  Taiwanese 
rent  control  p 
Dominant  Foreign 
arent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
less  than  200  4(19.05%)  4(19.05%)  13(61.90%)  21 
201  -  500  4(18.18%)  7(31.82%)  11(50.00-1.  )  22 
501-1000  8(33.33%)  8(33.33%)  8(33.33%)  24 
more  than  1000  21(44.68%)  11(23.40%)  15(31.91%)  47 
Total  37(32.46%)  30(26.32%)  47(41.23%)  114 
C  hi-Square=0.9293  D.  F.  =6  Si  ificance=  0.1277 
The  value  of  y  is  0.9293  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is 
concluded  that  the  number  of  employees  in  the  Taiwanese  parent  company  is  not 
associated  with  the  type  of  control  identified  in  relation  to  decision-making.  Although 
the  result  is  not  significant,  Table  6.2.1.18  shows  that  most  host  country  parents  exercise 
"Independent  control"  over  their  joint  ventures. 
With  regard  to  the  type  of  control  identified  by  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers 
and  the  number  of  employees  in  the  Taiwanese  parent  company,  the  output  from  the  Chi- 
square  test  is  represented  in  Table  6.2.1.20. 
Table  6.2.1.20  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  High-Level  Manager  Appointment 
and  Taiwanese  Parent'c  Fmnlnvpr  Nnmherc 
of  Control  identified  b  High-level  Manager  Appointment 
Number  of  employee  Dominant  Taiwanese  parent 
control  p 
Dominant  Foreign 
arent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
less  than  200  4(19,05%)  4(19.05%)  13(61.901/o)  21 
201  -  500  5(22.73%)  4(18.18%  13(59.09%)  22 
501-1000  8(33.33%)  6(25.00%)  10(41.67%)  24 
more  than  1000  17(36.17%)  10(21.28%)  20(42.55%)  47 
Total  34(29.82%)  24(21.05%)  56(49.12%)  114 
C  hi-Square-4.0560  D.  F.  -6  Significance=  0.6691 
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The  value  of  x2  is  4.056  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is 
concluded  that  the  number  of  employees  in  the  Taiwanese  parent  company  is  not 
associated  with  the  type  of  control  identified  by  high-level  manager  appointment.  Again, 
the  result  is  not  significant;  however,  it  shows  that  all  the  host  country  parents  exercised 
"Independent  control"  over  their  joint  venture.  Also,  there  is  a  trend  apparent  when  the 
number  of  employees  in  the  Taiwanese  parent  company  increased  a  smaller  proportion  of 
"Independent  control"  is  exercised. 
In  sum,  from  the  above  analysis  on  the  relationship  between  the  capital,  sales  volume,  the 
number  of  employees  and  the  type  of  control  identified  in  relation  to  decision-making 
and  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers,  most  of  the  results  are  not  significant  except 
for  the  sales  volume.  Therefore,  according  to  the  above  analysis,  one  can  conclude  that 
the  size  of  the  host  parent  company  did  not  affect  the  type  of  control  they  exercised  over 
their  joint  ventures.  The  results  of  this  survey  show  that  when  the  host  country  parents 
are  bigger,  the  less  "Independent  control'  they  employ  and  more  "Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control'  they  possess. 
6.2.1.4.4  Ages  of  the  Host  Country  Parents  and  Joint  Ventures 
This  subsection  conducted  an  analysis  of  whether  the  age  of  the  host  country  parents 
affects  the  type  of  control  they  exercise  over  the  joint  ventures  and  whether  the  age  of  a 
joint  venture  affects  its  parent's  control.  First,  we  conducted  an  analysis  between  the 
Taiwanese  parent's  ages  and  the  type  of  control  identified  in  relation  to  decision-making. 
The  output  from  the  Chi-square  test  is  represented  in  Table  6.2.1.21. 
Table  6.2.1.21  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  Decision-Making  and  Ages  of 
Host  Country  Parents 
Age  of  the  host  country 
parents 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  Decision-  makin 
Dominant  Taiwanese  Dominant  Foreign  Independent 
parent  control  parent  control  control 
Total 
1-5  years  1(50.00-1.  )  00.00%)  1(50.00%)  2 
6-10  years  1(25.00%)  2(50.00%)  1(25.001/o)  4 
11-20  years  4(26.67%)  2(13.331/o)  9(60.00%)  15 
21-30  years  5(20.83%)  9(37.50%)  10(41.67%)  24 
more  than  30  years  26(37.68%)  17(24.640/o)  26(37.68%)  69 
Total  37(32.46%)  30(26.32%)  47(41.23%)  114 
Chi-Scare=7.333  D.  F.  =8  Significance--  0.5011 
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As  the  results  of  Table  6.2.1.21  show,  the  value  of  is  7.333  and  the  significance  is 
greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is  concluded  that  the  age  of  Taiwanese  parents  ages  is  not 
associated  with  the  type  of  control  identified  by  decision-making.  However,  the  results 
show  that  there  is  a  trend  that  host  country  parents  who  have  a  longer  history  appear  to 
have  less  "Independent  control"  than  others.  The  companies  who  are  younger  tend  to  let 
their  joint  ventures  have  more  autonomy. 
Next,  we  analyzed  the  relationship  between  the  age  of  the  Taiwanese  parents  and  the 
type  of  control  identified  relative  to  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers.  The  output 
from  the  Chi-square  test  is  represented  in  Table  6.2.1.22. 
Table  6.2.1.22  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  High-Level  Manager  Appointment 
and  Ages  of  Host  Country  Parents 
Ages  of  the  host  country 
parents 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  High-Level  mans  erappointment 
Dominant  Taiwanese  Dominant  Foreign  Independent 
parent  control  parent  control  control 
Total 
1-5  years  1(50.00'1,.  )  1(50.00-1.  )  0(0.00%)  2 
6-10  years  l(25.00%)  2(50.00%)  1  25.00%  4 
11-20  years  2(13.33%)  1(6.671/o)  12(80.00'/o)  15 
21-30  years  6(25.00%)  6(25.00%)  12(50.00%)  24 
more  than  30  years  24(34.781/o)  14(20.29%)  31(44.931/o)  69 
Total  34(29.821/o)  24(21.05%)  56(49.121/o)  114 
Chi-S  uare=11.106  D.  F.  =8  Significance=  0.1958 
The  value  of  is  11.106  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is 
concluded  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  age  is  not  associated  with  the  type  of  control 
identified  by  high-level  manager's  appointment.  However  the  results  show  that  when  the 
Taiwanese  parent's  age  increases,  "Independent  control"  is  exercised  more,  except  for 
the  companies  that  are  younger  than  5  years. 
Then,  we  conducted  the  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the  age  of  joint  ventures  and 
the  type  of  control  identified  in  relation  to  decision-making.  The  output  from  Chi-square 
test  is  represented  in  Table  6.2.1.23. 
221 Chapter  6 
The  value  of  f  is  4.113  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is 
concluded  that  the  joint  venture's  ages  was  not  associated  with  the  type  of  control 
identified  by  decision-making.  However,  the  results  reveal  that  when  the  age  of  joint 
ventures  increases,  more  "Independent  control"  is  exercised  by  its  parents. 
Table  6.2.1.23  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  identified  by  Decision-Making  and  Ages  of  the 
Tnint  Venthrec 
Type  of  Control  identified  by  Decision  making 
Ages  of  the  Joint  Ventures  Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
1-5  years  7(29.17%)  7(29.17%)  10(41.67%)  24 
6-10  years  9(34.621/o)  7(26.9  2%  1008.46%)  26 
11-20  years  14(35.00%)  11(27.50%)  15(37.50%)  40 
21-30  years  4(40.00'/o)  3(30.001/o)  3(30.00%)  10 
more  than  30  years  3(21.43%)  2(14.29%)  9(64.291/o)  14 
Total  37(32.461/o)  30(26.32%)  47(41.23%)  114 
Chi-Square=4.113  D.  F.  =8  Significance=  0.8  468 
With  regard  to  the  type  of  control  identified  by  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers 
and  the  age  of  joint  ventures,  the  output  from  the  Chi-square  test  is  represented  in  Table 
6.2.1.24. 
Table  6.2.1.24  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Control  Identified  by  High-Level  Manager  Appointment 
nnri  A  oec  of  the  mint  VPntnrec 
Type  of  Control  identifie  d  by  High-level  Manag  r  Appointment 
Ages  of  the  Joint  Ventures  Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
1-5  years  5(20.83%)  5(20.831/o)  14(58.33%)  24 
6-10  years  7(26.92%)  7(26.92%)  12(46.151/o)  26 
11-20  years  13(32.50%)  7(17.50%)  20(50.00%)  40 
21-30  years  4(40.00%)  3  30.00%  3(30.00%)  10 
more  than  30  years  5  35.71%  2(14.291/o)  7(50.00%)  14 
Total  34(29.82%)  24(21.05%)  56(49.12%)  114 
Chi-Scare=3.3946  D.  F.  =8  Significance=  0.8665 
The  value  of  x2  is  3.3946  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  is 
concluded  that  the  joint  ventures'  age  were  not  associated  with  the  type  of  control 
identified  by  high-level  manager  appointment.  However,  the  results  show  all  the  joint 
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ventures  have  relatively  high  autonomy,  except  for  the  companies  who  are  in  the  21-30 
years  group. 
6.2.1.5  The  Number  of  Board  Members 
This  subsection  examines  the  relationship  between  the  control  of  host  country  parents  in 
relation  to  decision-making,  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  and  the  number  of 
board  members  in  joint  ventures.  The  number  of  board  members  percentage  was 
recalculated  based  on  the  number  of  the  Taiwanese  parent's,  or  foreign  parent's  board 
members  divided  by  the  total  number  of  board  members.  The  percentage  of  Taiwanese 
parent's  and  foreign  parent's  seats  on  the  board  is  equal  to  one.  In  order  to  launch  the 
suitable  statistical  methods,  the  percentage  of  board  members  were  classified  into  the 
following  three  groups:  less  than  50%,  equal  50%,  and  more  than  50%.  The  Chi  square 
test  was  launched  and  the  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.1.25  and  Table  6.2.1.26. 
Table  6.2.1.25  Cross-tabulation  of  Control  Type  of  Host  Country  Parents  Identified  by  Decision- 
Makina  and  the  Percentage  of  Rnnrd  Memherc  in  mint  Ventures 
Type  of  Control  id  entified  by  decision-making 
Percentage  of  board 
members 
Dominant  Taiwanese 
paren  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
less  than  50%  7(25.93%)  16(59.26%)  4  14.81%  27 
equal  50%  8(30.77%)  10(38.46%)  8(30.77%)  26 
more  than  50%  22(36.07%)  4(6.56%)  35(57.38%)  61 
Total  37(32.46%)  30(26.32%)  47(41.231/o)  114 
Chi-Square=  31.381  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0000* 
0  cells  . 
0%  have  expected  count  less  than  5. 
In  Table  6.2.1.25,  the  value  of  x2  is  31.381  and  the  significance  is  less  than  0.05.  These 
results  indicate  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  control  has  a  significant  relationship  to  the 
percentage  of  board  members  in  joint  ventures.  When  the  percentage  is  less  than  50%, 
this  group  has  the  highest  proportion  of  "Dominant  Foreign  parent  control".  When 
percentage  is  equal  to  50%,  these  groups  have  a  slightly  higher  proportion  of  "Dominant 
Foreign  parent  control,  "  while  the  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent  control"  and 
"Independent  control"  have  the  same  proportion.  If  the  percentage  is  more  than  50%, 
then  "Independent  control"  has  the  highest  proportion.  These  results  reveal  that  the 
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higher  the  percentage  of  board  members  that  host  country  parents  have,  the  more  they 
exercise  "Independent  control"  over  the  joint  venture. 
224 Chapter  6 
Table  6.2.1.26  Cross-tabulation  of  Control  Type  of  Host  Country  Parents  Identified  by  High-level 
Manager  Anointment  and  the  Percentage  of  Rnard  Memherc  in  Tnint  VPnt￿rPc 
P  fb  d 
Type  of  Control  identified  b  high-level  manage  r  appointment 
ercentage  o  oar 
members 
Dominant  Taiwanese 
parent  control 
Dominant  Foreign 
parent  control 
Independent 
control 
Total 
less  than  50%  5(18.52%)  11(40.740/o)  11(40.74%)  27 
equal  50%  6(23.08%)  8(30.77%)  12(46.15%)  26 
more  than  50%  23(37.70%)  5(8.20%)  33(54.10%)  61 
Total  34(29.82%)  24(21.05%)  56(49.12%)  114 
Chi-Square=  14.491  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0059# 
0  cells  (.  0%)  have  expected  count  less  than  5. 
In  Table  6.2.1.26,  the  value  of  x2  is  14.491  and  the  significance  is  less  than  0.05.  These 
results  indicate  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  control  type  as  identified  by  a  high-level 
manager  appointment  has  a  significant  relationship  with  the  percentage  of  board 
members  in  joint  ventures.  No  matter  how  high  the  percentage  of  board  members  of  the 
host  country  parents,  most  allow  "Independent  control"  over  the  joint  venture. 
From  Table  6.2.2.25  and  Table  6.2.2.26,  we  find  that  there  is  a  significant  relationship 
between  Taiwanese  parent  control  types  and  the  percentage  of  board  members  in  their 
joint  ventures.  The  higher  the  percentage  of  board  members  that  host  country  parents 
have,  the  more  "Independent  control"  they  exercise  over  joint  ventures.  The 
phenomenon  could  be  explained  by  host  country  parents  letting  joint  ventures  have  more 
autonomy  but  at  the  same  time,  they  use  their  representatives  among  the  joint  venture's 
board  members  to  control  the  joint  venture. 
A  summary  of  analysis  results  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  control  and  the  sample 
characteristics  is  provided  in  Table  6.2.2.27. 
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Table  6.2.2.27  Summary  of  the  Relationship  between  the  Taiwanese  Parent's  Control  and  Sample 
Characteristics 
Host  count  parents 
Sample  Characteristics  Type  of  control  identified  by  Type  of  control  identified 
decision-making 
by  high-level  manager 
appointment 
Regions  of  foreign  partners 
Asian  countries  No  association  No  association  American  countries 
European  countries 
Industry  groups 
Manufacturing  group  No  association  No  association 
Service  group 
Size 
Sales  Volume  GZ=13.6402  p=0.0339*  GZ=18.6645  p=0.0048* 
Capital  No  association  No  association 
Number  of  employees  No  association  No  association 
Age 
Host  country  parents  No  association  No  association 
Joint  ventures  No  association  No  association 
Number  (percentage)  of  board  x2=14.491  x2=31.381 
members  P=0.0059*  P=0.0000* 
As  a  whole,  the  results  of  this  empirical  survey  have  indicated  that  there  are  associations 
between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  control,  the  sales  volumes  of  host  country  parents,  and 
the  percentage  of  parent's  board  members  in  joint  ventures.  Although,  there  are  no 
associations  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  control  and  the  host  country  parent's 
industry  category,  the  region  of  the  foreign  partners,  the  capital  or  the  number  of 
employees  of  the  host  country  parents  and  the  ages  of  the  host  country  parents  and  the 
joint  ventures. 
From  the  above  analysis,  the  relationship  between  the  sample  characteristics  and  the  type 
of  control  in  relation  to  decision-making  and  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers,  in 
summation,  most  of  the  results  are  not  significant,  except  the  sales  volume  of  host 
country  parents  and  the  percentage  of  board  members. 
These  results  reveal  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  sales  volumes  are  associated  with  the 
type  of  control  identified  by  decision-making  and  a  high-level  manager  appointment. 
Higher  sales  volume  the  host  country  parents  have,  higher  "Dominant  Taiwanese  parent 
control'  they  exercise  over  the  joint  venture.  The  result  indicates  that  the  host  country 
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parents  tend  to  have  stronger  control  over  the  joint  ventures.  In  other  words,  the  host 
country  parents  who  have  smaller  sales  volumes,  have  greater  "Independent  control". 
The  results  also  reveal  that  there  is  a  significant  relationship  between  Taiwanese  parent 
control  types  and  the  percentage  of  their  board  members  in  their  joint  ventures.  The 
higher  the  percentage  of  board  members,  the  more  "Independent  control"  host  country 
parents  exercise  in  joint  ventures. 
These  results  could  partly  explain  why  some  important  sample  characteristics  have  an 
important  influence  on  the  control  types  employed  by  host  country  parents  over  joint 
ventures.  Next,  we  conducted  an  analysis  of  ownership  and  its  relation  with  sample 
characteristics. 
6.2.2  Empirical  Results  of  Ownership 
The  extent  of  host  country  parent's  and  foreign  parent's  equity  in  joint  ventures  is 
examined  first  in  this  subsection,  and  a  test  is  employed  to  measure  the  different  extent  of 
both  parents'  equity  shares  in  joint  ventures.  The  relationship  between  the  Taiwanese 
parent's  equity  share  and  the  sample  characteristics  are  tested.  The  results  of  the 
relevant  statistical  tests  are  described  in  the  relevant  subsections. 
6.2.2.1  Empirical  Results 
Beamish  (1985)  classifies  three  categories  of  ownership  of  multinational  joint  venture  in 
developing  countries.  This  study  applies  his  classification  of  ownership  and  categorises 
the  equity  shareholding  into  three  groups,  namely,  majority  equity  (more  than  50),  equal 
equity  (50-50)  and  minority  equity  (less  than  50).  The  degree  of  Taiwanese  parent's 
equity  shareholding  in  international  joint  ventures  is  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.1. 
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Tah1P  All1  PairPi_Samnles  T  Test  of  Fnuity  Shareholding  of  Parents 
Equity  Shareholding  Cases  Mean  Std  Dev  t  df  2-Tail  Sig. 
Host  country  parents  114  41.15  16.72 
2  135  113  0  035* 
Foreign  parents  114  46.64  16.02  -  .  . 
*  a=0.01 
The  mean  equity  shareholding  of  host  country  parents  is  41.15%  and  the  mean  equity 
shareholding  of  foreign  parent  is  46.64%.  The  computed  value  of  t  test  shows  that  the 
mean  equity  shareholding  is  significantly  different  between  the  host  country  parents  and 
foreign  parents  (p<  0.05),  but  both  parents  have  minority  shareholdings  in  the  ventures. 
Next,  equity  shareholding  is  classified  into  three  groups:  majority  equity  (greater  than 
50),  equal  equity  (50-50)  and  minority  equity  (less  than  50).  The  results  of  Table  6.2.2.2, 
show  that  either  host  country  parents  or  foreign  parents  have  less  than  50  %of  equity 
shareholding  in  joint  ventures,  about  a  half  of  the  sample.  Both  only  have  one  quarter  of 
the  sample  with  more  than  50  %  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures.  The  proportion  of 
50-50  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  is  the  lowest  percentage  for  both  parents. 
TehlP4  777  n^ce-rirti..  p  Ctatictirc  nfPnnity  CharPhnlAino  nfPnrentc 
Host  country  parents  Foreign  parents 
Equity  Shareholding 
Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
less  than  50  67  58.80  57  50.00 
50=50  18  15.80  22  19.30 
more  than  50  29  25.40  35  30.70 
Total  114  100.00  114  100.00 
These  results  are  similar  to  the  results  of  the  survey  which  was  conducted  by  the 
Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  on  the  equity  structure  of 
all  the  overseas  and  foreign  investments  in  Taiwan.  This  government  report  indicates 
that  most  equity  structures  of  overseas  Chinese  and  foreign  investors  are  joint  ventures 
and  most  of  them  hold  less  than  50%  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures.  The  results 
of  this  empirical  survey  are  consistent  with  the  results  of  the  government  report.  Thus, 
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we  conclude  that  most  parents  have  minority  shareholdings  (less  than  50%)  in  the  joint 
ventures,  but  the  host  country  parents  have  slightly  less  equity  shareholding  than  the 
foreign  parents. 
6.2.2.2  The  Analysis  of  Variance  between  Equity  Share  and  Sample 
Characteristics 
The  main  goals  of  this  subsection  are  to  analyze  the  variance  between  equity  share  of 
host  country  parents  and  the  sample  characteristics.  The  characteristics  include  regions, 
industry,  size,  age  of  host  country  parents  and  the  number  of  individuals  on  the  boards  in 
the  joint  ventures.  Appropriate  statistical  techniques  are  employed  to  test  their 
relationship. 
6.2.2.2.1  Regions 
As  described  in  chapter  5.5.4.2,  the  three  major  nationalities  of  foreign  partners  are 
Japanese,  American  and  Singaporean.  Asian  countries  were  the  major  regional  sources 
of  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan.  When  host  country  parents  cooperated  with  these 
foreign  partners,  does  ownership  create  a  significant  difference  among  different 
nationalities?  An  analysis  was  conducted  to  answer  the  question.  The  ANOVA  test  was 
employed  and  the  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.3. 
Table  6.2.2.3  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  the 
Source  Reainns  of  Fnreian  PnrPntc 
i  Re 
Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures 
g  ons 
No  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
Asian  countries  77  42.4681  16.5901 
American  countries  22  39.7859  16.7050 
European  countries  15  36.3707  17.5455 
0.9236  0.4001 
Total  114  41.1482  16.7239 
From  the  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.3,  we  find  that  host  country  parents  who 
cooperate  with  Asian  partners  have  a  higher  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  than 
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partners  from  other  region's  countries.  No  matter  which  foreign  partner  the  host 
country  parents  cooperates  with,  the  average  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  is  less 
than  50%.  From  the  output  of  the  ANOVA  computation,  the  significance  is  greater  than 
0.05;  therefore,  it  is  concluded  that  the  origin  of  the  foreign  partner's  and  equity 
shareholding  held  by  host  country  parents,  is  independent.  In  other  words,  the 
nationalities  or  origins  of  foreign  parents  do  not  affect  the  equity  shareholding  of  host 
country  parents. 
The  same  analytical  procedures  were  undertaken  to  measure  the  relationship  between 
foreign  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  and  the  origins  of  foreign  parents. 
The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.4. 
Table  6.2.2.4  ANOVA  test  of  Foreign  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  Source 
Re'innc  of  Fnreivn  Parentc 
Foreign  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures 
Regions 
No  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
F  Sig. 
Asian  countries  77  46.4335  16.7152 
American  countries  22  46.1464  12.3488 
1057  0  8998  0 
European  countries  15  48.4000  17.9157  .  . 
Total  114  46.6368  16.0158 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.4,  the  results  indicate  that  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05; 
therefore,  there  isn't  any  relationship  between  the  foreign  parent's  equity  shareholding  in 
joint  ventures  and  the  origins  of  foreign  parents.  From  the  Table  6.2.2.4,  for  those 
foreign  parents  from  European  countries,  the  average  of  the  foreign  parent's  equity 
shareholding  in  joint  ventures  is  higher  than  for  other  countries.  One  possible 
explanation  for  these  results  is  that  European  countries  are  far  from  Taiwan  and  parents 
from  European  countries  have  entered  the  Taiwan  market  late,  so  they  might  have  higher 
equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  in  order  to  control  the  joint  ventures  to  achieve  their 
objectives. 
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The  above  analysis  is  based  on  the  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  and  the 
results  reveal  that  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the  parent's  equity 
shareholding  and  nationalities  or  origins  of  foreign  partners. 
The  next  analysis  is  based  on  the  ownership  type  of  the  host  country  parents  in  joint 
ventures.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.5,  the  value  of  statistic  is  10.5909  and 
the  significance  is less  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  was  concluded  that  the  origins  of  foreign 
partners  is  associated  with  the  ownership  type  of  host  country  parents. 
Table  6.2.2.5  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  Regions  of 
Foreign  Partners 
i  R 
Type  of  ownership  of  Host  coup  parents  T  l  ons  eg  Minori  equity  Equal  equity  Majority  equity 
ota 
Asian  countries  44(57.14%)  8(10.391/o)  25(32.471/o)  77 
American  countries  12(54.55%)  7(31.82%)  3(13.64%)  22 
European  countries  11(73.33%)  3(20.00%)  l(6.67%)  15 
Total  67(58.771/o)  18(15.791/o)  29(25.441/o)  114 
Chi-Square=  10.5909  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0316* 
3  cells  (33.3%)  have  expected  count  less  than  5. 
G-S  uare=  10.9156  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0275* 
From  Table  6.2.2.5,  we  could  find  that  no  matter  which  regions  its  foreign  partners  come 
from,  the  occurrence  of  the  minority  equity  type  of  host  country  parent  has  the  highest 
percentage.  However,  when  the  foreign  partners  are  from  the  European  region,  the  host 
country  parents  have  a  higher  proportion  of  minority  equity  type  than  other  two  types. 
For  the  foreign  partners  from  the  American  region,  the  host  country  parents  have  around 
32%  on  equal  equity  type.  When  foreign  partners  are  from  Asian  countries,  the  host 
country  parents  have  the  highest  proportion  of  minority  equity  and  follow  by  the  majority 
equity. 
The  Chi-Square  Test  was  employed  and  the  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.6.  The  value  of 
f  statistic  is  10.7728  and  the  significance  is  less  than  0.05.  However,  there  are  33.3%  of 
cells  that  have  an  expected  count  of  less  than  S.  Therefore,  the  G-Square  Test  was 
employed. 
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Table  6.2.2.6  G-Squared  Test  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  Regions  of 
Fnreiun  Partners 
Minority  equity  Equal  equity  Majority  equity  Total 
Asian  Count  44  8  25  77 
countries  Expected  Count  45.25  12.16  19.59  77 
American  Count  12  7  3  22 
countries  Expected  Count  12.93  3.47  5.60  22 
European  Count  11  3  1  15 
countries  Expected  Count  8.82  2.37  3.82  15 
G-Square=  10.9156  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0275* 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.6,  the  value  of  the  G2  statistic  is  10.7728  and  the  significance  is 
less  than  0.05.  Thus,  it  was  concluded  that  the  source  regions  of  foreign  parents  are 
associated  with  the  ownership  type  of  Taiwan  parents.  In  other  words,  Taiwanese 
parent's  ownership  type  is different  when  their  foreign  partners  are  from  different  regions. 
Next,  the  same  analytical  process  was  launched  to  measure  the  relationship  between  the 
source  regions  of  foreign  parents  and  the  type  of  ownership  of  foreign  parents.  The 
results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.7. 
Table  6.2.2.7  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Foreign  Parents  and  Regions  of  Foreign 
Partners 
R  i  Type  of  ownershi  of  foreign  arents  T  l  eg  ons  Minority  equity  Equal  equity  Majority  equity 
ota 
Asian 
countries 
42(54.55%)  9(11.69%)  26(33.77%)  77 
American  countries  11(50.00-1.  )  7(31.82  %  4(18.18  %  22 
European  countries  4(26.67%)  %  6(40.00'o)  5(33.3  15 
Total  57  50.00%  22  19.30%  35  30.70%  114 
Chi-Square=  10.7728  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0292* 
3  cells  (33.3%)  have  expected  count  less  than  5. 
In  Table  6.2.2.7,  the  results  show  that  foreign  parents  who  came  from  European 
countries  had  the  highest  proportion  of  the  equal  equity  type.  On  the  other  hand,  foreign 
parents  coming  from  Asian  countries  have  a  higher  proportion  of  the  minority  equity 
type  and  follow  by  the  majority  equity  type.  Furthermore,  foreign  parents  from 
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American  countries  had  the  highest  proportion  of  the  minority  equity  type  and  followed 
by  equal  equity  type. 
As  described  above,  there  are  33.3%  of  cells  that  have  an  expected  count  of  less  than  5; 
therefore,  the  G-Square  Test  was  employed.  The  result  of  the  G-Square  Test  is  shown 
in  Table  6.2.2.8. 
Table  6.2.2.8  G-Squared  Test  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Foreign  Parents  and  Regions  of  Foreign 
Pnrtnrrc 
less  than  50  50=50  more  than  50  Total 
Asian  Count  42  9  26  77 
countries  Expected  Count  38.50  14.86  23.64  77 
American  Count  11  7  4  22 
countries  Expected  Count  11.00  4.25  6.75  22 
European  Count  4  6  5  15 
countries  Expected  Count  7.50  2.89  4.61  15 
G-Square=  10.5797  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0317* 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.8,  the  value  of  the  G2  statistic  is  10.5797  and  the  significance  is 
less  than  0.05.  Thus,  we  concluded  that  the  source  regions  of  foreign  parents  are 
associated  with  the  type  of  ownership  of  foreign  parents.  In  other  words,  foreign 
parent's  ownership  types  are  different  when  foreign  partners  are  from  different  regions. 
6.2.2.2.2  Industry 
This  subsection  analyzes  the  relationship  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity 
shareholding  in  joint  ventures  and  industry  groups  in  which  host  country  parents  are 
involved.  This  study  reclassifies  industries  into  manufacturing  and  service  groups.  The 
results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.9. 
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Table  6.2.2.9  ANOVA  test  of  the  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and 
Industry  Grouns 
I  d 
Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures 
n  ustry  groups 
No  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
Manufacturing  group  85  40.5161  17.5672 
Service  group  29  43.0007  14.0768  0.4750  0.4921 
Total  114  41.1482  16.7239 
From  the  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.9,  we  found  that  the  average  Taiwanese  parent's 
equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  is  less  than  50%,  no  matter  in  which  industry  group 
they  are  involved.  The  output  of  the  ANOVA  computation,  shows  that  the  significance 
is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  one  could  conclude  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity 
shareholding  and  their  industry  group  are  independent. 
Next,  the  relationship  between  the  industry  groups  and  the  type  of  ownership  of  host 
country  parents  was  tested.  The  type  of  ownership  was  classified  into  majority  equity, 
equal  equity,  and  minority  equity.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.10. 
Table  6.2.2.10  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  Industry 
r1rnnns 
Industry  groups 
Type  of  ownership  of  Host  country  parents  identified  by 
equity  shareholding  in  Joint  ventures  Total 
Minority  equity  Equal  equity  Maori  equity 
Manufacturing  group  51  60.00%  15(17.651/o)  19(22.35%)  85 
Service  group  16(55.17%)  3(10.34%)  10  34.48%  29 
Total  67(58.770/o)  18(15.79%)  29(25.44%)  114 
Chi-Square=  2.0666  D.  F.  =2  Significance=  0.3558 
The  value  of  the  f  statistic  is  2.0666  and  the  significance  is  greater  than  0.05;  therefore, 
it  was  concluded  that  the  type  of  ownership  of  the  host  country  parents  is  not  associated 
with  their  industry  group. 
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From  the  above  analysis,  we  conclude  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in 
joint  ventures  and  their  industry  group  is  not  associated.  Also  the  most  common  type  of 
ownership  stake  employed  by  the  host  country  parents  is  minority  equity. 
6.2.2.2.3  Size  of  Host  Country  Parents 
This  subsection  conducted  the  relationship  analysis  between  the  size  of  host  country 
parents  and  their  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures.  The  size  of  host  country  parents 
is  analyzed  using  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of  employees.  The  ANOVA  test 
was  launched  to  test  the  relationship  between  the  size  of  host  country  parents  and  their 
equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.11,  Table 
6.2.2.12  and  Table  6.2.2.13. 
Table  6.2.2.11  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  its 
Canital 
Capin  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures 
Unit:  NT$  No  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
less  than  500  million  18  39.2956  14.4072 
501-  5,000  million  43  37.1830  18.3604 
5,001  -  10,000  million  16  47.3238  13.7004  2.0148  0.1160 
more  than  10,000  million  37  43.9870  16.2071 
Total  114  41.1482  16.7239 
Table  6.2.2.12  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  its 
Sales  Volume 
Sales  Volume  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures 
Unit:  NT$  No  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
less  than  500  million  15  36.5813  15.0160 
501  -  5,000  million  37  33.6786  17.5997 
5,001  -  10,000  million  16  51.6638  10.4633  6.6057  0.0004* 
more  than  10,000  million  46  44.9878  15.5137 
Total  114  41.1482  16.7239 
Table  6.2.2.13  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  its 
Number  of  Emnlovees 
l  N  f  b 
Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding 
um  er  o  emp  oyees 
No  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
less  than  200  21  37.5010  15.7854  2.4126  0.0706 
201-  500  22  37.4791  18.9683 
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501-1000  24  38.0413  16.8600 
more  than  1000  47  46.0817  15.1632 
Total  114  41.1482  16.7239 
The  results  of  the  ANOVA  computation  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.11,  Table  6.2.2.12  and 
Table  6.2.2.13,  show  only  the  sales  volume  and  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity 
shareholding  has  a  strong  relationship,  the  significance  is  less  than  0.05.  The  host 
country  parents  whose  sales  volume  is  between  NT$5,001  -  10,000  million,  have  the 
highest  equity  shareholding  in  their  joint  ventures.  In  other  words,  they  have  the 
majority  equity  type  of  ownership.  Host  country  parents  in  other  sales  volume  groups 
had  the  minority  ownership  type. 
These  results  reveal  that  the  capital  and  the  number  of  employees  are  not  associated  with 
the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures.  However,  when  we 
analyzed  the  average  of  equity  shareholding,  we  found  that  there  was  a  trend.  The 
bigger  the  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  greater  the  number  of  employees  in  the  host 
country  parent  company,  the  higher  the  equity  shareholding  they  hold  in  joint  ventures. 
Next,  we  examined  the  relationship  between  the  ownership  type  of  host  country  parents 
and  their  capital,  sales  volume,  and  number  of  employees.  The  results  are  shown  in 
Table  6.2.2.14,  Table  6.2.2.15,  and  Table  6.2.2.16. 
The  output  of  X2  tests  from  the  three  tables  above,  shows  that  the  significance  of  each  is 
greater  than  0.05.  The  results  reveal  that  the  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of 
employees  are  not  associated  with  the  ownership  types  of  Taiwanese  parent.  From  these 
three  tables,  we  only  found  a  rough  phenomenon  that  the  smaller  host  country  parents 
have  more  minority  equity  types,  and  the  larger  host  country  parents  have  more  minority 
equity  types  and  majority  types. 
Table  6.2.2.14  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  its 
Canital 
Capital  Type  of  ownership  of  Host  country  ents  T  l 
Unit:  NT$  Mnori  equity  Equal  equity  Maor  ui 
ota 
less  than  500  million  11(61.110/o)  2(11.11  %  5(27.78%)  18 
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501  -  5,000  million  30(69.77%)  7(16.28%)  6(13.950/o)  43 
5,001  -  10,000  million  7(43.75%)  4(25.000/o)  5(31.251/o)  16 
more  than  10,000  million  19(51.35%)  5  13.51%  13(35.14%)  37 
Total  11  61.11%  2(l  1.11%  5(27.78%)  18 
Chi-Scare=  6.9478  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.3257 
Table  6.2.2.15  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  its 
Snlec  Volumes 
Sales  Volumes  Type  of  ownership  of  Host  coup  parents  T  l 
Unit:  NT$  Minori  equity  Equal  equity  Majority  equity 
ota 
less  than  500  million  10(66.67%)  _  2(13.33%)  3(20.00%)  15 
501  -  5,000  million  27(72.97%)  5(13.51%)  5(13.51%)  37 
5,001  -  10000  million  6(37.501/o)  3(18.751/o)  7(43.750/.  )  16 
more  than  10,000  million  24(52.17%)  8(17.391/o)  14  30.43%  46 
Total  67(58.77%)  18(15.79%)  29(25.44%)  114 
Chi-Scare=  8.1467  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.2276 
Table  6.2.2.16  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  its 
Niimh  r  of  Pmnlnvp  c 
Type  of  ownership  of  Host  coon  parents  l  T  t  Number  of  employees  Minority  equity  Equal  equity  Maori  equity 
o  a 
less  than  200  15(71.43%)  2(9.52%)  4(19.05%)  21 
201  -  500  13(59.09%)  4(18.18%)  5(22.73%)  22 
501-1000  18(75%)  2(8.331/o)  4(16.67%)  24 
more  than  1000  21(44.68%)  10(21.28%)  16(34.04%)  47 
Total  67(58.771/o)  18(15.79%)  29(25.44%)  114 
Chi-Scare=  8.0736  D.  F.  =6  Significance=  0.2328 
From  the  above  analysis,  one  concludes  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding 
in  the  joint  venture  and  their  sales  volumes  is  associated.  The  higher  the  sales  volume  of 
host  country  parents,  the  higher  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  they  hold. 
Additionally,  host  country  parents  with  bigger  capital  and  a  larger  number  of  employees 
also  have  higher  equity  shareholding  in  their  joint  ventures.  However,  there  is  no 
association  between  the  equity  types  of  host  country  parents  and  the  capital,  sales 
volumes,  and  the  number  of  their  employees. 
6.2.2.2.4  Ages  of  the  Host  Country  Parents  and  Joint  Ventures 
This  subsection  conducted  the  analysis  of  whether  the  age  of  host  country  parents  and 
their  joint  ventures  has  a  relationship  to  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in 
their  joint  ventures  or  not.  Firstly,  the  relationship  between  age  of  host  country  parents 
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and  their  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures  was  tested.  The  results  of  the  ANOVA 
test  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.17,  and  the  significant  is  greater  than  0.05.  Thus,  one 
concludes  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  venture  and  their  ages 
was  not  associated. 
Table  6.2.2.17  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  in  Joint  Ventures  and  its 
Ages 
Taiwanese  paren  t's  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures 
Age  of  host  country  parents 
No  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
1-5  years  2  52.5000  3.5355 
6-10  years  4  45.3750  12.3381 
11-20  years  15  37.8707  18.9209 
5202  0  0  7211 
21-30  years  24  39.4867  19.0770  .  . 
more  than  30  years  69  41.8645  15.8862 
Total  114  41.1482  16.7239 
Next,  the  relationship  between  the  age  of  joint  ventures  and  their  Taiwanese  parent's 
equity  shareholding  was  tested.  The  results  of  the  ANOVA  test  are  shown  in  Table 
6.2.2.18,  and  the  significant  is  also  greater  than  0.05.  Thus,  one  concludes  that  the 
Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  the  joint  venture  and  the  age  of  their  joint 
ventures  was  not  associated. 
Table  6.2.2.18  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  and  its  Joint  Venture's 
A  4PQ 
Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding 
Ages  of  Joint  Ventures 
No  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
1-5  years  24  44.2179  14.4605 
6-10  years  26  36.3623  19.5436 
11-20  years  40  43.4151  17.2774 
2425  1  2972  0 
21-30  years  10  43.5580  9.1810  .  . 
more  than  30  years  14  36.5743  16.3330 
Total  114  41.1482  16.7239 
238 Chapter  6 
However,  when  we  analyze  the  mean  of  equity  shareholding,  the  ages  of  host  country 
parents  and  their  joint  ventures,  we  found  that  there  was  a  trend.  The  younger  the 
companies,  the  higher  the  equity  shares  that  host  country  parents  held  in  joint  ventures. 
Especially,  in  the  1-5  years  group,  host  country  parents  and  joint  ventures  had  the 
highest  mean  of  equity  shares. 
Next,  the  analysis  defined  the  type  of  ownership  of  host  country  parents  in  joint  ventures 
and  the  relationship  with  the  ages  of  host  country  parents  and  joint  ventures.  The  results 
are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.19  and  Table  6.2.2.20. 
Table  6.2.2.19  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  Ages  of  Host 
Cniintru  DQrnnre 
Ages  of  host  country  Type  of  ownership  of  Host  coun  t  parents  Total 
parents  Minori  equity  Equal  equity  Majority  equity 
1-5  years  0  0.00%  1(50.00'Y.  )  1(50.00'Y.  )  2 
6-10  years  2(50.001/o)  1(25%)  1  25%  4 
11-20  years  9(601/o)  l(6.67%)  5(33.33%)  15 
21-30  years  16(66.67%)  4(16.671/o)  4  16.671/6)  24 
more  than  30  years  40(5 
. 
97%  11  15.94%  18(26.09%)  69 
Total  67(5  8.77%  18(15.790/o)  29(25.44%)  114 
Chi-Scare=  5.5739  D.  F.  =8  Significance=  0.6948 
Table  6.2.2.20  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  Ages  of  Joint 
Type  of  ownership  of  Host  coup  parents  Total  Ages  of  Joint  Ventures 
Minority  equity  Equal  equity  Majority  equity 
1-5  years  11(45.83%)  6(25.001/o)  7(29.17%)  24 
6-10  years  16(61.54%)  5(19.231/o)  5(19.23'o  26 
11-20  years  22(55.00%)  5(12.50%)  13(32.50%)  40 
21-30  years  6(60.00%)  1(10.000/0)  3  30.00%  10 
more  than  30  years  12(85.71%)  l(7.14%)  1  7.14%  14 
Total  67(58.77%)  18(15.781/o)  29(25.44%)  114 
Chi-Square=  8.4128  D.  F.  =8  Significance=  0.3942 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.19,  the  value  of  the  j  statistic  is  5.5739  and  the  significance  is 
greater  than  0.05;  therefore,  it  was  concluded  that  the  ages  of  host  country  parents  was 
not  associated  with  their  type  of  ownership  in  a  joint  venture.  From  Table  6.2.2.20,  the 
results  also  reveal  that  there  is  no  association  between  the  age  of  joint  ventures  and  the 
Taiwanese  parent's  equity  type. 
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From  the  above  analysis,  one  concludes  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding 
in  a  joint  venture,  their  ages  and  the  joint  venture's  ages  are  independent.  However,  the 
younger  parents  would  have  a  higher  equity  shareholding  in  their  joint  ventures. 
6.2.2.2.5  The  Number  of  Board  Members 
This  subsection  is  focused  on  the  relationship  between  ownership  of  host  country  parents 
and  the  number  of  board  members  in  joint  ventures.  The  number  of  board  members  was 
recalculated  as  a  percentage  based  on  the  number  of  board  members  of  the  Taiwanese 
parent's  or  foreign  parent  divided  by  the  total  number  of  board  members.  The 
percentage  of  Taiwanese  parent's  and  foreign  parent's  board  is  equal  to  one.  In  order  to 
launch  the  suitable  statistical  methods,  the  percentage  of  board  members  was  classified 
into  three  groups,  which  are  less  than  50%,  equal  to  50%,  and  more  than  50%.  The 
ANOVA  test  was  launched  and  the  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.21  and  Table 
6.2.2.22. 
Table  6.2.2.21  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Equity  Shareholding  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  the  Percentage 
of  Rnird  Memherc  in  Tnint  Ventnrec 
Percentage  of  Taiwanese 
parent's  board  members 
N  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
less  than  50  27  37.0867  14.4706 
Equal  50  26  36.5146  16.7199 
4940  3  0340*  0 
more  than  50  61  44.9208  16.9803  .  . 
1  Total  114  41.1482  16.7239 
Table  6.2.2.22  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Equity  Shareholding  of  Foreign  Parents  and  the  Percentage  of 
Board  Members  in  Joint  Ventures 
Percentage  of  foreign  parent's 
board  members 
N  Mean  Std.  Deviation  F  Sig. 
less  than  50  60  37.349  12.6854 
Equal  50  26  52.8846  11.1511 
* 
more  than  50  28  60.7378  13.0869 
37.8812  0.0000 
Total  114  46.6368  16.0158 
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From  Table  6.2.2.21  and  Table  6.2.2.22,  the  results  showed  that  there  were  significant 
differences  between  the  percentage  of  board  member  and  the  ownership  of  both  parents. 
The  parents  who  had  a  higher  percentage  of  board  members  in  joint  ventures  had  higher 
equity  shares.  However,  foreign  parents  have  a  stronger  statistically  significant 
difference  than  host  country  parents.  Basically,  the  representation  of  board  members  and 
the  equity  shares  could  represent  the  rights  on  important  decisions  relating  to  joint 
ventures.  The  higher  percentage  of  board  members  could  imply  higher  ownership.  We 
infer  that  foreign  parents  are  not  located  in  Taiwan;  therefore,  they  could  participate 
actively  on  the  N's  board  to  ensure  their  objectives  are  achieved  and  to  protect  their 
rights. 
Next,  the  associations  between  the  percentage  of  Taiwanese  parent's  board  members  in 
joint  ventures  and  the  type  of  ownership  of  host  country  parents  was  tested.  The  results 
are  shown  in  Table  6.2.2.23. 
Table  6.2.2.23  Cross  tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  the  Percentage 
of  Bnard  Members  in  mint  Ventures 
fb  Type  of  ownership  of  host  coun  parents  l  T  t  Percentage  o  oard  members  Minority  equity  Equal  equity  Majority  o  a 
less  than  50%  22(81.48%)  3(11.11%)  2(7.41%)  27 
equal  50%  14(53.85%)  10(38.46%)  2(7.69%)  26 
more  than  50%  31(50.82%)  5(8.2%)  25(40.98%)  61 
Total  67(58.770/o)  18(15.79%)  29(25.44%)  114 
Chi-Square=  26.663  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0000* 
2  cells  (22.2%)  have  expected  count  less  than  5. 
G-S  uare=  26.1785  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0000* 
The  value  of  G2  is  26.1785  and  the  significance  is  less  than  0.05.  These  results  indicated 
that  the  type  of  the  Taiwanese  parent's  ownership  has  a  significant  relationship  with  the 
percentage  of  board  members  in  joint  ventures.  When  the  percentage  is  more  than  50% 
group,  most  host  country  parents  have  a  majority  equity  ownership.  In  other  words,  the 
higher  the  percentage  of  board  members  that  host  country  parents  have,  the  greater  their 
majority  equity  ownership. 
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The  relationship  between  the  percentage  of  foreign  parent's  board  members  in  joint 
ventures  and  the  type  of  ownership  they  have  was  tested.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table 
6.2.2.24.  The  value  of  X2  is  758817  and  the  significance  is  less  than  0.05.  These  results 
indicated  that  the  type  of  foreign  parent's  ownership  has  significant  relation  with  the 
percentage  of  board  members  in  joint  ventures.  In  the  group  with  more  than  50%,  most 
foreign  parents  have  a  majority  equity  ownership.  In  the  group  less  than  50%,  most 
foreign  parents  have  a  minority  equity  ownership.  These  results  reveal  that  the  greater 
the  percentage  of  board  members  that  foreign  parents  have,  the  more  majority  equity 
type  they  have. 
Table  6.2.2.24  Cross-tabulation  of  the  Type  of  Ownership  of  Foreign  Parents  and  the  Percentage  of 
Board  Members  in  Joint  Ventures 
Percentage  of  board  Type  of  ership  of  foreign  parents  T  t  l 
members  Minori  equity  Equal  equity  Majority  a  o 
less  than  50%  49(81.67%)  5(8.33%)  6(10.001/o)  60 
equal  50%  5(19.23%)  14(53.85'Y.  )  7(26.921/o)  26 
more  than  50%  3(10.71%)  3(10.71%)  2278.57%  28 
Total  57(50.00%)  22(19.301/o)  35(30.70'/o)  114 
Chi-Square=  75.8817  D.  F.  =4  Significance=  0.0000* 
2  cells  (22.2%)  have  expected  count  less  than  5. 
From  Table  6.2.2.21  to  Table  6.2.2.24,  we  found  that  there  was  a  significant  relationship 
between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  ownership,  and  foreign  parent's  ownership  and  the 
percentage  of  board  members  in  their  joint  ventures.  The  higher  percentages  of  board 
members  from  host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents,  the  higher  the  equity 
shareholding  they  hold  in  joint  ventures;  and  the  more  majority  equity  type  they  have. 
The  parents  who  have  more  ownership  would  normally  have  more  power  in  terms  of 
board  member's  representation.  Leksell  and  Lindgren  (1982)  indicated  that  the  equity 
ownership  of  the  joint  ventures  would  affect  the  number  of  joint  venture's  board 
directors.  The  results  of  this  study  echo  Leksell  and  Lindgren's  (1982)  results.  We 
conclude  that  the  higher  the  ownership  that  parents  hold  in  joint  ventures,  the  higher  the 
percentage  of  board  members  they  hold. 
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A  summary  of  the  analysis  of  the  results  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  ownership  and 
the  sample  characteristics,  is  provided  in  Table  6.2.2.25.  To  view  it  as  a  whole,  the 
results  of  this  empirical  survey  indicated  that  there  are  associations  between  the 
Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding,  the  sales  volumes  of  the  host  country  parents, 
and  the  percentage  of  the  parent's  board  members  in  the  joint  ventures.  There  are  no 
associations  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding,  industry  of  the  host 
country  parents,  the  origin  of  foreign  partners,  capital  and  the  number  of  employees  of 
host  country  parents,  and  the  ages  of  host  country  parents  and  joint  ventures. 
Table  6.2.2.25  Summary  the  Relationship  between  the  Taiwanese  Parent's  Equity  Shareholding  and 
Tvne  of  Chvnerchin  and  Samnle  Characteristics 
Host  coun  parents  Sample  Characteristics 
Equity  shares  Type  of  ownership 
Regions  of  foreign  partners 
Asian  countries  G2=10.9156 
American  countries 
No  association  p=0.0275* 
European  countries 
Industry  groups 
Manufacturing  group  No  association  No  association 
Service  group 
Sizes 
Sales  volume  F=6.6057  p=0.0004*  No  association 
Capital  No  association  No  association 
Number  of  employees  No  association  No  association 
Age 
Host  country  parents  No  association  No  association 
Joint  ventures  No  association  No  association 
Number  (percentage)  of  board  F=3.3490  G  =26.1785 
members  P=0.034*  P=0.0000* 
From  Table  6.2.2.5,  the  Taiwanese  parent's  ownership  type  is  different  when  their 
foreign  partners  come  from  different  regions.  When  the  foreign  partners  are  from  the 
European  region,  the  host  country  parents  had  a  higher  proportion  of  the  minority  equity 
type  than  the  other  two  types.  For  the  foreign  partners  from  the  American  region,  the 
host  country  parents  have  a  preponderance  of  an  equal  equity  type.  When  foreign 
partners  come  from  Asian  countries,  the  host  country  parents  have  the  highest 
proportion  of  minority  equity. 
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The  results  also  reveal  that  the  Taiwanese  parent's  equity  shareholding  in  the  joint 
venture  and  their  sales  volumes  is  associated.  The  higher  the  sales  volume  of  the  host 
country  parents,  the  higher  their  equity  shareholding  in  joint  ventures. 
There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  Taiwanese  parent,  the  foreign  parent's 
ownership,  and  the  percentage  of  board  members  in  their  joint  ventures.  The  higher  the 
percentage  of  board  members  from  the  host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents,  the 
higher  the  equity  shareholding  they  hold  in  joint  ventures  and  the  more  majority  equity 
type.  These  results  are  consistent  with  Pedersen  and  Thomsen's  (1997)  in  their  study  of 
corporate  ownership  patterns,  which  they  found  that  industry  and  company  size  influence 
ownership  structures. 
These  results  partly  explain  why  some  important  sample  characteristics  had  an  important 
influence  on  the  percentage  equity  share  of  host  country  parents  in  joint  ventures. 
Next,  we  conducted  on  analysis  on  bargaining  power  and  its  relation  with  sample 
characteristics  in  the  following  section. 
6.2.3  Empirical  Results  of  Bargaining  Power 
In  this  section,  the  variables  which  affect  bargaining  power  are  analyzed  first.  Then,  the 
relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  sample  characteristics  is  tested.  The  relative 
importance  of  bargaining  power  is  discussed  first  in  the  following  subsection. 
6.2.3.1  The  Relative  Importance  of  Bargaining  Power 
This  section  aims  to  analyze  which  variable  assumed  the  greatest  importance  for  partners 
in  obtaining  bargaining  power  when  they  decided  to  cooperate  and  build  a  joint  venture. 
Firstly,  the  variables  of  bargaining  power  are  ranked  and  the  results  are  shown  in  Table 
6.2.3.1. 
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From  the  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.3.1,  the  most  important  variable  is  the  level  of 
equity  shares  with  a  mean  value  of  4.38.  When  two,  or  more  than  two  companies  want 
to  cooperate  and  establish  another  new  subsidiary,  equity  share  is  a  fundamental  and 
critical  resource.  This  indicates  that  ownership  is  a  very  important  variable  for  partners. 
In  addition,  the  equity  shares  in  joint  ventures  also  affected  the  number  of  the  N  board 
of  directors  who  represented  their  parents,  and  in  turn  affected  the  important  decisions  of 
joint  ventures.  Basically,  through  the  acquisition  of  equity  shares,  the  company  could 
obtain  control  over  the  joint  venture  in  order  to  ensure  that  its  organizational  goal  can  be 
reached. 
Therefore,  equity  ownership  has  a  very  important  meaning  for  a  joint  venture's  parents. 
The  amount  of  equity  shares  affect  the  bargaining  power  of  partners;  thus,  the  most 
effective  method  of  gaining  bargaining  power  is  to  gain  more  equity  shares. 
Table  6.2.3.1  The  Rank  Order  of  BarEainine  Power 
Variables  Mean  Std  Dev.  Rank 
10.  The  level  of  equity  shares  4.38  0.62  1 
4.  Access  to  export  markets  4.25  0.58  2 
9.  Knowledge  of  the  local  markets  3.71  0.95  3 
1.  Technological  ability  3.57  1.53  4 
5.  Access  to  financial  resources  3.51  0.60  5 
6.  Management  experience  3.28  0.94  6 
2.  Innovative  ability  3.08  1.36  7 
7.  Access  to  sale  distribution  channel  3.02  0.92  8 
3.  Investment  amount  2.73  0.88  9 
8.  The  influence  of  host  government'  1.87  0.67  10 
The  following  two  important  variables  are  "access  to  export  markets"  and  "the 
knowledge  of  the  local  markets".  Their  mean  scores  are  4.25  and  3.71  respectively.  The 
results  indicate  that  the  market  is  a  fairly  important  variable  for  bargaining  power.  With 
a  mean  score  of  1.87,  the  least  important  variable  is  "the  influence  of  host  government". 
The  results  indicate  that  the  influence  of  the  host  government  does  not  have  a  significant 
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effect  on  the  company's  bargaining  power.  Taiwan  is  a  democratic  county  and  the 
government  encourages  enterprises  to  cooperate  with  foreign  companies  by  offering 
some  assistance.  It  is  not  like  other  developing  countries  where  the  government 
oversees  cooperative  activities  and  has  a  strong  effect  on  bargaining  power.  Therefore, 
in  the  Taiwan  context,  the  government  has  the  least  influence  on  bargaining  power. 
The  mean  values  of  "technological  ability"  and  "innovative  ability"  are  3.57  and  3.08 
respectively.  They  ranged  between  "fairly  important"  and  "important".  These  results 
indicate  that  technology  is  an  important  variable  for  a  company  to  obtain  more 
bargaining  power  and  implies  that  technology  could  enhance  the  control  available  to  the 
partners.  These  results  echo  those  found  in  previous  studies. 
6.2.3.2  Factor  Analysis  of  Bargaining  Power 
After  the  primary  ranking  of  bargaining  power,  this  subsection  examines  the  factor 
analysis  of  bargaining  power.  Factor  analysis  is  used  to  identify  the  structure 
underpinning  bargaining  power  for  international  joint  ventures.  This  analysis  summarizes 
important  information  contained  in  these  10  variables  into  a  smaller  set  of  new  factors, 
with  a  minimum  loss  of  information.  Principal  components  analysis  is  used  to  extract  a 
new  set  of  core  data.  The  rotated  principal  components  analysis  for  bargaining  power  is 
shown  in  Table  6.2.3.2. 
Table  (2  32  The  Fioenvilne  after  Rntatinn  fnr  Rarvainine  Pnwer 
Factor  Eigenvalue  %  of  Variable  Cumulated  % 
1  3.8911  38.9114  38.9114 
2  2.6680  26.6803  65.5917 
3  1.4822  14.8219  80.4136 
The  results  of  factor  analysis  for  bargaining  power  have  provided  the  Eigenvalues  which 
represent  the  amount  of  variance  in  each  factor.  Each  of  the  three  extracted  factors  has 
an  Eigenvalue  greater  than  1.  The  total  cumulated  percentage  of  variance  is  80.41%. 
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In  order  to  achieve  a  clearer  factor  structure,  the  Varimax  method  was  used  to  rotate  the 
initial  factor  solution.  The  Varimax  rotated  analysis  factor  loading  matrix  for  bargaining 
power  is  presented  in  Table  6.2.3.3. 
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Table  6213  Rotated  Comnonent  Matrix  of  Factor  Analysis  of  Rareaininn  Prover 
Variables  Factor  1  Factor  2  Factor  3 
1.  Technology  ability  -0.9279  -0.2240  0.0665 
2.  Innovative  ability  -0.9224  -0.2056  0.0347 
9.  Knowledge  of  the  local  markets  0.9270  -0.0035  0.1019 
6.  Management  experience  0.8910  0.0174  -0.0680 
4.  Investment  amount  0.1806  0.8801  -0.2201 
5.  Access  to  financial  resources  0.1245  0.8680  "  0.0658 
10.  The  level  of  equity  shares  0.0291  0.8241  -0.3488 
7.  Access  to  sale  distribution  channel  -0.0219  -0.0816  0.9174 
3.  Access  to  export  markets  0.0896  -0.1221  0.9047 
8.  The  influence  of  host  government  -), 0881  -0.1399  0.6441 
The  rotated  factor  matrix  provided  a  different  factor  loading  for  each  variable  as  against 
each  of  the  three  extracted  factors.  The  interpretation  of  the  rotated  factor  matrix  is 
calculated  on  the  basis  that  a  factor  loading  greater  than  ±  0.5  is  considered  as  significant. 
All  the  factor  loadings  are  greater  than  0.6,  which  indicates  that  all  the  factor  loadings 
are  significant. 
However,  we  found  that  factor  I  has  four  significant  loadings  where  two  factor  loadings 
with  positive  scores  related  to  management  knowledge  and  the  other  two  factor  loadings 
with  negative  scores  related  to  technology.  One  factor  includes  two  different  and 
contradictory  subjects.  We  exercised  the  second  order  factor  analysis  again  in  order  to 
eliminate  the  intervention  between  variables.  The  Varimax  rotated  analysis  factor 
loading  matrix  for  these  four  variables  is  presented  in  Table  6.2.3.4.  The  results  also 
indicate  all  the  factor  loadings  are  greater  than  f  0.5  and  are  considered  as  significant. 
Takle  6234  Rotated  Comnonent  Matrix  of  Four  Variables  for  Rarvaininn  Power 
Variables  Factor  I  Factor  2 
2.  Innovative  ability  0.8924  -0.4226 
1.  Technological  ability  0.8679  -0.4606 
6.  Management  experience  -0.3831  0.8919 
9.  The  knowledge  of  the  local  markets  -0.5509  0.7562 
248 Chapter  6 
In  addition,  in  considering  the  significance  of  factor  loadings,  the  reliability  of  each  factor 
construct  was  also  tested  using  the  Cronbach  coefficient  alpha  in  order  to  measure  the 
internal  consistency  of  each  factor.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.3.5.  These 
results  represent  very  high  Cronbach  alpha  scores  for  the  factors  of  bargaining  power. 
Thus,  one  concludes  that  the  factor  of  bargaining  power  has  very  high  reliability. 
Table  6.2.3.5  Factor  Loadines  and  Reliability  of  Factors 
Factor 
Variables 
Fact 
Cronbach  a 
F 
2.  Innovation  ability  0.8924 
0  9689  actor  1 
1.  Technological  ability  0.8679  . 
6.  Management  experience  0.8919 
0  8894  Factor  2 
9.  Knowledge  of  the  local  markets  0.7562  . 
4.  Investment  amount  0.8801 
Factor  3  5.  Access  to  financial  resources  0.8680  0.8564 
10.  The  level  of  equity  shares  0.8241 
7.  Access  to  sale  distribution  channel  0.9174 
Factor  4  3.  Access  to  export  markets  0.9047  0.7045 
8.  The  influence  of  host  government  0.6441 
After  measuring  each  factor's  reliability,  we  identified  the  label  for  each  factor  according 
to  the  meanings  of  the  variables  in  each  one.  Each  factor  is  elucidated  in  the  following 
description. 
Factor  1:  Technological  Capability 
Factor  1  has  two  significant  loadings  and  the  variables  mainly  related  to  innovative  ability 
and  technological  ability,  with  respective  loadings  of  0.8924  and  0.8679.  All  the 
significant  variables  have  positive  signs.  This  indicates  that  technology  is  a  very 
important  factor  as  a  source  of  bargaining  power.  Therefore,  Factor  1  is  labeled  as 
"Technological  capability". 
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Factor  2:  Management  Capability 
Factor  2  has  two  significant  loadings,  and  the  variables  mainly  related  to  management 
knowledge,  which  is  management  experience  and  the  knowledge  of  the  local  markets, 
with  respective  loadings  of  0.8919  and  0.7652.  Therefore,  factor  2  is  labeled  as 
"Management  Capability". 
Factor  3:  Financial  Capability 
Factor  3  has  three  significant  loadings,  and  the  variables  mainly  related  to  financial  ability. 
These  variables  are  investment  amount,  access  to  financial  resources  and  the  level  of 
equity  shares,  with  respective  loadings  of  0.8801,0.8680  and  0.8241.  All  these  variables 
have  positive  signs.  Thus,  this  factor  is labeled  as  "Financial  Capability". 
Factor  4:  Marketing  Capability 
Factor  4  has  three  positively  significant  loadings,  and  the  variables  mainly  related  to 
marketing  access  which  included  access  to  sales  distribution  channel,  access  to  export 
markets  and  the  influence  of  host  government,  with  respectively  loadings  of  0.9174, 
0.9047  and  0.6441.  Therefore,  this  factor  is  labeled  as  "Marketing  Capability". 
According  to  the  above  factor  analysis,  the  10  variables  were  summarized  into  four  main 
dimensions  which  related  to  the  bargaining  power  for  international  joint  ventures  in 
Taiwan. 
These  results  are  not  the  same  as  Yan  and  Gray's  (1994)  results  which  classify  the 
components  of  bargaining  power  into  context  based  and  resource  based.  However  the 
results  of  this  empirical  survey  echoed  related  research  findings  (Blodgett,  1991;  Gomes- 
Cassores,  1990;  Kobrin,  1987;  Lecraw,  1984;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982).  Bargaining 
power  stems  from  critical  resources,  such  as  technology,  marketing  expertise,  access  to 
financial  markets,  access  to  export  or  local  markets  and  investment  amount.  The 
important  variables  relating  to  bargaining  power  are  analyzed  and  four  factors  of 
bargaining  power  are  obtained.  Next,  we  turn  to  analyze  the  relation  between  these 
factors  and  the  sample  characteristics. 
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6.2.3.2  Bargaining  Power  and  Characteristics  of  Sample 
The  main  goals  of  this  subsection  are  to  analyze  the  variance  between  the  sources  of 
bargaining  power  and  sample  characteristics  which  include  industry,  size  and  age  of  host 
country  parents.  This  analysis  is  conducted  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  the  rank  order  of 
bargaining  power  is  examined  over  a  number  of  characteristics  of  the  sample.  Secondly, 
the  relationship  between  factors  of  bargaining  power  and  the  characteristics  of  the 
sample  are  examined.  The  relative  statistical  methods  are  used  to  test  the  relationships. 
6.2.3.2.1  Industry 
This  subsection  attempts  to  test  whether  there  is  any  difference  in  bargaining  power  in 
different  industry  groups.  The  t  test  was  employed  and  the  result  is  shown  in  Table 
6.2.3.6. 
Table  6.2.3.6  t-Test  of  Variables  of  Bargaining  Power  and  Industry  Group  of  Host  Country  Parents 
Involved 
Service  group  Manufacturing  group 
Variables  Std.  Std.  t  Sig. 
Mean 
Deviation 
Mean 
Deviation 
1.  Technological  ability  2.5517  1.3252  3.9176  1.4410  20.2078  0.0000* 
2.  Innovative  ability  2.2414  1.2437  3.3647  1.2803  16.8831  0.0001* 
3.  Access  to  export  markets  2.5172  0.7847  2.8000  0.8971  2.2822  0.1337 
4.  Investment  amount  4.5172  0.6336  4.1647  0.5311  8.6153  0.0040* 
5.  Access  to  financial  resources  3.6552  0.6695  3.4588  0.5681  2.3543  0.1278 
6.  Management  experience  3.8276  0.9662  3.0941  0.8539  14.9093  0.0002* 
7.  Access  to  sale  distribution 
2  8276  0  8892  0824  3  0  9285  6623  1  0.2000 
channel  .  .  .  .  . 
8  The  influence  of  host 
.  1.7586  0.5766  1.9059  0.7007  1.0388  0.3103 
government 
9.  The  knowledge  of  the  local 
market 
4.3103  0.9298  3.5059  0.8677  17.9210  0.0000 
10.  The  level  of  equity  shares  4.5517  0.6317  4.3176  0.6018  3.1900  0.0768 
From  the  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.3.6,  we  found  that  part  of  the  results  have  a 
significant  difference  between  the  industry  groups,  while  part  of  results  are  not 
significant.  The  significant  variables  included  technological  ability,  innovative  ability, 
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investment  amount,  management  experience  and  the  knowledge  of  the  local  markets. 
The  manufacturing  group  has  higher  mean  values  than  the  service  group  in  terms  of 
technological  ability,  innovative  ability  and  investment  amount.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
service  group  has  higher  mean  values  than  the  manufacturing  group  in  management 
experience  and  the  knowledge  of  the  local  markets. 
These  results  explained  that  the  service  group  was  involved  with  more  invisible  assets 
and  focuses  more  on  markets  and  management.  However,  the  manufacturing  group  has 
involved  more  strongly  on  the  technological  issues  and  has  invested  large  amounts  on 
equipment  and  machines. 
Next,  the  analysis  focuses  on  the  factors  of  bargaining  power.  From  the  aspect  of  factor 
constructs,  Table  6.2.3.7  shows  that  there  are  significant  differences  between  industry 
groups  in  terms  of  technological  capability,  management  capability  and  financial 
capability,  but  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  marketing  capability.  The 
manufacturing  group  shows  technological  capability  as  a  higher  influence  on  bargaining 
power  with  a  mean  of  3.64.  For  the  service  group,  management  capability  and  financial 
capability  with  means  of  4.17  and  4.24,  have  a  higher  influence  on  obtaining  bargaining 
power 
Table  6  2.3  7  i-Test  of  Rareainina  Power  Factnrc  and  the  Industry  Groan  of  Host  Country  Parents 
Service  group  Manufacturing  group 
Factors 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
t  Sig. 
Technological  capability  2.3966  1.2634  3.6412  1.3399  19.1898  0.0000* 
Management  capability  4.0690  0.8937  3.3000  0.8099  18.4865  0.0000* 
Financial  capability  4.2414  0.5835  3.9804  0.4916  5.5293  0.0204* 
Marketing  capability  2.3678  0.5999  2.5961  0.7239  2.3325  0.1295 
On  the  basis  of  the  above  results,  we  found  that  different  industries  have  different 
characteristics  and  core  competitive  advantages.  Normally,  the  company  which  has  more 
industry  competitive  advantages  would  have  more  negotiating  power  than  its  partners. 
Therefore,  we  conclude  that  the  sources  of  bargaining  power  would  be  different  in  the 
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industry  group.  Bargaining  power  is  more  affected  by  technological  capability  in  the 
manufacturing  group;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  more  affected  by  management  capability 
and  financial  capability  in  the  service  group. 
6.2.3.2.2  Size  of  Host  Country  Parents 
This  subsection  looks  at  the  relationship  between  sources  of  bargaining  power  and  the 
size  of  the  host  country  parents.  The  size  of  host  country  parents  is  discussed  separately 
in  relation  to  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of  employees.  The  ANOVA  tests 
were  performed.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.3.8,  Table  6.2.3.9  and  Table 
6.2.3.10  and  are  indicated  separately  below. 
TahlP  7tR  ANf1VA  Tr  t  of  Factnrc  of  Raroainino  Pnwer  and  Canital  of  Nnst  Country  Parents 
Capital  of  host  country  parents 
Factors  less  than 
NT$500 
million 
NT$501  - 
5,000 
million 
NT$5  001- 
10,000 
million 
more  than 
NT$10,000 
million 
F  Sig. 
Technological  capability  2.92  3.12  4.09  3.43  2.5257  0.0613 
Management  capability  3.78  3.49  3.19  3.50  1.2412  0.2983 
Financial  capability  3.78  4.09  3.98  4.15  2.3509  0.0763 
Marketing  capability  2.78  2.53  2.60  2.40  1.2690  0.2886 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.3.8,  there  are  no  significant  differences  between  the  factors  of 
bargaining  power  and  the  capital  of  host  country  parents.  However  technological 
capability  and  financial  capability  had  the  lowest  significant  value  at  0.06  and  0.07 
respectively.  There  was  a  trend  that  the  company  who  had  higher  capital  seemed  to  have 
a  stronger  relationship  with  financial  capability.  It  is  reasonable  that  the  companies  with 
more  capital  have  more  power  when  negotiating  with  their  partners. 
Next,  we  turn  to  analyze  the  relationship  between  the  factors  of  bargaining  power  and 
the  sales  volume  of  host  country  parents.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.3.9. 
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Table  6.2.3.9  ANOVA  Test  of  Factors  of  Bargaining  Power  and  Sales  Volumes  of  Host  Country 
Parents 
Sales  volumes  of  host  country  parents 
Factors  less  than  NT$501- 
NT$5  001  -  more  than  F  Sig. 
NT$500 
000  million  000  5  NT$10,000 
million  , ,  million  million 
Technological 
bili 
2.90  3.14  3.50  3.55  1.1482  0.3330 
capa  ty 
Management  capability  3.83  3.53  3.50  3.36  1.0920  0.3557 
Financial  capability  3.62  4.07  4.21  4.11  4.3518  0.0062* 
Marketing  capability  2.69  2.56  2.52  2.48  0.3526  0.7873 
As  the  results  in  Table  6.2.3.9  show,  there  is  only  one  significant  difference  between  the 
financial  capability  and  the  sales  volume  of  the  host  country  parents.  The  companies 
who  have  higher  sales  volume  seemed  to  have  a  higher  relationship  with  financial 
capability  power.  This  result  is  very  similar  to  the  relationship  between  the  capital  of  the 
host  country  parents  and  the  factors  of  bargaining  power. 
Thirdly,  the  relation  between  the  employee  numbers  of  host  country  parents  and  the 
factors  of  bargaining  power  was  tested.  The  result  is  shown  in  Table  6.2.3.10. 
Table  6.2.3.10  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Factors  of  Bargaining  Power  and  Employee  Numbers  of  Host 
Country  Parents 
Employee  numbers  o  f  host  country  parents 
Factors  less  than 
200 
201-500  501-1000  more  than 
1000 
F  Sig. 
Technological  capability  2.74  3.27  3.56  3.49  1.6598  0.1799 
Management  capability  3.64  3.57  3.54  3.37  0.5511  0.6485 
Financial  capability  4.06  4.02  3.90  4.13  1.0023  0.3947 
Marketing  capability  2.54  2.67  2.54  2.48  0.3689  0.7756 
From  Table  6.2.3.10,  the  results  reveal  that  there  are  no  significant  differences  between 
the  factors  of  bargaining  power  and  the  employee  numbers  of  host  country  parents. 
In  summary,  the  size  of  host  country  parents  which  relate  to  capital,  sales  volume  and  the 
number  of  employees  do  not  have  a  significant  relationship  with  sources  of  bargaining 
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power.  There  is  only  one  exception,  i.  e.,  the  financial  capability  and  sales  volume  of  host 
country  parents  had  a  significant  association.  Taiwanese  companies  who  have  higher 
sales  volume  seemed  to  have  a  stronger  relationship  with  financial  capability  with  regard 
to  bargaining  power. 
6.2.3.2.3  Age  of  Host  Country  Parents 
This  subsection  conducted  the  relationship  analysis  between  the  ages  of  the  host  country 
parents  and  factors  of  bargaining  power.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.3.11. 
Table  6.2.3.11  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Factors  of  BareaininLy  Power  and  Aces  of  Host  Country  Parents 
Age  of  host  count  ry  parents 
Factors  6-10  11-20  21-30  more  than  30  F  Sig. 
1-5  years 
years  years  years  years 
Technological 
3  25  3  38  70  2  04  3  56  3  1.4478  0.2232 
capability  .  .  .  .  . 
Management 
75  2  3  75  70  3  3  67  40  3  1.0504  0.3848 
capability  .  .  .  .  . 
Financial 
83  2  4  00  4  24  3  99  06  4  3.5917  0.0086* 
capability  .  .  .  .  . 
Marketing 
2  33  2  67  2  47  2  54  2  55  0.1179  0.9759 
cap  abili  .  .  .  .  . 
As  the  results  of  Table  6.2.3.1  show,  there  is  only  one  significant  difference  between  the 
bargaining  power  of  financial  capability  and  the  ages  of  the  host  country  parents.  The 
result  is  similar  to  the  sales  volume  and  the  number  of  employees.  The  companies  who 
are  older  have  a  stronger  relationship  with  the  bargaining  power  of  financial  capability. 
To  review  it  as  a  whole,  the  results  reveal  that  there  are  no  associations  between 
bargaining  power  and  capital,  and  the  Taiwanese  parent's  employee  numbers,  and  the 
ages  of  host  country  parents.  There  are  only  a  few  exceptions  namely  the  industry  group 
and  the  age  of  the  host  country  parents.  A  summary  of  the  analysis  results  between 
bargaining  power  and  the  sample  characteristics  is  provided  in  Table  6.2.3.12. 
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Table  6.23.12  Summary  of  the  Relations  between  the  Bargaining  Power  ani  Samnle  rharacterictinc 
Bargaining  Power 
Sample  Characteristics  Technological  Management 
inancial  capability  F  Marketing 
capability  capability  capability 
Industry  groups  F=19.190  F=18  487  503  F=5 
Manufacturing  group 
p=0.0000* 
. 
p=0.0000* 
. 
p=0.0204* 
No  association 
Service  group 
Sizes 
Sales  volume  No  association  No  association  F=6.606  p=0.0004*  No  association 
Capital  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association 
Number  of  employees  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association 
Age 
Host  country  parents  No  association  No  association  F=3.592  =0.0086*  No  association 
On  the  basis  of  the  above  results,  there  is  little  evidence  in  the  study  of  any  statistical 
variation  in  the  sources  of  bargaining  power  across  the  characteristics  of  the  sample. 
The  major  exception  is  the  industries  in  which  Taiwan  parents  are  involved.  Different 
industries  have  different  core  competitive  advantages;  therefore,  companies  focus  on 
different  characteristics  and  different  resources.  The  results  of  this  study  show  that  the 
possible  sources  of  bargaining  power  are  different  between  industry  groups.  The 
bargaining  power  is  more  affected  by  technological  capability  in  the  manufacturing  group, 
while  it  is  more  affected  by  management  capability  and  financial  capability  in  the  service 
group.  Apart  from  financial  capability,  however,  there  appears  to  be  no  other  significant 
differences  between  the  factors  of  bargaining  power  and  the  age  of  the  host  country 
parents.  Next,  we  turned  to  analyze  the  dimension  of  resource  contributions. 
6.2.4  Empirical  Results  of  Resource  Contributions 
In  Chapter  5.4,  several  categorisations  of  resource  types  have  been  discussed  in  this 
study  in  relation  to  relevant  literature.  There  is  a  wide  range  of  resources  that  each 
parent  might  contribute  to  a  joint  venture  and  each  type  of  resource  potentially  provides 
a  different  source  of  power  and  different  scope  of  influence.  This  study  gathers  together 
the  most  common  variables  to  measure  the  contributions  of  the  host  country  parents  and 
foreign  parents.  The  resources  contributed  by  parents  are  classified  into  five  categories 
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viz,  physical  resources,  invisible  resources,  financial  resources,  human  resources,  and 
organisation  ability  resources. 
This  section  considers  the  resource  contributions  from  both  parents.  The  relative 
importance  of  a  set  of  resources  is  identified  first.  The  relation  between  resource 
contribution  by  both  parents  and  a  number  of  characteristics  of  the  sample  are  tested. 
The  results  of  this  empirical  survey  are  described  in  the  following  subsections. 
6.2.4.1  Resource  Contributions  by  Parents 
This  subsection  first  demonstrates  the  resource  contributions  by  host  country  parents  and 
foreign  parents.  The  rank  order  of  resource  contributions  by  parents  is  shown  in  Table 
6.2.4.1. 
Table  6.2.4.1  Rank  Order  of  reccmrce  contributions  by  Nnct  Country  Parents  and  Foreign  Parents 
Taiwanese  parent  Foreign  parent 
Variables 
Mean  Std  Rank  Mean  Std  Rank 
1.  Financial  resource  3.51  1.01  6  3.81  0.87  1 
2.  Key  components  and  raw  material  1.48  1.51  14  3.42  1.73  5 
3.  Land,  machinery,  equipment  1.78  1.51  12  2.46  1.51  13 
4.  Providing  high-level  expertise  3.15  1.06  8  3.05  1.08  9 
5.  Marketing  and  operation  ability  3.62  1.12  4  3.32  1.18  6 
6.  Marketing  channel  3.97  1.23  3  2.67  0.87  12 
7.  Technological  or  R&D  ability  1.75  1.44  13  2.97  1.44  10 
8.  Access  to  external  capital  3.51  0.83  5  3.25  0.82  7 
9.  Expertise  of  employees  2.72  1.08  9  3.25  1.12  8 
10.  Access  to  public  relation  with  local  government  4.35  0.53  1  1.63  0.52  14 
11.  Access  to  environmental  knowledge  4.11  0.96  2  2.91  0.82  11 
12.  Sharing  brands  or  patent  2.20  1.33  10  3.58  1.24  2 
13.  Sharing  know-how  1.87  1.29  11  3.43  1.20  4 
14.  Sharing  the  knowledge  of  management  3.37  0.98  7  3.45  1.14  3 
16.  In  general,  what  degree  is  contributed  by  each 
partner? 
3.75  1.12  3.85  0.99 
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From  the  results  in  Table  6.2.4.1,  for  the  host  country  parents,  "Access  to  public  relation 
with  the  local  government"  and  "Access  to  environmental  knowledge"  are  the  most 
significant  resources  which  contributed  to  the  joint  venture.  One  reason  that 
international  joint  ventures  are  formed  is  because  foreign  companies  want  to  expand  into 
overseas  markets.  However,  they  might  not  be  familiar  with  the  local  environment  of  the 
host  country;  therefore,  they  try  to  cooperate  with  a  local  company.  Thus,  local  parents 
usually  play  an  important  role  in  access  to  local  government  and  knowledge  of  the  local 
environment.  The  results  of  this  empirical  survey  are  consistent  with  the  results  of 
UNCTC  (1987)  and  Inkpen  and  Beamish  (1997).  The  local  partner's  contributions  are 
more  on  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  and  the  access  to  government  relation. 
In  addition,  the  results  show  that  the  least  resources  contributed  by  host  country  parents 
are  "Key  components  and  raw  material"  and  "Technological  or  R&D  ability".  Taiwan  is 
a  small  island  and  doesn't  have  natural  resources;  therefore,  most  Taiwanese  companies 
import  raw  material  from  other  countries.  For  some  industries,  the  key  components  are 
also  controlled  by  other  foreign  companies;  for  example,  Japanese  companies  control  the 
key  motor  components  of  the  motor  industry.  Most  Taiwanese  companies  have  very 
strong  strengths  in  manufacturing,  but  have  weaknesses  in  technology  or  R&D  ability. 
Thus,  they  would  cooperate  with  foreign  companies  to  obtain  or  improve  their 
technology  or  R&D  ability. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  first  three  resources  contributed  by  foreign  parents  are  "financial 
resources",  "sharing  brands  or  patent"  and  "sharing  the  knowledge  of  management". 
Foreign  parents  from  the  developed  countries  usually  have  a  very  strong  financial 
capability,  technological  capability,  and  global  brands.  Technology,  brands  and  patent, 
management  knowledge  are  the  most  important  resources  for  developing  countries. 
Therefore,  forming  an  international  joint  venture  is  a  useful  method  to  fit  each  other's 
demand  and  in  turn  to  benefit  from  the  complementarity.  The  results  of  this  survey  are 
consistent  with  the  results  of  Wu  (1994)  and  Chang  (1986).  Host  country  parents 
contribute  more  resources  with  regard  to  the  local  market  and  their  main  objectives  are 
obtaining  the  foreign  parent's  technology  and  brands  or  patent. 
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The  above  discussion  shows  that  the  analysis  of  resource  contribution  is  based  on  the 
rank  order  of  each  variable.  The  Paired-Samples  test  is  used  to  test  whether  the  resource 
contribution  by  each  parent  has  a  significant  difference.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table 
6.2.4.2. 
Table  6.2.4.2  Paired-Samples  Tests  of  Resource  Contribution  by  Host  Country  Parents  and  Foreign 
Pnrrnic 
Paired  Differences 
Si  2-t  il  d  Variables 
Mean  Std.  Dev. 
t  g.  (  a  e  ) 
1.  Financial  resource  -0.30  1.50  -2.12  0.0365* 
2.  Key  components  and  raw  material  -1.94  2.17  -9.53  0.0000* 
3.  Land,  machinery,  equipment  -0.68  1.87  -3.86  0.0002* 
4.  Providing  high-level  expertise  0.10  1.69  0.61  0.5441 
5.  Marketing  and  operation  ability  0.31  1.94  1.69  0.0942 
6.  Marketing  channel  1.31  1.54  9.09  0.0000* 
7.  Technology  or  R&D  ability  -1.23  1.62  -8.10  0.0000* 
8.  Access  to  external  capital  0.25  1.22  2.23  0.0277* 
9.  Expertise  of  employees  -0.53  1.73  -3.26  0.0015* 
10.  Access  to  public  relation  with  local 
government 
2.72  0.76  38.28  0.  ()()()()* 
11.  Access  to  environmental  knowledge  1.20  1.31  9.78  0.0000* 
12.  Sharing  brands  or  patent  -1.38  1.96  -7.50  0.0000* 
13.  Sharing  Know-how 
-1.56  1.85  -9.02  0.0()00* 
14.  Sharing  the  knowledge  of  management  -0.08  1.73  -0.49  0.6261 
16.  In  general,  what  degree  is  contributed  by 
each  partner'? 
4l  11  1.71  -0.66  0.5113 
From  Table  6.2.4.2,  we  could  find  that  most  of  the  variables  are  significant  except 
"Providing  high-level  expertise",  "Marketing  and  operating  ability",  "Sharing  the 
knowledge  of  management"  and  "In  general,  what  degree  is  contributed  by  each 
partner?  "  These  results  indicate  that  the  host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents 
contribute  different  degrees  of  resources  into  joint  ventures.  As  to  prior  discussion,  the 
host  country  parents  concentrate  on  the  relationship  with  local  government  and  local 
markets,  while  foreign  parents  contribute  more  in  financial  resources  and  brands  or 
patents. 
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On  the  other  hand,  there  are  no  significant  differences  on  human  resources,  marketing 
and  operating  ability,  or  management  knowledge.  However,  both  parents  might  focus  on 
different  issues.  For  example,  foreign  parents  might  contribute  high-level  managers  or 
special  experts  to  joint  ventures,  but  the  host  country  parents  provide  more  resources  on 
basic  management  or  day-to-day  management.  Both  contribute  to  human  resources,  but 
in  different  areas.  To  sum  up,  these  results  indicate  that  both  parents  contribute  different 
resources  to  joint  ventures  from  the  complementary  resource  aspect. 
Next,  the  analysis  was  employed  based  on  the  factor  of  resources  contributed  by  host 
country  parents  and  foreign  parents.  The  Paired-Sample  test  is  used  to  test  the 
difference  between  both  parents.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.3  and  Table 
6.2.4.4. 
Table  6243  Faetnrc  of  Recnnrcec  Cnnirihuted  by  Hnst  Cnirnlrv  Parents  and  Foreien  Parents 
Host  country  parents  Foreign  parents 
Factors 
Mean  Std  Rank  Mean  Std  Rank 
Physical  resources  1.63  1.45  5  2.94  1.51  4 
Invisible  resources  2.48  1.11  4  3.49  1.02  2 
Financial  resources  3.51  0.88  2  3.53  0.77  1 
Human  resources  2.93  1.04  3  3.15  1.07  3 
Organization  resources  3.56  0.86  1  2.70  0.70  5 
Table  6.2.4.4  Paired-Sample  Tests  of  Factors  of  Resource  Contribution  by  Host  Country  Parents  and 
Forcien  Parents 
V  i  bl 
Paired  Differences 
2  il  d  Si  ar  a  es 
Mean  Std.  Dev. 
I  -ta  e  )  g.  ( 
Physical  resources  -0.30  1.50  -7.401  0.  ()00* 
Invisible  resources  -1.94  2.17  -6.475  0.000* 
Financial  resources  -0.68  1.87  -0.179  0.858 
Human  resources  O.  10  1.69  -1.382  0.170 
Organization  resources  0.31  1.94  7.831  0.000* 
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From  the  Table  6.2.4.3,  it  is  clear  that  the  host  country  parents  contribute  more  on 
organization  resources,  and  foreign  parents  make  the  least  contribution.  On  the  other 
hand,  foreign  parents  contribute  more  in  invisible  resources,  but  host  country  parents 
have  less  contribution  in  this  area.  In  general,  foreign  parents  have  a  higher  mean  value 
on  resource  contribution,  excepting  the  mean  on  organizational  resources. 
Table  6.2.4.4  shows  that  there  are  significant  differences  in  most  factors  of  resources 
except  financial  resources  and  human  resources.  This  might  be  because  human  resources 
and  financial  resources  are  basic  resources  that  parents  have  to  contribute  to  joint 
ventures.  Therefore,  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  parents  in  financial  and 
human  resources. 
In  summary,  these  results  reveal  that  both  patents  contribute  different  resources  to  joint 
ventures  according  to  their  expert  resources.  Host  country  parents  contribute  more  on 
organizational  resources,  human  resources,  and  local  market  knowledge.  Foreign 
parents  contribute  more  on  the  key  components,  brands  or  patents,  and  technologies. 
Both  parents  contribute  complementary  resources  to  joint  ventures  and  benefit  from  the 
synergy  of  cooperation.  Next,  we  tested  the  relationship  between  resource  contributions 
and  sample  characteristics. 
6.2.4.2  Resource  Contributions  and  Characteristics  of  Sample 
The  main  goals  of  this  subsection  are  to  analyze  the  variance  between  the  resource 
contribution  by  parents  and  the  sample  characteristics  including  regions,  industry,  size 
and  age  of  the  host  country  parents.  The  analysis  is  conducted  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  the 
factors  of  resource  contribution  are  examined  over  a  number  of  characteristics  of  the 
sample.  Secondly,  the  relationship  between  the  factors  of  resources  and  the 
characteristics  of  the  sample  are  described.  The  relative  statistical  methods  are  used  to 
test  their  relationship. 
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6.2.4.2.1  Regions 
This  subsection  attempted  to  test  whether  foreign  parents  from  different  origins  would 
contribute  different  resources  into  joint  ventures.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.5. 
Table  6.2.4.5  ANOVA  Test  between  Cnntrihutinn  of  Foreign  Parents  and  Rehinns 
Regions  of  Foreign  Parents 
Factors 
Asian  countries 
American 
countries 
European 
countries 
F  Sig. 
F_Physical  resources  3.1364  2.8636  2.0333  3.5143  0.0331 
F  Invisible  resources  3.3939  3.7727  3.5333  1.1961  0.3062 
F  Financial  resources  3.4545  3.6591  3.7333  1.2128  0.3013 
F 
_Human 
resources  3.0649  3.2727  3.4000  0.8002  0.4518 
F_Organization 
resources 
2.7273  2.6727  2.6000  0.2257  0.7983 
The  results  reveal  that  there  is  only  one  significant  difference  between  the  resource  factor 
contributed  by  foreign  parents  and  the  origin  of  foreign  parents.  From  Table  6.2.4.5,  we 
find  that  foreign  parents  from  Asian  countries  had  more  contributions  in  physical 
resources  than  those  from  American  or  European  countries.  Although  other  factors  have 
no  significant  differences  in  relation  to  the  origins  of  foreign  parents,  the  results  showed 
that  foreign  parents  from  American  countries  had  a  higher  contribution  in  invisible 
resources  and  parents  from  European  countries  had  a  higher  contribution  in  financial 
resources. 
These  results  are  consistent  with  the  background  of  Taiwan,  in  that  Taiwan  has  a  closer 
relationship  with  America  and  has  greater  cooperative  experience  with  American 
companies.  Most  American  companies  contributed  more  in  brands  or  patent  when  they 
cooperated  with  Taiwanese  companies.  For  parents  who  are  from  European  countries, 
they  contributed  more  in  financial  resources.  The  reasons  as  discussed  before  might  be 
the  distance  and  the  cultural  differences  between  countries. 
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6.2.4.2.2  Industry 
This  subsection  conducted  an  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  industry  groups  and 
resource  contribution  by  host  country  parents.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.6. 
Table  6.2.4.6  t-Test  between  Contribution  Factors  of  Host  Countrv  Parent  and  Industry  Groun 
F 
Industry 
Si  actors 
Manufacturing  group  Service  group 
t  g. 
Physical  resources  1.9765  0.6207  22.6794  0.0000* 
Invisible  resources  2.6078  2.1034  4.6498  0.0332* 
Financial  resources  3.4529  3.6724  1.3416  0.2492 
Human  resources  3.0000  2.7414  1.3520  0.2474 
Organization  resources  3.6588  3.2759  4.3860  0.0385* 
There  are  significant  differences  between  the  industry  groups  and  the  physical  resources, 
invisible  resources  and  organizational  resources  that  the  host  country  parents  contributed. 
In  part  of  the  results  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  financial  resources  or  human 
resources. 
The  results  reveal  that  host  country  parents  who  are  in  the  manufacturing  group,  have 
higher  resource  contributions  to  the  joint  venture  than  parents  from  the  service  group. 
Thus,  the  manufacturing  group  has  a  higher  resource  contribution  on  all  the  resource 
factors  excepting  financial  resources.  They  also  have  significant  differences  in  physical 
resources,  invisible  resources  and  organizational  resources. 
Although  there  is  no  difference  in  financial  resources,  the  result  shows  that  the  service 
industry  received  a  higher  financial  contribution  than  the  manufacturing  group.  The 
reason  might  be  because  the  service  industry  is  not  largely  involved  in  productive 
equipments  or  visible  assets,  it  is  mainly  involved  in  the  investment  of  money. 
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6.2.4.2.3  Size  of  Host  Country  Parents 
This  subsection  conducted  the  relationship  analysis  between  the  size  of  the  host  country 
parents  and  their  resource  contributions  to  joint  ventures.  The  size  of  the  host  country 
parents  is  discussed  separately  in  relation  to  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of 
employees.  The  ANOVA  test  was  executed.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.7, 
Table  6.2.4.8  and  Table  6.2.4.9  and  are  discussed  separately  below. 
Table  6.2.4.7  ANOVA  Test  of  Contribution  Factors  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  the  Capital  of  Host 
C'nnntnv  Parente 
Capital  of  host  country  parents 
Factors  less  than 
NT$50() 
million 
NT$501  - 
, 
000  million  5,000 
NT$5,001  - 
million 
more  than 
NT$10,000 
million 
F  Sig. 
Physical  resources  1.4444  1.3023  2.0313  1.9324  1.8260  0.1466 
Invisible  resources  2.1481  2.2248  2.7083  2.8378  2.9742  0.0348* 
Financial  resources  3.4444  3.3372  3.7813  3.6216  1.2939  0.2802 
Human  resources  3.1389  2.6628  2.9063  3.1622  1.8610  0.1404 
Organization  resources  3.3889  3.3860  3.6875  3.7946  1.8897  0.1355 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.7,  there  is  only  one  significant  difference  between  the  invisible 
factor  and  the  capital  of  the  host  country  parents.  Apart  from  invisible  resources, 
however,  there  appears  to  be  no  other  significant  differences  between  the  resource 
factors  of  contribution  and  the  capital  of  the  host  country  parents. 
When  we  compare  the  mean  value  among  the  capital  groups  of  the  host  country  parents, 
there  is  a  significant  difference  between  the  capital  in  the  "less  than  NT$5,000  million 
group  and  those  in  the  more  than  NT$  5,000  million  group.  The  companies  with  higher 
capital  contribute  more  on  invisible  resources.  These  results  reveal  that  the  companies 
who  have  higher  capital  contributed  more  on  invisible  resources.  One  possible  reason 
might  be  because  the  brands  or  patents  always  are  supported  by  the  companies  who  have 
the  ability  and  resources  to  develop  these  invisible  assets.  In  the  business  world,  the 
brands  or  patents  always  cost  a  lot  of  money  to  build.  This  result  implies  that  the 
companies  who  have  the  ability  to  contribute  these  invisible  resources  are  the  big 
companies  of  high  reputation  in  the  world. 
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The  results  of  the  ANOVA  test  relating  to  the  resource  factors  and  sales  volumes  of  host 
country  parents  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.8. 
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Table  6.2.4.8  ANOVA  Test  of  Contribution  Factors  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  the  Sales  Volumes  of 
Hnct  ('nuntrv  Parents 
Sales  volumes  of  host  country  parents 
Factors  less  than 
NT$500 
million 
NT$501  - 
5"000  million 
NT$5,001  - 
10.000 
million 
more  than 
NT$  10,000 
million 
F  Sig. 
Physical  resources  1.4333  1.1216  2.0000  1.9783  3.0111  0.0332  * 
Invisible  resources  2.1333  2.0450  2.7083  2.8623  4.9313  0.0030  * 
Financial  resources  3.3000  3.1757  4.0625  3.6522  5.0279  0.0026  * 
Human  resources  3.0000  2.5405  3.1250  3.1630  2.8658  0.0399  * 
I  Organization  resources  3.2533  3.3027  3.7375  3.8087  3.4355  0.0195  * 
The  results  show  that  there  are  significant  differences  between  all  the  resource  factors 
and  the  sales  volume  of  the  host  country  parents.  These  results  indicate  that  the 
companies  who  have  higher  sales  volumes  contributed  more  resources  to  joint  ventures. 
The  higher  sales  volumes  of  the  host  country  parents,  the  higher  ability  and  more 
resources  they  have,  therefore,  the  big  companies  contribute  more  resources  to  a  joint 
venture 
The  results  of  the  ANOVA  tests  relating  to  the  resource  factors  and  employee  numbers 
of  the  host  country  parents  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.9.  As  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.9,  part 
of  the  result  is  significant  differences  between  the  resources  factors  and  the  employee 
numbers  of  the  host  country  parents.  The  significant  factors  are  physical  resources, 
invisible  resources  and  organizational  resources.  There  are  no  differences  in  financial 
resources  and  human  resources.  In  general,  no  matter  whether  it  is  significant  or  not,  the 
companies  who  have  more  employees  contributed  more  resources  into  joint  ventures. 
These  results  indicate  that  the  bigger  companies  have  greater  ability  to  contribute 
resources  to  their  joint  ventures. 
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Table  6.2.4.9  ANOVA  Test  of  Contribution  Factors  of  Host  Country  Parents  and  the  Employee 
Number  of  Host  Country  Parents 
Employee  number  of  host  country  parents 
Factors  less  than 
200 
201  -500  501-1000  more  than 
1000 
F  Sig. 
Physical  resources  0.8095  1.2500  1.9167  2.0319  4.7120  0.0039  * 
Invisible  resources  1.7302  2.1515  2.7500  2.8298  6.8341  0.0003  * 
Financial  resources  3.3810  3.2500  3.4375  3.7234  1.7935  0.1526 
Human  resources  2.6429  2.5909  3.0417  3.1702  2.3387  0.0774 
Organization  resources  3.0762  3.2455  3.6583  3.8766  6.1191  0.0007* 
In  summary,  the  size  of  host  country  parents  relating  to  capital,  sales  volume  and  the 
number  of  employees,  has  a  significant  influence  on  the  resource  contribution,  especially, 
the  sales  volume  of  parents.  These  results  indicate  that  bigger  companies  with  higher 
capability  and  resources  seemed  to  have  more  abilities  and  resources  to  support  their 
joint  ventures. 
6.2.4.2.4  Ages  of  Host  Country  Parents 
This  subsection  conducted  the  relationship  analysis  between  the  ages  of  the  host  country 
parents  and  the  resources  contributions  of  host  country  parents.  The  results  of  the 
ANOVA  tests  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.4.10. 
As  Table  6.2.4.10,  shows  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the  resource 
contributions  and  the  ages  of  the  host  country  parents.  Therefore,  it  was  concluded  that 
the  resource  contributions  of  the  host  country  parents  is  not  associated  with  ages  of  the 
host  country  parents 
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Table  6.2.4.10  ANOVA  Test  of  Contribution  Factors  of  Taiwanese  Parent  and  Age  of  Host  Country 
Parents 
Age  of  host  country  parents 
Factors 
1-5  years  6-10  years  11-20  years  21-30  years 
more  than 
30  years 
F  Sig. 
Physical  resources  3.5000  1.1250  1.0000  1.5833  1.7609  1.8758  0.1198 
Invisible  resources  2.8333  3.0000  2.0000  2.3472  2.5894  1.2463  0.2957 
Financial  resources  4.0000  3.5000  3.3667  3.2708  3.6087  0.9067  0.4628 
Human  resources  4.2500  3.8750  2.6667  2.7708  2.9565  2.1197  0.0832 
Organization 
resources 
4.0000  4.0500  3.2400  3.4583  3.6261  1.1589  0.3330 
In  sum,  the  age  of  the  host  country  parents  does  not  affect  the  resource  contributions  of 
host  country  parents  to  joint  ventures. 
On  the  whole,  the  results  of  this  empirical  survey  reveal  that  there  are  some  associations 
between  contribution  factors,  and  some  of  the  sample  characteristics  such  as  Taiwanese 
parent's  size.  A  summary  of  analysis  results  is  provided  in  Table  6.2.4.11. 
Table  6.2.4.11  Summary  the  Relations  between  the  Contribution  and  Sample  Characteristics 
Resource  contribut  ion 
Sample  Characteristics 
Physical  Invisible  Finance  Human  Organization 
Regions  of  foreign 
partners  F=3  514  No  No  No  No 
Asian  countries  . 
p=0.0331*  association  association  association  association  American  countries 
European  countries 
Industry  groups 
Manufacturing  t=22.6794  t=4.6498  No  No  t=4.3860 
group  p=0.0000*  p=0.0332*  association  association  p=0.0385* 
Service  group 
Size 
Sales  volumes  F=3.011  F=4.931  F=5.028  F=2.866  F=3.436 
p=0.0332*  p=0.0030*  p=0.0026*  p=0.0399*  p=0.0195* 
Capital  No  F=2.974  No  No  No 
association  p=0.0348*  association  association  association 
Number  of  employees  F=4.712  F=6.834  No  No  F=6.120 
-0.0039*  =0.0003*  association  association  =0.0007* 
Age  No  No  No  No  No 
Host  ntry  parents  association  association  association  association  association 
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On  the  basis  of  the  above  results,  there  is  some  evidence  of  statistical  variation  with 
respect  to  the  resource  contribution  factors  and  sample  characteristics.  The  results 
reveal  that  foreign  parents  from  Asian  countries  make  more  contribution  on  physical 
resources  than  those  from  American  or  European  countries.  The  results  also  show  that 
the  host  country  parents  in  the  manufacturing  group  had  a  higher  resource  contribution 
to  the  joint  venture  than  the  parents  from  the  service  group. 
The  size  of  the  host  country  parents  relating  to  capital,  sales  volume,  and  the  number  of 
employees  had  a  significant  influence  on  the  resource  contribution,  especially  on  the  sales 
volume  of  the  parents;  and  also  the  sales  volumes  of  the  host  country  parents.  The 
higher  sales  volumes  of  the  host  country  parents  meant  that  they  had  higher  ability  the 
more  resources  they  own,  in  this  case,  the  big  companies  are  willing  to  contribute  more 
resources  to  joint  ventures.  Next,  we  turn  to  analyze  the  dimension  of  motivation  for 
forming  international  joint  ventures. 
6.2.5  Empirical  Results  of  the  Motivation  for  International  Joint 
Venture  Formation 
The  main  objectives  of  this  section  are  to  analyze  the  motives  for  the  formation  of  an 
international  joint  venture.  The  relative  importance  of  a  set  of  motives  is  identified  in 
chapter  S.  S.  In  this  section,  the  relative  importance  of  different  motives  as  held  by 
Taiwanese  enterprises,  is  discussed  first.  Factor  analysis  of  many  motives  for 
international  joint  venture  formation  is  presented  in  the  second  subsection.  The 
relationship  between  motivation  and  a  number  of  characteristics  of  the  sample  is  tested 
and  indicated  in  relevant  subsections. 
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6.2.5.1  The  Relative  Importance  of  Motivation  for  International  Joint  Venture 
Formation 
This  subsection  aims  to  indicate  what  motives  for  international  joint  venture  formation 
assumed  the  greatest  importance  for  Taiwanese  enterprises.  The  rank  order  of  motives 
for  forming  the  international  joint  venture  is  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.1. 
Tahh  f2S1  Rank  (ln1r  r  of  Mntivatinn  of  Tnternatinnnl  Mint  Ventures 
Variables  Mean  Std  Rank 
6.  Extending  the  range  of  products  and  service  3.89  0.87  1 
11.  Facilitating  diversified  development  3.89  0.93  2 
5.  Expanding  the  market  and  entering  new  markets  3.75  0.85  3 
21.  Acquiring  partner's  brands  or  patents  3.75  1.20  4 
10.  Maintaining  or  improving  the  competitive  position  3.70  0.62  5 
20.  Sharing  partner's  resource  3.68  0.63  6 
18.  Acquiring  low  cost  materials  and  components  3.59  1.44  7 
25.  Technology  transfer  3.13  1.62  8 
24.  Acquiring  technology  3.12  1.62  9 
8.  Acquiring  the  economies  of  scale  of  production  and  sale  3.09  0.82  10 
14.  Improving  new  product  design  ability  from  partner  3.05  0.81  11 
22.  Acquiring  partner's  manufacturing  equipment  and  technology  3.03  1.49  12 
19.  Acquiring  sufficient  capital  3.01  0.68  13 
15.  Learning  management  knowledge  2.96  1.05  14 
7.  Reducing  competition  2.91  0.69  15 
13.  Learning  marketing  knowledge  2.82  1.06  16 
17.  Learning  partner's  manufacturing  technology  2.79  1.20  17 
23.  Improving  ability  on  developing  new  technology  2.77  1.44  18 
3.  Reducing  the  risk  caused  by  environment  uncertainty  2.60  0.75  19 
2.  Spreading  the  risk  of  finance  2.58  0.82  20 
12.  Learning  international  business  knowledge  2.58  0.85  21 
4.  Sharing  the  risk  of  the  business  cycle  2.55  0.77  22 
9.  Conforming  to  government  policy  2.48  0.64  23 
1.  Sharing  a  large  sum  of  fixed  costs  2.47  0.79  24 
26.  Shortening  the  time  from  the  product  designment  to  market  entry  2.36  1.21  25 
16.  Learning  partner's  human  resource  management  2.18  0.67  26 
From  the  results  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.1,  the  most  important  motives  are  "Extending  the 
range  of  products  and  service",  "Facilitating  diversified  development",  "Expanding  the 
market  and  entering  new  markets",  and  "Acquiring  partner's  brands  or  patents".  The 
mean  values  are  3.89  and  3.75.  These  motives  range  between  "important"  and  "fairly 
important".  This  indicates  that  market  expansion  and  diversified  development  were 
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considered  fairly  important  motives  for  Taiwanese  enterprises  to  form  an  international 
joint  venture.  The  results  are  consistent  with  those  found  in  previous  empirical  studies 
(Lin,  1995;  Beamish  et  al,  1994;  Datta,  1988;  Daniels  et  al.,  1985). 
The  least  important  variables  are  "Learning  partner's  human  resource  management"  with 
the  mean  value  of  2.18.  These  results  indicate  that  human  resource  management  is  not 
an  important  variable  for  Taiwanese  companies  when  they  consider  cooperating  with 
foreign  companies.  The  reason  might  be  because  the  human  resource  management  must 
fit  the  local  situation  and  cannot  be  copied  from  other  companies  without  any  adjustment. 
Thus,  the  human  resource  management  variable  is  not  important  to  Taiwanese  companies. 
All  the  motives  are  identified  from  the  relevant  studies;  however,  this  shows  too  many 
variables  on  the  motivation  for  international  joint  venture  formation.  From  the  review  of 
the  literature,  we  find  that  various  authors  use  a  broadly  similar  set  of  motivation 
variables.  Consequently,  these  26  motives  represent  a  number  of  overlapping 
perspectives  on  the  motivation  for  international  joint  venture  formation.  In  order  to  have 
a  clearer  profile  of  motivation,  factor  analysis  was  employed  to  identify  a  smaller  number 
of  motives  for  this  sample.  The  following  subsection  indicates  the  factor  analysis  of 
motivation. 
6.2.5.2  Factor  Analysis  of  Motivations 
The  potential  conceptual  and  statistical  overlapping  factor  analysis  was  launched  to 
identify  the  structure  underpinning  the  motivation  for  international  joint  venture 
formation.  This  subsection  deals  with  the  factor  analysis  of  the  motivation  for 
international  joint  venture  formation.  This  analysis  summarizes  the  important 
information  contained  in  the  26  variables  into  a  smaller  set  of  new  factors  with  a 
minimum  loss  of  information.  Principal  components  analysis  is  used  to  extract  a  new  set 
of  core  data.  The  rotated  principal  components  analysis  factor  loading  matrix  for 
motives  is  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.2. 
271 Chapter  6 
272 Chapter  6 
Table  6.2.5.2  The  Eigenvalue  after  Rotation  and  Iteration  of  Motivation  for  International  Joint 
Venture  Fnrmatinn 
Factor  Eigenvalue  %  of  Variable  Cumulated 
1  6.02  23.15  23.15 
2  3.91  15.06  38.20 
3  3.32  12.76  50.97 
4  3.12  12.00  62.97 
5  2.85  10.95  73.92 
6  2.25  8.64  82.56 
The  factor  analysis  results  for  motives  of  international  joint  venture  formation  indicated 
that  the  six  extracted  factors  account  for  82.56  %  of  the  total  variance  for  the  motivation. 
Each  factor  of  these  six  extracted  factors  has  an  Eigenvalue  greater  than  1. 
In  order  to  achieve  a  clearer  factor  structure,  the  Varimax  method  is  used  to  rotate  the 
initial  factor  solution.  The  Varimax  rotated  analysis  factor  loading  matrix  for  the 
motivation  is  presented  in  Table  6.2.5.3.  Each  of  these  six  extracted  factors  has  different 
factor  loadings  for  each  variable.  A  factor  loading  of  greater  than  ±o.  5  is  considered  as 
significant.  All  the  factor  loadings  are  greater  than  0.6.  These  results  indicate  that  all  the 
factor  loadings  are  significant. 
After  consideration  of  the  significance  of  the  factor  loadings,  the  reliability  of  each  factor 
construct  was  tested  using  the  Cronbach  coefficient  alpha  in  order  to  measure  the 
internal  consistency  of  each  factor.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.4.  The 
Cronbach  alpha  score  for  each  factor  of  motivation  for  international  joint  venture 
formation  is  greater  than  0.8.  These  results  represent  very  high  internal  consistency  in 
each  factor.  Thus,  we  conclude  that  the  factor  of  motivation  has  very  high  reliability. 
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Table  6.2.5.3  Rotated  Component  Matrix  of  Factor  Analysis  of  Motivation  for  International  Joint 
Venture  Formation 
Variables  Factor  1  Factor  2  Factor  3  Factor  4  Factor  5  Factor  6 
24.  Acquiring  technology  0.9528  -0.1337  -0.0181  0.0554  0.1577  -0.0975 
25.  Technology  transfer  0.9491  -0.1499  -0.0195  0.0644  0.1617  -0.1237 
23.  Improving  ability  on  developing 
0.9491  -0.0397  -0.0126  0.1030  0.1492  -0.1120  new  technology 
22.  Acquiring  partner's  manufacturing  0  9315  -0.1294  -0.0418  0.0880  0.2216  -0.0826  equipment  and  technology  . 
17.1-earning  partner's  manufacturing  0  9220  0.0016  -0.0349  0.1073  0.0102  0.0278 
technology  . 
26.  Shortening  the  time  from  the  0.8958  -0.0141  0.0295  0.1343  0.1494  -0.1006  product  design  to  market  entry 
15.  Learning  management  knowledge 
-0.1807  0.9098  0.0883  0.0309  -0.0331  0.0438 
13.  Learning  marketing  knowledge 
-0.2105  0.9070  0.0677  0.0643  -0.1268  0.0886 
12.  Learning  international  business 
-0.0879  0.8912  0.0232  0.0387  -0.1953  0.1264 
knowledge 
16.  Learning  partner's  human  resource  0.0057  0.8546  0.1406  0.0747  0.0258  0.0631 
management 
14.  Improving  new  product  design 
0  5481  0  6297  -0  0216  0.1522  0.0708  -0.0387 
ability  from  partner  .  .  . 
2.  Spreading  the  risk  of  finance  0.0072  0.0686  0.9200  -0.0547  0.0074  0.1308 
1.  Sharing  a  large  sum  of  fixed  costs  0.0780  0.0417  0.8866  0.0103  0.0562  0.1319 
4.  Sharing  the  risk  of  business  cycle  -0.0498  0.0797  0.8836  0.0871  -0.0086  0.0154 
3.  Reducing  the  risk  caused  by 
-0.1021  0.0952  0.8293  0.1427  -0.0729  -0.0131 
environment  uncertainty 
8.  Acquiring  the  economies  of  scale  of  0.1477  0.0007  0.0035  0.9015  0.1155  -0.0796 
production  and  sale 
7.  Reducing  competition  0.1868  0.0268  -0.0068  0.8467  0.0237  0.1069 
9.  Conforming  to  government  policy  0.0635  0.2411  0.1295  0.7519  0.0597  0.2405 
10.  Maintaining  or  improving  the  0.1284  0.0378  0.0973  0.7255  -0.0628  0.3700 
competitive  position 
21.  Acquiring  partner's  brands  or  0.2046  -0.0853  -0.2063  0.0144  0.8553  0.0489 
patents 
19.  Acquiring  sufficient  capital  0.0243  0.1127  0.1333  -0.0032  0.7973  -0.0822 
20.  Sharing  partner's  resource  0.2532  -0.1161  0.1410  0.0865  0.7819  0.0427 
18.  Acquiring  low  cost  materials  and  0.3100  -0.3284  -0.1779  0.0393  0.7622  -0.0851 
components 
5.  Expanding  market  and  entering  to 
-0  0872  0.0784  0.0659  0.3989  -0.1290  0.8040 
new  market  , 
6.  Extending  the  range  of  product  and 
-0.1441  0.0254  0.0706  0.4496  -0.1049  0.7939 
service 
11.  Facilitating  diversified  development 
-0.2758  0.2329  0.1784  -0.0840  0.1590  0.7861 
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Table  6.2.5.4  Factor  loadings  and  reliability  of  Factors  of  Motivation  for  International  Joint  Venture 
Formation 
Factor  Variables 
Factor 
loading 
Cronbach 
a 
24.  Acquiring  technology  0.9528 
25.  Technology  transfer  0.9491 
Factor  1 
23.  Improving  ability  on  developing  new  technology 
22.  Acquiring  partner's  manufacturing  equipment  and  technology 
0.9491 
0.9315 
0.9802 
17.  Learning  partner's  manufacturing  technology  0.9220 
26.  Shortening  the  time  from  the  product  design  to  market  entry  0.8958 
15.  Learning  management  knowledge  0.9098 
13.  Learning  marketing  knowledge  0.9070 
Factor  2  12.  Learning  international  business  knowledge  0.8912  0.9005 
16.  Learning  partner's  human  resource  management  0.8546 
14.  Improving  new  product  design  ability  from  partner  0.6297 
2.  Spreading  the  risk  of  finance  0.9200 
1.  Sharing  a  large  sum  of  fixed  costs  0.8866 
0  9117  Factor  3 
4.  Sharing  the  risk  of  business  cycle  0.8836  . 
3.  Reducing  the  risk  caused  by  environment  uncertainty  0.8293 
8.  Acquiring  the  economies  of  scale  of  production  and  sale  0.9015 
7.  Reducing  competition  0.8467 
8641  0  Factor  4 
9.  Conforming  to  government  policy  0.7519  . 
10.  Maintaining  or  improving  the  competitive  position  0.7255 
21.  Acquiring  partner's  brands  or  patents  0.8553 
Factor  5 
19.  Acquiring  sufficient  capital 
20.  Sharing  partner's  resource 
0.7973 
0.7819 
0.8222 
18.  Acquiring  low  cost  materials  and  components  0.7622 
5.  Expanding  the  market  and  entering  a  new  market  0.8040 
Factor  6  6.  Extending  the  range  of  product  and  service  0.7939  0.8380 
11.  Facilitating  diversified  development  0.7861 
After  the  measurement  of  each  factor's  internal  consistency,  we  constructed  the  label  for 
each  factor  according  to  the  meanings  of  the  variables  in  each  factor.  Each  factor  of 
motivation  for  international  joint  venture  formation  is  indicated  in  the  following 
description. 
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Factor  1:  Technological  Acquisition 
Factor  1  has  six  significant  loadings  and  the  variables  are  mainly  related  to  the 
technological  component.  These  variables  are  acquiring  technology,  exchanging  the 
technology  and  transfer,  improving  the  ability  to  develop  new  technology,  acquiring 
partner's  manufacturing  equipment  and  technology,  learning  partner's  manufacturing 
technology,  and  shortening  the  time  from  the  product  design  to  market  entry.  All  these 
variables  have  positive  signs  and  very  high  factor  loading  scores.  This  indicates  the 
technological  capability  is  a  very  important  factor  for  the  motivation  for  forming  an 
international  joint  venture.  Thus,  this  factor  is  labeled  as  "Technological  Acquisition". 
Factor  2:  Knowledge  Learning 
Factor  2  has  five  high  positively  significant  loadings  and  the  variables  are  mainly  related 
to  knowledge  learning  which  includes  learning  management  knowledge,  learning 
marketing  knowledge,  learning  international  business  knowledge,  learning  partner's 
human  resource  management  and  improving  new  product  design  ability  from  partner. 
Thus,  this  factor  is  labeled  as  "Knowledge  Learning". 
Factor  3:  Risk  Sharing 
Factor  3  has  four  significant  loadings  and  the  variables  are  mainly  related  to  the  risk 
sharing  component.  These  variables  are  spreading  the  risk  of  finance,  sharing  a  large 
sum  of  fixed  costs,  sharing  the  risk  of  the  business  cycle  and  reducing  the  risk  caused  by 
environment  uncertainty.  All  these  variables  have  positive  signs.  This  factor  is  therefore 
labeled  as  "Risk  Sharing". 
Factor  4:  Competitive  Strategic  Consideration 
Factor  4  has  four  significant  loadings  and  the  variables  are  mainly  related  to  competitive 
strategy  consideration,  which  includes  acquiring  the  economies  of  scale  of  production 
and  sale,  reducing  competition,  conforming  to  government  policy  and  maintaining  or 
improving  the  competitive  position.  All  these  variables  have  positive  signs.  Thus,  this 
factor  is  labeled  as  "Competitive  Strategic  Consideration". 
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Factor  5:  Resource  Complementarity 
Factor  5  has  four  significant  loadings  and  the  variables  are  mainly  related  to  resource 
acquisition.  These  variables  are  acquiring  partner's  brands  or  patents,  acquiring  sufficient 
capital,  sharing  partner's  resource  and  acquiring  low  cost  materials  and  components.  All 
these  variables  have  positive  signs.  This  factor  is  therefore  labeled  as  "Resource 
Complementarity". 
Factor  6:  Market  Expanding 
Factors  6  has  three  significant  loadings  and  the  variables  are  mainly  related  to  market 
expansion  which  includes  expanding  the  market  and  entering  a  new  market,  extending 
the  range  of  products  and  services  and  facilitating  diversified  development.  All  these 
variables  have  positive  signs.  Thus,  this  factor  is  labeled  as  "Market  Expanding". 
According  to  the  above  factor  analysis,  the  26  variables  were  summarized  into  six  main 
factors,  which  relate  to  the  motives  for  international  joint  venture  formation  in  Taiwan. 
These  are  technological  acquisition,  knowledge  learning,  risk  sharing,  competitive 
strategy  consideration,  resource  complementarity  and  market  expansion.  These  factors 
of  motivation  are  obtained  from  the  factor  analysis  and  each  factor  is  labeled.  The 
relationship  between  the  motivation  factors  and  sample  characteristics  were  tested  and 
are  described  next. 
6.2.5.3  Motivations  and  Characteristics  of  Sample 
The  main  goals  of  this  subsection  are  to  analyze  the  variance  between  the  motivation  for 
international  joint  venture  formation  and  the  characteristics  of  the  sample  which  includes 
regions,  industry,  size,  and  ages  of  the  host  country  parents.  The  analysis  was  conducted 
in  two  ways.  Firstly,  the  factors  of  motivation  for  forming  IJVs  are  examined  over  a 
number  of  characteristics  of  the  sample.  Secondly,  the  relation  between  the  motivation 
factors  and  the  sample  characteristics  are  tested  and  elucidated.  The  relevant  statistical 
methods  were  used  to  test  their  relationship. 
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6.2.5.3.1  Regions 
The  relation  between  the  motivation  factors  of  the  host  country  parents  to  form  the 
international  joint  ventures  and  the  regions  of  foreign  partners  were  tested.  The 
ANOVA  test  was  employed  and  the  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.5. 
Table  6.2.5.5  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Motivation  Factors  and  Regions  of  Foreign  Partners 
Regions  of  foreign  partners 
Factors  Asian 
countries 
American 
countries 
European 
countries 
F  Sig. 
Technological  Acquisition  2.9675  3.2045  1.8556  5.3148  0.0062 
Knowledge  Learning  2.6545  2.7636  2.9600  1.0653  0.3481 
Risk  Sharing  2.4870  2.6250  2.7667  1.1782  0.3117 
Competitive  strategic 
Consideration 
3.0944  3.0795  2.8000  1.5370  0.2196 
Resource  Complementarity  3.5942  3.3182  3.3167  1.3459  0.2645 
Market  Expanding  3.8268  3.8636  3.8889  0.0506  0.9507 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.5,  the  results  reveal  that  there  are  no  significant  differences 
between  the  motivational  factors  of  host  country  parents  and  the  regions  of  foreign 
partners,  except  for  the  technological  acquisition  motivation  factor.  From  the  mean 
value,  we  find  that  at  the  time  when  international  joint  ventures  were  formed  to  acquire 
technologies,  most  of  their  foreign  partners  are  from  American  countries,  followed  by 
Asian  countries.  American  countries  are  viewed  as  the  original  place  of  initial  and  high 
technology  in  the  world,  and  Taiwan  has  a  very  close  relationship  with  them.  Therefore, 
the  results  are  consistent  with  Taiwan's  historical  background  that  some  local  companies 
cooperated  with  American  enterprises  to  acquire  technologies.  For  the  Asian  countries, 
especially  Japan  as  described  in  Chapter  2,  most  Taiwanese  companies  also  have  a  close 
relationship  with  Japanese  companies.  Thus,  host  country  parents  obtained  technologies 
through  cooperation  with  Japanese  firms.  These  results  are  very  consistent  with  the 
background  of  Taiwan's  economic  growth. 
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6.2.5.3.2  Industry 
The  relative  importance  of  different  cooperative  motives  may  be  connected  with  the 
background  industry  of  Taiwanese  parents.  Therefore,  this  subsection  attempts  to  test 
whether  a  different  industry  group  has  different  motives  for  forming  an  international  joint 
venture.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.6. 
Tahle  6  ')  56t  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Mntivatinn  and  Industry  Groan  they  Involved 
Industry 
Si  Factors 
Manufacturing  group  Service  group 
t  g. 
Technological  Acquisition  3.17  1.98  4.3495  0.0000* 
Knowledge  Learning  2.66  2.87  -1.2579  0.2111 
Risk  Sharing  2.51  2.66  -1.0179  0.3109 
Competitive  strategic 
Consideration 
3.12  2.82  2.4702  *  0.0150 
Resource  Complcmentarity  3.58  3.28  1.6343  0.1050 
Market  Expanding  3.75  4.11  -2.2502  0.0264* 
From  the  results  of  t-  test  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.6,  we  find  that  part  of  the  results  have  a 
significant  difference  between  the  industry  groups,  but  on  the  other  hand,  part  of  the 
results  are  not  significant.  The  significant  differences  between  industry  groups  and 
motivation  factors  are  technological  acquisition,  competitive  strategic  consideration  and 
market  expanding.  The  manufacturing  group  has  higher  mean  values  than  the  service 
group  in  terms  of  technological  acquisition  and  strategic  consideration.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  service  group  has  higher  mean  values  than  the  manufacturing  group  in  market 
expansion. 
These  results  explain  that  the  firms  in  the  service  group  view  the  primary  benefit  of 
forming  an  international  joint  venture  as  being  expanding  the  market.  Normally, 
companies  in  the  service  industry  would  not  invest  significantly  in  fixed  assets  and  they 
mostly  conduct  market  expansion  to  achieve  the  firm's  growth.  As  a  result,  firms  in  the 
service  industry  focus  more  on  market  expanding  motives.  On  the  other  hand, 
technological  acquisition  is  the  most  important  issue  for  firms  in  manufacturing  group. 
Most  tacit  technology  could  not  be  obtained  from  the  market.  It  needs  to  be  transferred 
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through  cooperation  with  other  companies.  Thus,  for  manufacturing  companies,  there 
are  incentives  in  technological  acquisition  and  strategic  consideration  motives. 
6.2.5.3.3  Size  of  Host  Country  Parents 
This  subsection  conducted  the  analysis  of  whether  the  motives  for  forming  an 
international  joint  venture  would  be  different  because  of  the  Taiwanese  parent's  size. 
The  size  of  the  host  country  parents  is  discussed  separately  in  relation  to  capital,  sales 
volume,  and  the  number  of  employees.  The  ANOVA  test  was  performed  to  test  their 
relationship.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.7,  Table  6.2.5.8,  and  Table  6.2.5.9 
and  are  indicated  separately  below. 
Table  6.2.5.7  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Motivation  and  Capital 
Capital 
Factors  less  than 
NT$500 
million 
NT$501  - 
5,000  million 
NT$5.001  - 
10.000 
million 
more  than 
NT$  10,000 
million 
F  Sig. 
Technological  Acquisition  2.53  2.73  3.75  2.81  2.8670  0.0399* 
Knowledge  Learning  3.03  2.73  2.50  2.63  1.6572  0.1805 
Risk  Sharing  2.61  2.44  2.47  2.68  0.9130  0.4372 
Competitive  strategic 
Consideration  3.10  2.95  3.16  3.09  0.6951  0.5570 
Resource  Complementaritv  3.22  3.64  3.72  3.39  1.6226  0.1883 
Market  Expanding  4.37  3.64  3.75  3.86  4.1893  0.0075* 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.7,  part  of  the  results  show  a  significant  difference  while  part  of 
the  results  show  no  significant  difference  between  the  motivational  factors  and  the  capital 
of  the  host  country  parents.  There  are  significant  differences  on  technological 
acquisition  and  market  expansion.  For  the  technological  acquisition  factor,  it  shows  that 
the  medium  to  biggest  companies  who  have  capital  between  NT$5,001  to  NT$  10,000 
million,  have  a  higher  mean  value  on  technological  acquisition  motivation.  Those 
companies  who  have  capital  of  less  than  NT$  5,000  million  do  not  seem  to  have  high 
motivation  for  acquiring  technology  when  forming  an  international  joint  venture. 
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For  the  market  expanding  factor,  the  results  show  that  the  smallest  companies  who  just 
have  less  than  NT$  500  million  in  capital  have  the  highest  mean  on  the  market  expanding 
factor.  This  indicates  that  market  expanding  is  the  most  important  motive  to  small  size 
enterprises.  The  reason  might  be  because  small  companies  do  not  have  enough  resources 
and  capability  to  expand  their  business  to  other  areas  or  countries.  Therefore,  they  seem 
to  regard  forming  an  international  joint  venture  as  an  effective  mode  to  expand  their 
market. 
Next,  the  relation  between  the  motivation  factors  and  the  sales  volumes  of  the  host 
country  parents  was  examined.  As  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.8,  there  are  no  significant 
differences  between  the  motivational  factors  of  international  joint  venture  formation  and 
the  sales  volumes  of  host  country  parents.  This  indicates  that  the  amount  of  sales 
volume  of  the  host  country  parents  did  not  affect  their  motives  for  forming  international 
joint  ventures. 
Table  6.2.5.8  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Motivation  and  Sales  Volumes 
Sales  volume 
Factors  less  than  NT$501  -  NT$5,001  -  more  than  F  Sig. 
NT$500  5,000  10,000  NT$10,000 
million  million  million  million 
Technological 
2  56  69  2  3  04  3.05  0.7990  0.4970 
Acquisition  .  .  . 
Knowledge  Learning  3.05  2.78  2.61  2.59  1.6459  0.1830 
Risk  Sharing  2.55  2.61  2.23  2.61  1.3297  0.2684 
Competitive  strategic  3  13  2  90  17  3  09  3  1.2404  0.2986 
Consideration  .  .  .  . 
Resource 
3  08  3  57  59  3  3  56  4521  1  0.2317  Com  lementari  .  .  .  .  . 
Market  Expanding  4.27  3.75  3.73  3.82  1.8785  0.1374 
As  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.9,  the  results  of  the  ANOVA  test  show  that  there  is  only  one 
significant  difference  between  the  motivational  factors  of  international  joint  venture 
formation  and  the  employee  numbers  of  host  country  parents.  The  result  is  similar  to  the 
relationship  between  motivational  factors  and  the  capital  of  host  country  parents.  Small 
size  enterprises  have  more  incentives  for  market  expanding  motivation. 
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Table  625.9  The  ANOVA  Test  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Motivation  and  Number  of  Emulovecs 
Number  of  employees 
Factors  less  than 
200 
201  -500  501-1000  more  than 
1000 
F  Sig. 
Technological  Acquisition  2.54  2.84  2.78  3.07  0.7746  0.5106 
Knowledge  Learning  3.01  2.88  2.60  2.57  2.2548  0.0860 
Risk  Sharing  2.76  2.36  2.43  2.61  1.5556  0.2043 
Competitive  strategic 
Consideration 
3.00  3.07  2.93  3.12  0.6065  0.6121 
Resource  Complementarily  3.37  3.72  3.23  3.61  1.7488  0.1613 
1  Market  Expanding  4.32  3.91  3.51  3.77  4.7676  0.0037* 
In  summary,  the  size  of  host  country  parents  related  to  capital,  sales  volume  and  the 
number  of  employees,  has  little  significant  difference  on  the  motivational  factors  for 
international  joint  venture  formation.  However,  the  results  reveal  that  small  sized 
companies  had  a  higher  incentive  motivation  in  the  market  expanding  factor.  The 
medium  sized  companies  had  more  incentive  on  the  technology  acquisition. 
6.2.5.3.4  Age  of  Host  Country  Parents 
This  subsection  conducted  analysis  on  whether  the  age  of  host  country  parents  would 
affect  the  motives  for  international  joint  venture  formation.  The  results  of  the  ANOVA 
tests  are  shown  in  Table  6.2.5.10. 
As  the  results  show  in  Table  6.2.5.10,  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the 
motivation  factors  and  the  ages  of  the  host  country  parents.  Therefore,  we  conclude  that 
the  motivation  for  forming  an  international  joint  venture  is  not  associated  with  the  age  of 
host  country  parents 
Toh1A  AIa  In  AUf1VA  Tel  nfTAi.  vanpcr  Pnrnnt'c  Mntivntinn  find  Am,.,  of  Hnsl  Country  Parents 
Ages  of  H  ost  country  parents 
Factors  6-10  11-20  21-30  more  than  F  Sig. 
1-5  years 
years  years  years  30  years 
Technological  Acquisition  3.67  2.13  2.37  2.49  3.13  2.0932  0.0866 
Knowledge  Learning  2.40  2.95  2.67  2.73  2.72  0.1937  0.9412 
Risk  Sharing  3.38  2.25  2.85  2.61  2.46  2.0266  0.0957 
Competitive  strategic  3.88  3.19  2.88  2.92  3.09  1.8063  0.1328 
Consideration 
Resource 
3.50  2.56  3.23  3.48  3.63  2.0697  0.0897 
Com  lementari 
Market  Expanding  4.50  3.92  4.18  3.85  3.74  1.3876  0.243O 
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Based  on  the  above  analyses,  the  results  of  this  empirical  survey  reveal  that  there  are 
some  associations  between  motivation  factors  and  a  number  of  sample  characteristics 
such  as  the  Taiwanese  parent's  size.  A  summary  of  the  analysis  results  is  provided  in 
Table  6.2.5.11. 
Table  62511  Summary  the  Relations  between  Motivations  and  Samnle  Characteristics 
Sample  Characteristics  Motivation  of  forming  international  joint  ventures 
Technological  Knowledge  Risk  reduction  Strategic  Resource  Market 
acquisition  learning  consideration  complementarity  expanding 
Regions  of  foreign 
partners  F=  5.315  No 
Asian  countries  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association 
American  countries 
p-0.0062*  0.0062*  association 
European  countries 
Industry  groups 
Manufacturing  group  t  4.349 
No  association  No  association 
t=2.470  No  association 
t  --2.250 
Service  group  p  0.0000*  p=0.0150*  p  -0.0264* 
Size 
Sales  volumes  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association  No 
association 
Capital  F  -2.867  No  association  F=2.974  No  association  No  association  F  4.189 
p  0.0399*  p=0.0348*  p  0.0075* 
Number  of  employees  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association  F  4.768 
p  0.0037* 
Age 
Host  country  parents  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association  No  association 
No 
association 
On  the  whole,  there  is  little  evidence  in  the  study  of  any  statistical  variation  in  the 
motivational  factors  across  the  various  characteristics  of  the  sample.  The  relevant  results 
are  outlined  below. 
The  results  show  that  one  of  the  important  motivations  for  forming  international  joint 
ventures  is  technological  acquisition.  Most  host  country  parents  cooperated  with  foreign 
partners;  especially  American  and  Japan  companies,  in  order  to  acquire  technologies. 
One  of  the  reasons  for  these  results  might  be  the  influence  of  historical  background. 
Another  possible  reason  is  that  most  pioneer  technologies  are  developed  by  American 
and  Japanese  companies.  Therefore,  host  country  parents  have  more  cooperation  with 
both  countries'  firms  in  order  to  obtain  high  technologies. 
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The  results  showed  that  there  are  significant  differences  between  industry  groups  and  the 
motivational  factors  such  as  technological  acquisition,  strategic  consideration  and  market 
expansion.  The  companies  in  the  manufacturing  group  had  more  incentive  for  the 
technological  acquisition  and  strategic  consideration  motivation.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
companies  in  the  service  group  had  more  incentive  for  market  expansion. 
The  results  also  reveal  that  the  size  of  host  country  parents,  related  to  capital,  sales 
volume  and  the  number  of  employees  had  a  small  significant  difference  on  the 
motivational  factors  for  forming  an  international  joint  venture.  There  were  significant 
differences  in  technological  acquisition  and  market  expansion  factors.  The  results  show 
that  small  size  companies  have  higher  incentive  motivation  on  market  expansion.  The 
medium  sized  companies  had  more  incentive  on  the  technological  acquisition  factor. 
6.3  Summary 
This  chapter  examined  the  results  of  statistical  analysis  regarding  core  research 
dimensions  and  the  relationship  between  the  research  dimensions  and  the  sample 
characteristics.  There  are  five  core  dimensions  which  were  controlled  namely,  ownership, 
bargaining  power,  contribution  and  motivation  in  this  study.  Each  was  examined 
separately  and  the  results  have  provided  insight  into  the  nature  of  each  dimension. 
The  extent  of  control  is  measured  by  the  responsibility  for  decision-making  and  high- 
level  manager  appointment.  The  results  reveal  that  host  country  parents  perceive  the 
decision-making  responsibility  in  terms  of  capital  expenditures  and  sales  target  activities. 
Foreign  parents  take  more  responsibility  on  the  production  design  decisions.  Most  of  the 
decisions  relating  to  production  scheduling,  manufacturing  process,  quality  standards, 
and  cost  budgeting  are  taken  by  the  joint  ventures  themselves.  To  sum  up,  the  parents 
concentrate  on  controlling  specific  activities  instead  of  controlling  all  the  activities  of  the 
joint  venture  and  exercise  effective  control  through  the  appointment  of  key  executive 
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members  of  the  joint  venture.  However,  the  results  reveal  that  most  joint  ventures  had 
high  autonomy  to  manage  the  company. 
The  results  of  equity  shares  held  by  the  host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents  show 
that  both  parents  have  minority  shareholding  in  the  joint  ventures,  but  the  host  country 
parents  had  slightly  less  equity  than  the  foreign  parents 
Bargaining  power  can  stem  from  critical  resources  such  as  technology,  marketing 
expertise,  investment  amount,  and  access  to  export  markets.  In  this  study,  four 
constructs  of  bargaining  power  are  identified  which  are  technological  capability, 
management  capability,  financial  capability,  and  marketing  capability. 
There  is  a  wide  range  of  resources  that  each  parent  might  contribute  to  joint  ventures.  In 
this  study,  the  results  reveal  that  both  patents  contribute  different  resources  to  joint 
ventures  according  to  their  expert  resources.  The  host  country  parents  contribute  more 
on  organization  resources,  human  resources,  and  local  market  knowledge.  The  foreign 
parents  contribute  more  on  the  key  components,  brands  or  patents,  and  technologies. 
Both  parents  contribute  complementarity  resources  to  joint  ventures  and  thus  obtain  the 
synthesis  of  cooperation. 
There  are  many  possible  explanations  regarding  the  motivation  for  forming  an 
international  joint  venture.  This  study  identifies  six  factors  of  motivation  from  26 
variables.  These  factors  of  motivation  are  technological  acquisition,  knowledge  learning, 
risk  sharing,  competitive  strategic  consideration,  resource  complementarity  and  market 
expanding.  The  most  important  motivation  for  the  host  country  parents  were  "Extending 
the  range  of  products  and  services",  "Facilitating  diversified  development",  "Expanding 
the  market  and  entering  a  new  markets",  and  "Acquiring  partner's  brands  or  patents". 
The  results  indicate  that  the  companies  in  the  manufacturing  group  had  more  incentive 
for  technological  acquisition  and  strategic  consideration  motivation.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  companies  in  the  service  group  had  more  incentive  for  market  expansion. 
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The  relationship  between  each  core  research  dimension  and  the  characteristics  of  the 
sample  was  examined  in  the  relevant  sections.  We  only  summarize  the  most  significant 
results  here.  The  size  of  the  host  country  parents  and  the  percentage  of  board  members 
representing  parents,  had  a  strong  effect  on  the  control  that  they  exercised  over  the  joint 
venture.  The  percentage  of  board  members  also  had  a  strong  influence  on  the  equity 
share  of  joint  ventures  held  by  parents.  The  size  of  host  country  parents  had  a  significant 
influence  on  their  resource  contribution  to  a  joint  venture.  The  results  indicate  that  the 
big  companies  can  contribute  more  resources  to  their  joint  ventures. 
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1  The  operating  conditions  investigation  of  overseas  and  foreign  investment  and  the  contribution  to 
economic  development  of  Taiwan-The  Analysis  Report,  Investment  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of 
Economic  Affairs,  2003,  p.  5. 
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Chapter  7 
RESEARCHING  FINDINGS:  CORRELATION 
AND  REGRESSION  ANALYSIS 
7.1  Introduction 
Chapter  6  has  analyzed  and  discussed  the  descriptive  analysis  of  core  research 
dimensions.  In  this  chapter,  the  relationships  between  control  and  the  core  dimensions  of 
ownership,  bargaining  power,  contribution,  and  motivation  are  analyzed  and  described. 
All  the  hypotheses  posited  by  this  study  are  tested.  There  are  four  sections  organized  in 
this  chapter.  Section  7.2  analyses  the  relationship  between  all  the  core  research 
dimensions  which  encompass  control,  ownership,  bargaining  power,  contribution,  and 
motivation.  The  correlation  analyses  are  exercised  between  each  pair  of  dimensions. 
Section  7.3  draws  a  brief  conclusion. 
7.2  Correlation  Analysis  and  Regression  Analysis 
In  this  section,  we  launch  the  correlation  analysis  and  regression  analysis.  Relevant 
theories  in  terms  of  correlation  and  regression  analysis  are  described  in  Chapter  5.3.10.3 
and  Chapter  5.3.10.5.  As  discussed  previously,  before  we  employ  the  regression  analysis, 
we  have  to  assess  whether  there  are  high  associations  between  variables  or not.  In  other 
words,  we  have  to  assess  the  collinearity  or  multi-collinearity  between  independent 
variables.  At  a  time  when  multi-collinearity  occurs,  it  has  substantial  effects  on  the 
results  of  the  regression  analysis.  It  will  limit  the  size  of  the  coefficient  of  determination 
and  increases  the  difficulty  in  assessing  the  contribution  of  each  independent  variable  and 
distorts  the  results  substantially.  Thus,  the  researcher  has  to  assess  the  effects  of  multi- 
collinearity  when  exercising  the  regression  analysis.  The  simplest  and  most  obvious 
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method  of  identifying  collinearity  or  multi-collinearity  is  to  examine  of  the  correlation 
matrix  for  the  independent  variables  (Hair  et.  al,  1998).  Hair  et  al.  (1998)  provides  a 
step-by-step  procedure  of  regression  analysis  details  of  which  are  described  in  chapter 
5.3.10.5.  In  this  section,  this  study  applies  his  procedure  when  exercising  the  regression 
analysis.  Therefore,  correlation  analysis  is  conducted  through  all  the  following  sections. 
7.2.1  The  Analysis  of  Relationship  between  Ownership  and  Control 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  5.2,  ownership  is  seen  as  a  proxy  for  management  control  in 
joint  ventures  (Blodgett,  1991;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982;  Stopford  and  Wells,  1972;  ). 
From  their  research  results  in  China,  Child  and  Yan  (1999)  suggest  that  the  company  can 
increase  strategic  control  and  influence  operational  control  over  joint  ventures  through 
acquiring  a  larger  equity  share.  In  her  study  in  the  Taiwan  context,  Lin  (1995)  finds  that 
the  greater  the  ownership  the  parents  have,  the  greater  the  control  they  exercise  over  the 
joint  ventures.  Thus,  this  study  posits  that  ownership  and  control  have  a  positive 
relationship  and  the  hypotheses  are  tested. 
H  1:  There  is  a  significantly  positive  relationship  between  the  proportion  of  ownership 
and  the  extent  of  control 
H  1.1:  The  higher  the  proportion  of  equity  ownership  held  by  host  country  parents 
the  stronger  their  control  of  the  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a 
joint  venture 
H  1.2:  The  higher  proportion  of  equity  ownership.  held  by  host  country  parents  the 
stronger  their  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
venture 
A  Pearson  correlation  matrix  is  obtained  and  shown  in  Table  7.2.1.  The  correlations 
between  host  country  parent's  equity  share,  control  of  decision-making  activities,  and 
high-level  manager's  appointment  in  joint  ventures  are  significant  and  positive. 
Therefore,  one  can  conclude  that  ownership  is  significantly  correlated  to  the  level  of 
control  over  the  operational  decision-making  activities  and  the  appointment  of  high-level 
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managers  in  joint  ventures.  The  simple  regression  analysis  is  then  conducted  to  test  the 
hypotheses. 
Table  7.2.1  Correlations  between  Taiwanese  Parent's  Ownership  and  Control  of  Decision-Making 
Activities  and  Nigh-Level  Manager  Annointment  in  a  Joint  Venture 
Taiwanese 
Parent's 
Ownership 
Decision- 
Making 
Activities 
Appointment  of 
High-Level 
Managers 
Taiwanese  Parent's  Ownership  1.00 
Decision-Makin  Activities  0.60**  1.00 
A  intment  of  High-Level  Managers  0.60**  0.74**  1.00 
**  Correlation  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (2-tailed). 
The  hypotheses  are  tested  by  using  simple  regression  analysis  and  the  results  are  shown 
in  Table  7.2.2  and  Table  7.2.3.  As  shown  in  Table  7.2.2,  the  relationship  between 
ownership  and  the  control  on  decision-making  activities  shows  a  significant  relationship 
with  an  R2  value  of  0.360.  The  F-value  of  62.97  is  significant  at  the  0.05  level.  This 
implies  that  hypothesis  1.1  is  substantiated.  In  other  words,  the  higher  proportion  of 
equity  ownership  held  by  host  country  parents,  the  stronger  control  they  exercise  in  the 
operational  decision-making  activities  over  the  joint  ventures.  The  equation  is  written  as 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  DM  =  -0.043  +  0.008  TP_Equity 
Table  7.2.2  Regression  Analysis  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Ownership  and  the  Control  of  Decision- 
M  icing  Artiviti'.  c  in  a  Tnint  Vrntnrr 
Model  Sum  of  Square  Df  Mean  Square  F  Sig.  RZ 
AdRu2ted 
Regression  2.07  1  2.07 
62  97  0  000*  360  0  0  354 
Residual  3.68  112  0.03  .  .  .  . 
Model 
Unstandardised  Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients  t  Sig. 
B  Std.  Error  Beta 
(Constant)  -0.043  0.045  -0.952  0.343 
TP  Equity  0.008  0.001  0.600  7.935  0.000* 
Predictors:  (Constant),  TP  Equity 
Dependent  Variable:  TP  DM 
*  Significant  at  p<0.05 
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The  same  procedure  is  again  conducted  based  on  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers. 
From  Table  7.2.3,  the  relationship  between  ownership  and  control  of  the  high-level 
manager  appointment  in  joint  ventures  has  a  significant  relationship  with  an  R2  value  of 
0.359.  The  F-value  of  62.84  is  significant  at  the  0.05  level.  In  other  words,  there  is  a 
significant  relationship  between  ownership  and  control  in  a  high-level  manager 
appointment  in  joint  ventures.  Therefore,  hypothesis  HI-2  is  also  substantiated.  The 
equation  is  written  as 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  HL  manager  appointment 
=  -0.022  +  0.009  TP  Equity 
Table  7.2.3  Regression  Analysis  of  Taiwanese  Parent's  Ownership  and  the  Appointment  of  High- 
i.  evel  M  inaners  in  a  Mint  Venture 
Model  Sum  of  Square  Df  Mean  Square  F  Sig.  R2 
Adjusted 
Regression  2.34  1  2.32 
84  6  000*  0  0  359  0  354 
Residual  4.14  112  0.04 
2.  .  .  . 
Model 
Unstandardized  Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients  t  Sig. 
B  Std.  Error  Beta 
(Constant)  -0.022  0.048  -0.463  0.644 
TP  Equity  0.009  0.001  0.600  7.927  0.000* 
Predictors:  (Constant),  TP  Equity 
Dependent  Variable:  TP_  iL 
*  Significant  at  p<0.05 
Overall,  there  are  significant  and  positive  relationships  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's 
proportion  of  ownership  and  control  of  decision-making  activities  and  also  the 
appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  joint  ventures.  This  reveals  that  the  higher  the 
equity  share  of  ownership  held  by  host  country  parents,  the  more  control  on  decision- 
making  activities  and  high-level  manager  appointment  they  can  exercise  in  joint  ventures. 
These  results  are  consistent  with  most  researchers'  studies  (Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Lin, 
1995;  Blodgett,  1991;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982;  Stopford  and  Wells,  1972).  This  indicates 
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that  parents  can  gain  more  control  through  obtaining  higher  equity  shares  of  joint 
ventures. 
7.2.2  The  Analysis  of  Relationship  between  Bargaining  Power  and 
Control 
Previous  literature  demonstrates  that  bargaining  power  can  be  used  to  affect  the  outcome 
of  the  negotiation  process  (Lax  and  Sebinius  1986;  Schelling  1956).  Also  it  was 
reported  that  the  bargaining  power  of  partners  is  a  critical  variable  in  determining 
patterns  of  control  in  joint  ventures  (Blodgett,  1991;  Harrigan  and  Newman,  1990; 
Lecraw,  1984).  For  example,  Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  indicate  that  the  proportions  of 
bargaining  power  between  parents  will  affect  the  control  of  IJV,  including  the  percentage 
of  board  membership,  nomination  of  general  managers,  structural  control  and  perceived 
overall  control.  Moreover,  Lecraw  (1984)  finds  that  bargaining  power,  which  is 
influenced  by  technical  leadership,  advertising  intensity  and  export  capability  of  the 
multinational  partner  has  a  significant  contribution  to  control.  On  the  basis  of  the 
relevant  literature,  this  study  posits  that  there  is  relationship  between  bargaining  power 
and  the  degree  of  control.  Therefore,  the  hypothesis  is  presented  as  follow: 
H  2:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the  extent  of 
control 
In  Chapter  6.2.3,  we  demonstrate  relevant  importance  variables  which  will  affect  the 
ability  of  host  country  parents  to  gain  power  over  its  partners.  Factor  analysis  was 
launched  to  extract  a  new  set  of  bargaining  power  factors,  such  as  technological 
capability,  management  capability,  financial  capability,  and  marketing  capability.  A 
correlation  analysis  between  the  factors  of  bargaining  power  and  control  was  then 
conducted.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.4. 
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Table  7.2.4  Correlations  between  Bargaining  Power  and  the  Control  of  Decision-Making  Activities 
and  Appointment  of  High-Level  Managers  in  a  Joint  Venture 
DM  TP  HL  TP  B  Fina  B  Mark  B  Tech  B  Mana 
Decision-Making  1.00 
Appointment  of  H-L 
Managers  0.74**  1.00 
Financial  capability  -0.18  -0.05  1.00 
Marketing  capability  0.26**  0.29**  0.00  1.00 
Technological  capability  0.18  0.10  -0.31**  0.05  1.00 
Management  capability  -0.07  -0.09  -0.16  0.03  0.00  1.00 
"`  Correlation  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (2-tailed) 
The  correlations  between  bargaining  power  factors  and  control  identified  by  the  decision- 
making  and  high-level  managers'  appointment  has  a  limited  association.  It  shows  that 
only  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  has  a  positive  relationship  with  control 
in  terms  of  decision-making  and  high-level  managers'  appointment  in  a  joint  venture. 
The  next  step  was  to  conduct  a  multiple  regression  (the  Stepwise  method  is  used)  and 
the  results  are  shown  in  Tables  7.2.5  and  Table  7.2.6.  From  Table  7.2.5,  the  results 
indicate  that  only  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  is  included  in  the 
equation.  The  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the  extent  of  control  in 
operational  decision-making  activities  over  joint  ventures  has  a  significant  relationship 
with  an  R2  value  of  0.069.  The  F-value  of  8.26  is  significant  at  the  0.05  level.  The 
equation  is  written  as 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  N's  DM  activities=  0.290  +  0.059  B 
_Mark 
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Table  7.2.5  Multiple  Regression  Analysis  of  Bargaining  Power  and  Control  of  Decision-Making 
Activities  in  q  7nint  Venture 
Model 
Sum  of 
Square 
Df  Mean  Square  F  Sig.  R2  Adjusted  RZ 
Regression  0.40  1  0.40 
* 
Residual  5.36  112  0.05 
8.26  0.0049  0.069  0.06 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Variable  not  in  the  equation 
Variables 
B  Std.  Error  Beta 
t  Sig.  Partial 
correlatio 
n 
t  value  Sig. 
(Constant)  0.290  0.020  14.154  0.343 
B.  Mark  0.059  0.021  0.262  2.873  0.000* 
B 
_Tech 
0.169  1.807  0.074 
B_Manage  -0.077  -0.818  0.415 
B_Finan  FZ, 
-1.971  0.051 
Predictors:  (Constant),  Bjvlark 
Dependent  Variable:  TP_DM 
*  Significant  at  p<0.05 
The  same  procedure  was  conducted  based  on  the  high-level  manager  appointment.  From 
Table  7.2.6,  the  results  also  indicate  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  is 
included  in  the  equation.  The  relationship  between  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing 
capability  and  the  control  on  the  JV's  high-level  manager  appointment  has  a  significant 
relationship  with  an  R2  value  of  0.087.  The  F-value  of  10.672  is  significant  at  the  0.05 
level.  The  equation  is  written  as 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  HL  manager  appointment 
=  0.331  +  0.071  B 
_Mark 
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Table  7.2.6  Multiple  Regression  Analysis  of  Bargaining  Power  and  Control  of  High-Level  Manager 
Annnintment  nver  7nint  Ventures 
Model 
Sum 
Df  Mean  Square  F  Sig.  R2  Adjusted  R2 
Regression  0.563  1  0.563 
10  672  0  001*  08  0  0 
Residual  5.903  112  0.053  .  .  0.  7 
. 
79 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Variable  not  in  the  equation 
Variables 
B  Std.  Error  Beta 
t  Sig.  Partial 
correlatio 
n 
t  value  Sig. 
(Constant)  0.331  0.022  15.376  0.000* 
B_Mark  0.071  0.022  0.295  3.267  0.001* 
B 
_Tech 
0.091  0.962  0.338 
B 
_Manage 
(0.107)  (1.138)  0.258 
B  Finan  (0.052)  (0.544)  0.588 
Predictors:  (Constant),  B  Mark 
Dependent  Variable:  T? 
-HL  *  Significant  at  p<0.05 
Although  the  RZ  value  is  considerably  low  (0.069  and  0.087),  indicating  that  the 
bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  explains  very  little  of  the  control  of  decision- 
making  activities  and  high-level  manager  appointment  in  the  joint  venture.  Statistically, 
it  is  still  a  significant  and  positive  predictor.  Thus,  an  increase  in  the  bargaining  power  of 
marketing  capability  may  increase  the  extent  of  control  over  the  joint  venture.  Other 
variables  which  are  not  included  in  the  equation  do  not  have  any  influence  on  the  extent 
of  control.  Overall,  the  findings  provide  very  little  support  for  hypothesis  H2. 
In  summary,  bargaining  power  and  control  are  not  closely  associated.  Only  the 
bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  and  control  has  a  modest  and  positive 
relationship.  Therefore,  hypothesis  H2  is  only  partially  substantiated.  These  results  are 
not  consistent  with  some  other  researchers'  results.  One  possible  explanation  is  that 
bargaining  power  affects  the  outcome  of  the  negotiation  process,  but  it  does  not 
guarantee  any  direct  influence  on  control.  The  parents  exercising  their  control  over  joint 
ventures  are  normally  affected  by  many  possible  factors  such  as  their  equity  share  and 
resources  which  they  contribute  to  the  joint  venture.  Equity  share  and  resources  are 
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more  measurable  items.  However,  bargaining  power  cannot  be  measured  easily 
regarding  the  nature  of  its  concepts,  as  it  involves  the  process  of  negotiation  procedure. 
Therefore,  it  might  affect  control  but  not  directly.  Therefore,  most  factors  of  bargaining 
power  do  not  have  a  relationship  with  control. 
7.2.3  The  Analysis  of  Relationship  between  Contribution  and  Control 
Resource-dependency  theory  suggests  that  the  resources  provided  by  the  partners  can 
increase  a  partner's  control  over  the  joint  venture.  From  their  empirical  investigation, 
the  contributions  supplied  by  each  partner  significantly  affect  control  over  the  venture 
(Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Killing,  1983;  Lin,  1995).  Lin  (1995)  also  finds  that  different 
resource  contributions  result  in  different  scopes  of  control  by  each  partner. 
Based  on  the  relevant  literature,  this  study  posits  that  the  degree  of  control  and  resource 
contributions  supplied  by  the  host  country  parents  has  a  positive  relationship  and  the 
hypotheses  will  be  tested.  This  study  classifies  resource  contribution  into  five  main 
resource  factors  which  are  physical  resources,  invisible  resources,  financial  resources, 
human  resources,  and  organizational  resources.  Control  is  also  identified  by  decision- 
making  activities  and  high-level  managers'  appointment.  Thus,  the  hypotheses  are 
presented  separately. 
H  4:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  contribution  of  host  country 
parents  and  the  extent  of  control  they  exercise  in  a  joint  venture 
H  4.1k:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H  4-1b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  management  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  42,:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
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H  42b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  management  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  42,:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H  42b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  management  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  4-3a:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  financial  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H  4-3b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  financial  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  management  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  ",:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture 
H  4.4b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resource  contribution  will  have 
stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  management  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  45,:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organizational  resource  contribution  will 
have  a  stronger  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint 
venture 
H  45b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organizational  resource  contribution  will 
have  stronger  control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  management  in  a  joint 
venture 
A  Pearson  correlation  matrix  is  obtained  as  shown  in  Table  7.2.7.  The  correlations 
between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  resource  contributions,  control  of  decision-making 
activities  and  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  joint  ventures  are  strong  and 
positive.  The  results  indicate  that  all  the  factors  of  resource  contribution  and  control 
have  significant  relationships.  Therefore,  one  can  conclude  that  resource  contribution 
and  control  are  significantly  associated. 
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Table  7.2.7  Correlations  between  Resource  Contribution  and  Control  of  Decision-Making  Activities 
and  the  Appointment  of  High-Level  Managers  in  a  Joint  Venture 
TP  DM  TP_HL  Physical  Invisible  Finance  Human  Organiz 
TP  DM  1.00 
TP  HL  0.74**  1.00 
Physical  0.66**  0.65**  1.00 
Invisible  0.68**  0.66**  0.73**  1.00 
Finance  0.58**  0.57**  0.49**  0.63**  1.00 
Human  0.67**  0.66**  0.70**  0.85**  0.67**  1.00 
Organization  0.70**  0.63**  0.75**  0.89**  0.61**  0.87**  1.00 
**Correlation  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (2-tailed) 
From  Table  7.2.7,  the  results  reveal  that  organizational  resources  are  the  strongest 
influence  on  the  control  of  decision-making  in  joint  ventures,  followed  by  invisible 
resources  and  human  resources.  Control  of  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers, 
human  resources  and  invisible  resources  are  the  strongest  influences,  followed  by 
physical  resources.  In  summary,  all  the  contribution  factors  have  a  very  strong  and 
positive  association  with  control  of  decision-making  activities  and  high-level  manager 
appointment. 
However,  correlation  matrix  displays  show  that  there  are  multi-collinearity  problems 
between  resource  factors.  One  of  the  methods  which  could  be  used  to  solve  the  problem 
of  multi-collinearity  is  to  use  the  simple correlation  between  each  independent  and 
dependent  variable.  From  that,  we  could  understand  the  predictor-dependent  variable 
relationships  (Hair  et  al.,  1998).  Thus,  simple  regression  analysis  for  these  five  resource 
factors  was  exercised,  and  hypotheses  were  tested  separately.  The  regression  analysis  of 
the  Taiwanese  parent's  resource  contributions  and  control  of  decision-making  in  the 
venture  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.8. 
From  Table  7.2.8,  the  overall  F  value  and  the  p-value  are  statistically  significant.  The  R 
square  for  these  regressions  is  quite  high  and  has  relatively  explanatory  value  with  R2 
(most  of  them  are  over  o.  4).  These  results  show  that  relationships  between  contribution 
factors  of  physical,  invisible,  financial,  human,  and  organizational  ability  resource  and 
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control  of  decision-making  activities  over  joint  ventures  are  significant.  In  other  words, 
the  resource  contributions  supplied  by  host  country  parents  do  have  an  effect  on  control 
of  decision-making  activities  in  the  venture.  Therefore,  H  41a,  H  42a  ,H  4-3a  ,H  44,  ,  and 
H  $5a  are  substantiated.  The  equations  are  written  as 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  N's  DM  =  0.123  +  0.103  TP  Physical 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  JV's  DM  =  -0.057  +  0.140  TP  Invisible 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  N's  DM  =  -0.227  +  0.147  TP  Finance 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  N's  DM  =  -0.140  +  0.147  TP  Human 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  N's  DM  =  -0.359  +  0.182  TP  Organ 
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Overall,  these  results  reveal  that  the  more  resource  contributions  supplied  by  host 
country  parents  into  joint  ventures,  the  more  control  on  decision-making  activities  they 
exercise  over  joint  ventures.  These  results  are  consistent  with  most  researcher's  studies 
(Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Lin,  1995;  Killing,  1983). 
The  same  procedures  of  regression  analysis  were  performed  on  the  relationship  between 
resource  contribution  and  the  control  of  high-level  manager  appointment  in  the  joint 
venture.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.9. 
From  Table  7.2.9,  the  overall  F  value  and  the  p-value  are  statistically  significant.  The  R 
squares  for  these  regressions  are  quite  high  and  have  relatively  explanatory  value  with  R2 
(most  of  them  are  over  o.  4).  These  results  also  show  that  relationships  between 
contribution  factors  and  control  of  high-level  manager  appointment  in  joint  ventures  are 
significant  and  positive.  Therefore,  one  can  conclude  that  resource  contributions 
supplied  by  host  country  parents  do  have  an  effect  on  control  of  high-level  manager 
appointment  in  the  ventures.  The  H  41b,  H  42b,  H  43b,  H  4-4b,  and  H  45b  are  substantiated. 
The  equation  is  written  as 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  JV's  HL  =  0.155  +  0.108  TP  Physical 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  JV's  HL  =  -0.022  +  0.142  TP  Invisible 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  JV's  HL  =  -0.209  +  0.154  TP  Finance 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  JV's  HL  =  -0.114  +  0.152  TP  Human 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  N's  HL  =  -0.295  +  0.176  TP  Organ 
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Both  results  reveal  strong  and  positive  association  of  the  relationships  between 
contribution  factors  and  control  of  decision-making  activities  and  high-level  manager 
appointment.  Overall,  the  more  resource  contributions  supplied  by  host  country  parents 
to  the  joint  venture,  the  more  control  they  excise  over  the  venture.  These  results  are 
consistent  with  most  studies  (Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Lin,  1995;  Killing  1983).  The 
control  of  host  country  parents  can  be  derived  through  the  resource  contribution,  no 
matter  what  kind  of  resources  they  provide  to  the  joint  venture. 
7.2.4  The  Analysis  of  Relationship  between  Motivation  and  Control 
Plenty  of  literature  has  investigated  the  objectives  for  the  international  joint  venture's 
formation,  and  research  results  have  revealed  many  possible  explanations.  These 
explanations  are  variants  according  to  the  four  theoretical  perspectives  of  transaction 
cost,  strategic  behaviour,  resource  dependency,  and  organizational  learning  (Lin,  1995; 
UNECE,  1988;  Datta,  1988;  Contractor  and  Lorange,  1988;  Kogut,  1988;  Porter  and 
Fuller,  1986;  Daniels,  1985;  Harrigan,  1985;  Beamish,  1984;  Maniti  and  Smiley,  1983; 
Killing,  1983). 
However,  very  few  studies  have  examined  the  relationship  between  motivation  for 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  the  control  the  parents  exercise  over  joint 
ventures.  From  her  study  in  the  Taiwan  context,  Lin  (1995)  reports  that  different 
motivations  have  a  different  level  of  control  over  the  ventures  when  forming  international 
joint  ventures.  She  indicates  that  the  host  country  parents  who  have  learning  motivation 
have  higher  control  in  the  joint  ventures,  in  order  to  specifically  learn  knowledge  from 
foreign  partners.  From  her  research  results,  we  cannot  explain  the  relationship  between 
other  motivations  and  control  very  well.  Adopting  her  research  results,  this  study 
intends  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  the  motivation  for  international  joint 
venture  formation  and  control,  using  different  analysis  methods.  This  study  posits  that 
the  motivation  of  the  Taiwanese  parent  in  forming  international  joint  ventures  and 
control  has  a  positive  relationship  and  the  hypotheses  will  be  tested. 
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H  7:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host  country  parents 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  the  extent  of  control  they  exercise  over  a 
joint  venture 
In  Chapter  6.2.5,  we  elucidate  the  relatively  important  variables  of  motivation  for 
international  joint  venture  formation  and  launched  factor  analysis  to  extract  a  new  set  of 
motivational  factors  which  are  technological  acquisition,  knowledge  learning,  risk 
sharing,  competitive  strategic  consideration,  resource  complementarity  and  market 
expanding.  The  correlation  analysis  was  carried  out  using  those  motivational  factors  and 
the  results  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.10. 
Table  7.2.10  Correlations  between  Motivation  Factors  and  Control  of  Decision-Making  Activities  and 
the  Appointment  of  High-Level  Managers  in  a  Joint  Venture 
Constructs  TPDM  TP_HL  M  Tech  M  Know  M  Risk  M  Strat  M  Reso  M  Mark 
TP_DM  1.00 
TP_HL  0.74**  1.00 
M  Tech  0.10  0.02  1.00 
M  Know  -0.11  -0.01  0.00  1.00 
M  Risk  -0.12  -0.16  0.00  0.00  1.00 
M  Strat  0.29**  0.33**  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
M  Resou  -0.20*  -0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
M  Mark  -0.29**  -0.28**  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
**Conelation  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (2-tailed) 
*Conelation  is  significant  at  the  0.05  level  (2-tailed) 
The  results  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.10.  A  limited  number  of  significant  correlations  apply 
to  the  relationship  between  the  motivation  factors  of  host  country  parents,  control  of 
decision-making  activities,  and  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  joint  ventures. 
Strategic  consideration  motivation  has  a  modest  positive  relationship  on  the  venture's 
decision-making  activities  and  high-level  manager's  appointment,  but  market  expanding 
motivation  has  a  negative  relationship  to  control.  Resource  complementarity  only  has  a 
weak  relationship  to  control  of  a  joint  venture's  decision-making  activities.  Other  factors 
such  as  the  technological  acquisition,  knowledge  learning,  and  risk  sharing  do  not  have 
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associations  with  control  of  decision-making  and  a  high-level  manager's  appointment  in  a 
joint  venture. 
In  the  next  step,  a  multiple  regression  (the  Stepwise  method  is  used)  was  exercised  and 
the  results  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.11  and  Table  7.2.12.  From  Table  7.2.11,  the  results 
indicate  that  the  market  expansion  motive,  strategic  consideration  motive,  and  resource 
complementarity  motive  are  all  included  in  the  equation.  The  relationship  between 
motive  and  the  extent  of  control  in  the  operational  decision-making  activities  in  joint 
ventures  has  a  significant  relationship  with  an  R2  value  of  0.203.  The  F-value  of  9.355  is 
significant  at  the  0.05  level.  The  strategic  consideration  motive  and  the  extent  of  control 
have  a  positive  relationship;  however,  the  relationships  between  the  market  expanding 
motive  and  resource  complementarity  motive  and  the  extent  of  control  have  a  negative 
relationship.  The  equation  is  written  as 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  N's  DM  activities 
=  0.461  -  0.123  TP  MARK  +  0.155  TP_STRAT  -  0.049  TP_RESO 
Table  7.2.11  Multiple  Regression  Analysis  of  Motivation  and  Control  of  Decision-Making  Activities 
inn  mint  Vrntnrr. 
Model 
Sum  of  Df  Mean  Square  F  Sig.  R2  Adjusted  R2 
Regression  1.170  3  0.390 
9  355  0.000*  0.203  0.182 
Residual  4.584  110  0.042  . 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients  t  Sig. 
Variable  not  in  the  equation 
B  Std.  Error  Beta 
P  Partial 
ela 
t  value  Sig. 
(Constant)  0.461  0.144  3.192  0.002* 
TP_MARK  (0.123)  0.028  (0.419)  (4.440)  0.000* 
TP  STRAT  0.155  0.036  0.403  4.280  0.000* 
TP_RESO  (0.049)  0.023  (0.183)  (2.109)  0.037* 
TP_TECH  (0.008)  -0.085  0.932 
TP  KNOW  (0.130)  -1.364  0.175 
TP_RISK  (0.130)  -1.372  0.173 
Predictors:  (Constant),  TP  MARK,  TP_STRAT,  TP_RESO 
Dependent  Variable:  T? 
-DM  *  Significant  at  p<0.05 
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From  Table  7.2.12,  the  results  indicate  that  the  motives  for  market  expansion  and 
strategic  consideration  are  included  in  the  equation.  The  relationship  between  motivation 
and  control  on  the  high-level  manage  appointment  over  joint  ventures  has  a  significant 
relationship  with  an  R2  value  of  0.168.  The  F-value  of  11.246  is  significant  at  the  0.05 
level.  The  motive  of  strategic  consideration  and  the  extent  of  control  have  a  positive 
relationship;  however,  the  motive  for  market  expansion  and  control  has  a  negative 
relationship.  The  equation  is  written  as 
The  control  of  host  country  parents  on  the  JV's  HL  manager  appointment 
=  0.254  +  0.162  TP  STRAT  -  0.109  TP  MARK 
Table  7.2.12  Multiple  Regression  Analysis  of  Motivation  and  Control  of  High-Level  Manager 
Annnintment  in  a  Mint  Venture 
Model 
Sum  of  Df  Mean  Square  F  Sig.  RZ  Adjusted  RZ 
Regression  1.089  2  0.545 
11  246  000*  0  0.168  0.154 
Residual  5.376  111  0.048  .  . 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients  t  Sig. 
Variable  not  in  the  equation 
B  Std.  Error  Beta 
P 
on  elati 
t  value  Sig. 
(Constant)  0.254  0.128  1.989  0.049* 
TP  STRAT  0.162  0.039  0.398  4.208  0.000* 
TP_MARK  (0.109)  0.029  (0.350)  (3.701)  0.000* 
TP_TECH  (0.147)  (1.557)  0.122 
T? 
-KNOW 
0.017  0.180  0.858 
TP  RISK  (0.152)  (1.611)  0.110 
TP  RESO  (0.127)  (1.338)  0.184 
Predictors:  (Constant),  TP_MARK,  TP_STRAT 
Dependent  Variable:  T? 
-DM  *  Significant  at  p<0.05 
Consistent  with  the  correlation  results,  the  multiple  regression  analyses  reveal  a  limited 
number  of  significant  correlations  between  the  motives  of  host  country  parents  and  the 
control  of  decision-making  activities,  as  well  as  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers 
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in  joint  ventures.  The  motive  of  strategic  consideration  does  have  a  modest  positive 
relationship  on  the  venture's  decision-making  activities  and  high-level  manager's 
appointment.  However,  the  motive  for  market  expansion  has  a  negative  relationship  to 
control.  The  resource  complementarity  motive  has  only  a  weak  negative  relationship 
with  the  extent  of  control  of  a  joint  venture's  decision-making  activities.  Therefore,  the 
findings  only  provide  partial  support  for  hypothesis  H7. 
One  possible  explanation  is  the  strategic  consideration  which  seems  to  be  the  main 
concern  when  Taiwanese  companies  form  a  joint  venture  with  foreign  partners. 
Taiwanese  companies  seem  not  to  pursue  tight  control  over  their  joint  ventures  in  order 
to  attain  their  objectives.  For  example,  from  the  joint  venture  case  of  Talee-Isetan 
department  store  described  in  Appendix  I-A,  this  Taiwanese  parent  adopts  the  "with  the 
safe  to  make  safe"  strategy  to  achieve  its  objective  and  it  does  not  get  very  involved  in 
the  management  of  its  subsidiary.  Another  example  which  might  be  able  to  be  explained 
the  market  expansion  motivation  is  the  COSTCO  joint  venture  formed  by  the  American 
COSTCO  Corporation  and  the  President  Department  Group  (see  Appendix  I-B).  For 
the  host  parent,  it  has  its  own  warehouse  stores,  but  it  adopts  the  mode  of  joint  venture 
to  expand  its  business  field.  It  also  does  not  intervene  in  the  management  of  the  child 
and  let  its  foreign  partner  take  over  all  the  management  activity. 
Of  course,  these  two  examples  cannot  represent  all  cases,  but  they  can  provide  some 
information  about  the  relationship  between  motivation  and  control.  The  reader  should 
bear  in  mind  that  the  objectives  for  the  formation  of  international  joint  ventures  have 
many  possible  explanations  with  respect  to  four  theoretical  perspectives,  namely, 
transaction  cost,  strategic  behaviour,  resource  dependency,  and  organizational  learning. 
Therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  find  direct  or  single  associations  between  motivation  and 
control. 
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7.2.5  The  Analysis  of  the  Relationship  between  Bargaining  Power  and 
Ownership 
Lecraw  (1984)  finds  that  the  bargaining  power  of  multinational  firms  and  the  host  of 
LDCs  has  a  strong  influence  on  the  percentage  of  equity  ownership.  When  the  host 
country  has  the  country-specific  advantages,  the  local  investors  (host  parents)  have  the 
greater  bargaining  power  and  higher  ownership.  Fagre  and  Wells  (1982)  use  a 
bargaining  power  framework  to  explain  the  relationship  between  the  multinational  firm's 
characteristics  and  equity  ownership.  Theoretically,  when  the  partners  have  higher 
bargaining  power,  they  can  have  higher  opportunity  and  capability  to  obtain  greater 
equity  shares.  Thus,  this  study  posits  the  hypothesis  as  follows: 
H  3:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the  proportion  of 
ownership 
The  correlations  analysis  between  these  bargaining  power  factors  and  the  ownership 
were  conducted.  The  results  of  the  correlation  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.13. 
Table  7.2.13  Correlations  between  Taiwanese  Parent's  Bargaining  Power  and  Equity  Share  of  Host 
rniintrv  Parente  Nell  inn  Mint  Venture 
Financial  Marketing  Technological  Management 
Host  country 
Parent 
capability  capability  capability  capability  Ownership 
Financial  capability  1.00 
Marketing  capability  0.00  1.00 
Technological  capability  -0.31**  0.05  1.00 
Management  capability  -0.16  0.03  0.00  1.00 
Host  country  Parent 
03  -0  0.23**  0.11  -0.04  1.00 
Ownershi  . 
**Conelation  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (2-tailed) 
The  results  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.13.  The  relationship  between  the  factors  of 
bargaining  power  and  equity  shares  of  joint  ventures  held  by  host  country  parents  reveal 
only  one  significant  correlation.  The  marketing  capability  factor  has  a  modest 
relationship  with  ownership.  But  overall,  the  results  show  very  weak  correlations 
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between  bargaining  power  factors  and  the  equity  shares  in  joint  ventures  held  by  host 
country  parents. 
Next,  a  multiple  regression  was  conducted  to  measure  the  relationship  between 
ownership  and  bargaining  power.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.14.  From  Table 
7.2.14,  the  results  indicate  that  only  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  is 
included  in  the  equation.  The  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the  proportion 
of  equity  shares  held  by  host  country  parents  has  a  significant  relationship  with  an  R2 
value  of  0.054.  The  F-value  of  6.372  is  significant  at  the  0.05  level.  The  equation  is 
written  as 
The  equity  shares  held  by  the  of  host  country  parents  =  41.148  +  3.880  B  Mark 
Tai-1P  7'  1d  Mnltin1P  P  PCCinn  Annlvcic  of  Rarvainina  Pnwer  and  the  ProDo  Lion  of  Ownersh1D 
Model 
Sum  of  Df  Mean  Square  F  Sig.  RZ  Adjusted  W 
Regression  1701.367  1  1701.367 
6  372  0.013*  0.054  0.045 
Residual  29903.541  112  266.996  . 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Variable  not  in  the  equation 
Variables 
B  Std.  Error  Beta 
t  Sig.  Partial 
correlatio 
n 
t  value  Sig. 
(Constant)  41.148  1.530  26.888  0.000* 
B_Mark  3.880  1.537  0.232  2.524  0.013* 
B 
_Tech 
0.097  1.024  0.308 
B 
_Manage 
(0.051)  (0.541)  0.590 
B_Finan  (0.035)  (0.367)  0.715 
Predictors:  (Constant),  B_Mark 
Dependent  Variable:  T? 
-DM  *  Significant  at  p<0.05 
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  although  the  R2  value  is  considerably  low  (0.054), 
which  indicates  the  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  explains  very  little  in 
terms  of  the  proportion  of  equity  shares  held  by  host  country  parents.  Statistically,  it  is 
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still  a  significant  and  positive  predictor.  Thus,  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing 
capability  and  ownership  has  a  significant  and  positive  relationship  which  is  consistent 
with  the  correlation  results,  but  other  variables  which  are  not  included  in  the  equation  do 
not  have  any  influence  on  ownership.  Overall,  the  findings  provide  very  little  support  for 
hypothesis  H3. 
In  summary,  bargaining  power  and  ownership  are  not  closely  associated.  A  higher 
bargaining  power  variable  is  expected  to  have  greater  influence  on  equity  shares. 
However,  the  findings  have  provided  very  little  support  for  hypothesis  H3.  We  can  only 
conclude  that  bargaining  power  cannot  be  used  to  predict  the  degree  of  ownership  of 
parents.  From  the  previous  section,  one  possible  reason  is  because  bargaining  power  will 
affect  the  outcome  of  the  negotiation  process,  but  does  not  guarantee  direct  influence  on 
ownership.  Bargaining  power  has  a  lot  of  involvement  in  processes  throughout  the 
negotiation  procedure  and  the  outcome  of  negotiation  is  not  always  represented  by 
ownership.  It  may  be  represented  on  the  non-capital  contractual  resources.  Thus,  only  a 
small  part  of  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  ownership  could  be 
explained.  There  might  be  other  variables  that  can  be  used  to  better  explain  their 
relationships. 
7.2.6  The  Analysis  of  the  Relationship  between  Contribution  and 
Ownership 
Based  on  the  existing  literature,  some  researchers  deem  that  resource  contributions  to 
joint  ventures  will  affect  the  amount  of  equity  shares  (Fagre  and  Wells,  1982;  Harrigan, 
1985;  Gomes-Casseres,  1990;  Blodgett,  1991;  Lin,  1995;  Pan,  1996).  When  parents 
contribute  resources  to  joint  ventures,  they  can  acquire  certain  equity  shares  of  joint 
ventures.  Theoretically,  the  more  resources  provided  by  the  parent,  the  more  power  they 
can  acquire  from  a  greater  number  of  equity  shares.  Therefore,  this  study  posits  that  the 
contribution  supplied  by  host  country  parents  and  the  equity  shares  they  hold  in  joint 
ventures  have  a  positive  relationship  and  the  following  hypotheses  were  tested. 
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H  3.1:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource  contribution  will  have  a  higher 
proportion  of  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  5.2:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource  contribution  will  have  a  higher 
proportion  of  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  5_3:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  financial  contribution  will  have  a  higher 
proportion  of  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  s.  4:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resources  contribution  will  have  a  higher 
proportion  of  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  s_s:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organizational  resource  contribution  will  have  a 
higher  proportion  of  equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
The  correlations  analysis  between  these  contribution  factors  and  ownership  were  carried 
out.  The  results  of  correlation  analysis  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.15  which  shows  that  the 
correlations  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  resource  contribution  and  the  proportion  of 
equity  shares  are  strong  and  positive.  Therefore,  one  can  conclude  that  resource 
contributions  provided  by  host  country  parents  and  ownership  in  joint  ventures  are 
closely  associated. 
Table  7.2.15  Correlations  between  Taiwanese  Parent's  Resource  Contributions  and  the  Proportion  of 
Eauity  Shares  in  a  Joint  Venture 
Taiwanese  Parent's 
Ownership 
C  Phys  C_Invi  C 
-Fin 
C 
-Hum 
C  Org 
Taiwanese  Parent's 
Ownership 
1.00 
CPhs  0.50**  1.00 
C  Invi  0.61**  0.73  1.00 
C  Fin  0.90**  0.49  0.63  1.00 
C  Hum  0.63**  0.70  0.85  0.67  1.00 
C  Org  0.57**  0.75  0.89  0.61  0.87  1.00 
**Correlation  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (2-tailed) 
In  Table  7.2.15,  the  results  indicate  that  financial  resources  have  a  nearly  perfect 
correlation  with  the  ownership.  It  is  clear  that  financial  resources  are  always  related  to 
equity  shares.  Additionally,  human  resources,  invisible  resources,  organisational 
resources  and  physical  resources  also  have  strong  relations  with  ownership. 
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Again,  because  of  the  high  multi-collinearity  among  resources  factors  the  relationships 
apply  between  resource  factors  and  ownership  as  explained  in  section  7.2.3,  simple 
regression  analyses  was  carried  out  separately  and  hypotheses  were  tested.  The  results 
of  Taiwanese  parent's  resource  contribution  and  the  proportion  of  equity  shares  are 
shown  in  Table  7.2.16. 
From  Table  7.2.16,  the  overall  F  value  and  the  p-value  are  statistically  significant.  The  R 
square  for  these  regressions  is  quite  high  and  has  relative  explanatory  value  with  R2. 
These  results  show  that  the  relationships  between  contribution  factors  supplied  by 
Taiwanese  and  ownership  of  joint  ventures  are  significant  and  positive.  Therefore,  H 
H  s-z,  H  s-s,  H  s.  a,  and  H  s.  s  are  all  substantiated.  The  equations  is  written  as 
The  equity  shares  held  by  host  country  parents  =  31.75  +  5.76  TP  Physical 
The  equity  shares  held  by  host  country  parents  =  18.12  +  9.29  TP_Invisible 
The  equity  shares  held  by  host  country  parents  =  -18.74  +  17.07  TP_Finance 
The  equity  shares  held  by  host  country  parents  =  11.40  +  10.14  TP  Human 
The  equity  shares  held  by  host  country  parents  =  1.8  +  11.05  TP  Organ 
The  results  reveal  that  resource  contributions  supplied  by  host  country  parents  have  an 
effect  on  the  ownership  of  joint  ventures.  The  results  are  consistent  with  most 
researcher  studies  (Pan,  1996;  Lin,  1995;  Blodgett,  1991;  Gomes-Casseres  1990; 
Harrigan,  1985;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982).  The  more  resources  contributed  by  host 
country  parents  the  higher  their  proportion  of  N's  equity  shares. 
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7.2.7  The  Analysis  of  the  Relationship  between  Motivation  and 
Ownership 
Gomes-Casseres  (1989)  elucidates  that  the  motivation  for  cooperation  will  result  in  a 
different  ownership  structure  for  foreign  subsidiaries.  From  her  empirical  investigation, 
Lin  (1995)  finds  that  a  different  motivation  for  international  joint  venture  formation  will 
affect  the  proportion  of  ownership  held  by  host  country  parents.  She  also  finds  that 
Taiwanese  companies  with  learning  driven  motivation  have  a  higher  proportion  of 
ownership  than  for  other  kinds  of  motives.  Thus,  this  study  posits  a  hypothesis  as  follow. 
H  g:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host  country  parents 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their  ownership  in  a  joint  venture 
The  results  of  correlation  analysis  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.17.  It  reveals  no  significant 
associations  at  all  about  the  relationship  between  Taiwanese  parent's  motives  for  forming 
international  joint  ventures  and  the  proportion  of  equity  ownership.  Therefore, 
hypothesis  8  is  not  substantiated.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  relationship  between 
motivation  for  a  joint  venture's  formation  and  the  proportion  of  ownership. 
Table  7.2.17  Correlations  between  Taiwanese  Parent's  Motivations  for  Forming  Joint  Ventures  and 
the  Prnnnrtinn  of  Ownerchin 
M  Tech  M  Know  M  Risk  M  Stra  M  Reso  M  Mark  TP  Own 
M  Tech  1.00 
M  Know  0.00  1.00 
M  Risk  0.00  0.00  1.00 
M  Stra  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
M  Reso  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
M  Mark  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Taiwanese  Parent's 
,  Ownership 
0.10  -0.07  -0.15  0.13  0.00  -0.16  1.00 
One  possible  reason  is  that  the  motivation  of  joint  venture  formation  has  very  'wide  and 
varied  explanations,  depending  on  the  objectives  of  the  parents.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  host  country  parents  and  foreign  partners  have  an  agreement  to  form  an 
international  joint  venture,  ownership  is  a  basic  and  initial  resource  which  they  have  to 
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invest  in  joint  ventures.  Therefore,  no  matter  what  kind  of  motivation  the  parents  have, 
they  all  have  to  put  capital  into  joint  ventures  and  the  rights  of  equity  shares.  The 
findings  can  give  us  a  different  way  to  think  about  the  cooperation  between  the  partners 
based  on  the  objectives  of  parents. 
7.2.8  The  Analysis  of  the  Relationship  between  Contribution  and 
Bargaining  Power 
The  issue  of  the  determinants  of  bargaining  power  have  been  presented  by  some  studies 
and  research  results  indicate  that  the  bargaining  power  of  parents  can  be  increased  when 
parents  contributed  resources  to  joint  ventures  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Yan  and 
Gray,  1994;  Gomes-Casseres,  1990;  Kobrin,  1987;  Lecraw,  1984;  Fagre  and  Wells, 
1982).  Yet  what  kind  of  resource  contribution  has  a  strong  influence  on  bargaining 
power,  the  results  vary.  For  example,  Fagre  and  Wells  (1982)  find  that  the  bargaining 
power  of  the  multinational  firm  is  an  increasing  function  of  five  elements  which  are  the 
multinational's  technological  level,  the  product  differentiation,  the  access  provided  to 
export  markets,  the  invested  sum,  and  the  diversity  of  the  firm's  production  line.  In  his 
study,  Lecraw  (1984)  stresses  that  firm-specific  advantages,  which  include  proprietary 
products  or  technology,  access  to  relatively  inexpensive  capital,  access  to  export  markets, 
and  management  expertise,  may  give  the  multinational  bargaining  power  over  the  host 
country  and  competing  firms.  Kobrin  (1987)  has  used  several  variables  to  represent  the 
NINE  bargaining  power  sources,  such  as  technology,  parent  size,  subsidiary  size, 
employment,  and  export  potential. 
Gomes-Casseres  (1990)  suggests  that  the  bargaining  process  is  affected  by  several 
factors,  such  as  R&D  intensity,  marketing  intensity,  and  intra-system  sales  and  the 
outcome  of  ownership  negotiations  seems  to  be  affected  by  the  market  attractiveness  and 
the  type  of  subsidiary.  Harrigan  and  Newman  (1990)  show  that  the  bargaining  power  of 
potential  joint  venture  partners  is  determined  primarily  by  what  each  partner  brings  into 
the  venture.  Blodgett  (1991)  identifies  five  resources  which  are  government  suasion, 
technology,  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  and/or  marketing  expertise,  control  of 
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intra-system  transfers,  and  financial  capital  that  can  give  a  firm  bargaining  power  in  a 
joint  venture.  Inkpen  and  Beamish  (1997)  state  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  is 
not  only  a  key  resource  of  local  partners,  but  it  is  also  a  key  source  of  bargaining  power. 
Yan  and  Gray  (1994)  indicate  that  the  components  of  resources-based  bargaining  power 
encompass  two  context-based  and  seven  resource-based  components  of  bargaining 
power. 
In  general,  according  to  the  pioneering  work  of  researchers,  bargaining  power  can  be 
affected  by  the  parent's  resource  contributions.  On  the  basis  of  the  alternative  literature, 
this  study  posits  that  resource  contributions  supplied  by  parents  and  bargaining  power 
has  a  positive  relationship  and  the  hypothesis  will  be  tested. 
H  6:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  contribution  of  host  country 
parents  and  bargaining  power. 
The  correlation  matrix  provides  the  answer  to  the  hypotheses.  The  results  of  correlation 
analysis  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.18. 
Table  7.2.18  Correlations  between  Taiwanese  Parent's  Resource  Contributions  and  Bargaining  Power 
B  Fin  B  Mark  B  Tech  B  Mana 
C  Ph  s  -0.20*  0.30**  0.33  **  -0.24* 
C  Invi  -0.25**  0.39  **  0.35  **  0.06 
C  Fin  0.00  0.27**  0.15  0.03 
C  Hum  -0.22*  0.35**  0.28  **  0.07 
C  Org  -0.13  0.31**  0.30**  0.00 
**Correlation  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (2-tailed) 
*Correlation  is  significant  at  the  0.05  level  (2-tailed) 
Part  of  the  significant  associations  to  the  correlations  between  resources  contributions 
supplied  by  host  country  parents  and  bargaining  power  are  shown  in  Table  7.2.13.  The 
results  reveal  that  of  all  resource  contributions  which  have  strong  and  positive 
relationships  with  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  and  also  have  positive 
relationships  with  the  bargaining  power  of  technological  capability,  the  exception  is 
financial  resources.  Physical  resource  contributions  have  a  modest  but  negative 
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relationship  with  the  bargaining  power  of  management  capability.  However,  physical 
resources,  invisible  resources,  and  human  resource  contributions  have  modest  but 
negative  relationships  with  the  bargaining  power  of  financial  capability. 
The  results  confirm  that  the  resources  contributed  by  host  country  parents  are  correlated 
with  bargaining  power,  but  not  all  resources  have  the  same  direct  relationships  with 
bargaining  power.  Different  resources  will  have  different  influences  on  bargaining  power. 
For  example,  the  result  reveals  that  all  the  resource  factors  have  a  positive  correlation 
with  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability.  That  is,  the  greater  the  resources 
contributed  by  the  host  country  parents,  the  more  these  resources  influence  bargaining 
power  in  terms  of  marketing-capability. 
However,  there  are  negative  correlations  between  the  resources  and  bargaining  power  of 
finance  capability.  This  indication  is  shown  when  host  country  parents  contribute  more 
non-financial  resources  to  joint  ventures  which  might  result  in  less  influence  on  financial- 
based  bargaining  power.  It  is  reasonably  to  say  that  parents  supplying  non-financial 
resources  such  as  technological  know-how,  management  skills,  and  brands  or  patents, 
can  complement  the  weakness  of  few  equity  shares  held  in  joint  ventures. 
In  sum,  these  results  can  confirm  that  the  resource  contributions  and  bargaining  power 
are  associated.  Therefore,  hypothesis  6  is  partially  substantiated. 
7.2.9  The  Analysis  of  Relationship  between  Motivation  and 
Contribution 
In  chapter  5.5  the  alternative  theories  for  forming  international  joint  ventures  are 
reviewed.  The  principal  theories  relating  to  the  motives  for  forming  an  international  joint 
venture  are  (a)  resource  dependency  theory,  (b)  transaction  cost  theory,  (c)  strategic 
contingency  theory,  (d)  organizational  learning  theory. 
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From  the  aspect  of  resource  dependency  theory,  international  joint  ventures  are 
motivated  by  the  belief  that  the  parent  of  the  international  joint  venture  can  better  obtain 
the  target's  resources  through  cooperation.  Harrigan  (1985)  suggests  that  joint  ventures 
can  be  resource-aggregating  and  resource-sharing  mechanisms,  which  allow  investing 
companies  to  concentrate  resources  in  those  areas  where  they  possess  the  greatest 
respective  strengths.  Inkpen  and  Beamish  (1997)  state  dependence  can  be  a  source  of 
power  to  control  key  resources,  because  each  firm  can  increase  or  withhold  resources 
which  are  attractive  to  its  partner  (Bacharach  and  Lawler,  1980). 
Transaction  cost  theory  is  concerned  with  the  cost-effectiveness  of  organizing 
international  economic  activities  and  is  seen  as  a  means  to  decide  whether  a  joint  venture 
is  the  best  option  according  to  the  sum  of  production  costs  and  transaction  costs.  Teece 
(1986)  finds  that  a  joint  venture  is  the  best  option  when  firms  possess  high  specific 
resources  (Hennart  1991;  Kogut  1988). 
Strategic  behaviour  theory  emphases  how  strategic  behaviour  influences  the  competitive 
position  of  a  firm.  Kogut  (1988)  indicates  that  the  purpose  of  forming  joint  ventures  is 
to  prevent  the  entry  of  rivals  or  to  enervate  the  competitive  position  of  rivals. 
Organizational  learning  theory  views  a  joint  venture  as  a  mode  by  which  firms  learn  (or 
seek)  to  retain  their  capabilities.  Firms  will  cooperate  in  forming  joint  ventures  when 
they  can  benefit  from  another  partner's  knowledge  or  advantages  (Hamel,  1991; 
Badaracco,  1991;  Ciborra,  1991,  Hamel,  1991;  Kogut,  1988;  Harrigan,  1984;  Nelson 
and  Winter,  1982;  ).  Based  on  alternative  literature,  many  previous  research  point  out 
that  one  of  the  motivations  for  forming  a  joint  venture  is  resource  dependence  (Inkpen 
and  Beamish,  1997;  Harrigan,  1985;  Beamish,  1985;  Killing,  1983;  Pfeffer  and  Salabcik, 
1978;  Zald,  1970;  Aiken  and  Hage,  1968;  Tompson,  1967;  Blau,  1964;  Emerson,  1962; 
Selznick,  1949).  On  the  basis  of  the  relative  literature's  results,  this  study  posits  that 
there  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  for  forming  an  international 
joint  venture  and  the  resource  contribution  of  the  host  country  parents.  Thus,  the 
hypothesis  is  represented  below: 
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H  9:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivations  of  host  country  parents 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their  resource  contribution  to  a  joint 
venture 
A  Pearson  correlation  matrix  shown  in  Table  7.2.19  is  obtained  for  the  motivational 
factors  and  contribution  factors.  The  results  show  there  are  partial  positive  and  negative 
relationships  between  motivation  and  contribution  factors. 
Table  7.2.19  Correlations  between  Taiwanese  Parent's  Motivation  for  Forming  Joint  Ventures  and 
Resource  Contributions 
M  Tech  M  Know  M  Risk  M  Strat  M  Resou  M  Mark 
C  Phys  0.31**  -0.20*  -0.07  0.48**  -0.06  -0.30** 
C  Invi  0.23*  -0.01  -0.12  0.47**  -0.14  -0.29** 
C  Fina  0.15  0.00  -0.18  0.16  0.03  -0.08 
C  Huma  0.21*  0.10  -0.11  0.41**  -0.24*  -0.25** 
C  Ora  0.24*  -0.02  -0.15  0.47**  -0.13  -0.34** 
**Correlation  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (2-tailed) 
*Correlation  is  significant  at  the  0.05  level  (2-tailed) 
The  results  reveal  that  motivational  factors  do  not  have  any  relationships  to  financial 
resource  contribution.  This  is  because  financial  resources  encompass  equity  investments 
which  are  basic  resources  involved  in  forming  international  joint  ventures.  Therefore,  no 
matter  what  kind  of  motivation  the  parents  have,  partners  still  have  to  contribute  the 
financial  resources  for  joint  ventures. 
Beside  financial  resources,  most  resource  contribution  factors  have  positive  and  strong 
relationships  with  motivational  factors  such  as  strategic  consideration  motive,  and 
technological  acquisition  motive.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  negative  relationships 
between  market  expansion  motivation  and  most  resource  contribution  factors.  Resource 
complementarity  motivation  has  only  a  weak  and  negative  relationship  with  physical 
resources  contribution,  and  knowledge  learning  motivation  also  has  a  weak  and  negative 
relationship  with  physical  resources  contribution. 
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Why  is  there  a  positive  relationship  between  strategic  consideration  motivation  and 
resource  contributions?  This  study  infers  that  host  country  parents  use  joint  ventures  to 
improve  their  competitive  positioning  within  the  market,  and  see  the  joint  venture  as  a 
mode  to  prevent  the  entry  of  rivals.  From  the  analysis  of  sample  characteristics,  we  find 
that  most  joint  venture's  parents  are  big  companies.  They  use  their  resource  strengths  to 
cooperate  with  foreign  companies  to  enervate  the  competitive  position  of  their  rivals  and 
increase  the  value  of  their  company's  assets.  Therefore,  they  will  contribute  more 
resources  into  joint  ventures  in  order  to  achieve  their  strategic  aspiration.  These  results 
are  consistent  with  most  researcher  studies  (Lin,  1995;  Kogut,  1988;  Contractor  and 
Lorange,  1986;  Vickers,  1985;  Vernon,  1983;  Pennings,  1981). 
Technological  acquisition  motivation  and  resource  contribution  also  have  positive 
relationships.  Harrigan  (1985)  classifies  the  various  uses  of  joint  venture  into  three 
categories  which  are  internal  uses,  competitive  uses  and  strategic  uses.  One  strategy 
which  has  been  used  is  technology  or  other  skills  transfer.  Hung  (1992)  identifies  twenty 
two  motives  for  strategic  alliances  based  on  Canadian  and  Pacific  Asia  companies.  One 
of  the  motives  is  the  acquisition  of  foreign  technology.  From  her  empirical  study  in  the 
Taiwan  context,  Lin  (1995)  finds  that  one  motivation  for  forming  international  joint 
ventures  is  acquiring  technology. 
From  relative  research  results,  we  find  that  Asian  companies  engaging  in  international 
joint  ventures  are  generally  concerned  with  obtaining  foreign  resources,  especially 
acquiring  foreign  technology.  The  results  of  this  study  also  find  that  host  country 
parents  who  have  a  motivation  for  technology  acquisition  will  contribute  more  resources 
to  joint  ventures.  These  results  are  also  consistent  with  some  research  results  (Lin,  1995; 
Hung,  1992;  Harrigan,  1985). 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  market  expansion  motive 
and  resource  contributions,  excepting  financial  resources.  This  study  infers  that  when 
host  country  parents  engage  in  an  international  joint  venture  for  market  expansion,  they 
might  be  considering  entering  a  new  market  or  a  new  industry.  Based  on  the  Taiwan 
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empirical  situation,  Taiwanese  companies  like  to  cooperate  with  foreign  companies  in 
order  to  use  the  foreign  company's  expertise  to  enter  a  new  industry  or  a  new  market. 
Thus,  they  normally  put  more  money  into  joint  ventures  and  contribute  less  in  other 
resources.  In  other  words,  they  only  invest  the  money  and  do  not  intervene  in  other 
activities  in  joint  ventures. 
For  example,  one  of  the  interviews  cases  the  Taiwanese  company-President  group  and 
American  COSTCO  enterprise  form  an  international  joint  venture  in  Taiwan.  The 
President  enterprise  group  only  invests  money  into  the  venture,  it  does  not  contribute 
other  resources  and  does  not  intervene  in  the  joint  venture's  operating  activities.  The 
objective  of  President  enterprise  group  in  engaging  in  the  joint  venture,  is  to  expand  its 
market  through  cooperation  with  a  foreign  company.  Therefore,  one  can  infer  that 
companies  with  motivation  for  market  expansion  will  have  less  resource  contribution  into 
joint  ventures.  Other  motivations  and  resource  contribution  have  weak  relationships, 
thus,  it  is  not  discussed  here. 
In  summary,  with  regard  to  the  relationship  between  control,  ownership,  bargaining 
power,  contribution,  and  motivation  derived  from  this  empirical  survey,  all  the  results  are 
represented  in  Table  7.2.20. 
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Table  7.2.20  Summary  of  the  Results  of  the  Research  Hvnotheses 
Research  Hypotheses  Results 
Dimension 
HI:  There  is  a  significantly  positive  relationship  between  the 
proportion  of  ownership  and  the  extent  of  control. 
H  1.1:  The  higher  the  proportion  of  equity  ownership  held  Substantiated  + 
by  host  country  parents  the  stronger  their  control  of 
Ownership  operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint 
venture. 
H  1.2:  The  higher  the  proportion  of  equity  ownership  held  Substantiated  + 
by  host  country  parents  the  stronger  their  control  of 
the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
venture. 
H2:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining 
Bargaining  power  and  the  extent  of  control. 
H3:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining 
power  and  the  proportion  of  ownership. 
Partially  +/  - 
Substantiated 
Partially  + 
Substantiated 
H.  4:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource 
contribution  of  host  country  parents  and  the  extent  of 
control  they  exercise  in  a  joint  venture. 
H 
, -I.:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource  Substantiated  + 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activities  in  a  joint  venture. 
H  4.  Ib:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resource  Substantiated  + 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the 
appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
venture.  Substantiated  + 
H  4.2.:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activity  in  a  joint  venture.  Substantiated  + 
H  4-2b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  invisible  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the 
appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint  Substantiated  + 
venture. 
H  4.3.:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  financial  resource 
Contribution  contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational  Substantiated  + 
decision-making  activity  in  a  joint  venture. 
H  4-3b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  financial  resource 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the  Substantiated  + 
appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
venture. 
H  ":  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resources  Substantiated  + 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activity  in  a  joint  venture. 
H  44b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  human  resources  Substantiated  + 
contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of  the 
appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
venture. 
H  4.5.:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organizational  Substantiated  + 
resources  contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of 
operational  decision-making  activities  in  a  joint 
venture. 
H  4-5b:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  organizational 
resources  contribution  will  have  stronger  control  of 
the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  in  a  joint 
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venture. 
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Table  7.2.20  Summary  of  the  Results  of  the  Research  Hypotheses  (continue) 
Research  Hypotheses  Results 
Dimension 
H5:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  resource  Substantiated 
contribution  of  host  country  parents  and  their  proportion  of 
ownership  in  a  joint  venture. 
H  s.  1:  Host  country  parents  with  higher  physical  resources  Substantiated 
contribution  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of  equity 
shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  s_Z:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  invisible  resources  Substantiated 
contribution  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of  equity 
shares  in  a  joint  venture 
Contribution  H  5-3:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  financial  resources  Substantiated 
contribution  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of  equity 
shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  5.4:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  human  resources  Substantiated 
contribution  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of  equity 
shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  -.  5:  Host  country  parents  with  a  higher  organizational  Substantiated 
resource  contribution  will  have  a  higher  proportion  of 
equity  shares  in  a  joint  venture 
H  6:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  Partially 
contribution  of  host  country  parents  and  bargaining  power  Substantiated  +/  - 
H  7:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  Partially 
of  host  country  parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  Substantiated  +/  - 
and  their  control  over  a  joint  venture. 
H  8:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  Not 
Motivation  of  host  country  parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  Substantiated 
and  their  ownership  in  a  joint  venture. 
H  9:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  Partially  +/  - 
of  host  country  parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  Substantiated 
and  their  resource  contribution  to  a  joint  venture 
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7.3  Summary 
The  chapter  analyzed  the  relationships  between  control,  ownership,  bargaining  power, 
contributions,  and  motivations.  All  the  hypotheses  have  been  tested  and  examined. 
Hypotheses  H1.1  and  H1.2  are  built  to  test  the  relationship  between  ownership  and  control 
in  operational  decision-making  activities  and  high-level  managers'  appointments  in  joint 
ventures.  The  results  reveal  that  the  ownership  is  significantly  and  positively  correlated 
to  control  over  operational  decision-making  activities  and  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers  in  joint  ventures.  The  higher  the  proportion  of  IV's  equity  shares  held  by  host 
country  parents,  the  stronger  control  they  exercise  in  joint  ventures.  Therefore,  H1.1  and 
Hl_2  are  substantiated. 
Hypothesis  H2  is  built  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the  bargaining  power  of  a 
firm  and  its  control  of  operational  decision-making  activities  and  the  high-level 
manager's  appointment  in  joint  ventures.  There  are  four  factors,  namely,  technological 
capability,  management  capability,  financial  capability,  and  marketing  capability.  The 
results  reveal  that  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  control  are  not  closely 
associated.  Only  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  and  control  has  a  modest 
and  positive  relationship.  The  findings  provide  a  very  little  support  for  Hz.  Therefore, 
H2  is  only  partially  substantiated. 
Hypothesis  H3  is  built  to  test  the  relationship  between  a  firm's  bargaining  power  and 
ownership.  The  results  of  this  study  provide  very  little  support  for  H3.  Only  the 
bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  has  a  modest  and  positive  relationship  with 
ownership.  Therefore,  H3  is  only  partially  substantiated. 
Hypothesis  114  is  posited  to  examine  the  relationship  between  the  resource  contribution 
supplied  by  host  country  parents  and  the  extent  of  control.  The  results  show  that 
relationships  between  contribution  factors  which  are  physical,  invisible,  financial,  human, 
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and  organizational  ability  resource  and  control,  are  significant  and  positive.  The  more 
resource  contributions  supplied  by  host  country  parents  to  joint  ventures,  the  more 
control  on  decision-making  activities  and  high-level  manager  appointment  they  exercise 
in  joint  ventures.  Therefore,  H  41,,  and  F  14-1b,  H  42,,  and  H  4_2b,  H  4-3a  and  H4-3b,  H 
and  H  44b,  F  14-s.  and  H4-5b,  are  all  substantiated. 
Hypothesis  H5  is  posited  to  examine  the  relationship  between  the  contribution  of  host 
country  parents  and  the  proportion  of  ownership.  The  results  reveal  that  relationships 
between  resource  contributions  of  host  country  parents  and  the  proportion  of  ownership 
are  significant  and  positive.  The  more  resources  contributed  by  host  country  parents,  the 
higher  the  proportion  of  JV's  equity  shares  they  possess.  Therefore,  H  5.1,  H  5-2,  H  s.  s,  H 
5.4,  and  H  s.  s  are  all  substantiated. 
Hypothesis  Hb  is  posited  to  examine  the  relationship  between  the  contribution  of  host 
country  parents  and  bargaining  power.  The  results  reveal  that  most  resources 
contributed  by  host  country  parents  are  correlated  with  bargaining  power.  However,  not 
all  resources  have  the  same  direction  of  relationship  with  bargaining  power.  All  resource 
contribution  factors  have  a  strong  and  positive  relationship  with  the  bargaining  power  of 
marketing  capability,  and  also  have  positive  relationships  with  the  bargaining  power  of 
technological  capability  except  for  the  financial  resources  contribution.  The  greater  the 
resource  contributed  by  host  country  parents,  the  more  these  resources  influence 
bargaining  power  with  regard  to  marketing-capability.  On  the  other  hand,  physical 
resources  contribution  has  a  modest  but  negative  relationship  with  the  bargaining  power 
of  management  capability.  Therefore,  for  the  most  part,  H6  is  substantiated. 
Hypothesis  H7  is  posited  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the  motivation  for 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  the  extent  of  control.  There  are  six  motivational 
factors  as  follows,  technological  acquisition,  knowledge  learning,  risk  sharing, 
competitive  strategy  consideration,  resource  complementarity,  and  market  expanding. 
The  results  reveal  that  there  are  a  limited  number  of  significant  correlations  between 
motivational  factors  and  the  extent  of  control.  Strategic  consideration  motivation  has  a 
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modest  positive  relationship  to  control.  However  market  expansion  resource  motivation 
has  a  negative  relationship  to  control.  Resource  complementarity  motive  has  a  weak 
relationship  with  control  of  a  joint  venture's  decision-making  activities.  Therefore,  the 
findings  provide  a  partial  support  for  hypothesis  H7. 
Hypothesis  H8  is  posited  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the  motivation  for 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  the  proportion  of  ownership.  The  results  reveal 
there  are  no  significant  associations  between  Taiwanese  parent's  motivations  for  forming 
international  joint  ventures  and  the  proportion  of  equity  shares.  Therefore,  hypothesis 
H$  is  not  substantiated. 
Hypothesis  H9  is  posited  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the  motivation  for 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  the  level  of  contribution.  The  results  show  there 
are  partial  positive  and  negative  relationships  between  motivational  factors  and 
contribution  factors.  Beside  financial  resources,  most  resource  contribution  factors  have 
positive  and  strong  relationships  with  motivational  factors  such  as  strategic  consideration 
motivation  and  resource  contribution  motivation.  However,  there  are  negative 
relationships  between  the  market  expansion  motive  and  all  resource  contribution  factors 
except  financial  resources  contribution  factor.  Resource  complementarity  motivation 
and  the  knowledge  learning  motive  have  only  a  weak  and  negative  relationship  with 
physical  resources  contribution.  Therefore,  part  of  hypothesis  H9  remains  substantiated. 
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Chapter  8 
FINDINGS  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
8.1  Introduction 
Chapter  6  and  Chapter  7  have  conducted  the  description  analysis  and  inferential  analysis 
of  the  data.  The  primary  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  discuss  the  results  derived  from 
this  empirical  survey.  The  organization  of  this  chapter  is  divided  into  five  sections.  A 
summary  of  the  main  findings  of  this  study  is  presented  in  section  8.2.  Followed  by 
section  8.3,  which  is  a  discussion  of  the  limitations  of  this  study.  Section  8.4  provides 
some  suggestions  for  future  research.  A  brief  conclusion  is  provided  in  section  8.5. 
8.2  Summary  of  Main  Findings 
The  main  findings  derived  from  this  empirical  survey  are  examined  briefly  in  this  section. 
There  are  the  general  characteristics  of  Taiwanese  enterprises,  the  core  research 
dimensions  in  terms  of  control,  ownership,  bargaining  power,  contributions,  and 
motivation,  the  results  of  hypothesis  testing.  Each  factor  is  described  separately. 
8.2.1  The  General  Characteristics  of  Taiwanese  Enterprises 
The  general  characteristics  of  Taiwanese  enterprises  forming  international  joint  ventures 
includes  the  industry,  the  nationality  /regions  of  foreign  parents,  size  of  host  country 
parents,  ages  of  both  host  country  parents  and  joint  ventures,  the  number  of  board 
members,  and  the  nationality  of  general  managers.  The  findings  of  each  characteristic 
are  described  separately  below. 
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1.  Industry 
The  major  industries  of  host  country  parents  are  Electronics,  Plastics,  Trade/General 
Merchandise,  Machinery  Equipment,  Electrical  Equipment/Cable,  and  Banking  & 
Insurance  industry.  These  results  indicate  that  most  international  joint  venture 
formations  in  Taiwan  occur  in  the  manufacturing  group.  This  probably  reflects  that 
economic  development  under  the  Government's  influence  in  Taiwan  has  been  more 
focused  on  the  manufacturing  industry  since  1960.  The  manufacturing  sector  needed  to 
develop  new  technologies,  improve  production  processes,  increase  market  power,  and 
improve  their  managerial  efficiency  in  order  to  meet  the  demands  of  international  market 
competition.  Therefore,  most  international  joint  ventures  occur  in  the  manufacturing 
sector.  Nevertheless,  the  government  of  Taiwan  implemented  an  open  policy  on  the 
service  industry  in  1990,  which  results  in  an  increasing  ratio  of  IN  in  the  service  sector. 
These  results  indicate  that  the  Taiwan  government  plays  a  vital  role  in  economic 
development  and  enterprises  can  improve  their  competitiveness  through  assistance  from 
and  cooperation  with  the  government's  policy. 
2.  Nationality  /  Regions  of  foreign  partners 
The  major  nationality  of  foreign  partners  is  Japanese,  followed  by  American  partners. 
These  results  indicate  that  Japan  and  other  Asian  companies  are  heavily  involved  in 
international  joint  ventures  in  Taiwan.  Because  of  location,  historical  background  and 
culture,  Japan  and  other  Asian  countries  have  a  higher  percentage  of  foreign  investment. 
Especially  Japan,  as  most  key  production  components  have  been  controlled  by  them,  and 
some  Taiwanese  companies  have  relied  on  them  to  obtain  technology  or  import 
machinery  or components.  American  partners  represent  the  second  highest  proportion  of 
foreign  investment.  The  US  and  Taiwan  have  had  a  special  political  relation  since  the 
government  of  Taiwan  withdrew  from  Mainland  China.  Under  a  military  and  economic 
agreement,  the  US  provided  economic  aid  to  Taiwan  which  gave  the  government  of 
Taiwan  the  impetus  to  develop  the  economy  and  trade.  Although  the  US  ended 
economic  aid  in  1957,  a  close  relationship  was  built  between  the  government  and 
enterprises.  These  relations  brought  great  influence  on  foreign  investment  in  Taiwan. 
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America  becomes  the  main  and  fastest  growth  area  on  the  amount  of  inbound  foreign 
investment  in  Taiwan.  Taiwanese  enterprises  obtain  high  technologies  and  advance  skills 
from  their  American  partners,  and  greatly  improve  their  competitive  abilities  through 
such  cooperation.  These  results  indicate  that  Japan  and  America  have  great  influence  on 
the  development  of  Taiwan  enterprises  and  the  economy  of  Taiwan. 
3.  Size  of  host  country  parents 
The  size  of  host  country  parents  is  measured  by  capital,  sales  volume  and  the  number  of 
employees.  No  matter  whether  based  on  the  company's  capital,  or  the  company's  sales 
volume,  or  the  numbers  of  employees,  the  results  indicate  that  most  international  joint 
ventures  occur  within  large  companies  in  Taiwan.  With  regard  to  capital,  sales  volume 
and  the  number  of  employees,  these  results  indicate  that  most  host  country  parents 
involved  in  international  joint  ventures  are  very  successful  companies  and  have  a  high 
reputation  in  Taiwan  and  this  may  be  the  reason  why  foreign  companies  choose  them  as 
partners. 
4.  Ages  of  host  country  parents  and  the  joint  ventures 
From  the  empirical  results,  the  average  age  of  host  country  parents  is  32.9  years.  Over 
half  (60.5%)  of  the  host  country  parents  have  been  established  more  than  30  years.  Only 
5.3%  of  host  country  parents  were  established  less  than  10  years.  These  results  imply 
that  the  older  the  company,  the  more  experience  and  abilities  it  has,  and  in  turn,  more 
opportunities  to  cooperate  with  foreign  investors. 
From  the  age  of  joint  ventures,  the  average  age  of  a  joint  venture  is  14.2  years.  Over 
half  (56.1%)  of  the  joint  ventures  were  established  more  than  10  years.  Especially,  14 
cases  of  ventures  have  been  formed  for  more  than  30  years.  These  results  imply  that 
host  country  parents  have  very  good  relationships  with  foreign  parents  and  these  good 
relationships  will  affect  opportunities  for  future  cooperation. 
5.  The  number  of  board  members 
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The  board  directors  serve  as  a  communication  and  information  processing  channel 
between  the  parents  and  the  child  (or  joint  venture).  It  is  also  the  method  that  parents 
use  to  exercise  control  over  the  joint  venture.  The  mean  score  of  the  number  of  JV's 
board  members  represented  by  the  host  country  parents  is  4.2  and  3.9  for  foreign  parents. 
When  counted  as  a  percentage,  the  host  country  parents  have  57%  and  foreign  parents 
have  43%.  These  findings  reveal  that  host  country  parents  have  more  seats  on  the  board 
of  directors  of  joint  ventures  than  foreign  parents.  Prior  research  results  suggest  that 
partners  could  use  participation  in  the  joint  venture's  board  of  directors  to  exert  effective 
control  over  its  activities  (Jaussaud,  Schaaper  and  Zhang,  2001;  Kumar  and  Seth,  1998; 
Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Schaan,  1983).  Therefore,  this  study  infers  that  the  host 
country  parents  might  have  more  control  over  the  joint  venture  than  the  foreign  parents. 
6.  The  nationality  of  the  general  manager 
Prior  research  suggests  that  occupation  of  key  executive  positions  can  ensure  the 
parent's  objectives  are  observed  (Yan  and  Child,  2004;  Jaussaud,  Schaaper  and  Zhang, 
2001;  Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Schaan,  1983).  The  general  managers  are  commonly 
regarded  as  a  tool  for  control  by  the  parents  (Yan  and  Gray,  1994;  Geringer  and  Hebert, 
1989).  The  results  indicate  that  most  general  managers  of  joint  ventures  are  Taiwanese 
(70%  of  total  samples).  This  result  implies  that  the  host  country  parents  might  have 
greater  control  than  their  partners  by  having  more  general  managers. 
8.2.2  The  Control  of  International  Joint  Ventures 
This  section  examined  the  results  of  statistical  analysis  regarding  the  core  research 
dimensions  and  the  relationship  between  research  dimensions  and  sample  characteristics. 
In  this  study  the  five  core  dimensions  are  control,  ownership,  bargaining  power, 
contribution  and  motivation.  Each  one  has  been  examined  separately  and  the  results 
have  provided  insight  into  the  nature  of  each  dimension. 
From  the  relevant  literature,  three  constructs  have  been  identified  to  describe  the  control 
of  international  joint  venture  (Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989).  They  are  the  mechanism  of 
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control,  the  extent  of  control  and  the  focus  of  control.  The  focus  and  extent  of  control 
are  measured  by  responsibility  for  decision-making  and  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers. 
Regarding  the  focus  of  control,  the  results  indicate  that  most  of  the  decisions  relating  to 
production  scheduling,  manufacturing  process,  quality  standards,  and  cost  budgeting  are 
taken  by  joint  ventures;  however,  on  the  other  hand,  they  have  the  least  power  in  capital 
expenditure  decisions.  This  might  be  because  these  activities  are  highly  related  to  a  joint 
venture's  environment  and  have  to  acknowledge  the  joint  venture's  daily  operating 
strategies.  Foreign  parents  actively  participate  in  exercising  control  in  product  design 
decisions.  This  might  be  because  most  foreign  parents  see  product  design  as  their  area  of 
expertise  and  competitive  advantage.  Host  country  parents  exercise  more  control  in 
sales  targets  and  capital  expenditures  decisions.  This  may  be  because  these  two 
decisions  largely  involve  the  financial  investment  and  performance  of  joint  ventures. 
The  results  are  consistent  with  those  found  in  previous  empirical  studies  (Glaister,  1994; 
Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Geringer,  1986;  Schaan,  1983).  They  suggest  that  parents 
tend  to  seek  control  over  particular  activities  rather  than  over  the  whole  range  of  the 
joint  venture's  operations.  This  study  also  suggests  that  that  the  joint  venture's  parents 
concentrate  on  controlling  specific  activities  instead  of  controlling  all  the  operations  of 
the  joint  ventures. 
For  the  mechanism  of  control,  most  general  managers  are  appointed  by  either  both 
parents  or  one  parent.  The  purpose  of  this  is  to  ensure  that  the  policies  of  the  joint 
ventures  are  followed  up  and  fully  observed  by  the  subsidiary  company.  Except  for  the 
general  managers,  host  country  parents  command  stronger  control  over  the  appointment 
of  vice  general  managers,  and  financial  managers.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the 
findings  of  IN's  decision-making  activities  where  it  reveals  that  Taiwan  headquarters 
also  have  stronger  power  on  the  decision  of  capital  expenditures.  The  results  indicate 
that  host  country  parents  have  high  intervention  in  capital  expenditure  decisions  and  the 
appointment  of  financial  directors  in  their  invested  company.  Normally,  Taiwanese 
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companies  like  to  use  financial  results  to  estimate  the  performances  of  their  subsidiaries 
and  they  also  use  it  to  decide  on  resource  allocation.  Therefore,  they  would  have  higher 
intervention  on  that  issue.  On  the  other  hand,  foreign  parents  are  the  most  active  in  the 
appointment  of  R&D  managers  and  also  have  stronger  control  in  the  decision-making  on 
product  design  as  already  explained.  The  results  indicate  that  foreign  parents  have  better 
professional  skills  and  superiority  in  completion  of  production  design  and  research. 
Therefore,  they  possess  stronger  control  in  R&D.  Joint  venture  companies  have  more 
autonomy  in  terms  of  production,  marketing  and  personnel  managers  as  well  as  head 
engineers.  Again,  these  results  are  consistent  with  most  existing  research  findings  that 
effective  control  should  emphasize  selective  control  over  some  important  dimensions 
rather  than  attempting  to  control  the  entire  range  of  the  joint  venture's  activities  (Glaister, 
1994;  Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Geringer,  1986;  Schaan,  1983). 
For  the  extent  of  control,  the  empirical  results  reveal  that  most  joint  ventures  have  higher 
autonomy  to  manage  the  company.  The  parents  seek  to  control  particular  activities 
which  they  perceive  as  critical  dimensions  and  which  work  in  synergy.  These  results  are 
not  consistent  with  some  prior  studies  and  some  other  studies  have  different  arguments 
on  this  issue  (Glaister,  1994;  Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989;  Geringer,  1986;  Schaan,  1983). 
The  results  are  puzzling.  There  are  some  possible  explanations.  Firstly,  it  might  be  the 
different  research  context  that  results  in  a  different  management  culture  in  the  way  the 
subsidiaries  are  managed.  Secondly,  it  might  be  caused  by  the  measurement  of  control. 
Killing  (1983)  deems  the  importance  of  each  decision  is  equal,  but  Chang  (1996)  argues 
that  control  is  not  a  dichotomous  context,  there  is  a  different  degree  of  importance  for 
decisions.  Each  decision  or  activity  should  be  weighted  by  its  importance.  This  study 
uses  a  different  method  to  measure  the  extent  of  control  by  modifying  Killing's  method 
and  considering  the  weighting  of  each  activity  in  which  parents  and  the  joint  ventures  are 
involved  at  the  same  time.  Thus,  the  method  of  measurement  of  control  is  more 
comprehensive.  Therefore  it  creates  different  results.  Thirdly,  a  joint  venture  is  an 
independent  organization,  it  has  its  own  objectives  and  management  structures,  even 
though  the  parents  are  involved  in  some  important  decisions.  Joint  ventures  still  have  to 
be  responsible  for  the  results  of  its  activities.  Thus,  it  would  have  higher  autonomy  in 
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operating  the  company.  Fourthly,  most  of  the  joint  ventures  have  been  established  more 
than  10  years  and  they  have  run  the  business  successfully,  this  might  let  their  parents 
have  trust  and  respect  for  them  and  let  them  have  more  autonomy. 
With  regard  to  the  relation  between  the  sample  characteristics  and  the  type  of  control, 
most  of  the  results  are  not  significant  except  for  the  sales  volume  of  the  host  country 
parents  and  the  percentage  of  board  members.  The  higher  sales  volume  of  host  country 
parents  allows  them  to  have  stronger  control  over  their  joint  ventures.  Host  country 
parents  who  have  sales  volumes  normally  mean  they  have  more  resources  and  abilities  to 
successfully  manage  businesses  by  themselves.  When  they  form  international  joint 
ventures  with  foreign  partners,  they  have  their  special  strategic  motives.  Therefore,  this 
study  infers  that  host  country  parents  might  have  special  objectives  for  forming 
international  joint  ventures;  and  therefore  require  greater  control  over  their  joint  ventures 
to  ensure  their  strategic  objectives  are  adhered  to  and  achieved.  In  addition,  the  higher 
the  percentages  of  board  members  from  host  country  parents,  the  more  "independent 
control"  they  exercise  over  a  joint  venture.  The  phenomenon  could  be  explained  by  the 
host  country  parents  letting  their  joint  venture  have  more  autonomy  but  at  the  same  time, 
they  use  the  representatives  on  the  joint  venture's  board  to  exert  control  over  the  joint 
venture. 
8.2.3  The  Ownership  of  International  Joint  Ventures 
The  results  of  equity  shares  held  by  the  host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents  show 
that  both  parents  have  minority  shareholding  in  the  joint  ventures.  The  mean  equity 
shareholding  of  host  country  parents  is  41.15%  and  the  mean  equity  shareholding  of  the 
foreign  parent  is  46.64%.  The  relationship  between  the  Taiwanese  parent's  ownership 
and  the  sample  characteristics  reveal  that  there  are  associations  between  the  Taiwanese 
parent's  equity  shareholding,  the  sales  volume  of  the  host  country  parents,  and  the 
percentage  of  parent's  board  members  in  joint  ventures.  The  higher  the  sales  volume  of 
the  host  country  parents,  the  higher  their  equity  shareholding  in  a  joint  venture.  The 
study  infers  that  when  the  parents  are  bigger,  they  will  have  more  financial  ability  to 
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invest  capital  in  a  joint  venture.  Therefore  they  hold  higher  equity  shares  in  a  joint 
venture. 
The  results  also  reveal  that  a  higher  ownership  by  the  parents  in  joint  ventures  indicates 
that  they  have  a  higher  percentage  of  board  members.  Leksell  and  Lindgren  (1982) 
indicate  that  the  equity  ownership  of  joint  ventures  affects  the  number  of  members  on  a 
joint  venture's  board  of  directors.  Basically,  the  representation  of  board  members  and 
the  equity  share  represent  voting  rights  on  important  decisions  relating  to  joint  ventures. 
Therefore,  the  parents  who  have  a  larger  ownership  would  have  more  power  in  terms  of 
board  member  representation.  The  results  of  this  study  echo  Leksell  and  Lindgren's 
(1982)  results. 
8.2.4  Bargaining  Power  of  International  Joint  Ventures 
Bargaining  power  stems  from  critical  resources  such  as  technology,  marketing  expertise, 
investment  sum,  and  access  to  export  channels  or  markets.  The  results  of  this  study 
show  that  the  most  important  variable  affecting  bargaining  power  is  ownership.  When 
two,  or  more  than  two  companies  want  to  cooperate  and  establish  another  new 
subsidiary,  ownership  is  a  basic  and  critical  resource.  The  amount  of  equity  shares  held 
affects  the  bargaining  power  of  partners;  thus,  the  most  effective  method  of  gaining 
bargaining  power  is  to  gain  more  equity  shares.  Two  other  important  variables  are 
"access  to  export  markets"  and  "the  knowledge  of  the  local  markets".  The  results 
indicate  that  market  is  a  fairly  important  variable  for  bargaining  power.  "Technological 
ability"  and  "Innovative  ability"  are  ranged  between  "fairly  important"  and  "important". 
These  results  indicate  that  technology  is  an  important  variable  for  a  company  to  obtain 
more  bargaining  power  and  implies  that  technology  could  enhance  the  control  available 
to  the  partners. 
The  least  important  variable  is  "the  influence  of  host  government".  Taiwan  is  a 
democratic  country  and  the  government  encourages  and  assists  enterprises  in 
cooperating  with  foreign  companies.  Taiwan  is  unlike  other  developing  countries  where 
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the  government  is  involved  in  cooperative  activities  between  local  business  and 
transactional  companies  and  has  a  strong  effect  on  bargaining  power.  In  the  Taiwan 
context,  the  government  has  minimal  influence  on  bargaining  power. 
In  this  study,  four  factors  of  bargaining  power  are  identified  using  factor  analysis,  namely: 
technological  capability,  management  capability,  financial  capability,  and  marketing 
capability.  The  relationship  between  bargaining  power  factors  and  the  sample 
characteristics  reveal  that  the  only  industry  variable  in  which  host  country  parents  are 
involved  has  an  association  with  the  bargaining  power  factors.  It  seems  that  different 
industries  have  different  characteristics  and  core  competitive  advantages.  Normally,  the 
company  who  possesses  more  industry  competitive  advantages  would  have  more 
negotiating  power  than  its  partners.  Therefore,  one  could  conclude  that  the  sources  of 
bargaining  power  would  be  different  in  each  industry  group.  Bargaining  power  will  be 
affected  more  by  technological  capability  in  the  manufacturing  group;  on  the  other  hand, 
it  would  be  affected  more  by  management  capability  and  financial  capability  in  the  service 
group. 
8.2.5  The  Parent's  Contribution 
There  is  a  wide  range  of  resources  that  each  parent  might  contribute  to  joint  ventures.  In 
this  study,  the  results  reveal  that  both  parents  contribute  different  resources  to  a  joint 
venture  according  to  their  expert  resources.  For  the  host  country  parents,  "access  to  a 
public  relation  with  the  local  government"  and  "access  to  environmental  knowledge"  are 
the  most  significant  resources  they  contributed  to  a  joint  venture.  When  foreign 
companies  expand  their  market  overseas  through  cooperation  with  host  country 
companies,  the  local  partners  usually  play  an  important  role  in  access  to  local 
government  and  knowledge  of  the  local  environment.  The  results  of  this  empirical 
survey  are  consistent  with  the  results  of  UNCTC  (1987)  and  Inkpen  and  Beamish  (1997). 
The  local  partner's  contributions  are  more  on  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  and 
access  to  a  relationship  with  the  government.  On  the  other  hand,  the  least  significant 
resources  contributed  by  host  country  parents  are  "key  components  and  raw  material" 
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and  "technological  or  R&D  ability".  Most  Taiwanese  companies  have  very  strong 
strengths  in  manufacturing,  but  have  weaknesses  on  technology  or  R&D  ability.  Thus, 
they  would  cooperate  with  foreign  companies  to  obtain  or  improve  their  technological  or 
R&D  ability. 
Foreign  parents  mostly  contribute  inputs  in  terms  of  the  following:  "financial  resource", 
"sharing  brands  or  patent"  and  "sharing  the  knowledge  of  management".  Foreign 
parents  who  are  from  developed  countries  usually  have  a  very  strong  financial  capability, 
technology  capability,  and  global  brands.  Technology,  brands  and  patent,  management 
knowledge  are  most  important  resources  for  developing  countries.  Therefore,  forming 
an  international  joint  venture  is  a  useful  method  to  satisfy  each  other's  requirements. 
The  results  are  also  consistent  with  the  results  of  Lin  (1986),  Chang  (1986),  Wu  (1994) 
and  Lin  (1995).  Host  country  parents  contribute  more  resources  with  regard  to  the  local 
market  and  their  main  objectives  are  to  obtain  the  foreign  parent's  technology  and  brands 
or  patent.  These  results  indicate  that  both  parents  contribute  different  resources  to  joint 
ventures  with  respect  to  resource  complementarity. 
There  is  some  evidence  of  the  statistical  variation  in  relation  to  resource  contribution 
factors  and  sample  characteristics.  The  results  reveal  that  foreign  parents  who  come 
from  Asian  countries  have  a  greater  contribution  in  physical  resources  than  those  from 
American  countries  or  European  countries.  The  results  also  show  that  host  country 
parents  who  are  in  the  manufacturing  group  have  a  higher  resource  contribution  to  a 
joint  venture  than  parents  from  the  service  group.  The  big  companies  contribute  more 
resources  into  their  joint  ventures.  The  larger  the  host  country  parents  are,  the  higher 
ability  and  more  resources  they  own.  In  this  case,  the  big  companies  are  willing  to 
contribute  more  resources  to  a  joint  venture. 
8.2.6  The  Motivation  for  Formation  of  an  International  Joint  Venture 
There  are  many  possible  explanations  with  regard  to  the  motivation  for  international  joint 
venture  formation.  The  most  important  motives  for  Taiwanese  parent  to  form  the  IN 
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are  "Extending  the  range  of  product  and  service",  "Facilitating  diversified  development", 
"Expanding  the  market  and  entering  new  markets",  and  "Acquiring  partner's  brands  or 
patents".  From  the  results,  it  shows  that  "market  expansion"  and  "considering 
diversified  development"  are  fairly  important  motives  for  Taiwanese  enterprises.  The 
results  are  consistent  with  those  found  in  previous  empirical  studies  (Lin,  1995;  Beamish 
et  al,  1994;  Datta,  1988;  Daniels  et  al.,  1985).  On  the  other  hand,  the  least  important 
motivation  is  "Learning  partner's  human  resource  management".  The  reason  might  be 
because  human  resource  management  must  be  adapted  to  the  local  situation  and  cannot 
simply  be  copied  from  other  companies  without  any  adjustment.  Thus,  the  motivation  of 
learning  foreign  partner's  human  resource  management  does  not  have  very  high  effect  to 
Taiwanese  companies  comparing  with  other  variables. 
There  are  too  many  variables  in  terms  of  the  motives  for  forming  an  IN.  Therefore, 
factor  analysis  was  used  to  identify  a  smaller  range  of  motives.  Six  motivation  factors 
are  identified  from  26  variables.  They  are  namely,  technological  acquisition,  knowledge 
learning,  risk  sharing,  competitive  strategic  consideration,  resource  complementarity  and 
market  expanding. 
The  relationship  between  resource  contribution  factors  and  sample  characteristics  shows 
that  there  are  some  associations.  The  results  reveal  that  the  technological  acquisition 
motive  and  the  origins  of  foreign  partners  are  associated.  When  international  joint 
ventures  are  formed  to  acquire  technologies,  the  majority  of  foreign  partners  are  from 
American  countries,  followed  by  Asian  countries.  American  countries  are  viewed  as  the 
original  creators  of  high  technology  in  the  world.  As  Taiwan  has  a  very  close 
relationship  with  them,  therefore,  most  local  companies  cooperate  with  American 
enterprises  to  acquire  technologies.  For  Asian  countries,  especially  Japan,  most 
Taiwanese  companies  also  have  close  relationships  with  Japanese  companies  and 
cooperate  with  Japanese  firms  to  obtain  technology.  The  results  reveal  that  there  is  great 
consistency  with  the  background  of  Taiwan's  economic  growth.  In  addition,  there  is  an 
association  between  resource  contribution  factors  and  the  industry  of  the  host  country 
parents.  The  results  indicate  that  companies  in  the  manufacturing  group  have  more 
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incentive  in  technological  acquisition  and  strategic  consideration  motives.  On  the  other 
hand,  companies  in  the  service  group  have  more  incentive  for  market  expansion.  Firms 
in  the  service  group  view  the  primary  benefit  of  forming  an  international  joint  venture  as 
being  market  expansion.  As  a  result,  service  companies  focus  more  on  market  expansion 
motives.  For  firms  in  the  manufacturing  group,  technological  acquisition  is  the  most 
important  issue.  Most  tacit  technology  could  not  be  obtained  from  the  market.  It  needs 
to  be  transferred  through  cooperation  with  other  companies.  Thus,  the  companies  in 
manufacturing  have  a  high  incentive  for  technological  acquisition  and  strategic 
consideration  motives. 
The  relationship  between  each  core  research  dimension  and  the  characteristics  of  the 
sample  has  been  examined  in  the  relevant  sections.  We  only  summarize  the  most 
significant  results  here.  The  size  of  host  country  parents  and  the  percentage  of  board 
member  represented  by  parents,  has  a  powerful  effect  on  the  control  they  exercise  in  a 
joint  venture.  The  percentage  of  board  members  also  has  a  strong  influence  on  the 
equity  share  of  joint  ventures  held  by  the  parents.  The  size  of  host  country  parents  has  a 
significant  influence  on  their  resource  contribution  to  a  joint  venture.  The  results 
illustrate  that  big  companies  have  the  ability  and  willingness  to  contribute  more  resources 
to  their  joint  venture. 
8.2.7  The  Results  of  Hypotheses  Testing 
The  results  of  each  hypothesis  posited  by  this  study  are  summarised  and  described  briefly. 
Hypothesis  Hl:  There  is  a  significantly  positive  relationship  between  the  proportion  of 
ownership  and  the  extent  of  control 
This  study  expects  that  the  proportion  of  equity  shares  would  have  an  impact  on  control 
in  terms  of  mechanisms,  focus  and  the  extent  of  control.  It  successfully  shows  that 
ownership  is  significantly  correlated  with  control.  The  results  reveal  that  ownership  is 
significantly  and  positively  correlated  with  the  control  of  a  N's  operational  decision- 
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making  activities  and  the  appointment  of  the  high-level  manager.  These  findings  are 
consistent  with  most  research  studies  (Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Lin,  1995;  Blodgett,  1991; 
Fagre  and  Wells,  1982;  Stopford  and  Wells,  1972).  Parents  can  gain  more  control  of 
their  joint  venture  through  obtaining  higher  equity  shares  in  such  ventures. 
Hypotheses  H2:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the 
extent  of  control 
While  an  attempt  is  made  to  relate  the  firm's  bargaining  power  to  control  of  operational 
decision-making  activities  and  the  high-level  manager's  appointment  in  a  joint  venture. 
The  results  reveal  that  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  control  is  not 
closely  associated.  Only  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  and  control  has  a 
modest  and  positive  relationship.  The  findings  provide  very  little  support  for  Hypotheses 
Hi,  Bargaining  power  is  normally  involved  in  the  process  of  the  negotiation  procedure 
which  in  turn  affects  the  outcome  of  the  negotiation  process,  but  it  is  not  a  guarantee  to 
direct  influence  on  control.  In  addition,  bargaining  power  cannot  be  measured  easily 
regarding  its  nature.  It  might  indirectly  affect  control.  Therefore,  from  the  results,  most 
factors  of  bargaining  power  do  not  have  a  relationship  with  control. 
Hypotheses  H3:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  the 
proportion  of  ownership. 
The  investigation  of  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  ownership  reveals 
that  the  findings  of  this  study  provide  very  little  support.  A  higher  bargaining  power 
variable  is  expected  to  have  greater  influence  on  equity  shares.  However,  only 
bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  has  a  modest  and  positive  relationship  with 
ownership.  Bargaining  power  has  a  lot  of  involvement  in  the  process  throughout  the 
negotiation  procedure,  and  the  outcome  of  a  negotiation  is  not  always  contingent  on 
ownership.  It  might  be  represented  in  non-capital  contractual  resources.  Thus,  other 
variables  might  be  used  to  better  explain  their  relationship. 
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Hypotheses  H4:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  contribution  of  host 
country  parents  and  the  extent  of  control  they  exercise  in  a  joint  venture 
The  investigation  of  the  relationships  between  resource  contributions  in  terms  of  physical, 
invisible,  financial,  human,  and  organizational  ability  of  host  country  parents  and  their 
control  has  indicated  that  there  are  significant  and  positive  associations.  The  findings  of 
this  study  are  consistent  with  most  prior  research  studies  (Yan  and  Child,  2004;  Chalos 
and  O'Connor,  2004;  Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Mjoen  and  Tallman,  1997;  Child,  Yan  and 
Ku,  1997;  Lin,  1995;  Killing,  1983).  The  greater  the  resource  contribution  of  host 
country  parents  to  joint  ventures,  the  greater  their  control  in  decision-making  activities 
and  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers. 
Hypotheses  H5:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  contribution  of  host 
country  parents  and  their  proportion  of  ownership  in  a  joint  venture 
The  findings  of  this  study  with  respect  to  the  relationship  between  the  resource 
contributions  and  the  ownership  reveal  that  there  appears  to  be  a  significant  and  positive 
association.  The  findings  are  consistent  with  most  other  research  studies  (Pan,  1996;  Lin, 
1995;  Blodgett,  1991;  Gomes-Casseres,  1990;  Harrigan,  1985;  Fagre  and  Wells,  1982). 
The  greater  the  resources  contributed  by  host  country  parents,  the  larger  their  proportion 
of  a  N's  equity  shares. 
Hypotheses  H6:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  resource  contribution  of  host 
country  parents  and  bargaining  power 
This  study  attempts  to  test  the  relationship  if  any,  between  resource  contributions  which 
are  predicted  to  be  associated  with  a  firm's  bargaining  power.  The  findings  confirm  that 
resources  contributed  by  host  country  parents  do  correlate  with  bargaining  power. 
These  findings  are  consistent  with  prior  studies  (Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Yan  and 
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Gray,  1994;  Gomes-Casseres,  1990;  Kobrin,  1987;  Lecraw,  1984;  Fagre  and  Wells, 
1982;  ).  Not  all  resources  have  the  same  direction  of  relationship  with  bargaining  power. 
All  the  resource  contribution  factors  have  a  strong  and  positive  relationship  with  the 
bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability  and  also  have  a  positive  relationship  with  the 
bargaining  power  of  technological  capability,  excepting  financial  resource  contribution 
factor.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  also  negative  correlations  between  resource 
contributions  and  bargaining  power  of  financial  capability.  The  findings  show  that  when 
host  country  parents  contribute  more  non-financial  resources  to  a  joint  venture,  this 
might  result  in  less  influence  in  financially-based  bargaining  power.  This  study  infers  that 
parents  supplying  non-financial  resources  such  as  technological  know-how,  management 
skills,  and  brands  or  patents  can  complement  the  weakness  of  holding  less  equity  shares 
in  joint  ventures.  Especially,  when  these  non-financial  resources  could  not  be  obtained 
from  the  market  and  are  important  to  cooperating  firms,  the  suppliers  of  these  non- 
financial  resources  will  have  more  power  even  though  they  own  less  equity  shares. 
Therefore,  resource  contributions  have  negative  associations  to  the  bargaining  power  of 
financial  capability.  However,  these  findings  overall  confirm  that  resource  contributions 
and  bargaining  power  are  associated. 
Hypotheses  H7:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host  country 
parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their  control  over  a  joint 
venture 
The  investigation  of  the  relationships  between  the  motives  for  forming  an  IN,  in  terms 
of  technological  acquisition,  knowledge  learning,  risk  sharing,  competitive  strategy 
consideration,  resource  complementarity,  market  expansion,  and  control,  indicate  that 
there  are  a  limited  number  of  significant  correlations  between  motivational  factors  and 
control.  The  strategic  consideration  motive  does  have  a  modest  positive  relationship  to 
control.  However,  the  motive  for  market  expansion  has  a  negative  relationship  to 
control.  Resource  complementarity  has  only  a  weak  relationship  with  control  of  a  joint 
venture's  decision-making  activities.  These  findings  reveal  that  the  motives  for  forming 
an  international  joint  venture  have  many  possible  explanations  with  respect  to  different 
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theoretical  perspectives.  Therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  find  direct  associations  between 
motives  and  control. 
Hypotheses  Hg:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motives  of  host  country 
parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their  ownership  in  a 
joint  venture 
The  investigation  of  the  relationships  between  the  motives  of  host  country  parents 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their  ownership,  indicates  that  there  are  no 
significant  associations.  From  the  prior  research,  the  motives  for  forming  a  joint  venture 
have  diverse  explanations  and  they  depend  upon  the  various  objectives  of  the  parents. 
On  the  other  hand,  ownership  is  the  fundamental  and  primary  resource  under 
consideration  when  partners  negotiate  to  form  an  international  joint  venture.  This  study 
infers  that  the  all  parents  have  to  put  capital  into  the  joint  venture  and  so  have  rights  to 
equity  shares,  no  matter  their  motives.  Therefore,  the  findings  of  this  study  reveal  that 
there  is  no  relationship  between  motivation  and  ownership. 
Hypotheses  H9:  There  is  a  significant  relationship  between  the  motivation  of  host  country 
parents  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  their  resource 
contribution  to  a  joint  venture 
The  investigation  of  the  relationship  between  the  motivation  for  forming  international 
joint  ventures  and  the  contribution,  reveals  that  there  are  partial  positive  and  negative 
relationships  between  motivation  factors  and  contribution  factors.  The  motives  for 
forming  international  joint  ventures  and  the  financial  resource  contribution  do  not  have 
any  relationship.  This  study  infers  that  financial  resources  which  encompass  equity 
investments  are  the  basic  resource  to  a  new  venture.  Therefore,  no  matter  the  motives  of 
the  parents,  all  partners  still  have  to  contribute  financial  resources  to  a  joint  venture. 
Beside  the  financial  resource  factor,  strategic  consideration  and  technological  acquisition 
motives  have  positive  and  strong  relationships  with  resource  contribution  factors.  This 
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study  infers  that  host  country  parents  use  joint  ventures  to  improve  their  competitive 
position  within  the  market,  and  see  the  joint  venture  as  a  mode  to  prevent  the  entry  of 
rivals.  In  addition,  the  motives  for  technological  acquisition  and  resource  contributions 
also  have  positive  relationships.  The  findings  also  reveal  that  host  country  parents  who 
have  the  motive  to  acquire  technology  will  contribute  more  resources  to  a  joint  venture. 
These  results  are  consistent  with  most  researcher  studies  (Lin,  1995;  Contractor  and 
Lorange,  1988;  Kogut,  1988,  Vickers,  1985;  Vernon,  1983;  Pennings,  1981). 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  motive  for  market 
expansion  and  resource  contribution  factors.  Based  on  the  Taiwanese  empirical  situation, 
this  study  infers  that  when  host  country  parents  engage  in  an  international  joint  venture 
for  market  expansion,  they  like  to  cooperate  with  foreign  companies  in  order  to  use  the 
foreign  company's  expertise  to  enter  a  new  industry  or  a  new  market.  Thus,  they  only 
invest  capital  and  do  not  intervene  in  any  of  the  other  activities  of  a  joint  venture. 
Overall,  the  motives  of  host  country  parents  in  forming  international  joint  ventures  and 
their  level  of  resource  contribution  are  associated.  The  resources  contributed  by  host 
country  parents  depend  on  their  objectives.  These  findings  provide  evidence  that 
different  motives  for  forming  an  international  joint  venture  affect  the  level  of  resource 
contributions  to  a  joint  venture. 
8.3  The  Limitations  of  this  Study 
There  are  a  number  of  limitations  which  must  be  borne  in  mind  when  interpreting  these 
results. 
The  first  limitation  of  the  current  study  is  data  resources.  It  is  very  difficult  to  collect 
examples  of  international  joint  ventures  from  any  source  other  than  the  government.  As 
mentioned  in  Chapter  5.3.7,  no  list  of  international  joint  venture  organizations  is 
available.  It  is  also  very  difficult  to  successfully  request  access  to  the  government 
database.  Although  the  researcher  has  made  every  effort  to  identify  all  international  joint 
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venture  companies,  there  might  still  be  other  enterprises  left  unidentified.  The  most 
efficient  method  is  to  obtain  permission  to  enter  the  Taiwan  government's  database.  In 
that  way  the  researcher  can  more  accurately  identify  examples  directly,  which  is  crucial 
to  the  success  of  the  research;  in  addition,  it  can  also  save  much  time  and  expense. 
The  second  limitation  is  the  sample  size.  For  a  quantitative  study,  the  size  of  the  sample 
is  very  important  as  this  can  affect  the  statistical  results.  Basically,  the  larger  the  sample 
size,  the  better  this  is  for  data  analysis.  There  are  few  examples  of  international  joint 
ventures  in  Taiwan,  and  one  phenomenon  exists  in  which  one  business  group  invests  in 
numerous  international  joint  venture  companies.  The  unit  of  analysis  in  this  study  is  the 
Taiwanese  parent  company;  therefore,  the  duplicate  Taiwanese  parent  company  must  be 
eliminated.  This  means  that  the  total  sample  size  was  reduced  which  in  turn  affects  the 
results  of  this  empirical  study. 
The  third  limitation  is  the  data  collection  method.  Primary  data  was  collected  by  the 
method  of  mail  questionnaires  dispatched  to  a  single  respondent  in  each  of  the  Taiwanese 
parent  companies.  This  single  respondent  of  each  parent  was  assumed  to  be  competent 
across  a  range  of  dimensions  of  their  international  joint  venture's  activity.  While  the 
researcher  made  telephone  contacts  in  order  to  identify  the  individual  and  his/her  position 
as  the  most  appropriate  president  or  senior  manager  in  the  parent  organization  with 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  international  joint  ventures.  However,  this  did  not  guarantee 
that  the  selected  respondents  had  intimate  familiarity  with  all  the  dimensions  of  the 
international  joint  venture's  activity.  Also,  this  study  relies  only  on  a  single  respondent 
from  the  Taiwanese  parent.  This  type  of  research  could  be  conducted  by  investigating 
both  the  foreign  parent's  perspectives  and  the  joint  venture's  perspectives  to  develop  a 
fuller  understanding  of  all  the  actives  of  international  joint  ventures. 
The  fourth  limitation  is  the  cross-sectional  design  employed  by  this  study.  Cross- 
sectional  studies  are  designed  to  obtain  information  simultaneously  on  a  variable  in 
different  contexts.  They  are  commonly  used  in  social  research  due  to  constraints  of  time 
or  resources.  However,  it  cannot  explain  why  a  correlation  between  variables  exists.  On 
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the  other  hand,  the  longitudinal  study  is  recognized  as  producing  more  fundamental 
insights  than  the  cross-sectional  study.  It  allows  the  researcher  to  examine  processes  of 
change  within  a  social  context.  Therefore,  it  should  be  possible  to  suggest  likely 
explanations  from  an  examination  of  the  process  of  change  and  the  patterns  which 
emerge  (Hussey,  1997).  As  a  result  of  the  characteristics  of  longitudinal  research,  it 
helps  to  identify  the  "cause  and  effect"  relationships  between  variables.  The  creation  of 
an  international  joint  venture  is  the  outcome  of  both  parents'  negotiations  of  an 
agreement  to  cooperate.  This  involves  many  negotiation  processes  and  takes  a  long  time 
to  accomplish.  Therefore,  a  well-planned  longitudinal  study  could  be  conducted  in 
future  research  in  order  to  improve  the  applicability  and  validity  of  the  findings  which  are 
obtained  from  this  cross-sectional  study. 
8.4  Suggestions  for  Further  Research 
A  number  of  suggestions  for  future  research  are  offered  from  this  study. 
Firstly,  if  the  research  difficulty  could  be  overcome,  the  researcher  should  investigate  the 
relationship  between  control  and  its  antecedents  from  both  parent's  perspectives 
simultaneously,  not  only  from  the  Taiwanese  parent's  perspective.  For  example,  the 
degree  of  resource  contribution  from  foreign  partners  was  answered  by  the  host  country 
parents.  If  the  foreign  parents  could  answer  these  questions  directly,  this  would  increase 
confidence  in  the  results.  Therefore,  it  would  be  valuable  to  conduct  an  investigation 
from  the  perspectives  of  both  parents  and  compare  the  findings. 
Secondly,  an  international  joint  venture  includes  at  least  the  host  country  parents,  the 
foreign  parents  and  the  joint  venture  (child).  These  three  organizations  often  play  an 
extremely  different  role  but  have  very  close  relationships.  Therefore,  there  are  at  least 
three  permutations  between  the  organizational  relationships;  (1)  foreign  parents  and  host 
country  parents,  (2)  foreign  parents  and  the  joint  ventures,  and  (3)  host  country  parents 
and  the  joint  ventures.  The  inter-dynamic  relationships  between  foreign  parents  and  their 
joint  ventures,  or  host  country  parents  and  their  joint  ventures  might  affect  the  control 
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that  parent's  could  exercise.  Therefore,  the  issues  in  terms  of  future  research  of 
international  joint  ventures  could  not  only  be  discussed  from  parent's  viewpoint,  but  also 
from  the  perspectives  of  the  joint  venture  itself. 
Thirdly,  when  we  discuss  the  relationship  between  control  and  the  nationality  or  region 
of  the  foreign  parents,  we  find  that  the  nationalities  of  foreign  parents  do  have  influence 
on  the  degree  of  control  that  they  exercise  in  a  joint  venture.  According  to  the  definition 
of  an  international  joint  venture,  it  is  clear  that  the  international  joint  venture  is 
established  by  the  parents  of  different  nationalities.  Parkhe  (1993)  deems  that  the 
differences  in  culture  between  the  participating  firms  in  a  joint  venture  mean  that  they 
have  different  perspectives  on  the  issue  of  control,  which  in  turn  results  in  a  different 
outcome  for  the  research.  Therefore,  how  the  culture  influences  management  control  of 
the  international  joint  venture,  could  be  the  subject  of  comparative  research  in  the  future. 
Fourthly,  from  this  empirical  survey,  we  find  the  phenomenon  that  host  country  parents 
and  foreign  parents  normally  have  good  interaction  which  affects  their  cooperation  in  the 
future.  These  good  relationships  are  built  on  long  term  relationships  which  are  a  benefit 
from  the  past,  and  in  turn  have  influence  on  trust  and  credibility.  Trust  tends  to  have 
influence  on  control  in  a  joint  venture.  Therefore,  it  would  be  worthwhile  to  consider 
placing  the  factor  of  trust  into  the  antecedent  variables  which  would  affect  the  issue  of 
control  in  the  future  research. 
Fifthly,  this  study  only  considers  joint  ventures  set  up  in  Taiwan.  It  could  be  expanded 
to  other  areas  such  as  mainland  China.  Through  cooperation  with  Taiwanese  enterprises, 
advances  into  mainland  China  have  continuously  increased,  therefore  it  would  be  an 
interesting  subject  to  examine  how  host  country  parents  and  foreign  parents  exercise 
control  over  the  joint  venture  which  they  have  set  up  in  mainland  China.  Are  there  any 
differences  with  respect  to  control  because  of  the  joint  venture's  location?  What  factors 
would  have  more  influence  on  control?  Therefore,  the  research  context  could  be 
expanded  to  whichever  country  the  joint  venture  is  located  in. 
349 Chapter  8 
8.5  Summary 
The  above  chapter  presents  the  conclusions  of  this  study.  The  main  findings  derived 
from  this  empirical  survey  are  briefly  described  which  include  the  sample  characteristics 
of  Taiwanese  enterprises,  the  core  research  dimensions  in  terms  of  control,  ownership, 
bargaining  power,  contribution,  and  motivation,  and  the  results  of  testing  hypotheses. 
The  limitations  of  this  study  are  examined  and  attention  should  be  paid  when  interpreting 
the  results.  Some  suggestions  are  provided  for  future  research. 
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Chapter  9 
THEORETICAL  AND  MANAGERIAL  IMPLICATIONS 
9.1  Introduction 
The  aim  of  the  final  chapter  is  to  draw  out  the  recommendations  and  research 
implications  of  this  study.  This  chapter  is  divided  into  three  sections.  The  theoretical 
implications  are  presented  in  section  9.2.  Section  9.3  presents  the  managerial 
implications  of  this  study. 
9.2  Theoretical  Implications 
Drawing  on  theoretical  rationales  for  international  joint  ventures,  this  study  engages  in 
empirical  research  into  Taiwanese  enterprises.  It  attempts  to  further  our  understanding 
of  international  joint  ventures  based  on  the  Newly  Industrialized  Country  context.  This 
study  makes  the  following  contributions  to  the  theoretical  debate  and  also  offers  some 
suggestions  for  all  the  enterprises. 
1.  Providing  an  integrative  framework  of  control  and  its  antecedent  factors  in 
international  joint  ventures 
Parkhe  (1993)  argues  that  the  dimensions  of  joint  ventures  (  motives  for  joint  venture 
formation,  partner  selection/characteristics,  control/conflict,  and  stability  /performance) 
have  previously  been  investigated,  and  cannot  be  viewed  as  separate  phenomena,  but 
need  to  be  re-conceptualized  into  an  integrative  framework.  Therefore,  this  study  has 
attempted  to  follow  his  suggestion  to  integrate  the  relative  dimensions  of  international 
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joint  ventures  into  a  framework  in  order  to  have  a  more  lucid  picture  of  IJVs.  One  of 
this  study  `s  contributions  is  to  provide  a  structure  to  discuss  the  correlations  between 
the  most  important  dimensions  with  regard  to  the  international  joint  venture  and  offers 
associations  between  these  dimensions. 
Control  vs  Ownership 
There  is  substantial  research  literature  to  describe  the  relationship  between  ownership 
and  control;  however,  some  research  results  are  conflicting.  Some  research  indicates 
that  equity  share  is  a  predictor  of  the  overall  control  held  by  IN  partners,  and  of  their 
control  over  strategic  decisions  in  particular  (Child,  2002;  Child  and  Yan;  1999;  Child  et 
al.,  1997;  Yan  and  Gray;  1996;  Lin,  1995;  Meier,  Perez,  and  Woetzel,  1995;  Harrigan 
, 
1986;  Lecraw,  1984;  Killing,  1983  Youseff,  1975).  However,  other  researchers  argue 
that  equity  structure  is  not  equivalent  to  management  control  (Mjoen  and  Tallman 
, 
1997; 
Yan  and  Gray,  1994;  Lecraw,  1984). 
The  results  of  this  study  reveal  that  ownership  is  significantly  and  positively  correlated 
with  the  control  of  a  N's  operational  decision-making  activities  and  the  appointment  of 
the  high-level  manager.  These  findings  are  consistent  with  most  research  studies  (Child, 
2002;  Child  and  Yan;  1999;  Child  et  al.,  1997;  Yan  and  Gray;  1996;  Lin,  1995;  Meier, 
Perez,  and  Woetzel,  1995;  Harrigan,  1986;  Lecraw,  1984;  Killing,  1983;  Youseff,  1975). 
Parents  can  gain  more  control  of  their  joint  venture  through  obtaining  higher  equity 
shares  in  such  ventures. 
Control  vs  Bargaining  power 
Previous  researchers  suggest  that  the  bargaining  power  of  partners  is  a  critical  variable  in 
determining  patterns  of  control  in  joint  ventures  (Blodgett,  1991;  Harrigan  and  Newman, 
1990;  Lecraw,  1984).  The  results  of  this  study  reveal  that  the  relationship  between 
bargaining  power  and  control  is  not  closely  associated.  Only  the  bargaining  power  of 
marketing  capability  and  control  has  a  modest  and  positive  relationship. 
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Bargaining  power  vs  Ownership 
Based  on  his  research  results,  Lecraw  (1984)  deems  that  the  greater  the  country-specific 
advantages  of  the  host  country,  the  greater  its  bargaining  power  and  the  higher  the  level 
of  local  ownership  it  may  gain  for  local  investors.  By  following  the  bargaining  approach, 
Lee  (2004)  indicates  that  the  multinational  corporations  will  hold  an  equity  share  of  IN 
that  is  larger  than  its  relative  bargaining  power,  because  the  MNC  has  a  cost  advantage 
and  superior  technology  over  its  local  partner. 
The  result  of  this  study  reveals  that  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and 
ownership  has  a  very  weak  relationship.  A  higher  bargaining  power  variable  is  expected 
to  have  greater  influence  on  equity  shares.  However,  only  bargaining  power  of 
marketing  capability  has  a  modest  and  positive  relationship  with  ownership.  Bargaining 
power  has  a  lot  of  involvement  in  the  process  throughout  the  negotiation  procedure,  and 
the  outcome  of  a  negotiation  is  not  always  contingent  on  ownership.  It  might  be 
represented  in  non-capital  contractual  resources.  Thus,  other  variables  might  be  used  to 
better  explain  their  relationship. 
Control  vs  Resource  Contributions 
Resource-dependence  theory  suggests  that  the  extent  of  the  stakeholders  control 
depends  on  their  ability  to  provide  the  resources  needed  for  the  international  joint 
venture  to  succeed.  Some  researcher  suggest  that  the  parents  supply  the  necessary 
resources  and  the  most  critical  resources  to  the  joint  venture  will  gain  more  control  over 
the  international  joint  venture  entity  (Chalos  and  O'Connor,  2004;  Child  and  Yan,  1999; 
Mjoen  and  Tallman,  1997;  Lin,  1995).  Yan  and  Child  (2004)  also  claimed  that  the  ability 
of  one  party  to  provide  better  resources  than  its  partners  and/or  control  resources  will 
give  that  party  power  over  the  IN. 
The  result  of  this  study  reveals  that  the  relationship  between  control  and  resource 
contributions  has  significant  and  positive  association.  The  findings  of  this  study  are 
consistent  with  most  prior  research  studies  (Yan  and  Child,  2004;  Chalos  and  O'Connor, 
354 Chapter  9 
2004;  Child  and  Yan,  1999;  Mjoen  and  Tallman,  1997;  Child,  Yan  and  Ku,  1997;  Lin, 
1995;  Killing,  1983).  The  greater  the  resource  contributions  of  host  country  parents 
contribute  to  joint  ventures,  the  greater  control  they  have. 
Resource  Contributions  vs  Ownership 
Blodgett  (1991)  indicates  that  the  type  of  expertise  that  a  company  contributes  to  a  joint 
venture  may  affect  the  amount  of  equity  it  holds.  Pan  (1996)  indicates  that  the  foreign 
partner  who  is  capable  of  contributing  more  to  the  initial  capital  sum  acquires  stronger 
bargaining  power  for  a  higher  equity  share  (Gomes-Casseres,  1990;  Harrigan,  1985; 
Fagre  and  Wells,  1982).  Lin  (1995)  demonstrates  that  the  level  of  contribution  supplied 
by  each  stakeholder  will  affect  their  proportion  of  ownership  in  the  joint  venture. 
The  results  of  this  study  reveal  that  relationships  between  resource  contributions  of  host 
country  parents  and  the  proportion  of  ownership  are  significant  and  positive.  The  more 
resources  contributed  by  host  country  parents,  the  higher  the  proportion  of  N's  equity 
shares  they  possess. 
Resource  Contributions  vs  Bargaining  Power 
Some  researchers  assert  that  the  parents  can  gain  the  bargaining  power  from  their 
commitment  of  various  resources  (Blodgett,  1991;  Harrigan  and  Newman,  1990;  Gomes- 
Casseres,  1987b;  Robinson,  1969).  Lecraw  (1984)  indicates  that  possession  of  a 
proprietary  product  or  technology  may  increase  the  bargaining  position  of  a  multinational 
over  the  host  country.  Kobrin  (1987)  indicates  that  the  sources  of  MNE  bargaining 
power  can  be  derived  from  the  firm-specific  advantages  or  assets. 
The  results  of  this  study  reveal  that  most  resources  contributed  by  host  country  parents 
are  correlated  with  bargaining  power.  All  resource  contribution  factors  have  a  strong 
and  positive  relationship  with  the  bargaining  power  of  marketing  capability,  and  also 
have  positive  relationships  with  the  bargaining  power  of  technological  capability  except 
for  the  financial  resources  contribution.  The  greater  the  resource  contributed  by  host 
country  parents,  the  more  these  resources  influence  bargaining  power  with  regard  to 
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marketing-capability.  However,  not  all  resources  have  the  same  direction  of  relationship 
with  bargaining  power.  The  physical  resources  contribution  has  a  modest  but  negative 
relationship  with  the  bargaining  power  of  management  capability. 
Control  vs  Motivation 
Chalos  and  O'Connor  (2004)  describe  partner  differences  in  their  perceptions  of  control 
mechanisms  as  determined  largely  by  their  respective  motives.  They  found  knowledge 
dependency  and  asset  specific  transaction  costs  to  be  the  determinants  of  controls  to 
varying  degrees  for  each  partner.  Lin  (1995)  indicates  that  a  different  motivation  for 
joint  venture  formation  has  a  different  extent  of  control.  In  her  study,  she  found  that  the 
partner  who  has  the  learning  motivation  would  have  higher  control  in  order  to  learn 
specific  knowledge  from  a  partner. 
The  results  of  this  study  reveal  that  there  are  a  limited  number  of  significant  correlations 
between  motivational  factors  and  the  extent  of  control.  Strategic  consideration 
motivation  has  a  modest  positive  relationship  to  control.  However  market  expansion 
resource  motivation  has  a  negative  relationship  to  control.  Resource  complementarity 
motive  has  a  weak  relationship  with  control  of  a  joint  venture's  decision-making 
activities. 
Motivation  vs  Ownership 
The  parents  of  a  joint  venture  usually  have  different  backgrounds  and  different  business 
operating  strategies  which  affects  the  choice  of  ownership  structure  (Harrigan,  1985; 
Killing,  1983;  ).  Gomes-Casseres  (1989)  address  the  motivation  for  cooperation  as  the 
result  of  a  different  ownership  structure  of  foreign  subsidiaries.  Lin  (1995)  also  reported 
that  different  motivation  for  creating  a  joint  venture  will  affect  the  proportion  of 
ownership  in  such  venture. 
The  results  of  this  study  reveal  there  are  no  significant  associations  between  Taiwanese 
parent's  motivations  for  forming  international  joint  ventures  and  the  proportion  of  equity 
shares. 
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Motivation  vs  Resource  Contributions 
For  a  joint  venture,  the  needed  resources  are  derived  from  different  parent  entities. 
Therefore,  firms  will  cooperate  in  forming  joint  ventures  when  they  can  benefit  from 
another  partner's  knowledge  or  advantages  (Hamel,  1991;  Badaracco,  1991;  Ciborra, 
1991;  Kogut,  1988;  Harrigan,  1984;  Nelson  and  Winter,  1982).  Much  existing  research 
points  out  that  one  of  the  motivations  for  forming  a  joint  venture  is  resource  dependence 
(Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997;  Harrigan,  1985;  Beamish,  1985;  Killing,  1983;  Pfeffer  and 
Salabcik,  1978;  Zald,  1970;  Aiken  and  Hage,  1968;  Thompson,  1967;  Blau,  1964; 
Emerson,  1962;  Selznick,  1948). 
The  results  of  this  study  show  there  are  partial  positive  and  negative  relationships 
between  motivational  factors  and  contribution  factors.  Beside  the  financial  resource 
factor,  strategic  consideration  and  technological  acquisition  motives  have  positive  and 
strong  relationships  with  resource  contribution  factors.  However,  there  are  negative 
relationships  between  the  market  expansion  motive  and  all  resource  contribution  factors 
except  financial  resources  contribution  factor.  The  findings  also  reveal  that  host  country 
parents  who  have  the  motive  to  acquire  technology  will  contribute  more  resources  to  a 
joint  venture.  These  results  are  consistent  with  most  researcher  studies  (Lin,  1995; 
Kogut,  1988,  Contractor  and  Lorange,  1988;  Vickers,  1985;  Vernon,  1983;  Pennings, 
1981). 
Overall,  the  motives  of  host  country  parents  in  forming  international  joint  ventures  and 
their  level  of  resource  contribution  are  associated.  The  resources  contributed  by  host 
country  parents  depend  on  their  objectives.  These  findings  provide  evidence  that 
different  motives  for  forming  an  international  joint  venture  affect  the  level  of  resource 
contributions  to  a  joint  venture. 
In  sum,  this  study's  theoretical  contribution  is  that  these  empirical  findings  derived  from 
this  study  could  provide  some  insightful  understandings  of  the  relationship  between  the 
most  important  dimensions  of  international  joint  ventures. 
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2.  Providing  an  empirical  results  of  international  joint  ventures  in  Newly  Industrialized 
Countries  context 
Most  existing  research  has  focused  on  developed  countries  and  developing  countries; 
however,  there  are  few  studies  examining  Newly  Industrialized  Countries.  This  study 
provides  some  empirical  findings  based  on  the  Newly  Industrialized  Countries  context. 
From  this  empirical  survey,  we  could  find  the  Western  theories  might  not  be  applicable 
to  these  Newly  Industrialized  Countries.  Especially,  when  China  has  such  great  potential 
in  the  marketplace  and  has  attracted  such  large  numbers  of  foreign  investors.  However, 
many  difficulties  have  been  encountered  and  high  failure  rates  have  occurred  among  the 
legions  of  foreign  investors  in  China.  Since  Taiwan  plays  a  vital  and  intermediate  role 
between  Western  countries  and  China,  the  empirical  findings  of  this  study  could  help  to 
explain  why  international  joint  ventures  operate  successfully.  The  findings  of  this  study 
are  important  in  relation  to  providing  useful  insights  into  established  and  viable 
international  joint  ventures  in  a  Newly  Industrialized  Country  context. 
3.  Providing  the  categorization  of  bargaining  power 
There  is  scant  research  highlighting  bargaining  power  in  terms  of  international  joint 
ventures.  The  investigation  of  the  relationship  between  bargaining  power  and  control  are 
difficult  to  compare  from  the  results  of  prior  research  because  in  these  studies  bargaining 
power  has  been  quantified  using  different  variables.  This  study  has  drawn  together  the 
appropriate  variables  from  the  relevant  literature  and  conducted  factor  analysis  to 
identify  the  structure  underpinning  bargaining  power  for  international  joint  ventures. 
The  empirical  survey  of  this  study  identifies  the  source  of  bargaining  power  into  four 
basic  capabilities  which  are  technological  capability,  management  capability,  financial 
capability,  and  marketing  capability.  The  relationships  between  bargaining  power, 
control  and  ownership  are  not  totally  supported  by  this  study;  however,  there  are  partial 
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correlations.  The  findings  could  help  to  create  insights  into  the  relationship  between 
bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control  and  also  provide  an  empirical  base  for  further 
exploration  on  this  issue. 
4.  Providing  the  more  comprehensive  relationships  between  resource  contribution, 
ownership  and  control. 
This  study  has  offered  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  relationships  between 
resource  contribution,  ownership  and  control.  The  findings  of  this  study  provide  some 
theoretical  and  empirical  support  for  the  different  determinants  of  ownership  and  control. 
Previous  research  examined  the  relationship  between  these  factors  by  measuring  the 
individual  resource  supplied  by  parents.  This  study  classifies  the  resource  into  five 
categories  and  the  results  support  the  hypothesis  that  resource  contributions  have  a  high 
correlation  with  control  and  ownership.  Based  on  resource  dependency  theory,  resource 
contributions  not  only  have  an  important  influence  on  the  equity  share  held  by  parents 
but  also  the  focus  and  the  extent  of  control  of  the  parents  in  their  joint  ventures. 
9.3  Managerial  Implications 
The  findings  of  this  study  have  important  implications  for  all  types  of  business  enterprises. 
A  brief  review  of  managerial  recommendations  derived  from  this  study  is  provided. 
1.  The  mechanism,  the  focus,  and  the  extent  of  the  control 
This  study  uses  the  appointment  of  high-level  managers  as  the  mechanism  of  control  and 
the  responsibility  for  nine  types  of  decisions  is  used  to  measure  the  focus  of  control.  The 
extent  of  control  is  classified  into  four  types  namely;  dominant  host  country  parent 
control,  dominant  foreign  parent  control,  shared  management  control,  and  independent 
control. 
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With  regard  to  the  mechanism  of  control,  the  results  of  this  study  reveal  that  Taiwanese 
parents  have  the  strongest  control  over  the  appointment  of  general  managers,  vice 
general  managers  and  financial  managers.  However,  joint  venture  companies  have  more 
autonomy  in  the  appointment  of  managers  in  production,  marketing,  personnel  and 
engineering  sections.  These  results  are  consistent  with  most  research  findings  (Child  and 
Yan,  1999;  Chang,  1996;  Wu,  1994;  Child,  1984;  Schaan,  1983,  Killing,  1983;  Gullander, 
1976;  Rafii,  1978). 
With  regard  to  the  focus  of  control,  the  results  of  this  study  reveal  that  most  of  the 
operating  decisions  are  taken  by  the  joint  venture  management  excepting  the  decisions 
on  capital  expenditure.  These  results  are  also  consistent  with  several  other  research 
findings  which  state  that  effective  control  emphasises  selective  control  over  the  joint 
venture's  activities  (Jaussaud,  Schaaper  and  Zhang,  2001;  Geringer  and  Hebert,  1989; 
Geringer,  1986;  Dunning  and  Cantwell,  1984;  Schaan,  1983). 
With  regard  to  the  extent  of  control,  these  empirical  results  reveal  that  most  joint 
ventures  in  Taiwan  have  a  high  degree  of  autonomy  to  manage  their  business.  These 
results  are  inconsistent  with  some  prior  studies  (Killing,  1983;  Schaan,  1983). 
In  sum,  given  the  above  findings  of  this  study,  the  N's  parents  seem  to  employ  control 
over  particular  areas  rather  than  over  the  whole  range  of  the  N's  activities.  For  example, 
most  decisions  concerning  production  scheduling,  manufacturing  processes,  cost  budgets, 
pricing  policies,  and  quality  standards  are  taken  by  the  joint  venture  management  as  are 
most  appointments  of  production  managers,  marketing  managers,  personnel  managers, 
and  head  engineers.  These  findings  indicate  that  when  decisions  are  closely  connected  to 
local  and  day-to-day  operations,  these  decisions  are  normally  made  by  the  joint  venture 
management.  As  the  N's  managers  have  to  respond  to  local  customers  and  cultures,  it 
follows  that  they  have  more  appropriate  information  and  capabilities  to  deal  with  these 
types  of  decisions.  Therefore,  these  decisions  should  not  be  centralized  in  the  parent 
companies.  When  parent  companies  exercise  control  over  their  joint  ventures,  they  must 
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consider  the  relative  weighting  of  various  factors  and  choose  the  most  important 
activities  in  which  to  exert  control,  in  order  to  achieve  their  objectives. 
On  the  other  side,  for  the  IN's  managers,  if  they  wish  to  have  more  autonomous 
authority  over  operational  decision-making  activities  and  the  appointment  of  high-level 
managers,  they  should  improve  their  resources  and  abilities  relating  to  these  areas.  When 
a  joint  venture  has  stronger  capabilities  and  more  resources  than  its  parents,  or  it 
supports  its  capabilities  and  resource  independently,  the  greater  the  authority  that  is 
gained  from  the  parent  companies.  In  other  words,  a  joint  venture  will  have  high 
autonomy  only  when  it  has  strong  capabilities  to  manage  the  company,  which  in  turn 
gives  the  parent  companies  the  confidence  to  delegate  responsibilities  to  it. 
In  addition,  this  study  finds  the  mean  age  of  a  joint  venture  in  Taiwan  is  14.2  years  and 
over  half  (56.1%)  of  the  joint  ventures  are  more  than  10  years  old  (see  chapter  5.4.4). 
These  findings  indicate  that  in  Taiwan,  joint  ventures  have  long  and  healthy  relationships 
with  their  parent  companies.  Therefore,  this  study  implies  that  the  relationship  between 
the  N's  managers  and  their  parent  companies  can  influence  the  extent  of  control  of 
parent  companies  over  the  joint  venture.  A  close  relationship  between  the  N's 
managers  and  their  parent  companies  can  maximise  trust  between  each  partner,  which  in 
turn  increases  the  opportunities  for  greater  autonomy.  Therefore,  the  N's  managers 
should  actively  build  a  close  and  trusting  relationship  with  their  parent  companies. 
2.  Control  and  its  antecedents 
As  noted  in  Chapter  3  and  Chapter  4,  existing  research  demonstrates  that  the  degree  of 
control  is  an  important  function  in  an  international  joint  venture,  which  is  affected  by 
various  factors  in  terms  of  parent's  contributions,  ownership,  bargaining  power  and  the 
motives  for  forming  the  11V.  The  findings  indicate  that  among  the  four  antecedent 
dimensions,  ownership  and  resource  contributions  demonstrate  significant  strong  and 
positive  linkages  with  the  degree  of  control  (see  the  results  of  hypothesis  Hl  and 
hypothesis  Ha). 
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As  we  discussed  in  Chapter  7.2.1  and  7.2.3,  resource  dependency  theory  asserts  that  the 
extent  of  control  is  affected  by  the  resource  contribution  which  is  needed  for  the 
international  joint  venture  to  succeed  (Chalos  and  O'Connor,  2004;  Child  and  Yan,  1999; 
Mjoen  and  Tallman,  1997;  Lin,  1995;  Killing,  1983).  The  higher  the  proportion  of  equity 
shares  held  by  the  parent  companies  and  the  larger  and  more  significant  their  resource 
contribution,  the  greater  the  degree  of  control  they  exercise  over  the  joint  venture. 
Based  on  both  the  resource  dependency  perspective  and  the  findings  of  this  study,  we 
suggest  that  the  parent  companies  can  increase  their  control  in  their  joint  venture  through 
the  acquisition  of  a  higher  proportion  of  the  N's  equity  shares  or  by  contributing  large 
and/or  significant  resources  to  their  joint  venture.  Moreover,  the  parent  companies  can 
also  protect  their  investment  (equity  shares  and  resource  contributions)  by  exercising 
strict  control  over  the  joint  venture. 
However,  the  two  other  antecedents,  bargaining  power  and  the  motives  for  forming  an 
IN  have  only  tenuous  relationships  with  the  degree  of  control  (see  the  results  of 
hypothesis  H2  and  hypothesis  H7).  This  study  found  that  only  the  bargaining  power  of 
marketing  capability  has  a  modest  and  positive  relationship  with  the  extent  of  control. 
Even  so,  the  adjusted  RZ  was  too  small  to  be  viewed  as  having  any  practical  impact  on 
control  (see  the  analysis  in  Chapter  7.2.2).  Thus,  bargaining  power  might  not  have  a 
linear  relationship  with  control;  therefore,  it  cannot  be  used  to  predict  influence  on  the 
extent  of  control,  although  it  does  have  a  modest  and  positive  relationship  with  control. 
As  we  discussed  in  Chapter  7.2.2,  because  of  the  nature  of  the  concept,  bargaining 
power  cannot  be  measured  easily  and  directly,  and  it  also  has  a  significant  influence  on 
the  process  of  negotiation  procedures.  Previous  research  also  suggests  that  partners  use 
the  power  of  cooperation  to  influence  the  outcome  of  a  negotiation  process  (Brouthers 
and  Bamossy,  1997;  Schelling,  1956;  ),  which  in  turn  affects  the  degree  of  control 
(Lecraw,  1984).  Therefore,  we  suggest  that  parent  companies  increase  their  opportunity 
to  control  the  joint  venture  through  the  process  of  negotiation.  To  assure  the  outcome 
of  negotiation,  the  parent  companies  can  increase  directly  or  indirectly  their  influence  and 
power  over  the  joint  venture. 
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Moreover,  this  study  found  that  there  are  a  limited  number  of  significant  relationships 
between  the  degree  of  control  and  the  motives  for  forming  an  IJV.  The  strategic 
consideration  motive  has  a  modest  and  positive  relationship  with  control;  however,  the 
motive  for  market  expansion  has  a  negative  relationship  with  the  extent  of  control. 
Resource  complementarity  motivation  only  has  a  weak  connection  with  control. 
For  the  motive  of  strategic  consideration,  this  study  found  that  it  is  the  main  concern 
when  Taiwanese  companies  form  a  joint  venture  with  foreign  partners.  This  result  is 
inconsistent  with  Lin's  (1995)  and  Lin's  (1986)  investigations  in  Taiwan.  They  found 
that  the  main  motive  of  Taiwanese  parents  in  forming  a  joint  venture  with  foreign 
partners  is  to  learn  or  acquire  technological  knowledge.  However,  the  findings  of  this 
study  might  reflect  more  the  economic  development  of  Taiwan  and  add  a  new 
explanation  for  the  motivation  of  IJV  formation.  As  noted  in  Chapter  2,  Taiwanese 
companies  acquired  their  foreign  partner's  technologies  to  improve  their  competitive 
abilities  between  1984  and  1994.  As  a  result  of  the  effort  of  the  past  forty  years,  Taiwan 
has  risen  rapidly  to  the  status  of  a  "Newly  Industrialized  Country"  and  becomes  an 
integral  link  in  the  global  high  technology  industry  supply  chain.  Therefore,  the 
motivation  for  forming  an  IJV  will  be  allocated  to  strategic  considerations  since 
Taiwanese  companies  acquire  high-level  technologies  and  the  desire  to  expand  their 
global  markets.  According  to  this  finding,  the  international  joint  venture  is  an  effective 
mode  to  achieve  a  parent  company's  objectives.  We  suggest  that  Taiwanese  enterprises 
can  create  IJVs  to  achieve  their  strategic  objectives. 
In  addition,  the  motives  for  forming  an  international  joint  venture  have  many  possible 
explanations  with  respect  to  the  following  four  theoretical  perspectives;  transaction  cost, 
strategic  behaviour,  resource  dependency,  and  organizational  learning.  Most  prior 
studies  discuss  the  motivation  of  IN  formation  by  using  a  single  theoretical  perspective. 
However,  this  study  found  that  these  four  theoretical  perspectives  all  play  an  important 
role  in  forming  the  IN.  For  host  country  companies,  the  motives  for  forming  an  IN 
might  be  to  acquire  critical  resources  in  order  to  overcome  a  transaction  difficulty 
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(transaction  cost  perspective  and  resource  dependency  perspective),  or  to  achieve  a 
specific  strategic  objective  (strategic  behaviour  perspective),  or  to  benefit  from 
knowledge  learning  (organizational  learning  perspective),  or  include  all  these  motives  at 
the  same  time.  Different  motives  will  result  in  a  different  influence  on  the  extent  of 
control.  Therefore,  we  suggest  that  the  parent  companies  can  employ  various  degrees  of 
control  over  their  joint  ventures  according  to  their  main  motives. 
In  sum,  the  international  joint  venture  offers  multinational  companies  the  ability  to  use 
their  partner's  capabilities  in  achieving  their  objectives.  Given  this  fact,  the  degree  of 
control  is  regarded  as  the  most  important  factor  of  any  business  organization  when  they 
cooperate  with  other  partners.  Therefore,  by  identifying  the  principal  factors  affecting 
the  extent  of  control  that  parents  exercise  over  their  ventures,  parent  companies  can  have 
a  better  understanding  of  the  importance  of  each  individual  factor  and  the  way  in  which  it 
influences  the  degree  of  control.  Moreover,  parent  companies  can  adjust  their 
operational  strategies  and  reconstruct  the  mechanism  of  control.  Redesign  of  the  control 
mechanism,  can  improve  both  partners'  resource  commitments  on  the  one  hand  and  on 
the  other,  can  advance  the  successful  achievement  of  both  partners'  objectives. 
The  government  of  Taiwan  continues  to  demonstrate  its  effort  to  encourage  foreign 
companies  to  cooperate  with  Taiwanese  enterprises.  In  fact,  Taiwanese  enterprises  gain 
significant  benefits  from  cooperation  in  international  joint  ventures.  For  example, 
Taiwanese  companies  are  increasing  their  competitiveness,  advancing  their  technological 
skill  and  knowledge  management  through  such  cooperation.  They  should  continue 
investing  in  international  joint  ventures  and  employ  appropriate  procedures  in  managing 
their  joint  ventures.  At  the  outset,  the  parent  companies  should  set  a  clear  and  definite 
motive  when  they  consider  forming  an  international  joint  venture,  since  this  can  affect 
some  important  issues,  such  as  the  kind  of  resource  contribution  to  the  joint  venture, 
how  many  equity  shares  will  be  allocated  to  each  partner,  what  areas  will  be  under  the 
control  of  the  parents,  and  what  extent  of  control  the  parents  will  exercise  in  their  joint 
venture.  Through  successful  cooperation,  all  partners  can  reach  a  win-win  outcome. 
Companies  which  understand  these  relationships  can  apply  this  knowledge  to  effectively 
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enhance  their  company's  specific  advantage(s).  The  better  the  understanding  of  the 
operation  of  international  joint  ventures,  the  more  success  and  achievement  will  be 
gained. 
Today,  there  are  numerous  challenges  facing  international  joint  ventures  both  in  their 
day-to-day  operations  and  their  strategic  management.  All  the  findings  of  this  study 
provide  numerous  useful  suggestions  and  insights  for  companies  which  are  operating  in 
today's  highly  competitive  marketplace,  especially,  for  Taiwanese  enterprises  to  improve 
their  competitive  capabilities  in  the  global  market. 
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Appendix  I-A:  President  Department  Store 
1.  History  of  President  Department  Store 
President  Department  Store  established  in  Kaohsiung  in  1975,  was  the  largest 
department  store  of  Southeast  Asia  at  that  time.  Its  founder  had  already  established  the 
first  large-scale  domestic  department  store-Dashin  Department  Store  in  1958.  After 
President  Department  Store  was  established,  the  founder  of  this  group  set  up  the 
President  Supermarket  chain.  In  1984,  it  set  up  Talee  Department  Store.  In  addition,  it 
entered  into  the  warehouse  market  in  1991,  and  established  President  Department  Store- 
Hooping  Branch  in  1999.  All  these  developments  show  the  ambition  and  strength  of  the 
President  Enterprise  Group  in  the  past  30  years.  President  Enterprise  Group  has  gained 
the  favorable  terrains  in  Kaohsiung,  it  has  been  the  leader  of  the  south  general 
merchandise  industry  of  Taiwan  all  the  time. 
2.  Develop  the  Motive  and  Methods  of  the  International  Joint-Venture 
Originally,  President  Enterprise  Group  planned  to  set  the  Talee  Department  Store 
holding  a  high  price  market,  which  in  order  to  make  the  clear  distinction  between  the 
President  Department  Store  and  the  Talee  Department  Store.  However,  a  few  years 
later,  the  achievement  of  Talee  Department  Store  was  not  outstanding.  In  addition, 
because  there  are  many  other  general  merchandise  industry  companies  settling  on  the 
potentiality  of  the  high  consumer  market  in  Kaohsiung  area,  they  decided  to  expand  the 
market  in  Kaohsiung  and  set  up  one  branch  after  another.  Among  two  or  three  of  them 
are  the  Japanese  general  merchandise  industry  companies  also  attending  the  battle  of 
Kaohsiung.  Under  the  impact  of  international  competition,  the  achievement  of  the  Talee 
Department  Store  still  does  not  reach  the  original  expectation  of  the  President  Enterprise 
Group.  The  group  has  the  reputation  of  being  conservative  and  the  leader  of  the  group 
is  determined  to  adopt  "a  safe"  strategy.  In  1991,  the  group  decided  to  cooperate  with 
the  Japanese  Isetan  Department  Store. 
_ 
The  original  Talee  Department  Store  changed  its 
title  to  the  Talee-Isetan  Department  Store.  President  Enterprise  Group  occupies  51%  of 
the  equity  shares;  Japanese  side  has  49%  of  the  stock  shares.  Japanese  Isetan  is  famous 
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for  its  fashion  in  Japan,  and  has  a  long  term  relationship  with  the  President  Department 
Store.  The  private  relations  with  the  executives  on  the  senior  level  of  both  sides  are 
quite  good  which  makes  the  Japanese  Isetan  beat  back  another  cooperative-  Japan 
SOGO  Company. 
3.  Management  and  Administration 
The  President  of  President  Department  Store  is  also  the  president  of  Talee-Isetan 
Department  Store.  On  one  hand,  President  Department  Store  hopes  to  depend  on 
Isetan's  management  knowledge;  on  the  other  hand,  to  understand  the  Talee-Isetan 
Department  Store's  daily  operation  activity  by  taking  the  topographical  advantages. 
Hence,  the  Japanese  Isetan  is  in  charge  of  the  major  operations  of  the  Talee-Isetan 
Department  Store.  The  President  has  a  meeting  with  the  general  manager  of  Talee- 
Isetan  Department  Store  regularly  every  two  weeks. 
Since  the  Japanese  Isetain  takes  over  the  management  of  the  department  store,  it  has 
greatly  advanced  in  its  achievements.  The  achievement  grows  up  continuously  that 
shows  the  original  tactics  works  so  as  to  meet  the  group's  expectation  at  first. 
The  table  shows  the  brief  explanation  of  the  Talee-Isetan  Department  Store. 
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Name  ofjoint-venture's  Talee-Isetan  Department  Store 
subsidiary 
Items  of  business  of  the  Department  store  subsidiary 
The  subsidiary  establishes  1991 
time 
General  manager  of  the  Japan 
subsidiary  nationality 
Name  of  the  parent  President  Department  Store  Japanese  Isetan 
company 
Characteristic  of  the  parent 
The  leader  of  general  Large  department  store 
merchandise  group  in  in  Japan 
company  Kaohsiung 
1.  The  performance  of  the  Expand  the  Southeast 
Department  does  not  meet  Asian  market 
Joint-venture's  motive  of 
the  Group's  expectation. 
parent  company 
2.  Face  the  new  competitor 
The  Group  adopts  "with  the 
safe  to  make  safe"  strategy. 
Main  contribution  to  joint-  Equipment  and  building  Management  know-how 
venture's  subsidiary  of  Knowledge  of  the  local  Marketing  knowledge 
parent  company  market 
Hold  the  proportion  in  stock  51  49 
right  of  parent  company 
The  management  to  joint-  President  not  intervene  The  general  manager  is 
venture's  s  subsidiary  of 
subsidiary's  daily  operation  appointed  by  the  Isetan 
parent  company  is  activity,  but  has  a  meeting  company  and  he  is  in 
' 
controlled  with  the  general  manager  charge  of  Talee-Isetan  s 
regularly  every  two  weeks.  main  operation. 
The  parent  companies  of 
both  sides  take  subsidiary  4  3 
directors'  percentage 
Performance  Stand  greatly  in  his  tendency  after  taking  over 
managing,  an  achievement  grows  up  continuously. 
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Appendix  I-B:  COSTCO  Wholesale  Corporation 
1.  History  of  COSTCO 
PRICE  Club  which  is  established  in  Santiago  of  California  in  1976,  is  one  of  the 
COSTCO  Company  predecessors.  It  is  the  first  warehouse  club  for  business  shoppers  in 
the  world.  In  1984,  PRICE  Club  became  the  greatest  warehouse  seller  in  America. 
Another  predecessor  of  COSTCO  Company  is  the  one  which  was  established  as  the 
COSTCO  member  system  wholesaling  firm  in  Seattle  of  Washington  in  1983.  PRICE 
Club  is  located  in  the  Holy  Land  (the  end  of  California),  and  COSTCO  is  in  Seattle, 
Washington  (relatively  close  to  Canada),  the  two  locations  are  in  the  west  coast  of  the 
U.  S,  and  enjoy  good  operating  conditions. 
In  order  to  pursue  better  achievements,  the  Western  companies  adopted  merges  and 
acquisition  strategies  in  1980s.  In  October  1983,  PriceCostco  is  formed  by  merging 
PRICE  Club  and  COSTCO.  It  officially  changed  its  name  from  PriceCostco  to  Costco 
Companies,  Inc.  afterwards,  in  1998.  Due  to  the  merger  of  these  two  companies,  the 
number  of  locations  increased  and  the  operation  was  even  bigger  than  before. 
Furthermore,  the  company  started  to  open  markets  in  Florida  and  gradually  moved 
towards  the  East  of  the  U.  S.  and  the  International  markets.  By  December  2004,  there 
were  449  locations,  over  110,300  full  and  part-time  employees  worldwide,  with  over  43 
million  cardholders  in  8  countries  of  the  world  and  the  average  annual  revenues  reached 
$47.15  billion.  Costco  Companies,  Inc.  presents  one  of  the  largest  international  chains  of 
membership  warehouses.  Table  1  shows  its  worldwide  distributions 
Table  1  Worldwide  Distributions  of  Costco  Company 
Worldwide  Countries  Number  of  Warehouses 
U.  S.  &  Puerto  Rico  333 
Canada  63 
U.  K.  15 
Korea  5 
japan  5 
Taiwan  3 
Mexico  25 
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Source  :  Costco  Wholesale  Corporation  (2005)  (on-line)  Available-  http:  //202.43.196.230 
2.  Motivation  for  entering  Taiwan  Market 
Costco  has  been  in  the  American  market  about  30  years,  and  has  a  solid  foundation  in 
the  market.  However,  due  to  the  warehouse  gradually  tending  towards  maturity  in  the 
North  America  market,  and  in  order  to  pursue  the  persistent  development  of  the 
enterprise,  it  has  increasingly  penetrated  the  overseas  market. 
When  the  company  decides  to  get  into  the  overseas  market,  Asia  is  also  the  target 
market  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  besides  developing  the  middle  South  America  and 
European  market.  Hence,  after  opening  locations  in  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada  and 
Mexico  in  succession,  it  starts  to  plan  getting  into  Asia  in  the  1990s. 
After  a  series  of  political  and  economical  assessments  in  south-east  Asia  countries,  the 
Taiwanese  political  and  economical  environment  is  more  stable  comparison  to  the  other 
south-east  Asia  countries.  Therefore,  the  company  decides  to  open  the  first  Costco 
branch  in  Taiwan. 
3.  Methods  of  entering  Taiwan  Market 
The  Taiwan  government  has  allowed  foreign  investors  to  operate  retail  businesses  since 
1985.  There  are  many  foreign  joint-venture  hypermarkets  in  operation  in  Taiwan  in  a 
short  period  of  time,  for  instance,  Makro,  Carrefour  and  so  forth.  Costco  and  Talee 
Investment  Ltd.  which  is  one  of  the  companies  of  the  President  Enterprise  Group  started 
a  joint-venture  in  Taiwan.  The  proportion  of  equity  share  of  the  parent  company  is  55% 
and  45%.  Costco  is  in  charge  of  operating  the  business  and  management.  The  first 
Taiwan  Costco  opens  in  Kaohsiung  on  January  18th  in  1997.  Nei-Hu  Costco  in  the 
North  of  Taiwan  is  established  in  July  1999.  Shih-chih  Costco  in  the  North  of  Taiwan 
starts  in  January  2000.  In  addition,  the  fourth  locations  in  Jhong-He  was  scheduled  to 
open  in  the  beginning  of  the  year  2005. 
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4.  Human  Resources  Management 
In  the  first  stage  of  organizing  and  operating  the  business,  American  Costco  dispatches 
employees  to  Taiwan  and  teaches  the  operational  knowledge,  experience,  techniques  and 
the  methods  of  food  production.  These  employees  leave  after  Taiwan  Costco  employees 
learn  all  the  techniques.  Since  the  first  Taiwan  Costco  in  Kaohsiung  had  been  opened  for 
more  than  10  years,  the  employees  who  were  sent  by  American  Costco  had  gone  home. 
Currently  there  is  three  high  levels  of  administrators  working  in  Taiwan,  which  occupies, 
small  amount  of  staff  ratio  in  Taiwan.  According  to  the  above,  Costco  adopts  a  local 
policy,  but  it  still  tends  to  send  higher  level  of  management  from  the  Costco  Home 
Company. 
Name  of  joint-venture's 
COSTCO  Wholesale  Corporation  Subsidiary 
Subsidiary  Selling  Items  wholesale 
The  subsidiary  established  time  1995 
Nationality  of  the  general  United  States 
manager  of  the  subsidiary 
Name  of  the  parent  company  Talee  Investment  Ltd.  American  COSTCO  Wholesale 
Corporation 
Characteristic  of  the  parent  The  largest  department  store  A  big  American  wholesale 
company  hsiung  company 
Joint-venture's  motive  of  Expand  business  field  Expand  Asia  market 
parent  company 
Main  contribution  to  the  joint- 
'  Capital  Management  know-how 
venture  s  subsidiary  of  parent  Local  marketing  knowledge  Marketing  knowledge 
company 
Hole  the  proportion  in  stock  45  55 
right  of  parent  company 
The  management  to  the  joint-  The  investor  does  not  intervene  The  general  manager  is  sent  by 
venture's  subsidiary  of  parent  the  subsidiary's  daily  operation  the  home  company  and  he  is  in 
company  is  controlled  activity,  but  have  a  meeting  charge  of  Costco's  main 
with  the  general  manager  operation. 
regularly 
The  parent  companies  of  both 
sides  take  subsidiary  directors'  5  5 
percentage 
Achievement  Since  enters  in  Taiwan,  the  achievement  grows  up  continuously 
and  expands  locations  continually 
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Appendix  11-A:  English  Questionnaire  A 
Bargaining  Power,  Ownership  and  Control 
of  International  Joint  Venture  in  Taiwan 
Dear  Sir/  Madam, 
I  am  a  doctoral  research  student  in  the  Department  of  Management  Studies  at 
University  of  Glasgow  in  U.  K.  and  a  lecturer  at  the  Department  of  Business 
Administration  -  National  Kaohsiung  University  of  Applied  Sciences  in  Taiwan  as 
well.  For  my  research  I  am  undertaking  a  study  on  the  following  topic:,  `Bargaining 
Power,  Ownership  and  Control  of  International  Joint  Ventures  in  Taiwan'. 
According  to  the  Directory  of  Foreigner  Investing  in  Taiwan  it  appears  your  company 
is  an  institute  invested  by  foreign  enterprises.  This  objective  of  this  questionnaire  is 
to  identify  the  firm  of  joint  venture  and  the  Taiwanese  parent  of  the  joint  venture. 
Responses  will  be  used  strictly  for  the  purpose  of  academic  research  and  not  be  for 
the  public  domain.  All  information  is  strictly  confidential.  You  may  return  your 
completed  questionnaire  in  the  prepaid  envelope  provided.  Thank  you  for  taking  time 
out  of  your  busy  schedule  to  assist  is  this. 
Yours  Sincerely, 
The  University  of  Glasgow 
Department  of  Management  studies 
Supervisor:  Doctor  Michael  Mayer 
Professor  Luiz  Moutinho 
Postgraduate  student  :  Miss  Min-Li  Yang 
Contact  telephone:  (07)  3814526  ext  7305 
Fax  number  :  (07)  3961245 
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A.  On  what  basis  was  the  company  formed?  Please  tick  one. 
Q  1.  Sole  trader 
Q  2.  Wholly  owned  subsidiary 
Q  3.  Overseas  branch 
Q  4.  Joint  venture  with  other  non  Taiwanese  partners 
Q  5.  Joint  venture  with  Taiwanese  partners 
If  you  tick  Boxes  `1-4',  please  do  not  continue  this  questionnaire.  Thank  you  very 
much  for  your  cooperation,  there  is  no  need  to  return  this  form. 
If  you  tick  Box  `5' 
,  please  continue. 
B.  Please  list  the  domestic  parent  company's  name,  address  and  telephone  number. 
Starting  with  the  most  important  parent  companies. 
Name: 
Address  : 
Telephone: 
Name: 
Address  : 
Telephone: 
Name: 
Address  : 
Telephone: 
Please  return  your  completed  questionnaire  in  the  prepaid  envelope  provided 
Thank  you  very  much  for  your  time  and  co-operation 
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Appendix  11-B:  English  Questionnaire  B 
Bargaining  Power,  Ownership  and  Control 
of  International  Joint  Ventures  in  Taiwan 
Dear  Director  General, 
I  am  a  doctoral  research  student  in  the  Department  of  Management  Studies  at  the 
University  of  Glasgow  in  the  U.  K.  and  also  a  lecturer  in  the  Department  of  Business 
Administration  -  National  Kaohsiung  University  of  Applied  Sciences  in  Taiwan.  For 
my  research  I  am  undertaking  a  study  on  the  following  topic:  `Bargaining  Power, 
Ownership  and  Control  of  International  Joint  Venture  in  Taiwan'.  Hopefully,  with 
your  assistance,  this  study  could  provide  insights  into  the  local  joint  venture  relation 
affect  bargaining  power,  ownership  and  control  when  Taiwanese  companies  create 
joint  ventures  with  foreign  firms,  and  the  results  could  provide  reference  for  the 
companies. 
Our  data  sources  show  that  your  company  is  the  Taiwanese  parent  of  an  international 
joint  venture  and  has  high  a  profile  in  the  industry.  Your  opinions  will  have  a  crucial 
influence  on  this  study.  It  is  requested  that  the  senior  manager  who  has  a  good 
knowledge  of  the  background  of  the  joint  venture  complete  this  questionnaire.  This 
questionnaire  is  for  the  purpose  of  academic  research  only.  Responses  will  be  used 
strictly  for  entire  analysis  and  will  not  be  made  public.  All  information  is  strictly 
confidential.  Please  return  your  completed  questionnaire  in  the  prepaid  envelope 
provided.  Thank  you  for  taking  time  to  assist  in  this  study. 
Yours  Sincerely, 
The  University  of  Glasgow 
Department  of  Management  studies 
Supervisor:  Doctor  Michael  Mayer 
Professor  Luiz  Moutinho 
Postgraduate  student  :  Miss  Min-Li  Yang 
Contact  telephone:  (07)  3814526  ext  7305 
Fax  number  :  (07)  3961245 
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Instructions: 
1.  For  an  international  joint  venture,  we  describe  the  partners  involved  as: 
Taiwanese  Parent 
Taiwanese  investment  firms 
as  `Your  Company' 
(for  example:  President  Group.  ) 
Foreign  Parent 
Foreign  investment  firms 
as  `Foreign  Parent' 
(for  example:  French's 
Carrefour  Co.  ) 
New  firm  invested  by  both  o 
parent  as  `joint  venture' 
(for  example:  Taiwan 
Carrefour  Co.  ) 
Child  (Joint  venture) 
2.  If  foreign  investment  firms  are  comprised  of  more  than  two  companies,  Please  choose 
the  foreign  partner  who  has  the  highest  percentage  shareholding  as  reference. 
3.  If  there  are  more  than  two  cases  of  international  joint  venture,  please  base  your 
comments  on  the  case  is  the  most  important  and  which  you  have  deep  knowledge. 
4.  The  senior  managers  include  the  general  manager  and  other  managers  who  have 
sound  knowledge  of  the  background  of  the  joint  venture. 
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Section  A:  The  motivation  for  International  Joint  Venture  Formation 
As  far  as  your  company  is  concerned,  how  important  are  the  following  motives  for 
forming  the  Joint  Venture?  On  a  scale  between  1  to  5,  please  tick  the  appropriate  number 
according  to  their  importance. 
Extremely  Not  at  all 
important  important 
54321 
Extremely  Not  at  all 
important  important 
54321 
1.  Sharing  a  large  sum  of  fixed  costs 
2.  Spreading  the  financial  risk 
3.  Reducing  the  risk  caused  by  environment  uncertainty 
4.  Sharing  the  risk  of  business  cycle  l1 
5.  Expanding  the  market  and  entering  new  markets 
6.  Extending  the  range  of  products  and  services 
7.  Reducing  competition 
8.  Acquiring  the  economies  of  scale  of  production  and  sale 
9.  Conforming  to  Government  policy  I 
10.  Maintaining  or  improving  the  competitive  position 
11.  Facilitating  diversified  development  I1 
12.  Learning  international  business  knowledge 
13.  Learning  marketing  knowledge 
14.  Improving  new  product  design  ability  from  partner 
15.  Learning  management  knowledge  It 
16.  Learning  partner's  human  resource  management 
17.  Learning  partner's  manufacturing  technology 
18.  Acquiring  low  cost  materials  and  components  Il 
19.  Acquiring  sufficient  capital 
20.  Sharing  partner's  resource 
21.  Acquiring  partner's  brands  or  patents 
22.  Acquiring  partner's  manufacturing  equipment  and  technology 
23.  Improving  ability  on  developing  new  technology 
24.  Acquiring  technology 
25.  Technology  transfer  iiii 
26.  Shortening  the  time  from  the  product  development  to  market  entry  it 
27.  other,  please  specify  iiii 
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Section  B:  The  degree  of  contribution  by  each  partner  to  the  Joint 
Venture 
What  degree  of  resource  has  been  contributed  by  each  partner  to  the  joint  ventures? 
Please  tick  one  according  to  the  degree  of  contribution.  Please  indicate  on  a  scale  of  one 
to  five  your  assessment  of  the  resource  contribution  of  each  partner. 
Extremely  high  High  Average  Low  Very  low  None 
543210 
Your  company  Foreign  partner 
Extremely  Very 
Nie 
Extremely  Very 
high  low  high 
543210543210 
1.  Financial  resources 
2.  Key  components  and  raw  material 
3.  Land,  machinery,  equipment 
4.  Providing  high-level  expertise 
5.  Marketing  and  operation  ability 
6.  Marketing  channel 
7.  Technology  or  R&D  resources 
8.  Access  to  external  capital 
9.  Expertise  of  employees 
10.  Access  to  public  relation  with 
local  government 
11.  Access  to  environmental  knowledge 
12.  Sharing  brands  or  patent 
13.  Sharing  Know-how 
14.  Sharing  the  knowledge  of  management 
15.  Other,  please  specify 
16.  In  general,  what  degree  is  contributed  by 
each  parent? 
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Section  C:  Factors  affecting  the  Bargaining  Power 
To  what  degree  do  the  following  factors  affect  the  bargaining  power?  Please  tick  each 
one  according  to  their  degree  of  influence. 
Extremely 
strong  Strong  Average  Weak  Very  weak 
54321 
Extremely 
strong 
1.  Technology  ability 
2.  Innovative  ability 
3.  Access  to  export  markets 
4.  Investment  amount 
5.  Access  to  financial  resources 
6.  Management  experience 
7.  Access  to  sale  distribution  channel 
8.  The  influence  of  host  government 
9.  Knowledge  of  the  local  markets 
10.  The  level  of  equity  shares 
11.  Other,  please  specify 
Very  weak 
54321 
iiii 
i 
iiii 
iiii 
1 
Section  D:  Operational  Decision  Making  for  the  Joint  Venture 
The  following  decisions  with  regard  to  the  N  are  taken  by  whom?  Please  tick  the 
partner/s  taking  the  major  responsibility  for  these  decisions. 
*  N(  joint  venture)  means  the  new  firm  invested  by  your  company  and  foreign  partner. 
Your  Foreign  JV  Your  Co.  Your  Foreign  Your  Co.  Not 
company  Partner  alone  &  foreign  company.  Partner  &  foreign  applicable 
alone  alone  partner  &  JV  &  iv  partner  & 
iv 
1.  Product  design 
2.  Pricing  policy 
3.  Production  scheduling 
4.  Manufacturing  process 
5.  Quality  standards 
6.  Cost  budgeting 
7.  Sales  targets 
_  8.  Capital  expenditures 
_  9.  Other,  please  specify 
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Section  E:  High  level  management  Appointment 
Who  appoints  the  management  in  the  following  areas  for  the  Joint  Venture?  Please  tick 
the  partner/s  responsible  for  the  appointment  of  the  following  positions. 
*  JV(joint  venture)  means  the  new  firm  invested  by  your  company  and  foreign  partner. 
Your  Foreign  N  Your  Co.  Your  Foreign  Your  Co.  Not 
company  Partner  alone  &  foreign  company.  Partner  &  foreign  applicable 
alone  alone  partner  &N&N  partner  & 
N 
1.  General  manager 
2.  Vice  general  manager 
3.  Production  manager 
4.  Marketing  manager 
5.  Financial  manager 
6.  Personnel  manager 
7.  R&D  manager 
8.  Head  engineer 
9.  Other,  please  specify 
Section  F:  Company's  Background 
1.  When  was  your  company  founded?  Year 
2.  The  number  of  employee: 
3.  Current  investment  capital:  NT$  million 
4.  The  average  business  volume  last  three  years:  NT$  million 
5.  Country  of  incorporation  of  your  foreign  partner 
(1)  Japan  (2)  America  (3)  United  Kingdom 
(4)  Germany  (5)  France  (6)  Canada 
(7)  South  Korea  (8)  Hong  Kong  (9) Others,  please  specify 
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6.  What  percentage  shareholding  do  your  company  and  the  foreign  partner  hold  for  the 
joint  venture? 
(1)Your  company: 
(2)Foreign  partner: 
7.  The  number  of  the  N's  board  members  represented  by  your  company? 
(1)  The  total  number  of  board  member  in  the  joint  venture: 
(2)  The  number  of  seats  on  the  board  occupied  by  your  company: 
8.  What  is  the  nationality  of  N's  general  manager? 
9.  What  is  the  major  business  activity  of  your  company? 
(1)  Mining  (2)  Food 
(3)  Plastics  (4)  Textiles 
(5)  Machinery  /  Equipment  (6)  Electrical  Equipment/Cable 
(7)  Chemicals  (8)  Glass/Ceramics 
(9)  Paper  Product  &  Printing  (10)  Steel 
(11)  Rubber  Products  (12)  Automobiles 
(13)  Banking  &  Insurance  (14)  Trade/General  Merchandise 
(15)  Electronic  (16)  Construction 
(17)  Transportation  (18)  Tourism 
(19)  Others, 
Thank  you  very  much  for  your  assistance. 
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Appendix  111-A:  Chinese  Questionnaire  A 
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